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SUMMARY 
This thesis investigates both substantive and procedural issues pertaining to allegations of 
crimes committed by UN peacekeepers in three African countries, Somalia, Burundi, and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. Under the current UN Model Status-of-Forces Agreements, 
criminal jurisdiction over peacekeepers rests with their sending States. However, although the 
UN has no criminal jurisdiction, it has been the Office of Internal Oversight Services that has 
conducted investigations. It is argued that every Status of Force Agreement and every 
Memorandum of Understanding should contain specific clauses obligating Troop-
Contributing Countries to prosecute and the UN to follow-up.  
If rape, murder, assault, and any other crimes by UN peacekeepers go unpunished, the 
message sent to the victims is that peacekeepers are above the law. Rape is the most 
commonly committed crime by peacekeepers, but is usually considered as an isolated act. The 
procedural issue of prosecuting peacekeepers is investigated in order to establish whether 
troops can be caught under the ambits of the criminal law of the Host State to hold UN troops 
criminally accountable for their acts. The laws relative to the elements of each crime and the 
possible available defences under the three Host States, and the criminal law of South Africa 
as a Troop-Contributing Country, are discussed. The apparent lack of prosecution is 
investigated and existing cases of prosecution discussed. Alternatives to the unwillingness by 
States with criminal jurisdiction under the Status of Forces Agreement or under the 
Memorandum of Understanding are considered. Considering the current rules related to 
crimes committed by peacekeepers, the argument put forward is that crimes by peacekeepers 
must be dealt with completely and transparently though a Convention aiming at barring 
Troop-Contributing Countries who do not meet their obligations under international law from 
participating in future operations of peace.  
This thesis, furthermore, suggests a tripartite court mechanism to fill the lacunae in the law 
relating to the prosecution of peacekeepers. It considers the issues of reserving jurisdiction 
over peacekeepers to the Troop-Contributing Countries which are reluctant to prosecute 
repatriated alleged perpetrators. The victims’ importance in criminal proceedings and their 
their right to a remedy are highlighted. 
  
VI 
 
 
Key words: Crimes by peacekeepers, accountability of peace operation personnel, 
jurisdiction over crimes, domestic law, international law, status-of-forces 
agreements, Memorandum of Understanding, investigation, Host State, Troop-
Contributing Country, tripartite on-site court, sexual crimes, war crimes, draft 
convention, prosecutions, state liability. 
  
  
VII 
 
 
ABBREVIATIONS-ACRONYMS: GLOSSARY 
 
 
Except for GC AP, HS and MDMSA as used below, which have been created by the author, 
all the abbreviations-acronyms are recognized as such in academic and legal publications. 
AI:   Amnesty International. 
AJIL:    The American Journal of International Law. 
AMIB:   African Mission in Burundi. 
ASIL:    American Society of International Law. 
BCE:   Before Common Era. 
CAT (UNCAT):  UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment.  
CCI: Canada Commission of Inquiry. 
CNDP:  National Council for the Defence of the People (Conseil National pour 
la Défense de la Population). 
CRC:    Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
DCAF:    Democratic Control of Armed Forces.  
DPKO:   Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO). 
DRC:   Democratic Republic of Congo. 
EJIL:   European Journal of International Law. 
Elis.:  Elisabethville (currently Lubumbashi). 
Eq.:  Equateur. 
EU:    European Union. 
FIDH:  Federation International des Droits de l’Homme (International 
Federation for Human Rights). 
GC AP:   Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol(s). 
HHI:  Harvard Humanitarian Initiative. 
HS:  Host State (the state in which a UN operation is deployed or 
established). 
ICC:   International Criminal Court. 
ICCPR:  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
  
VIII 
 
 
ICJ:   International Court of Justice. 
ICLQ:    The International and Comparative Law Quarterly. 
ICRC:    International Committee of the Red Cross. 
ICTR:    International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. 
ICTY:    International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. 
IDP:   Internally Displaced People. 
IDP/SAIIA: Institute for Defence Policy/South African Institute for International 
Affairs. 
IJRL: International Journal of Refugee Law. 
IHL:    International Humanitarian Law. 
ILC:    International Law Commission. 
ILSA:   International Law Student Association. 
IMT:    International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. 
IMTFE:   International Military Tribunal of the Far East. 
I
re
 inst. :  Tribunal de première instance. 
IRCT:    International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims.  
IRRC:   International Review of the Red Cross.  
ISS:   Institute for Security Studies. 
JICJ:    Journal of International Criminal Justice. 
JIL:   Journal of International Law. 
J.T.O. :  Journal des tribunaux d’outre mer. 
Jur. Col.:  Revue de doctrine et jurisprudence coloniale.  
Jur. Etat :  Jurisprudence de l’Etat indépendant du Congo. 
Kas. :    Kasai. 
Léo. :   Léopoldville (currently Kinshasa). 
LGDJ:   Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence. 
MDMSA:   Military Discipline Supplementary Measures Act (South Africa). 
MONUC:  UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(Mission de l’Organisation des Nations-Unies au Congo) 
  
IX 
 
 
MONUSCO:  UN Organization Mission for the Stabilization of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (Mission des Nations-Unies pour la Stabilisation du 
Congo) 
MOU:   Memorandum of Understanding. 
NATO:   North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
NGO:    Non-Governmental Organisation. 
NUPI:   Norsk Utenriskpolitik Institutt. 
ONUB:  UN Operation in Burundi (Opération des Nations-Unies au Burundi).  
ONUC:   UN Operation in the Congo (Opération des Nations-Unies au Congo). 
OUP:   Oxford University Press. 
PCIJ:   Permanent Court for International Justice. 
RJCB:   Revue Juridique du Congo-belge. 
RUSI:  Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies. 
SACJ:    South African Journal of Criminal Justice. 
SALJ:   South African Law Journal. 
SANDF:  South African National Defence Force. 
SAPS:   South African Police Services. 
SEA:   Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. 
SOFA:   Status-of-Forces Agreement. 
SRSG:   Special Representative of the Secretary-General (UN). 
Stan. :    Stanleyville (Kisangani). 
TCC:  Troop-Contributing Country (a state who has contributed personnel to a 
UN peace operation). It is also called sending state. The phrase sending 
state or TCC are used interchangeably. 
TOAELP:  Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher. 
TSAR:  Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (Journal of South African Law). 
UDHR:   Universal Declaration on Human Rights. 
UK:    The United Kingdom. 
ULPGL:   Université Libre des Pays des Grands Lacs. 
UN:   The United Nations. 
  
X 
 
 
UNGA:   UN General Assembly. 
UNHCR:   United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 
UNITAF:   Unified Task Force. 
UNODC:  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 
UNOIOS:   UN Office of Internal Oversight Services. 
UNOSOM:   UN Operation in Somalia. 
UNSG:   UN Secretary General. 
UNTS:   United Nations Treaty Series. 
US:    The United States (of America). 
UCIHL:   University Centre for International Humanitarian Law.  
  
  
XI 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
CONTEXTUAL STUDY OF CRIMES COMMITTED BY PEACEKEEPERS ......................1 
1.1 Problem background: Context of deployment of peacekeepers in Africa........................1 
1.2 Problem statement .........................................................................................................8 
1.3 Conceptualisation and scope of the thesis ............................................................... 11 
1.3.1 The concept of ‘crime’ .......................................................................................... 11 
1.3.2 Peacekeepers - Peacekeeping ................................................................................ 13 
1.3.3 UN mission of peace or peace operations .............................................................. 15 
1.4 Aim of the research ..................................................................................................... 17 
1.5 Method of research ...................................................................................................... 20 
1.6 Delineation and limitation of study .............................................................................. 21 
1.7 Structure of research.................................................................................................... 23 
 
CHAPTER II 
CRIMES BY PEACEKEEPERS IN THE HOST STATE ..................................................... 26 
2.1 Introduction................................................................................................................. 26 
2.2 Account of allegations of crimes by peacekeepers in Somalia, Burundi, and the DRC . 27 
2.2.2 Incidents reported in Burundi ................................................................................ 29 
2.2.3 Incidents reported in the DR Congo ...................................................................... 31 
2.2.4 Synopsis of the crimes allegedly committed by peacekeepers ............................... 36 
2.3 The law of the Host State with respect to the alleged crimes ........................................ 37 
2.3.1 Somali law ............................................................................................................ 37 
2.3.1.1 Rape ............................................................................................................... 37 
2.3.1.2 Other sexual acts and sexual offences involving children ................................ 44 
2.3.1.3 Murder ........................................................................................................... 45 
2.3.1.4 Assault ........................................................................................................... 52 
2.3.1.5 Synopsis of the findings on Somali criminal law ............................................ 55 
2.3.2 Burundian law ...................................................................................................... 55 
2.3.2.1 Rape ............................................................................................................... 56 
2.3.2.2 Other sexual acts and sexual offences involving children ................................ 60 
  
XII 
 
 
2.3.2.3 Murder ........................................................................................................... 61 
2.3.2.4 Assault ........................................................................................................... 63 
2.3.2.5 Synopsis of the findings on Burundian Criminal Law ..................................... 65 
2.3.3 DR Congolese law ................................................................................................ 66 
2.3.3.1 Rape ............................................................................................................... 66 
2.3.3.2 Other sexual acts and offences involving children .......................................... 71 
2.3.3.3 Murder ........................................................................................................... 74 
2.3.3.4 Assault ........................................................................................................... 78 
2.3.3.5 Synopsis of the findings on DR Congolese Criminal Law ............................... 81 
2.4 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 81 
 
CHAPTER III 
PEACEKEEPERS AND THE DOMESTIC CRIMINAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA AS A 
TROOP-CONTRIBUTING COUNTRY............................................................................... 85 
3.1 Introduction................................................................................................................. 85 
3.2 Law of South Africa as a Troop-Contributing Country ................................................ 86 
3.2.1 Rape ..................................................................................................................... 87 
3.2.2 Other sexual act and sexual offences involving children ........................................ 98 
3.2.3 Murder ................................................................................................................ 103 
3.2.4 Assault ................................................................................................................ 107 
3.2.5 Synopsis of the findings on South African criminal law as a TCC ....................... 109 
3.3 State liability for failure to prosecute the crimes of peacekeepers .............................. 110 
3.3.1 Vicarious liability of the State for crimes committed by peacekeepers ................ 111 
3.3.2 State liability for failure to protect ...................................................................... 118 
3.3.2.1 Minister van Polisie v Ewels (1975) 3 SA 590 (A) ........................................ 118 
3.3.2.2 Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden (2002) 6 SA 431 (SCA).
 ................................................................................................................................ 119 
3.3.2.3 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2001 (4) SA 938 
(CC)......................................................................................................................... 121 
3.3.2.4 K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC)............................ 122 
3.3.2.5 The relevance of State liability cases to peacekeeping forces (if any) ............ 125 
3.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 128 
  
XIII 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
THE CRIMES COMMITTED BY PEACEKEEPERS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW .............................................................................. 130 
4.1 Introduction............................................................................................................... 130 
4.2 The core international crimes categories .................................................................... 131 
4.2.1 Definition of the core international crimes .......................................................... 131 
4.2.1.1 Genocide ...................................................................................................... 132 
4.2.1.2 Crimes against humanity ............................................................................ 136 
4.2.1.3 War crimes ................................................................................................... 142 
4.3. Alleged specific crimes committed by peacekeepers under international law ............ 152 
4.3.1 Rape, prostitution, and sexual offences involving children .................................. 152 
4.3.2 Murder ................................................................................................................ 155 
4.3.3 Causing serious injury to body or health: torture and assaults .............................. 156 
4.4 Issue of immunity of UN peace operations personnel ................................................ 158 
4.4.1 Rationale of immunities in general ...................................................................... 158 
4.4.2 Scope of peace operations personnel immunity .............................................. 159 
4.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 163 
 
CHAPTER V 
THE LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY RELATED TO PROBLEMS WITH CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATION ............................................................................................................. 165 
5.1 Introduction............................................................................................................... 165 
5.2 The investigative authority over crimes committed by peacekeepers ......................... 167 
5.2.1 Investigation by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) ................ 167 
5.2.1.1. The OIOS is not a law enforcement agency ................................................. 169 
5.2.1.2. Investigation needs UN personnel cooperation ............................................ 171 
5.2.1.3. OIOS Investigation needs Contingent Commander Cooperation .................. 173 
5.2.2 Investigation by organs of the Troop-Contributing Country ................................ 174 
5.2.2.1. Canada ........................................................................................................ 177 
5.2.2.2. Belgium ...................................................................................................... 186 
5.2.2.3. South Africa ................................................................................................ 188 
5.2.2.4.1 Recall of extra-territoriality issues .......................................................... 189 
  
XIV 
 
 
5.2.2.4.2 Investigation of the allegations against members of SANDF .................. 190 
5.2.3 Investigation by Organs of the Host State ........................................................... 196 
5.2.4 Investigation by a State other than the Host State ................................................ 200 
5.2.5 Cooperation between the investigative authority and the Host State .................... 201 
5.3 The purpose and period of a criminal investigation .................................................... 203 
5.3.1 Victims’ involvement in investigation ................................................................. 204 
5.3.2. TCC investigation for court proceedings in home country .................................. 207 
5.3.3. Investigation by the TCC towards court proceedings onsite ............................... 208 
5.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 210 
 
CHAPTER VI 
JURISDICTION OVER CRIMES COMMITTED BY PEACEKEEPERS .......................... 214 
6.1 Introduction............................................................................................................... 214 
6.2. Exclusive jurisdiction of the TCC ............................................................................. 215 
6.3. Residual criminal jurisdiction of the Territorial State (Host State) ............................ 217 
6.4. Residual criminal jurisdiction of a third State ........................................................... 218 
6.5. The International Criminal Court and Tribunals’ jurisdiction .................................... 220 
6.6. Some prosecutions of crimes by peacekeepers: TCCs ............................................... 222 
6.6.1 Canada .......................................................................................................... 222 
6.6.1.1 R. v. Brocklebank (Appeal) [1996] C.M.A.J. No. 4 ....................................... 223 
6.6.1.1.1 The facts of the case ............................................................................... 223 
6.6.1.1.2 The Court-martial of Appeal decision .................................................... 224 
6.6.1.1.3 Criticism of the decision in R v. Brocklebank ......................................... 227 
6.6.1.2 R. v. Brown (Appeal) .................................................................................... 228 
6.6.1.2.1 The facts of the case ............................................................................... 228 
6.6.1.2.2 The Court-martial of Appeal decision .................................................... 230 
6.6.1.2.3 Criticism of the decision in R v Brown ................................................... 231 
6.6.1.3 R. v. Boland (Appeal) ................................................................................... 232 
6.6.1.3.1 The facts of the case ............................................................................... 232 
6.6.1.3.2 The Court-martial of Appeal decision .................................................... 233 
6.6.1.3.3 Criticism of the decision in R v. Boland ................................................. 234 
6.6.1.4 R. v. Sox (Appeal) ...................................................................................... 235 
  
XV 
 
 
6.6.1.4.1 The facts of the case ............................................................................... 235 
6.6.1.4.2 The Court-martial of Appeal decision .................................................... 236 
6.6.1.4.3 Criticism of the decision in R v. Sox ....................................................... 237 
6.6.1.5 R. v. Seward (Appeal) .................................................................................. 239 
6.6.1.5.1 The facts of the case ............................................................................... 239 
6.6.1.5.2 The Court-martial of Appeal decision .................................................... 240 
6.6.1.5.3 Criticism of the decision in R v. Seward ................................................. 241 
6.6.1.6 R. v. Mathieu (Appeal) ................................................................................. 242 
6.6.1.6.1 The facts of the case ............................................................................... 242 
6.6.1.6.2 Criticism of the decision in R v. Mathieu ................................................ 243 
6.6.1.7 Final comment on the prosecution of peacekeepers by Canada .................. 245 
6.6.2 Belgium .............................................................................................................. 246 
6.6.2.1 Case A: Korad Kalid v. Paracommando Soldier ........................................... 247 
6.6.2.1.1 Facts ...................................................................................................... 247 
6.6.2.1.2 The Court Martial decision ..................................................................... 248 
6.6.2.1.3 Criticism of the decision ........................................................................ 250 
6.6.2.2 Case B: Osman Somow v. Paracommando Soldier ....................................... 251 
6.6.2.2.1 Facts ...................................................................................................... 251 
6.6.2.2.2 The Court Martial decision ..................................................................... 252 
6.6.2.2.3 Criticism of the decision ........................................................................ 253 
6.6.2.3 Final comment on the prosecution of peacekeepers by Belgium.................... 253 
6.6.3 South Africa ....................................................................................................... 255 
6.7. Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 256 
 
CHAPTER VII 
THE DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE CRIMINAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF UN 
OFFICIALS AND EXPERTS ON MISSION AND ON-SITE COURTS FOR PEACE 
MISSION PERSONNEL .................................................................................................... 261 
7.1. Introduction.............................................................................................................. 261 
7.2. Current status of the Draft Convention ..................................................................... 264 
7.2.1 Dealing with crimes of UN experts on mission at State level ............................... 266 
  
XVI 
 
 
7.2.2 Role of UN regarding the curbing of crimes by UN officials and experts on mission
 .................................................................................................................................... 268 
7.3. Content and scope of the Draft Convention .............................................................. 270 
7.3.1 Personnel covered by the Draft Convention ................................................... 270 
7.3.2. Jurisdiction over conduct ............................................................................... 273 
7.3.3. Practical exercise of jurisdiction .................................................................... 276 
7.3.3.1. International jurisdiction .............................................................................. 278 
7.3.3.2. Host State jurisdiction ................................................................................. 282 
7.3.3.3. Jurisdiction of the Troop-Contributing Country ........................................... 284 
7.3.3.4 Third State jurisdiction: universal jurisdiction .............................................. 287 
7.3.3.5. Hybrid jurisdiction ...................................................................................... 289 
7.4. Other considerations on the Draft Convention .......................................................... 290 
7.5. Proposed form of jurisdiction: Onsite Special Tripartite Court: ................................ 293 
7.5.1 Investigation of crimes committed by peacekeepers. ........................................... 296 
7.5.2 Prosecution relating to crimes committed by peacekeepers. ................................ 298 
7.5.3 Detention of suspected perpetrators. .................................................................... 298 
7.6 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 300 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
GENERAL CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 304 
8.1 Synthesis ................................................................................................................... 304 
8.2 Recommendations ..................................................................................................... 319 
 Suggested Draft Convention on Accountability of UN Peace Personnel......... 320 
8.3 Implications for further studies .................................................................................. 325 
8.4 Final remarks ............................................................................................................ 326 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................................................................................. 329 
Principal works used (Books, monographs, dissertations and journal articles) ................. 329 
Online publications and other documents ........................................................................ 358 
UN Reports / documents ................................................................................................. 364 
Table of cases ................................................................................................................. 367 
Domestic level ............................................................................................................. 367 
  
XVII 
 
 
International level ....................................................................................................... 371 
Table of legislation ......................................................................................................... 371 
National level .............................................................................................................. 371 
International level ....................................................................................................... 372 
 
ANNEXURES.................................................................................................................... 374 
Annexure A 
Excerpts from Burundian Penal Code (French) - Translation by Kakule Kalwahali ......... 374 
Annexure B 
Excerpts from DRC legislation (French) - Translation by Kakule Kalwahali ................... 390 
Annexure C 
Excerpt from Act 16 of 1999 Military Discipline Supplementary Measures Act of 23 April 
1999 (South Africa). ....................................................................................................... 397 
 
INDEX ............................................................................................................................... 399 
1 
 
 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
CONTEXTUAL STUDY OF CRIMES COMMITTED BY PEACEKEEPERS 
1.1 Problem background: Context of deployment of peacekeepers in Africa  
Over the past number of years, allegations of crimes committed by peacekeeping personnel 
where missions of peace are deployed have arisen.
1
 The allegations in question include rape 
and other acts of sexual violence, such as prostitution in the form of engaging the services of a 
prostitute, sexual offences involving children, and pornography.
2
 Crimes of murder, wilful 
causing of serious injury to body or health, and instances of weapons and mineral trafficking 
and looting have also been recorded.
3
 However, the greater part of the alleged crimes is of a 
sexual nature. 
This study examines specific issues of those crimes alleged to have been committed during 
UN peace missions by UN peace mission personnel in three African countries. The study 
investigates whose responsibility it is, among the UN, the Host State
4
, and the Troop-
Contributing Country,
5
 and necessitates an investigation into complex issues which are 
intertwined across the fields of domestic criminal law, international criminal law and 
humanitarian law. 
The background of the United Nations interventions in each of the three African countries is 
presented in order to ascertain whether any crimes allegedly committed by members of UN 
peace personnel actually occurred on the African continent. 
                                                             
1 Data established for the period between 2003 and 2008 reveal a total number of 767 allegations of crimes by 
UN personnel. 537 of the said allegations are crimes perpetrated by military personnel. See statistics from 
‘Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse’, Secretary-General’s Reports of 
sexual exploitation and abuse investigation data: A/59/782- Annex 1 Nature of allegations by United Nations 
entity and category of personnel 1 January- 31 December 2004; A/60/861-Annex I Nature of allegations by 
United Nations entity and category of personnel 1 January- 31 December 2005; A/61/957- Annex VI Nature of 
allegations by personnel of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations 1 January-31 December 2006; 
A/62/890-Annex VI Nature of allegations in completed investigations by category of personnel of the 
DPKO/DFS 1 January- 31 December 2007; A/63/720-Annex V Nature of allegations by category of personnel of 
the DPKO/DFS for completed investigations 1 January- 31 December 2008. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 A Host State is the state where a UN mission of peace is deployed. 
5 A Troop-Contributing Country or Sending State is the state of origin (nationality) of a member of UN peace 
mission personnel. 
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The total collapse of the State in Somalia led to the United Nations intervention in this 
country in 1992,
6
 although its peace operations to Somalia did not actually result in a 
solution.
7
 Amongst other reasons, the terrain and roots
8
 of the civil war were not appropriately 
studied.
9
 It is not, however, the intention of the present thesis to dig deeply to show the 
underlying roots of the conflict, but merely to indicate that peacekeepers themselves, by 
committing crimes, have added to the suffering of the civilian population, especially those 
directly made victims of their misconduct.
10
  It has been reported that, during their stay in 
Somalia, peacekeepers committed crimes such as murder, serious injury to body, rape, other 
sexual offences and looting. 
The first United Nations operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was established in April 1992, 
pursuant to Security Council resolution 751, to facilitate an immediate effective cessation of 
hostilities, to maintain a ceasefire throughout the country, which ceasefire would promote 
reconciliation and political settlement, and would allow to provide urgent humanitarian 
assistance.
11
 Most Security Council resolutions such as of January 1992,
12
 as well as all the 
subsequent resolutions put the emphasis on humanitarian assistance.
13
  
                                                             
6 Gall T L and Hobby J M (eds) Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations: United Nations 12th ed (2007) 70; 
Sadiki Koko ‘Whose responsibility to protect? Reflection on the dynamics of an ‘abandoned disorder’ in 
Somalia’ 2007 (16) African Security Review 2-13; Murithi T ‘The African Union’s Evolving role in Peace 
Operations: The African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union 
Mission in Somalia’ 2008 (17) African Security Review 70-82. The UN intervention in the horn of Africa is 
considered to have been a total failure because Somalia is still in a state of civil war. Civil wars do not end by 
UN involvement but by a true and thorough understanding of how the conflict emerged and how it has been 
handled. The fighting could not end without the intervention of the world community. See Issa-Salwe AM The 
Collapse of the Somali State: The Impact of the Colonial Legacy (HAAN Publishing London 1996) 129. 
7 Issa-Salwe AM The Collapse of the Somali State: The Impact of the Colonial Legacy (HAAN Publishing 
London 1996) 133-134. 
8 A true resolution of a conflict necessitates a thorough understanding of how the conflict emerged and how it 
was perpetuated. See Kohler J From Miraculous to Disastrous: The Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire (Centre for Applied 
Studies in International Negotiations – CASIN - Geneva 2003) 11. 
9 Philipp C E ‘Somalia: A Very Special Case’ in von Bogdandy A and Wolfrum R (eds) Max Planck Yearbook 
of United Nations Law (Volume 9 2005) 517-554. 
10 Razack S ‘From the "Clean Snows of Petawawa": The Violence of Canadian Peacekeepers in Somalia’ 2000 
(15) Cultural Anthropology 127-163, 158; Bedont B International Criminal Justice: Implications for 
Peacekeeping (report for the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade December 2001) 
available at www.peacewomen.org/un/pkwatch-/DFAIT_rport.doc [last accessed 29 September 2011]. 
11 S/RES/751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, paragraphs 2 and 7; Young RM and Molina M ‘IHL and Peace 
Operations: Sharing Canada’ Lessons Learned from Somalia’ in Fischer H et al.(eds) Yearbook of International 
Humanitarian Law (T.M.C. Assert Instituut the Hague 1998) 362-370, 363. 
12 S/RES/733 (1992) of 23 January 1992. See also Manoj Kumar Sinha Humanitarian Intervention by the United 
Nations (Manak Publication New Delhi 2002) 93-95. 
13 S/RES/767 (1992) of 7 July 1992, S/RES/775 (1992) of 28 August 1992; Boulden J Peace Enforcement: The 
United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia and Bosnia (Praeger Westport 2001) 55. 
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The 500-strong UN force approved by Security Council in April 1992 proved to be too few 
troops to handle the situation,
14
 to the point that by the end of the year, UNOSOM I had to be 
replaced by a multilateral force of 37,000 troops
15
 led by the United States of America.
16
 This 
latter force began to arrive in Somalia in December 1992 and stayed until replacement by 
UNOSOM II,
17
 established pursuant to Security Council resolution 814 of 26 March 1993,
18
 
with the mandate of establishing throughout Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian 
aid, the restoration of stability, law and order.
19
 Made up of 20,000 troops, most of which 
integrated from UNITAF, UNOSOM II withdrew from Somalia in March 1995 without any 
notable achievement.
20
 It is one of the UN peacekeeping operations that failed.  
Burundi is a state situated in the African Great Lakes region. It has experienced cyclic 
outbreaks of coups d’état and conflicts since its independence in 1962.21 One of these coups 
occurred in October 1993 when the first democratically-elected Hutu President, Melchior 
Ndadaye, was murdered.
22
 The reaction of the the ethnic group of the murdered president was 
described in a report of the United Nations Security Council, as an act of genocide against 
some 300,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus.
23
  
After a long time of war, a peace process was initiated led by Nyerere, then President of 
Tanzania. With the support of the Regional Peace Initiative and the international community, 
a Peace Agreement was signed on 28 April 2000 in Arusha under the auspices of President 
Nelson Mandela of South Africa.
24
 Article 8 of Protocol V of this Arusha Agreement provides 
that ‘the Burundian Government shall submit to the UN a request for an international 
                                                             
14 Woodward P ‘Somalia’ in Furley O and May R (eds) Peacekeeping in Africa (Ashgate 1998) 143-158. 
15 The Unified Task Force (UNITAF). 
16 Carey M ‘Peacekeeping in Africa: Recent Evolution and Prospects’ in Furley O and May R (eds) 
Peacekeeping in Africa (Ashgate 1998) 13-27, 19; S/RES/794 (1992) for the establishment of safe environment 
for Humanitarian assistance in Somalia. See Woodward P ‘Somalia’ op cit (n 14) 46-147. 
17 Woodward P op cit (n 14) 148. 
18 Shraga D ‘Military Occupation and UN Transitional Administration: The Analogy and its Limitations’ in 
Marcelo Kohen G (ed) Promoting Justice, Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Through International Law/La 
promotion de la justice, des droits de l’homme et du règlement des conflits par le droit international (Liber 
Amicorum Lucius Caflish/ Martinus Nijhoff Leiden 2007) 479-498. 
19 Ibid. 483. 
20 Woodward P op cit (n 14) 150-151. 
21 Boshoff H and Vrey W A Technical Analysis of DDR: A Case from Burundi (ISS Monograph Series No. 125 
August 2006). 
22
 Keeler J A ‘Genocide: Prevention through Nonmilitary Measures’ 2002 (171) Military Law Review 135-191, 
157; Kwakwa E ‘Internal Conflicts in Africa: Is There a Right of Humanitarian Action?’ 1994 (2) African 
Yearbook of International Law 9-45, 22. 
23 Boshoff H and Vrey W op cit (n 21) 3. 
24 Aboagye F ‘The African Mission in Burundi: Lessons learned from the first African Union Peacekeeping 
Operations’ 2004 Peacekeeping 9-15, 9-10. 
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peacekeeping force’.25 The December 2002 cease-fire agreement, however, provides that the 
verification and control of the ceasefire agreement shall be conducted by an African 
Mission.
26
  
In April 2003 the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was deployed. Its mandate came to an 
end on 31 May 2004, and the United Nations Operation in Burundi took over from there, 
incorporating AMIB forces
27
 (almost 50 per cent of the force personnel were from South 
Africa, viz 1,600 of 3,335 troops).
28
 It must be recognised that the African Mission was able 
to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire agreements and it created the first necessary 
conditions suitable for the deployment of ONUB on 1 June 2004.
29
 
Authorised under chapter VII of the UN Charter,
30
 the UN operation in Burundi departed 
from the country in December 2006. It was replaced by the United Nations Integrated Office 
in Burundi which coordinates international assistance.
31
 The integrated office provides 
technical assistance in developing a comprehensive security sector reform plan that includes 
the training of Burundi’s national police and army.32 The Office also implements the national 
programme for the demobilisation and integration of former combatants, as well as providing 
training for employment and access to micro credit schemes.
33
 A case of murder and cases of 
sexual offences were reported to have been committed by peacekeepers in Burundi.
34
 
Allegations of sexual offences have also been levelled against MONUC personnel in the 
neighbouring country, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). 
After the United Nations Emergency Force deployed to Egypt to deal with the Suez crisis,
35
 
the following intervention of the UN on the African continent was in the Congo, 
 
to oversee 
                                                             
25 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi (Arusha August 28, 2000) - Protocol V: Guarantees 
on Implementation of the Agreement. 
26 Aboagye F op cit (n 24) 9-10. 
27 ONUB: Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi. See S/RES/1545 (2004) of 21 May 2004. 
28 Aboagye F op cit (n 24) 14. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Boshoff H and Vrey W op cit (n 21) 35. 
31 BINUB: Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi. 
32 Murithi T op cit (n 6) 75, 76. 
33 Ibid. 
34
 BBC News ‘UN sex abuse sackings in Burundi: Two United Nations peacekeepers in Burundi have been 
sacked after having sex with prostitutes and minors’ Published 2005/07/19 available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go-
/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/4697465.stm [last accessed 15 December 2012]. 
35 The UNEF was deployed to Egypt following the Suez crisis in 1956, owing to the invasion of Egypt by Great 
Britain, France and Israel in October that year. See Olonisakin F Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa: 
Conceptual and Legal Issues in ECOMOG Operations (Kluwer Law International The Hague 2000) 33; UN. 
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the Belgian withdrawal of its troops from its erstwhile colony.
36
 The mandate of that 60s 
operation in the Congo,
37
 which lasted up to 1964,
38
 was to prevent civil war and to ensure the 
withdrawal of foreign military personnel.
39
 ONUC forces were accused of partiality, which 
may explain why the mission failed to restore stability.
40
 No reported allegations of 
misconduct, however, existed against ONUC civilian and military personnel. 
Thirty-five years later, precisely in 1999,
41
 another UN mission had to be deployed to the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, after witnessing that over five million people had been 
declared dead owing to the ongoing crisis of armed conflict since 1996.
42
 By a 1999 
resolution, the Security Council recognised that the situation in the DRC constituted a threat 
to international peace and security.
43
 The origin of this second United Nations military 
presence in the Democratic Republic of Congo, known as the United Nations Observer 
Mission in the Congo,
44
 has its foundations in the signature of the Lusaka agreement and the 
following UN resolution 1258
45
 authorizing the deployment of a maximum of 90 officers.
46
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Doc. A/RES/998 (ES-I) of 4 November 1956; Bothe M and Dörschel T UN Peacekeeping: A Documentary 
Introduction (Kluwer Law International the Hague1999) 134. 
36 S/RES/143/1960 of 14 July 1960; S/RES/145/1960 calling upon Belgium to implement S/RES/143; 
S/RES/146/1960 concerning the entry of ONUC forces into the secessionist Katanga; S/RES/161/1961 on the 
death of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and the reorganisation of Congolese armed forces; and 
S/RES/169/1961 on an arms embargo against the Congo; Higgins R United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967 
Documents and Commentary volume III: Africa (Oxford University Press Oxford 1980) 14 et passim. 
37 ONUC: Opération des Nations Unies au Congo. 
38 Marks J ‘The Pitfalls of Action and Inaction: Civilian Protection in MONUC’s Peacekeeping Operations’ 
2007 (16) African Security Review 67-80, 68. 
39 Boulden J Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia and Bosnia (Praeger 
Westport 2001) 4. 
40 Corum J S ‘Operational Problems in Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations’ in Cilliers J and Mills G 
(eds) Peacekeeping in Africa (IDP and SAIIA 1995)119-133. 
41 MONUC : Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo;  MONUSCO: Mission de l’organisation 
des Nations-Unies pour la stabilisation du Congo. See para 1 of the UN Security Council resolution 1925 (2010) 
(S/RES/1925 of 28 May 2010). 
42 One of the best predictors of UN intervention is the number of the deaths in a conflict. In the area of conflict, 
there is the sentiment that the UN is not willing to stop the conflict, even though it seems obvious that the UN is 
more likely to be eager to respond quickly in Europe than it is in Africa. See Fortna VP ‘Does Peacekeeping 
Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War’ 2004 (48) International 
Studies Quarterly 269-292. 
43 UN Security Council Resolution 1234 (1999) of 9 April 1999; Hawkins V ‘History Repeating Itself: The DRC 
and the UN Security Council’ 2003 (12) African Security Review 47-55, 49. 
44 Its French acronym is MONUC (Mission d’observation des Nations Unies au Congo). 
45
 Res. 1258 (1999) of 6 August 1999. 
46 See para 8 of the UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1258 (1999) of 6 August 1999; Marks J op cit (n 38) 
69; For MONUC history, mandate the number of troops and troops contributing countries, up to the renaming of 
the mission on 1 July 2010, see its website: www.monuc.org [last accessed 15 December 2012]; see also in 
regard to MONUC strength up to 2006, Allred KJ ‘Peacekeeping and Prostitutes: How Deployed Forces Fuel the 
Demand for Trafficked Women and New Hope for Stopping it’ 2006 (33) Armed Forces and Society 15-23. 
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Their mission was to liaise with all the warring factions, to provide technical assistance, and 
to prepare the deployment of military observers.
47
  
MONUC has been, like ONUC in the earlier 1960s, accused of partiality, and its members 
have been accused of colluding with armed groups to prolong the war and to benefit from the 
mineral resources.
48
 Most importantly, MONUC personnel have been accused of committing 
crimes, especially sexual crimes, and trading weapons for minerals.
49
 One scholar has 
observed that the increase of peacekeeping operations throughout the world, essentially 
staffed with male personnel, can lead to some specific criminal conduct with negative effects 
on the host populations.
50
 Although peacekeepers have been accused of committing crimes 
where they are deployed, most of their crimes have been kept quiet.
51
 If in the 1990s the 
conduct of peacekeeping personnel has been reported and made public, it is because of the 
work of media and human rights organisations.
52
 One report has indicated that peacekeepers 
have exploited refugee children;
53
 girls of 9, 12 and 14 have been raped by peacekeepers, and, 
in other instances, rape has been disguised as prostitution where some peacekeepers pooled 
                                                             
47 Amongst the presence of armed forces, MONUC is the only actor with the legal legitimacy, embodied by 26 
UN Security Council Resolutions, 20 UN Security Council Presidential Statements, 20 Secretary-General 
Reports, 5 international agreements and 5 Security Council Missions to the DRC since 1999. 
48 Usborne D ‘UN Troops Traded Guns for Gold with Militias, Says Report’ The Independent Thursday 24 May 
2007 available at www.independent.co.uk/news-/world/politics/un-troops-traded-guns-for-gold-with-militias-
says-report-450103.html [last accessed 11 May 2011]; Plaut M ‘UN Troops “Traded Gold for Guns”’ BBC News 
Wednesday 23 May 2007 available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6681457.stm [last accessed 15 December 
2012]. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Deen-Racsmány Z ‘The Amended UN Model Memorandum of Understanding: A New Incentive for States to 
Discipline and Prosecute Military Members of National Peacekeeping Contingents?’ 2011 Journal of Conflict & 
Security Law 1-35, 1et passim. 
51 Martin S ‘Must Boys Be Boys? Ending Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Missions’ 2005 
Refugees International 1-32, 21. 
52 See UN. Doc. A/59/661 of 5 January 2005 para 1. Historically men were affected by war-related consequences 
owing to their involvement as combatants. But, currently, effects of military presence are felt by civilians, 
especially women and children. See Chiziko MD ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Does the African Stand-By 
Force Need a Doctrine for Protection of Civilian?’ 2007 (2) Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Rights Law 73-
87, 73.  Disparities in national laws of TCCs do not bring views from the officials of different countries actually 
to see and understand the need to punish crimes against women. Thus Lithuania, Germany, Netherlands, etc. are 
not prepared to see their contingents prosecuted for sexual offences, especially with regard to prostitution and 
‘trafficking in human beings for prostitution’. See Allred KJ op cit (n 46) 16 et passim. Boys can also be victims 
of criminal conduct of peacekeepers. See Allais C ‘Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Peacekeepers: The 
Psychosocial Context of Behaviour Change’ 2011 (39) Scientia Militaria South African Journal of Military 
Studies 1-15. 
53 Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services: Investigation 
into Sexual Exploitation of Refugees by Aid Workers in West Africa UN. Doc. A/57/465 of 11 October 2002 
para 20 et passim. 
7 
 
 
their money and then all had sex with the same child.
54
 Such conduct may amount either to a 
war crime or a specific crime as will be discussed in this thesis. As the UN Department of 
peacekeeping has recognised, because of the status of UN personnel, crimes committed by 
peacekeepers remain serious crimes.
55
 As regards the host population, how can one expect 
members of war-torn societies, who have experienced gross violations of human rights
56
 by 
parties to the conflict, to regain confidence in their personal environment and in the rule of 
law if the mission of peace meant to protect them further traumatizes them by committing 
human right violations, without seeing their dignity restored? When it comes to serious 
crimes, it is therefore imperative that perpetrators are held accountable for their crimes.
57
 The 
prosecution of perpetrators of the crimes committed today will consequently serve as a 
deterrent for future crimes.
58
  
                                                             
54 Levin SA ‘Sexual Exploitation of Refugee Children by UN Peacekeepers’ 2003(19.3) New York Law School J 
Human Rights 833-842; Richey KC ‘Several Steps Sideways: International Legal Developments Concerning 
War Rape and the Human Rights of Women’ 2007 (17) Texas Journal of Women and the Law 109-129, 121. 
55 UNDPKO Public Information Guidelines for Allegations of Misconduct Committed by Personnel of UN 
Peacekeeping and Other Field Missions (DPKO/MD/03/00996 DPKO/CPD/DPIG/2003/001). 
56 Human rights are entitlements, basic values common to all cultures. These basic values must be respected by 
each and every country worldwide. Human rights are commonly understood as inalienable fundamental rights to 
which a person is inherently entitled simply because she or he is a human being. See Sepulveda M et al. Human 
Rights Reference Handbook 3rd revised edition (University for Peace Ciudad Colon-Costa Rica 2004) xxxvii et 
passim. Violation of human rights is understood as any lack of fulfillment of a duty of obligation arising from 
human rights instruments. Only a state or state-like entities or their agents or individuals acting as agents for 
those entities or at the instigation of such an agent can commit a violation of human rights. A state that respects 
human rights does not interfere directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of those rights. One speaks of a 
“violation of human rights” when the state has breached any of its obligations towards human righ ts, namely the 
obligation to respect and to protect human rights. By its actions a state can cause a right not to be enjoyed or 
fulfilled. A state will also violate human rights where such a state fails to prosecute those who have violated such 
a right, who have caused individuals to be in a situation where they cannot enjoy their rights. For instance, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo is the primary protector of human rights in several international instruments 
it has ratified, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights. As a signatory of these conventions, the Congolese state is bound to respect the 
human rights guaranteed in the texts and to take necessary measures to sanction and prevent violations of these 
rights whether committed by its own State security forces or by other non-State actors. See MONUSCO and UN 
Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner Report of the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office on 
Human Rights Violations Perpetrated by Armed Groups during Attacks on Villages in Ufamandu I And II, 
Nyamaboko I And II and Kibabi Groupements, Masisi Territory, North Kivu Province, between April and 
September 2012, para 14. The state is the guarantor of human rights. For more detail and for specific human 
rights, see Pogge T ‘Comment: Are We Violating the Human Rights of the World’s Poor?’ 2011 (14) Yale 
Human Rights & Development Law Journal 1-33, 3 et passim; Gorsboth M and Wolf E Identifying and 
Addressing Violations of the Human Right to Water: Applying the Human Rights Approach (Brot für die Welt 
Stuttgart-Germany 2008) 6, 12 et seq.   
57 Lindenmann J ‘Transitional Justice and the ICC: Some Reflections on the Role of the ICC in Conflict 
Transformation’ in Kohen MG (ed) Promoting Justice, Human Rights and Conflict Resolution through 
International Law 315-338. 
58 Lindenmann J op cit (n 57) 320; Ntoubandi FZ Amnesty for Crimes against Humanity under International Law 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Leiden 2007) 1. 
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1.2 Problem statement  
The purpose of deploying UN forces is, amongst other tasks, to provide protection to 
civilians.
59
 Instead of affording protection to civilians, missions of peace have constituted 
opportunities for crimes to be perpetrated against civilians.
60
 United Nations peacekeepers are 
often accused of having sexually exploited women and children.
61
 This phenomenon of gross 
misconduct and human rights violations by peacekeepers is not new.
62
 For example, 
misconducts by peacekeepers have occurred in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Kosovo, Cambodia, 
Eastern Timor, and West Africa.
63
 In most post-conflict peace operations serious human 
rights abuses by peacekeepers, such as sexual exploitation and abuse, are committed by 
almost all categories of UN personnel, military, civilian police and civilian peacekeeping 
personnel.
64
 For instance, MONUC personnel are accused of having constituted an unfailing 
help to armed groups to fight against the government,
65
 and to have traded or exchanged 
                                                             
59 Even if civilian protection clauses exist in the MONUC mandate [see UN SC Res. 1291(2000) and 
1493(2003)], and peacekeepers were supposed to use force, the interpretation, execution of those clauses are not 
resorted to by UN peacekeepers in the DRC when civilians’ lives were at risk. See Marks J ‘The Pitfalls of 
Action and Inaction: Civilian Protection in MONUC’s Peacekeeping Operations’ 2007 (16) African Security 
Review 67-80 and his reference to the tragic events of Kisangani (2002), Bunia (2003) and Bukavu (2004). 
60 Doss A (MONUC SRSG) 2009 Nelson Mandela Lecture on African Security and Development (RUSI 
Whitehall London 11 November 2009) 10. 
61 Spencer SW ‘Making Peace: Preventing and Responding to Sexual Exploitation by United Nations 
Peacekeepers’ 2005 (16) Journal of Public and International Affairs 167-181. 
62 Miller SK ‘Accountability for the Conduct of UN-Mandated Forces under International Human Rights Law: A 
Case Study Concerning Sexual Abuse of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)’ in 
Arnold R and Knoops GJA (eds) Practice and Policies of Modern Peace Support Operations under 
International Law (Transnational Publishers Ardsley 2006) 261-286. 
63 Notar SA ‘Peacekeepers as Perpetrators: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse of Women and Children in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo’ 2006 (14) American University of Gender Social Policy and the Law 413-
429; A report of the UN forces commander in Sierra Leone indicated that senior Nigerian military and political 
officials were attempting to sabotage the UN Assistance Mission to Sierra Leone by collusion with the 
Revolutionary United Front in order to prolong the conflict and, thereby, to benefit from the country’s illicit 
diamond trade. See Adebajo A Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau (Lynne 
Rienner Publishers London 2002) 101. 
64 Jennings KM and Nikolić-Ristanović V UN Peacekeeping Economies and Local Sex Industries: Connections 
and Implications (MICROCON Research Working Paper 17 Brighton 2009) 20. Not all places are considered as 
being off-limits so that peacekeepers find ways of continual fraternization. See Dahrendorf N Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse -Lessons Learned Study: Addressing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in MONUC 
(Discussion Paper - United Nations Peacekeeping 2006) paras 53-58. 
65 On 10 July 2008, the MONUC radio reported that an Indian blue helmet met with the CNDP leader to express 
his gratitude. The leader responded that he had indeed helped him a lot. MONUC rejected the declaration and 
judged it to be an individual and personal initiative and that the officer had failed in his obligations. In French: 
Un officier militaire indien, commandant d’une base de casques bleus de la MONUC au Nord-Kivu, a déclaré 
son soutien à Laurent Nkunda à la mi-avril 2008 à Kitchanga, à la veille de son retour dans son pays. La 
MONUC rejette la déclaration de ce casque bleu, la jugeant individuelle et personnelle. See MONUC 
Radiookapi ‘Kinshasa : Pour Solidarité avec le CNDP, un casque bleu désavoué’ available at 
http://radiookapi.net/sans-categorie/2008/07/10  [last accessed 15 December 2012]. 
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weapons for minerals with armed groups in the DRC.
66
 Reports
67
 indicate that sexual 
misconduct in peacekeeping missions continues unabated,
68
 and the UN has recognized this.
69
 
Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan recognized that acts of gross misconduct which 
were committed by UN personnel in the Congo had occurred.
70
  
It is evident that peacekeepers are committing crimes and escaping liability and prosecution. 
The questions which necessarily arise are whether this is attributable to problems encountered 
which relate to either substantive or procedural issues or perhaps both instances. The problem 
which will be addressed in this thesis focuses on why peacekeepers have not been charged 
with crimes, and, furthermore, why, in instances where prosecutions have been conducted, 
such accused persons have not been punished? It will be shown that the problem has a degree 
of complexity as indicated earlier. It falls not only under the domestic Criminal Laws of the 
selected countries but across International Criminal Law as well. This thesis will proceed to 
investigate both substantive and procedural issues pertaining to the allegations of crimes 
committed by UN peacekeepers in three African countries, namely Somalia, Burundi, and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. These countries have specifically been selected because, as 
indicated in the delimitation and delineation paragraph of this introductory chapter, the United 
Nations has conducted so many missions of peace on the African continent that the present 
study cannot undertake to analyse all the crimes committed by their personnel.
71
 The other 
reason is that two of the three missions have been completed, but crimes committed by 
                                                             
66 Usborne D ‘UN troops traded guns for gold with militias, says report’ The Independent (New York Thursday 
24 May 2007) available at www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/un-troops-traded-guns-for-gold-with-
militias-says-report-450103.html [last accessed 11 May 2011]. 
67 It is important to mention that media report signalled the recurrence of sexual abuse by peacekeepers. See 
Investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services into allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in the 
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo UN. Doc. A/59/661 of 5 January 
2005 para 1. 
68 See Lacey M In Congo War: Even Peacekeepers Add to Horror (N.Y. Times Dec. 18 2004) at A1; Lynch C 
UN Sexual Abuse Alleged in Congo (Wash. Post Dec. 16 2004) at A16; Lynch C Report on Abuse Urges DNA 
Tests for Peacekeepers (Wash. Post March 25 2005) at A15 cited by Notar SA op cit (n 63) 414. 
69 UNGA Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects (report 
prepared by Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein March 24 2005) UN. Doc. A/59/710. 
70 Consequently to Zeid Report, the United Nations could not obfuscate the scandal. See The New World 
Disorder ‘U.N. accused of rape, paedophilia, and prostitution: Civilians, staff in Congo under internal 
investigation’ available at http://www.wnd.com/2004/11/27722/ [last accessed 15 December 2012]. 
71 Africa is a great security-consumer of UN operations. See Tardy T ‘EU-UN Cooperation in Peacekeeping: A 
Promising Relationship in Constrained Environment’ in Berman E, Tanner F, Windmar E and Fugfugosh M (dir) 
The European Union and the United Nations –Partners in Effective Multilateralism (cc78-Text.qxp 11/07/2005) 
49-68, 49; Bothe M and Dörschel T ‘The UN Peacekeeping Experience’ in Fleck D (ed) The Handbook of the 
Law of Visiting Forces (Oxford University Press Oxford 2001) 487-506. 
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peacekeepers seem not to have received any attention.
72
 With respect to the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, the conflict is still ongoing and the mission has lasted more than thirteen 
years. The UN investigating division has produced reports with respect to criminal acts 
committed by peacekeepers, but prosecution of alleged offenders does not follow suit.
73
 
Under the current UN Model Status-of-Forces Agreement, criminal jurisdiction over 
peacekeepers rests with their Troop-Contributing Countries.
74
 Most of the time, however, it 
has been the UN, through the Office of Internal Oversight Services, that investigates 
allegations of crimes by UN personnel. When this office finds that there is irrefutable 
evidence of the commission of the crime, all that the UN can do is to expel the perpetrator and 
send him or her home.
75
 It has been reported that in March 2005, the United Nations received 
and investigated 150 allegations of sexual abuse by UN civilian staff and soldiers in the 
Congo,
76
 for which ‘disciplinary action was recommended against nine civilian MONUC 
members and 65 soldiers, 63 of whom were expelled from the mission and repatriated.’77 The 
allegations include accusations of paedophilia, rape, and prostitution.
78
 Even the reported and 
substantiated cases of abuse by peacekeepers in the north-eastern town of Bunia in 2004 have 
never received prosecution.
79
  
The UN as such, however, has no jurisdiction to prosecute the perpetrators of the alleged 
crimes.
80
 The only action, therefore, the UN can take is to repatriate individuals who have 
                                                             
72 Criminal acts by peacekeepers need not go unpunished. See Malan M ‘Towards Sounder Investments in 
Developing African Peace Operations Capabilities’ 1997 (6) African Security Review 17-27, 17.  
73 With respect to the long stay of MONUC and the ongoing conflict, Fortna has titled one of her papers in 
question: Does peacekeeping keep the peace? See Fortna VP ‘Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International 
Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War’ 2004 (48) International Studies Quarterly 269-292. 
74 Para 47(b) of the Model Status of Forces Agreement, UN. Doc. A/45/594 of 9 October 1990. 
75 Martin S ‘Must Boys Be Boys? Ending Sexual Exploitation & Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Missions’ 2005 
Refugees International 1-32, 14, 22; Rehn E and Sirleaf EJ Women, War and Peace: The Independent Experts’ 
Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women’s Role in Peace-building (United Nations 
Development Fund for Women New York 2002) 72; OPIE RA ‘Human Rights Violations by Peacekeepers: 
Finding a Framework for Attribution of International Responsibility’ 2006 (1) New Zealand Law Review 1-33, 
27.  
76 Allred KJ ‘Peacekeepers and Prostitutes: How Deployed Forces Fuel the Demand for Trafficked Women and 
New Hope for Stopping It’ 2006 (33) Armed Forces and Society 5-23. 
77 Ilg GM Few Governments Answer U.N. Queries on Peacekeeper (United Nations Inter Press Service Thursday 
5 August 2010) 4. 
78 Notar SA op cit (n 63) 413. 
79
 Investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services into allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in 
the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo UN. Doc. A/59/661 of 5 
January 2005. 
80 O’Brien M Protectors on trial? Prosecuting peacekeepers for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the 
International Criminal Court (ARC Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security Griffith University 2012) 2. 
Despite misconduct by UNISOM personnel, especially soldiers, the UN never conducted an investigation. It did, 
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committed crimes.
81
 As Notar notes, ‘peacekeepers often are repatriated before the conclusion 
of the investigation, which contributes to a lack of accountability and timeliness in pursuing 
these complaints’.82 This same scholar also highlights the lack of transparency, in that when 
the Office of Internal Oversight Services has investigated allegations of crimes and 
misconduct by peacekeepers, the Office immediately hands the investigative reports to the 
Troop-Contributing Countries concerned.
83
 The UN receives no information with respect to 
the course of action taken vis-à-vis the repatriated troops. Most countries are not willing to 
send information to the UN regarding the appropriate action taken.
84
 The responsibility for the 
training, command, and discipline of peacekeeping troops lies almost entirely in the hands of 
the member States that contribute the troops.
85
 This limits the UN’s ability to enforce 
consistent standards of behaviour in its missions and it fuels perceptions that the organization 
condones or ignores sexual abuse and other crimes committed by peacekeepers on mission.
86
 
The lack of UN jurisdiction over troops underlines the difficulty of maintaining discipline 
among military and civil personnel deployed around the world in UN operations of peace.
87
 
This can be remedied only if the national contingent commander can be prosecuted for having 
failed to prevent acts of misconduct by peacekeepers and the State of origin can be held liable 
and asked to pay reparation to victims. This thesis will, therefore, also investigate the critical 
issue of criminal liability for omissions, as well as State liability for crimes committed by its 
troops serving under the UN flag. 
1.3 Conceptualisation and scope of the thesis 
1.3.1 The concept of ‘crime’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
however, paid compensation to victims. See Zwanenburg  MC Accountability under International Humanitarian 
Law for United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty Organization Peace Support Operations (LLD Leiden 2004) 
245. 
81 Martin S ‘Must Boys Be Boys? Ending Sexual Exploitation & Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Missions’ 2005 
Refugees International 1-32, 14. 
82 Notar SA op cit (n 63) 414. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 415. 
85 Article 7 of the UN Revised Model Memorandum of Understanding, 12 June 2007, UN. Doc. A/61/19 (Part 
III). The UN can provide pre-deployment training upon request by a State. See UN. Doc. A/63/19: Report of the 
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group 2009 substantive session of 23 
February-20 March 2009 para152. 
86
 Deen-Racsmány Z ‘The Amended UN Model Memorandum of Understanding: A New Incentive for States to 
Discipline and Prosecute Military Members of National Peacekeeping Contingents?’ 2011 Journal of Conflict & 
Security Law 1–35, 4-5. 
87 Fleshman M ‘Tough UN line on peacekeeper abuses: Action initiated to end sexual misdeeds in peacekeeping 
missions,’ available at www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/april-2005/tough-un-line-peacekeeper-abuses [last 
accessed 15 December 2012]. 
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In simple terms, the concept of crime indicates ‘a human act that violates the criminal law’.88 
Snyman’s definition of the concept of ‘crime’ is as follows: ‘A crime is a conduct which is 
legally forbidden, which may, in principle, be prosecuted only by the state, and which always 
results in the imposition of punishment.’89 This definition by Snyman can also be linked to 
other academic authors such as Burchell and Milton,
90
 Desportes and Le Gunehec
91
  and 
Pradel.
92
 Of key importance is that someone must have performed an act and his/her act or 
behaviour must have already been identified in terms of substantive law as criminal.
93
 A 
number of criteria must normally be met for an act to be considered to be a crime and for 
criminal liability to result from such an act.
94
 The accused must have committed an act or an 
omission by which the interests of an individual or of the State or the people in general are 
infringed. The unlawful conduct must have been performed voluntarily or negligently.
95
 The 
punishment is meted out against the perpetrator on conviction and after prosecution in 
criminal proceedings the rules of which are also determined by law.
96
  
It is apparent that the concept of ‘crime’ is usually and technically defined by its elements, i.e. 
by all the requirements that need to be met to make up an offence and the procedure in court 
to secure a conviction. In national criminal law systems, an activity or an event is called a 
crime because the State has labelled it as such by law.
97
 At an international level it becomes a 
question of ‘international crimes’, which might be understood as any conduct globally 
                                                             
88 Broadly speaking, a crime is any action or omission prohibited by law. See.Simester AP and Sullivan GR 
Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine 3 ed (Hart Publishing Portland 2007) 1; Kauzlarich D & Barlow H 
Introduction to Criminology 9 ed (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Lanham 2009) 7.  
89 Snyman CR Criminal Law 5 ed. (LexisNexis Durban 2008) 3-5. 
90 Burchell J and Milton J Principles of Criminal Law (Juta Lansdowne 2005) 139. 
91 Desportes F et Le Gunehec F Droit pénal général 10 éd (Economica Paris 2003) 377. 
92 Pradel J Droit pénal général 11 éd (Cujas Paris 1996) no. 258. 
93 That is the quintessential of the criminal principle of legality. See Burchell J South African Criminal Law and 
Procedure Volume I: General Principles of criminal law 4 ed. (Juta Cape Town 2011) 34-37. 
94 Burchell J op cit (n 93) 45. 
95 For the discussion of requirements for criminal liability, see Burchell J South African Criminal Law and 
Procedure Volume I: General Principles of criminal law 4 ed. (Juta Cape Town 2011) 45-60. 
96
 Molan MT Criminal Law 4 ed (Old Bailey Press Great Britain 2003) 2; Burchell J and Milton J Principles of 
criminal law (Juta Lansdowne 2005) 139; Pradel J Droit pénal comparé (Dalloz Paris 2002) 257; Soyer JC Droit 
pénal et procédure pénale (LGDJ Paris 1992) 47 ; Levasseur G, Chavanne A et Montreuil J Droit pénal général 
et procédure pénale 10 éd (Sirey Paris 1991) 17; Stefani G, Levasseur G et Bouloc B Droit pénal général 
(Dalloz Paris 1987) 118. 
97 Ibid. 
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prohibited by International Criminal Law, and/or contained in enforceable conventions or in 
international customary rules.
98
  
The present thesis investigates the crimes which may fall under national law as well as under 
international criminal law. The crimes in issue here are, however, those committed by a 
specific category of people, namely UN peacekeepers.
99
  
1.3.2 Peacekeepers - Peacekeeping 
The concept of ‘peacekeepers’100 includes all members of any category of personnel sent on a 
UN mission of peace: troops; military observers; civilian police; and civilian servants, 
whether internationally or locally recruited.
101
 They all become part of the mission to help to 
keep the peace, i.e. they are peacekeepers.
102
 The concept is, therefore, used to refer to the 
personnel serving on any peacekeeping mission or operation. They are peace support 
operations
103
 personnel, military or civilian.
104
 Civilian police and military observers are often 
referred to as ‘experts on mission’.105 Special rules are, therefore, applicable to them. Indeed 
some rules specific to military contingents differ from those applicable to other categories of 
peacekeepers. For example, peacekeepers who are members of a military component are 
subjected to the criminal jurisdiction of their Troop-Contributing Country while those who are 
                                                             
98 Cassese A International Criminal Law 2 ed. (OUP New York 2008) 3. In peace operations there may be a mix 
of domestic and international law. Since such law provides for criminal liability of individuals, the conduct of 
peacekeepers may fall under actual international criminal law. See Rowe P ‘Maintaining Discipline in United 
Nations Peace Support Operations: The Legal Quagmire for Military Contingents’ 2000 (5) Journal of Conflict 
and Security Law 45-62. 
99 It is now well documented that peacekeepers have been involved in sexual misconduct, smuggling, murder, 
torture, and even slavery. See Lineham R ‘Downwards Accountability and Consent in Comprehensive 
Assistance Missions’ 2007 (3) Policy Quarterly 14-21; Spees P ‘Gender Justice and Accountability in Peace 
Support Operations: Closing the Gaps’2004 (a Policy Briefing Paper by International Alert) 21. 
100 Peacekeepers are also called ‘blue helmets’ or ‘blue berets’ because of the light blue colour of their hats or 
hard protective head covering. See Dorn AW Blue Sensors: Technology and Cooperative Monitoring for UN 
Peacekeepers - Cooperative Monitoring Centre Occasional Paper No. 36 (Canadian Forces College Toronto 
December 2004) 1; Van Rooyen Blue Helmets for Africa: India’s Peacekeeping in Africa – Occasional Paper 
No. 60 (AIIA Johannesburg 2010) 7. 
101 This is the meaning assigned to the concept in the present thesis. For any other meaning and use in other 
documents, see Findlay T The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations (SIPRI/Oxford University Press Oxford 
2002). 
102 The UN peacekeepers are sometimes called ‘Blue Helmets’, ‘Blue Berets’ and even "Blue Caps" (civilian 
peacekeepers) because of the colour of their headgear. See Dorn AW op cit (n 100) 1. 
103 Peacekeeping and peace support operations are ‘catch-all’ concepts. See Ngoma N ‘Peace Support Operations 
and Perpetual Human Failings: Are We All Human, or Are Some More Human than Others?’ 2005 (14) African 
Security Review 111-116, 111. 
104 Spees P op cit (n 99) 10. 
105 Miller AJ ‘Legal Aspects of Stopping Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations’2006 
(39) Cornel International Law Journal 71- 99, 77. For the mandate of military observers, see Dorn AW op cit (n 
100) 1. 
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not can be hauled before the criminal jurisdictions of the Host State, save where the Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary-General refuses to waive their immunity.
106
 
As some writers define it,  
Peacekeeping is the deployment of United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all 
parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently 
civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of 
conflict and the making of peace.107  
Strictly speaking, the scope of peacekeeping remains limited to the activities consented
108
 to 
by the parties to the conflict.
109
 The UN requests the consent of the Host State, but, where 
there is no government, the UN may still deploy the mission of peace.
110
 Consent has 
constituted a constant feature in peacekeeping operations.
111
 Consent by the warring parties 
allows the UN to conduct its activities on the ground freely.
112
  
                                                             
106 See paras 42 and 47 of the Model Status of Forces UN. Doc. A/45/594 of 9 October 1990.  
107 Hough M, Du Plessis A and Kruys GPH (Eds) Peace Support Operations: Selected United Nations and 
African Documents (Institute for Strategic Studies University of Pretoria 2006) 21; Gumbi L ‘Peacekeeping: A 
Historical Background’ in Cilliers J and Mills G (Eds) Peacekeeping in Africa (Institute for Defence Policy and 
SA Institute of International Affairs 1995)27-47. In intrastate conflict it is sometimes only the consent of the 
legitimate government that is required. This puts the impartiality of the UN operation in doubt. See Tsangourias 
N ‘Consent, Neutrality/Impartiality and the Use of Force in Peacekeeping: Their Constitutional Dimension’ 2006 
(11) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 465-482, 475 et passim. A peacekeeping mission can be sent where 
there is actually no peace to keep. See Goulding M ‘The United Nations and Conflict in Africa since the Cold 
War’1999 (98) African Affairs 155-166, 163. 
108 Bouvier A ‘Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel: Presentation and analysis’ 
1995 (309) International Review of the Red Cross 638-666; Gilligan M and Stedman SJ ‘Where Do the 
Peacekeepers Go?’ 2003 (5) International Studies Review 37-54;  Porretto G & Vité S The Application of 
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law to International Organizations (Research Paper Series 
/ Collection des travaux de recherché 2006 (1) Centre Universitaire de Droit International Humanitaire/ 
University Center for International Humanitarian Law 2006); Greenwood C ‘Historical Development and Legal 
Basis of International Humanitarian Law’ in Dieter Fleck (ed) The Handbook of International Humanitarian 
Law (Oxford University Press Oxford 2008)1-78; Dorn AW op cit (n 100) 7. 
109 Peacekeeping  has  come  to  involve  a  diverse array  of  activities  including:  confidence-building  
measures;  cease-fire  monitoring; disarmament of  combatants; election monitoring;  and humanitarian  relief  
distribution. See Ndulo M ‘The United Nations Responses to the Sexual Abuse and Exploitation of women and 
Girls by Peacekeepers during Peacekeeping Missions’ 2008 (27) Berkeley Journal of International Law 126-160, 
128. 
110 Boutros-Ghali B ‘Empowering the United Nations’ 1992 (71) Foreign Affairs 89-102. 
111 Tsangourias N ‘Consent, Neutrality/Impartiality and the Use of Force in Peacekeeping: Their Constitutional 
Dimension’ 2006 (11) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 465-482. 
112 James A ‘The Dual Nature of UN Peacekeeping’ in Bourantonis D and Evriviades M (eds) A United Nation 
for the Twenty-First Century: Peace, Security and Development (Kluwer Law International The Hague 1996) 
174; Petithomme M ‘Humanitarian Assistance and  the Dilemmas of Force for Peace: The 1992-1994 
Peacekeeping Operations in Somalia’ 2008 (7) Human Security Journal 32-45, 43; Ratner SR ‘Foreign 
Occupation and International Territorial Administration: The Challenges of Convergence’ 2005 (16) EJIL 695-
719, 698. Where the UN intervention is without consent, pursuant to UN SC resolution under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, the UN can be considered as an occupying power. See de Jonge B ‘The “Trembling Hand” of a One 
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It is important to note, however, that any activities aimed at bringing peace or maintaining it 
are considered as peacekeeping, in a general understanding.
113
 As one scholar has indicated, 
‘Peacekeeping has become a synonym for almost any international activity aimed at 
attenuating and resolving conflict that has potential or actual international consequences.’114 
Traditional peacekeeping is distinguished from other UN missions of peace which involve 
combat or enforcement powers.
115
 In such occurrences, the UN peace operations constitute a 
means of enforcement action and the requirement of consent is, or may be, ignored.
116
 The 
UN force is, therefore, deployed against the will of the host government and without its 
consent. In such a case, the action of the force can be justified on humanitarian basis. 
Throughout this thesis, peacekeeping should be understood as including all peace support 
operations, viz traditional peacekeeping, peace enforcement operations, and other peace-
related operations or missions such as humanitarian assistance. The study of crimes 
committed by peacekeepers includes all personnel who perform any activities pertaining to 
peace operations.
 117
  
1.3.3 UN mission of peace or peace operations  
The expression ‘UN mission of peace’ includes all activities engaged in by the organisation in 
its efforts towards solving a conflict endangering international peace and security, whether 
such conflict occurs between two different States or within the frontiers of the same State.
118
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Hundred Year Old Provision: The Law of Occupation as Legal Framework for Legislative Acts in Peacekeeping 
Operations’ 2006 International Law of Military Operations, available at www.scribd.com/The-Trembling-Hand-
of-a-One-Hundred-Year-Old-Provision [last accessed 25 July 2011]. 
113 Peacekeeping has shifted from traditional duties to be involved in taking on new tasks that raise questions 
over what we mean by ‘peacekeeping: civilian activities, de facto administration, etc.’ See Ian Johnstone, 
Tortolani BC and Gowan R ‘The evolution of UN peacekeeping: unfinished business’ 2005 (80) Die FrieDens-
Warteian 55-71, 57-58. 
114 Chipma J ‘What Do We Understand by Peacekeeping Today?’ in Cilliers J and Mills G (eds) Peacekeeping in 
Africa (Institute for Defence Policy and SA Institute of International Affairs 1995) 1-25. 
115 Shraga D ‘The United Nations as an Actor Bound by International Humanitarian Law’ 1998 (5) International 
Peacekeeping 64-81; Wilson G ‘The Legal, Military and Political Consequences of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ 
Approach to UN Military Enforcement Action’ 2007 (12) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 295-330; 
Tittemore BD ‘Belligerent in Blue Helmets: Applying International Humanitarian Law to United Nations Peace 
Operations’1997 (33) Standford Journal of International Law 61-117, 81. 
116 Bantekas I, Nash S and Mackarel M International Criminal Law (Cavendish Publishing London 2001) 43. 
117 Aoi C, De Coning C and Thakur R (eds) Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations (United 
Nations University Press Tokyo 2007); Tsangourias N ‘Consent, Neutrality/Impartiality and the Use of Force in 
Peacekeeping: Their Constitutional Dimension’ 2006 (11) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 465-482; Spees 
P op cit (n 99) 10 et passim; Johnston N Peace Support Operations 33-50, available at www.international-
alert.org/sites/default/files/library/TKPeaceSupportOOperations.pdf [last accessed 15 December 2012]. 
118 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva 8 June 1977 (U.N.T.S. 1125, 1-17512). An inter-state 
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Any mission sent by the UN to monitor or solve any situation with the potentiality of 
endangering international security and peace, therefore, is a mission of peace or a peace 
operation. The crimes committed by peacekeepers are those criminal acts perpetrated in the 
Host State where such peacekeepers are deployed. Those acts must be distinguished from 
‘acts performed on duty’.119 Indeed, whenever peacekeepers have been acting in a 'non-
official or non-operational capacity', when their conduct is not linked to their official presence 
and capacity in the Host State, such acts are considered to have been actions 'off-duty'.
120
 
Such off-duty conduct cannot be attributable to the UN, i.e. the organization cannot be asked 
to pay reparations to third parties.
121
 Indeed, when a mission arrives in a Host State, its 
members are regarded as UN personnel. Their acts, therefore, are considered official when 
performed on duty, and private when performed off-duty.
122
 Whether committed on-duty of 
off-duty, criminal acts can never fall within the mandate of a peace operation.
123
 
1.3.4 Mandate of peace operations 
The Security Council resolution authorizing the operation determines the mandate which 
defines the tasks of the operation.
124
 In the course of time, the initial mandate may be altered 
by the passing of a new resolution, which usually occurs if the conditions of the assistance 
initiatives, monitoring, and prevention of violence have changed on the ground, or where it is 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
conflict is usually considered international armed conflict; an intra-state conflict is called armed conflict of a 
non-international character. Whenever a conflict crosses the borders, belligerents are assumed to be States and 
the conflict an international armed conflict. See Arimatsu L ‘Territory, Boundaries and the Law of Armed 
Conflict’ 2009 (12) Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 157-192, 172. 
119 Operational duties or on-duty are activities such as patrols, manning checkpoints, and guarding missions. Off-
duty activities are, for instance, eating and socializing in the camp’s bar and club, guided tours of Sarajevo. See 
Sion L ‘Dutch Peacekeepers and Host Environments in the Balkans: An Ethnographic Perspective’ 2008 (15) 
International Peacekeeping 201-213, 202. 
120 Leck C ‘International Responsibility in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Command and Control 
Arrangements and the Attribution of Conduct’ 2009 (10) Melbourne Journal of International Law 346-364, 351. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Most UN peacekeepers’ actions, especially of a sexual character would be considered as being performed off 
duty or out of the official/operational capacity. Such acts are considered as private and will therefore entail 
individual criminal responsibility. See Leck C op cit (n 120) 351. 
123 In principle acts perpetrated in a private capacity cannot be covered by immunity. The agreements signed 
between the UN and the Host State as well as the UN and the Troop-Contributing Countries, however, disinvest 
the Host State of criminal jurisdiction where the perpetrator is a member of the military component of the 
mission, and members of the civilian component can be prosecuted in the Host State and by its jurisdiction only 
upon waiver of the individual jurisdictional immunity by the UN Secretary-General. See Model SOFA and 
Revised Memorandum of Understanding. These agreements do not include the specific limitation that acts which 
remain far from official duties will not be covered by the jurisdictional immunity peacekeepers enjoy vis-à-vis 
the judiciary of the Host State. See Burke R ‘Status of Forces Deployed on UN Peacekeeping Operations: 
Jurisdictional Immunity’ 2011 (16) Journal of Conflict & Security Law 63-104, 75.  
124 Johnston N op cit (n 117) 33. 
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necessary to adapt the operation to the changing nature of the conflict in the Host State.
125
 The 
term ‘mandate’ is used to refer to authorisations and tasks under public international law with 
which a UN mission is vested. In peace operations, traditional tasks are: monitoring a 
ceasefire to allow space for political negotiations and a peaceful settlement of disputes; to 
protect civilians; to provide support to law enforcement agencies; to assist in the restructuring 
and reform of the armed forces; to facilitate the implementation of the peace agreement; to 
support the delivery of humanitarian assistance; to supervise and assist with the organization 
of elections; and to promote respect for human rights and investigate alleged violations.
126
 In 
summary, mandates range from traditional monitoring of ceasefire agreements and acting as a 
buffer between disputing parties to conducting disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration 
programmes,
127
 civilian protection
128
 from fighting factions and nation building tasks.
129
 
1.4 Aim of the research 
Since peacekeepers, military, and civilian personnel do commit crimes against the laws of the 
Host State, against the civilians, it will be argued that every Status-of-Forces Agreement and 
every Memorandum of Understanding should contain specific clauses obligating Troop-
Contributing Countries to prosecute and the UN to follow-up. Such clauses should be a pre-
condition for the government of the Host State to consent to the mission, where this is needed, 
and for the UN to accept an offer to contribute personnel from any country. According to the 
current position of the international law related to crimes by peacekeepers, criminal 
jurisdiction over troops serving with a UN mission of peace lies with the Troop-Contributing 
Country.
130
  Indeed ‘sovereign states have always been loath to allow other authorities to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction over their troops which is why the UN has never been in a 
position to prescribe standards of criminal process or substantive law to be exercised by 
                                                             
125 Johnston N op cit (n 117) 33. 
126 Klappe BF ‘International Peace Operations’ in Dieter Fleck (ed) The Handbook of International 
Humanitarian Law (Oxford University Press Oxford 2008) 635-673. 
127 Tittemore BD op cit (n 115) 77. 
128 For UN Security Council resolutions for Missions with direct reference to the protection of civilians, see Holt 
VK ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Considering the Operational Capacity for Civilian Protection’ (Discussion 
Paper of Research conducted for the Stimson Center’s Project on Operational Capacity for Civilian Protection 
Washington DC 2005) 46; Breau SC ‘The Impact of the Responsibility to Protect on Peacekeeping’ 2006 (11) 
Journal of Conflict and Security Law 429-464. 
129
 Johnston N op cit (n 117) 33. 
130 UNGA Model Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) (UN. Doc. A/45/594) paras 46-48 regarding jurisdiction 
of peacekeepers; UNGA ‘Note by the Secretariat: Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and 
Experts on mission’ (UN. Doc. A/62/329 of 11 September 2007) para 16; Allais C ‘Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse by UN Peacekeepers: The Psychosocial Context of Behaviour Change’ 2011 (39) Scientia Militaria- 
South African Journal of Military Studies 1-15, 8. 
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peacekeeping participants.’131 It will be shown that the problem has a dimension of a 
complexity and is therefore not prima facie clear cut as one needs to consult not only 
domestic Criminal Law of the selected countries, but also International Criminal Law. 
The aims of this thesis will be to investigate and address the following issues:  
 The possibility that sexual offences, such as rape, could be elevated to the rank of war 
crimes when committed by peacekeepers. Rape is the most commonly committed crime by 
peacekeepers, but it is usually considered to be an isolated act, without connection to the 
armed conflict monitored by peacekeepers. In fact, if the so-called isolated sexual act is 
considered to be a war crime, the agreements between a Host State and the UN (i.e. a 
Status-of-Forces Agreement) or between the UN and the Troop-Contributing Country (i.e. 
a Memorandum of Understanding), will be considered as res inter alios acta and, 
therefore, have no effect on third states who will remain in a position to prosecute alleged 
perpetrators of such rape, provided that the latter is actually on their territory.
132
 
 How the law of the Host State is applicable to members of the UN contingents alleged to 
have committed crimes in Somalia, Burundi, and the DRC. In the discussion of the law of 
each of these Host States, the elements of the specific crime and the possibility of available 
defences will be presented. In this regard a discussion will be undertaken relating to 
Somalia, Burundi, and the DRC to establish whether troops can be caught under the ambits 
of the relevant crimes, or whether defences exist, which render the troops criminally 
unaccountable for their acts.  
 The issue of state liability for omissions will also be discussed. South Africa as a Troop-
Contributing Country, which has deployed troops to Africa, will be furnished as an 
example in discussing state liability, as well as the element of the specific crimes and the 
defences available to perpetrators of the crimes when prosecuted before the courts of their 
country of nationality.  
                                                             
131
 Patterson M ‘A Corporate Alternative to United Nations ad hoc Military Deployments’ 2008 (13) Journal of 
Conflict and Security Law 215-232, 224. 
132 Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties - see United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 
331; Bedont B International Criminal Justice: Implications for Peacekeeping (report for the Canadian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade December 2001) available at www.peacewomen.org-
/un/pkwatch-/DFAIT_rport.doc [last accessed 29 September 2011]. 
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 The hurdles relating to the issues of reserving jurisdiction over peacekeepers to the Troop-
Contributing Countries, as well as their apparent reluctance actually to prosecute 
repatriated alleged perpetrators. 
 The apparent lack of prosecution will be investigated and, where available, cases of 
prosecution discussed.  
 The need to determine the best mechanism for criminal accountability for peacekeeping 
personnel who have actually committed crimes violating domestic or International 
Criminal Law.
133
 Alternatives to the unwillingness by those States who actually have 
criminal jurisdiction under the Status of Forces Agreement or under the Memorandum of 
Understanding are considered, in particular, with emphasis on how barriers regarding 
investigations prior to any prosecution can be surmounted. Further arguments which will 
be put forward are that crimes by peacekeepers must be dealt with by clear legislation 
aiming at barring Troop-Contributing Countries who do not meet their obligations under 
International Law from participating in future operations of peace.  
The ‘fear of criminal or disciplinary punishment, in addition to the deterrent effect of past 
convictions, is a means by which adherence to humanitarian law can be guaranteed.’134 
Without prosecutions and convictions, it may be hard to enforce human rights law and/or 
international humanitarian law.
135
 This applies to any state forces as well as to UN 
peacekeepers. If a systematic mechanism is put in place, it must be a mechanism that holds 
every peacekeeper accountable. It will be shown that peacekeepers who allegedly committed 
crimes in the three selected countries of this study have not accounted for their deeds. Where 
attempted prosecutions were held, namely in Belgium and Canada, the sentences were not of 
any weight compared to the gravity of the crimes prosecuted, and the UN showed no effort to 
follow-up to ensure the prosecutions were serious.  
It will be argued that the UN should ensure that Troop-Contributing Countries, under the 
existing policies, prosecute those blue helmets found to have committed crimes during UN 
missions of peace. Since it is the Office of Internal Oversight Services that investigates 
alleged crimes by peacekeepers, once this service has sufficient evidence that a crime has 
                                                             
133 Gray C ‘Peacekeeping After the Brahimi Report: Is There a Crisis of Credibility of the UN?’ 2001 (6) 
Journal of Conflict and Security Law 267-288. 
134 Wolfrum R and Fleck D ‘Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law’ in Fleck D (ed) The Handbook of 
International Humanitarian Law 2 ed (Oxford University Press Oxford 2008) 675-722, 687. 
135 Ibid. 
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been committed, the UN should not limit its reaction to repatriation; it should also make sure 
that she or he faces prosecution in her/his home country. As to UN civilian personnel, the 
model Status-of-Forces Agreement gives the procedure to follow even if such procedure does 
not actually mean the wrongdoer will actually be prosecuted in the host country.
136
  
The study attempts, and seeks to elucidate, the meaning of the privilege of jurisdiction 
accorded to peacekeepers serving under the UN flag. The argument is that such a state of 
affairs has the appearance of an almost devised impunity, since states do not appear to be 
obliged to exercise the criminal jurisdiction that rests with them. It also discusses the fact that 
the interests of victims are not taken into consideration since the model Status-of-Forces 
Agreement and other agreements do not foresee that a trial in the home country takes away 
the right of the victims because they cannot travel to witness or to claim reparation. The study 
proposes some alternatives to resolving the problem and throws light on the importance of 
victims in criminal proceedings and their right to a remedy, and, at the very least, the right of 
victims to know that justice has been done. 
1.5 Method of research 
The method employed to conduct this research adequately is essentially analytical. The 
literature survey, especially with reference to domestic Criminal Law of selected countries, 
International Criminal Law, and international norms and principles, will help to shed enough 
light on the question of whether leaving criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by 
peacekeepers under UN command to contributing states is the proper solution or whether, to 
some extent, it contradicts the objective of outlawing impunity. The research involves a 
literature study of UN resolutions and other official documents, textbooks, and journal articles 
in connection with specific UN operations of peace and available case law.
137
 The primarily 
critical analysis of the relevant law and peacekeeping-related documents is undertaken in 
order to identify the shortcomings of the current mechanism put in place to deal with crimes 
perpetrated by UN peacekeepers.  
                                                             
136 Paragraph 47(b) of the Model SOFA, UN. Doc. A/45/594. Obstacles exist as to the observance by the Host 
State of the international standards to assure a fair trial. 
137
 It is of great importance to mention that most military court decisions in criminal matters are not made 
available to the public. Libraries do not have law reports on military criminal cases decided in South Africa nor 
elsewhere with respect to peacekeeping personnel. Military prosecutions are shrouded in secrecy. See Rehn E  
and Sirleaf EJ Women, War and Peace: The Independent Experts’ Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict 
on Women and Women’s Role in Peace-building (United Nations Development Fund for Women New York 
2002) 119. 
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1.6 Delineation and limitation of study 
Since the United Nations has had many missions of peace on the African continent, and since 
the present study cannot undertake to analyse the crimes committed by personnel on all the 
different missions, the specific focus of this thesis is on those crimes committed by 
peacekeepers on missions in three African countries, namely Somalia, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi. Taking Canada, Belgium, and South Africa as the 
paradigm, the thesis investigates whether Troop-Contributing Countries have actually 
prosecuted, or not prosecuted, the members of their military contingents who have been 
accused of having committed crimes abroad, on a UN mission of peace. With respect to the 
DRC, the UN has conducted two missions: ONUC in the 1960s and MONUC from November 
1999. It is the latter mission that is included in the study on crimes committed by 
peacekeepers in DRC. The analysis relates to crimes committed by UN peacekeepers, 
irrespective of whether these crimes may qualify as domestic or international crimes. Issues of 
jurisdiction relating to such conduct, problems relating to investigation, and the role victims 
can play in all the process are discussed.  
The study does not seek to demonstrate whether these UN operations of peace were 
successful or not. It focuses purely on issues of criminal accountability and jurisdiction 
relating to peacekeepers.
138
 It is the understanding of the present researcher that every 
allegation of a crime by a peacekeeper should be considered and prosecuted and the victim’s 
interests taken into account in the proceedings. Prosecution of previous crimes alleged to have 
been committed by peacekeepers may serve to prevent future misconduct by UN personnel on 
mission.
139
 The study does not include cases where UN operations or missions function as 
quasi-governments, as the latter have not been identified as such in Africa.
140
 The failure to 
protect civilians under imminent threat is not part of the discussion, even though such an 
attitude of abstaining
141
 from fulfilling the mandate may amount to collusion with the armed 
                                                             
138 Ngoma N ‘Peace Support Operations and Perpetual Human Failings: Are We All Human, or Are Some More 
Human than Others?’ 2005 (14) African Security Review 111-116. 
139
 Ntoubandi FZ Amnesty for Crimes against Humanity under International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
Leiden 2007) 1. 
140 See Mégret F and Hoffmann F ‘The UN as a Human Rights Violator? Some Reflections on the United 
Nations Changing Human Rights Responsibilities’ 2003 (25) Human Rights Quarterly 314-342. 
141 Darhendorf N and Shifman P ‘Sexual Violence in Conflict and Post Conflict: A Need for More Focused 
Action’ 2004 (23) Refugee Survey Quarterly 7-19. 
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group committing war crimes.
142
 The study is interested in allegations of crimes committed by 
any personnel working with UN agencies, and/or humanitarian personnel, in order to suggest 
ways of eliminating sexual exploitation and the abuse of women and children. 
It is of crucial importance to note that, in civil law systems, especially in countries like 
Burundi and DR Congo, the most important source of law is Statutes (emanation of 
Parliament) and not case precedent. References to provisions of Codes are, therefore, 
considered to be a sufficient source with respect to principles of criminal law which need not 
be supported by case law.
143
 Somali is, on the other hand, an eclectic system in that it borrows 
from the French, Italian, and English law system. It has a Penal Code dated 1962. This is the 
main source of criminal law available to any researcher, which explains the lack of references 
to case law in the study of principles applicable to crimes committed by peacekeepers as a 
system of case law precedent is not followed.
144
 
Since the aim of this thesis is not to seek to develop domestic law, a limited comparative 
analysis can merely be undertaken for the purposes of identifying possible substantive issues 
which may play a role in holding peacekeepers accountable.
145
 A comparative study may be 
undertaken with the objective of influencing the melioration of the domestic law. Such an 
objective can be reached finding inspiration in the rules and principles of law or the legal 
institutions of another state.
146
 The adoption of those foreign legal institutions considered in 
some way superior to be imitated or adopted, either as a whole or in part, does not mean that 
the State which takes inspiration in those institutions adopts a foreign law, but actually 
reforms its own law.
147
 In this thesis, the focus is on International Criminal Law issues of 
                                                             
142 The UNSC has increasingly included civilian protection in peacekeeping mandates, especially since 1999. 
See Chiziko MD op cit (n 52) 80; Holt VK op cit (n 128) 53. 
143 Contrary to common-law systems, any principle of criminal law needs proof of application in case law. This 
is not so in civil law systems where principles are considered abstract. The influence of the Supreme Court 
decisions can be taken into account only in law reforms. Indeed there is no systematice publication of judicial 
decision, selected cases deemed to be of more than unusual interests are published. Thus, in rare instances, 
unwritten principles may have their origin in interpretation of the law by courts. For example with respect to 
some grounds of justification in the DR Congolese Criminal Law. See Crabb JH The Legal System of Congo-
Kinshasa (The Michie Company Law Publishers Charlottesville 1970) 90. 
144 Military secrecy also constitutes a great limitation to the analysis of specific prosecution or principles laid by 
case law. See Ngoma N op cit (n 138) 111-116. 
145 The study of foreign laws is a subject of interest whenever legal science realizes that no legal system can 
claim perfection. See Hug W ‘The History of Comparative Law’ 1932 Harvard Law Review 1027-1070, 1028. 
146 Hug W op cit (n 145) 1029. 
147 Ibid; Eser A ‘The Importance of Comparative Legal Research for the Development of Criminal Sciences’ in 
Blancpain R (ed) Law in Motion: Recent Developments in Civil Procedure, Constitutional, Contract, Criminal, 
Environmental, Family & Succession, Intellectual Property, Labour, Medical, Social Security, Transport Law 
(Kluwer The Hague 1997) 492-517. 
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accountability and jurisdiction over peacekeepers, and culminates in a proposed amended 
Convention in Chapter eight which addresses many of the lacunae in International Criminal 
Law pertaining to crimes committed by peacekeepers. 
1.7 Structure of research 
The present study on the crimes committed by UN peacekeepers in Africa is divided into 
eight main subdivisions. Since chapter one has been discussed, chapter two investigates the 
three missions of peace during which peacekeepers have been accused of committing crimes. 
The chapter seeks to analyse the allegations of those crimes by peacekeepers and to study 
them in the light of domestic law of the Host State of the mission. This is undertaken in order 
to ascertain whether or not peacekeepers would be criminally liable under the territorial law 
of the place where the act was performed. The crime allegedly committed, its elements, and 
possible defences to such crime will be discussed, and peacekeepers will be investigated as 
possible perpetrators of these crimes. The purpose of the chapter is to try to identify whether 
or not peacekeepers can be held accountable in terms of the law of the Host State. 
Chapter three discusses the law applicable to crimes committed by peacekeepers with respect 
to the domestic Criminal Law of a Troop-Contributing Country. Since the study of the law of 
each and every contributing country whose contingent members are alleged to have 
committed crimes during UN missions of peace in Somalia, Burundi, and the DRC cannot be 
undertaken, South African law has been selected because South Africa is an African State 
which has deployed troops to MONUC and ONUB, but also because it is beyond the scope of 
this thesis to include the study of each and every TCC criminal system and response to crimes 
committed by its troops while serving under the UN flag.
148
 The focus is centred on how the 
alleged crimes committed by peacekeepers infringe the domestic Criminal Law of the troops-
contributing countries, utilising South Africa as an example of an African State. Rape, 
prostitution, murder, and assault are, therefore, discussed in light of the South African law.
149
 
Special emphasis is placed on whether there can be any State liability for failure to prevent 
crimes or to prosecute peacekeepers who have been accused of perpetrating crimes while on 
mission. 
                                                             
148 For instance MONUC is composed of 60 Troop-Contributing Countries. See Gall TL & Hobby JM (eds) 
Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations volume 1: the United Nations (Thomson Gale Detroit 2007) 88. 
149 The discussion does not imply that all the crimes presented were actually committed by South African 
soldiers, for most of the crimes levelled against the considered contingent were rape. 
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Chapter four of this thesis investigates how International Criminal Law deals with crimes 
committed by peacekeepers. Although many of the allegations of crimes committed by 
peacekeepers are of a sexual character, the chapter seeks to determine whether these offences 
can, therefore, be categorised under war crimes and crimes against humanity. Both categories 
include sexual crimes and abuses such as rape under the Rome Statute.
150
  
Chapter five presents the practical problems relating to the investigation of crimes committed 
by peacekeepers. It presents, first of all, the authorities invested with some investigating 
powers. These authorities may come from the UN, the Troop-Contributing Countries or the 
Host State. The chapter also questions the possible residual criminal jurisdiction of the Host 
State as well as of a third state. It argues that investigating crimes that have occurred outside 
one’s own jurisdiction constitutes a difficult task. Co-operation between stakeholders is, 
therefore, crucial. It insists on the issue of the importance of an investigation to hold 
peacekeepers accountable for their crimes and on the crucial involvement of victims in the 
proceedings. 
Chapter six explores the avenues available regarding jurisdiction over crimes allegedly 
committed by peacekeepers. The chapter also investigates whether the International Criminal 
Court may have criminal jurisdiction over the alleged misconduct of peacekeepers. As it is the 
duty of the Troop-Contributing Country whose contingent member is alleged to have 
committed a crime to prosecute such crime,
151
 the chapter discusses the relevant prosecutions 
in Belgium and Canada where allegations of misconduct exist pertaining to peacekeepers 
while on mission in Africa.  
Chapter seven critically analyses the draft convention on the criminal accountability of UN 
officials and experts on mission.
152
 It will be argued that the draft remains an instrument that 
needs core improvement. A treaty to be presented for signature and ratification necessitates 
more amelioration to ensure all crimes are taken into account and the scope ratione personae 
should not be limited to UN officials and experts on mission. The chapter will also suggest 
the insertion, into the UN Security Council resolution that establishes a UN operation of 
                                                             
150 Ss 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute. 
151 Oswald B, Durham H and Bates A Documents on the Law of UN Peace Operations (Oxford University Press 
New York 2010) 56; Article 7.10 of the Revised Draft Model Memorandum of Understanding as set out in 
A/61/19 (Part III). 
152 Annex III to UN Doc. A/60/980 of 16 August 2006. 
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peace, of a tripartite jurisdiction that will adjudicate any allegation of misconduct by 
peacekeepers, whether military or civilian.  
This study concludes with Chapter eight which draws upon the findings of the seven main 
chapters. Recommendations are made to insure that peacekeepers are held accountable for 
their actions and the chapter investigates the viability of a non-partial court as a possible 
solution to jurisdictional issues. Other recommendation relate to the amendment of the draft 
convention. The benefits of doing so are highlighted. It will be shown that the extant norms 
with respect to peacekeepers are not adequate to ensure that justice is done and that they need 
to be revised and the shortcomings addressed. To this end, reform is necessitated. Draft 
legislation is, therefore, proposed. 
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CHAPTER II  
CRIMES BY PEACEKEEPERS IN THE HOST STATE 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter gives an account of the allegations of the specific crimes committed by peace-
keepers in the Host States of Somalia, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.  The 
three African countries have been selected for the purpose of this study by virtue of the fact 
that crimes committed by peacekeepers are the most prevalent in those countries. 
Furthermore, although the UN missions of peace to Somalia and to Burundi have been 
completed, few prosecutions against peacekeepers alleged to have perpetrated murder, 
wilfully causing of serious injury to body, rape, and acts of sexual violence have been 
initiated. The allegations of crimes committed by peacekeepers who have served with 
different UN missions of peace on the African continent are not limited to the 
abovementioned crimes.
1
 In the DRC, for instance, there have been allegations that 
peacekeepers are involved in minerals for weapons trafficking and the pillaging of natural 
resources.
2
  
The chapter also discusses the question of whether or not the law of the Host State contains 
provisions criminalising the different crimes allegedly committed by visiting forces such as 
United Nations peacekeepers. Criminal conduct by any individual person, including peace-
keepers, should fall under the domestic criminal law of wherever it takes place because the 
notion of territoriality, as the basis for criminal jurisdiction, requires that the trial of the 
offender shall take place where the offence was committed.
3
 However, it will be indicated that 
                                                             
1 See UNGA Criminal accountability of United Nations officials and experts on mission: Note by the Secretariat 
(UN. Doc. A/62/329 of 11 September 2007) para 37, where it is stated that ‘The Secretariat recognizes the 
difficulty in establishing a finite list of crimes that should be covered by a convention. What seems clear is that a 
convention should not be limited to crimes against the person; the recent investigation into gold smuggling and 
trafficking in weapons in MONUC highlights the need for a Convention to apply to all serious crimes to ensure 
there is no jurisdictional gap.’  
2 Ibid. see also Adaka F ‘The Enforcement of Military Justice and Discipline in External Military Operations: 
Exploring the Fault Lines’ 2008 (47) Military Law and the Law of War Review 253-265, 256. 
3 See Sornarajah M ‘Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction: British, American and Commonwealth Perspectives’ 
1998 (2) Singapore Journal of International and comparative law 1-36, 2.  Indeed it is in the interest of the State 
enacting the law to fix the territorial scope of its criminal laws. This enables such a state to set the limits of its 
tribunals, taking into account the existence of foreign jurisdictions. See de Vabres D Essai d’histoire et de 
critique sur la compétence criminelle dans les rapports avec l’étranger (Sirey Paris 1922) 47 et passim.  
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this might not, in fact, be the case, and the situation is not so straight-forward.
4
 The extent to 
which the domestic law of the three countries included in this study have enacted substantive 
law to deal with crimes committed by peacekeepers will, therefore, be investigated. Before 
doing that, an account of allegations of crimes committed by peacekeepers will be undertaken 
to delineate the parameters of the crimes and to provide the context in terms of which these 
crimes are committed.  
2.2 Account of allegations of crimes by peacekeepers in Somalia, Burundi, and the DRC 
Although the media has published numerous allegations regarding each and every mission of 
peace established in the post cold war period and deployed to Africa, the present thesis 
focuses on three of the UN missions of peace conducted on the African continent.
5
 Reports of 
crimes committed by peacekeepers began to emerge in the early 1990s,
6
 although much of the 
conduct of peacekeepers was considered to have been concealed or not reported.
7
  
The account of allegations against peacekeepers starts with the examination of those 
perpetrated in Somalia, then Burundi, and, then, the DRC. The focus is on crimes against life 
and the physical integrity of the person. Sexual crimes, especially rape and engaging the 
services of a prostitute, will be explored in more depth as it will be shown that these crimes 
are the most prevalent. Other forms of crimes will be indicated only where possible and to 
show the difference between different peace operations. 
2.2.1 Incidents reported in Somalia  
As far as Somalia is concerned, there have been allegations of the rape of women perpetrated 
by peacekeepers outside the camps of internally displaced people.
8
 The victims have usually 
been women who left the camp to find and collect firewood.
9
 Although all the allegations of 
                                                             
4 SOFAs and Memorandums of Understanding leave criminal jurisdiction over military peacekeepers to the 
TCC. See infra 6.2 in this thesis. 
5 UNGA Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on its investigation into allegations of sexual 
exploitation and abuse in the Ituri region (Bunia) in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (UN. Doc. A/61/841 of 5 April 2007) para 1. 
6 With the UN mission of peace in Somalia. 
7 For an overview of crimes committed by peacekeepers in Africa and elsewhere, see O’Brien M Overcoming 
Boys-Will-Be-Boys Syndrome: Is Prosecution of Peacekeepers in the ICC for Trafficking, Sexual Slavery and 
Related Crimes against Women a Possibility? (Master’s thesis: University of Lund 2004) 13; DeGroot GJ 
‘Wanted: A Few Good Women: Gender Stereotypes and their Implications for Peacekeeping’ (paper presented at 
the 26th annual meeting with the theme Women in NATO forces 26-31 May 2002) available at www.nato.int-
/ims/2002/cwinf2002/cwinf-01.htm [last accessed 19 December 2012].  
8 O’Brien M Overcoming Boys-Will-Be-Boys Syndrome op cit (n 7) 13. 
9 Ibid. 
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rape do not appear to amount to the level of widespread conduct, other cases of rape did 
exist.
10
 One example of such cases is the gang-rape of a 20-year-old Somali woman in June 
1993 near the ‘Porto’ entry to Mogadishu, after one of the soldiers had beaten her into a semi-
conscious state.
11
 It has also been reported that on or about 14-15 June 1993, peacekeepers 
forced a Somali woman into a container and gang-raped her.
12
 A similar incident is 
reported that another young Somali woman was raped with a pistol flare at the ‘Demonio’ 
check-point, North of Mogadishu, in November 1993.
13 
 
Other instances of criminal conduct point to acts of torture and physical abuse. There have been 
allegations that soldiers subjected a detained Somali man, Aden Abukar Alì, to electric shocks 
in the Johar camp,
14
 and that, in July 1993, peacekeepers had beaten and seriously injured 
three Somali men.
15
 Acts of torturing and murder of unarmed Somalis by Belgian troops 
stationed in Kismayo have also been reported.
16
 Belgian paratroopers were depicted holding a 
Somali boy above a campfire.
17
 Further instances of murder and grievous bodily harm 
inflicted against civilians by US troops have been reported.
18
 Peacekeepers from Canada have 
also been accused of four cases of murder.
19
 Some allegations are documented and supported 
by photographs.
20
 All of these crimes occurred during UNOSOM II, between June and 
November 1993.
21
  
                                                             
10 The concept of ‘widespread’ may be defined as massive, frequent, large scale action, carried out collectively 
with considerable seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of victims. See Damgaard C Individual 
Criminal Responsibility for Core International Crimes: Selected Pertinent Issues (Springer Berlin 2008) 80. 
11 Amnesty International ‘Italy: A briefing for the UN Committee against Torture’ (AI Index: EUR 30/002/1999 
1 May 1999) 11. 
12 Lupi N ‘Report by the Inquiry Commission on the Behaviour of Italian Peacekeeping Troops in Somalia’ 1998 
(1) Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 375-379, 378.  
13 Ibid. 
14 Amnesty International ‘Italy: A briefing for the UN Committee against Torture’ (AI Index: EUR 30/002/1999 
1 May 1999) 11. 
15 Ibid. 
16 With respect to the Belgian contingent, it is estimated that out of a total of 268 cases of crimes allegedly 
committed by Belgian troops and submitted for investigation, 58 of those cases related to murder or grievous 
bodily harm. One paratrooper interviewed on a Belgian radio estimated the number of killings to be four or five 
times higher. See de Waal A ‘US War crimes in Somalia’ 1998 (30) New Left Review 131-144, 135 et seq; 
Martins M S ‘Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not Lawyering’ 1994(143) US 
Military Law Review 3-160, 66; Adams TK ‘SOF in Peace-Support Operations’1993 (6) Special Warfare 2-7. 
17 Van Baarda TA ‘Military Ethics in Peacekeeping and in War: Maintaining Moral Integrity in a World of 
Contrast and Confusion’ available at http://jha.ac/articles/a129.htm [last accessed 1 July 2011]; Shraga D ‘UN 
Peacekeeping Operations: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and Responsibility for Operations-
Related Damage’ 2000 (94) American Journal of International Law 406-412, 406. 
18 De Waal A ‘US War crimes in Somalia’ 1998 (30) New Left Review 131-144, 137. 
19 Ibid.  
20 Lupi N op cit (n 12) 376. 
21 Ibid. 
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2.2.2 Incidents reported in Burundi 
Regarding Burundi, two UN peacekeepers were repatriated in 2004 after being accused of 
sexual abuse
22
 in Muyinga at the border of Burundi with Tanzania.
23
 The other instance 
relevant to the present study is the case of crime committed by a peacekeeper deployed with 
the UN mission in Burundi. A South African sergeant allegedly raped and killed a 14-year-old 
girl called Therese Nkeshimana.
24
 The killing of this Burundian teenager remains the only 
known instance of murder perpetrated by peacekeepers deployed with ONUB.
25
 Sergeant 
Philippus Jacobus Venter is also reported to have assaulted a guesthouse employee for having 
allegedly refused to rent him and the girl a room.
26
  
It is important to remind the reader that only discovered criminality is reported and makes its 
way into the statistics
27
, and sexual violence against women is, in almost all different 
situations, under-reported.
28
 This is also the case in respect of crimes by UN peacekeepers in 
Burundi. In a report of 2008, the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services recognized that 
there were substantiated allegations that members of a military contingent sexually 
exploited local women in Burundi. In an excerpt from the report, it is explained that: 
In the former ONUB, OIOS substantiated allegations that members of a military contingent 
sexually exploited local women. Their conduct was aided by lax security at the military 
contingent’s camp which facilitated unauthorized access by members of the local population 
into and out of the camp. OIOS also found that though allegations had been brought to the 
attention of the military contingent commander and the poor security situation was known, 
                                                             
22 See Busari S ‘Charity: Aid workers raping, abusing children’ available at http://edition.cnn.com/2008-
/WORLD/europe/05/27 [last accessed 19 December 2012]. 
23 BBC News ‘UN sex abuse sackings in Burundi: Two United Nations peacekeepers in Burundi have been 
sacked after having sex with prostitutes and minors’, Published 2005/07/19, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk-
/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/4697465.stm [last accessed 21 December 2012]. 
24 Williams K ‘SA exports a culture of sexual abuse’ available at www.genderslinks.org.za/article/south-africa-
exports-a-culture-of-sexual-abuse-2006-03-10 [last accessed 21 December 2012]. 
25 Otto H ‘SA Soldier Facing Murder Charge in Burundi’ (27 February 2006) at www.iol.co.za/news-
/africa/sasoldier-facing-murder-charge-in-burundi-1.267660 [last accessed 21 December 2012]. 
26 Ibid. 
27 The most significant problem is that a substantial proportion of all crime goes unreported to police. 
Unreported crimes represent the so-called ‘dark figure’ of crime because their nature and extent are unknown. 
See Luckenbill DF and Miller K  ‘Criminology’ 2006 (39) Bryant-45099 Part VIII.qxd  391-398, 392 ; Nabi A 
‘The Enigma of the Crime of Cattle Theft in Colonial Sindh 1843 – 1947’ 2011 (3) Pakistan Journal of 
Criminology 35-102, 59; Skogan WG ‘Dimension of the Dark Figure of Unreported crimes’ 1977 Crime and 
Delinquency 41-50, 42. 
28 Bastick M, Grimm K & Kunz R Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict Global Overview and Implications for the 
Security Sector (DCAF Geneva-Switzerland 2007) 51, 117; Amnesty International Burundi: No protection from 
rape in war and peace (AI Index: AFR 16/002/2007 London 2007) 7; Gilliard N ‘Peacekeepers or Perpetrators? 
An analysis of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) by UN personnel in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ 
2010-2011 (3) Mapping Politics 27-35, 34. 
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little or no action was taken by the commander to address the issue. OIOS recommended to 
the Department of Field Support that the case be referred to the concerned Troop-Contributing 
Country for appropriate action; however, to date, no response from the Troop-Contributing 
Country has been received.29 
From an analysis of the above excerpt, it would appear that, despite the existence of a code of 
conduct devised in response to reports of sexual exploitation of host populations by several 
peacekeeping missions in Africa, the situation is still not curbed. It is even considered that 
cases of sexual exploitation and abuse remain underreported.
30
 This may be attributed to 
factors such as the fact that rape victims themselves do not always wish to come forward with 
a complaint, owing to fear, ignorance, or cultural barriers.
31
 It was hoped that the 
establishment of an ONUB Code of Conduct Unit and the appointment a gender adviser 
would reduce the problem of sexual exploitation and abuse as well as the effect of 
underreporting sexual criminal acts by peacekeepers in Burundi.
32
 Diop, the military 
spokesman of the UN Operation in Burundi, is quoted to have said that he has been in contact 
with the Burundian police chief from the area where the alleged crimes took place.
33
 No other 
details are, however, available.
34
 
                                                             
29 Report on the activities of the OIOS - Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the 
United Nations peacekeeping operations - Report on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services 
for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2007 (UN. Doc. A/62/281 (Part II) 25 February 2008) para 36. 
30 Dahrendorf N Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: Lessons Learned Study - Addressing Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse in MONUC DRC (Department of Peacekeeping Operations or of the United Nations March 2006) para 36.  
31 Van der Bijl C and Rumney P ‘Attitudes, Rape and Law Reform in South Africa 2010 (73) Journal of 
Criminal Law 414-449, 420. Cases of abuse go unreported for fear of stigmatisation. Children fear their parents 
would beat them if they told them that they themselves had been abused. Children are afraid of physical 
retribution by the perpetrator or fear that the authorities would not believe them. Rape and other offences of a 
sexual nature are notoriously underreported in almost every society. This underreporting is 'exacerbated in direct 
proportion to the degree a society denigrates a victim for the offence perpetrated upon him or her', as violence of 
a sexual nature engenders multiple levels of shame to the victims, their families, and communities. Husbands and 
families reject the women as soiled after rape has occurred. See Csáky C No One to Turn To: The under-
reporting of child sexual exploitation and abuse by aid workers and peacekeepers (London Save the Children 
UK 2008)12-14.   
32 The number of the complaints relating to sexual behaviour totaled 536. There were 136 specific complaints 
related to charges of rape. Other incidents of sexual violence are surely not reported. See the report by Krasno J 
External Study: Public Opinion Survey of ONUB's Work in Burundi (City College of New York and Yale 
University New York 2006) 6. 
33 Ibid 23. The worst cases of rape and prostitution occurred in Gitega. See also UN ‘UN conducts inquiry into 
alleged sexual abuse by peacekeepers in Burundi’ available at www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID-
=13623&Cr=burundi&Cr1 [last accessed 19 December 2012]. 
34 Ibid. 
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2.2.3 Incidents reported in the DR Congo 
Concerning the DRC, Human Rights Watch reported that MONUC personnel sexually 
exploited women, and girls as young as 12, where they were deployed.
35
 This report revealed 
that six Moroccans and one French peacekeeper were repatriated owing to criminal conduct.
36
 
The French case alluded to is that of the MONUC logistics employee, Didier Bourguet, who 
video-taped himself abusing underage girls.
37
 The practice of luring girls ‘as young as ten 
years old to have sex in exchange for a cup of milk, a few eggs, peanut butter or a dollar’38 
has come to be known in the war-torn eastern part of the country as kidogo usharati, i.e. little 
prostitution or prostitution where the client pays little or almost nothing.
39
 One victim is 
reported as saying that she ‘negotiated to have sex with one Moroccan peacekeeper but then 
five other Moroccan peacekeepers raped her.’40 It must be borne in mind, however, that 
having sex with a child for a reward is not prostitution. A child cannot give valid consent to 
sexual intercourse. In such circumstances, the conduct amounts to rape in Congolese criminal 
law.
41
 
The above report by NGOs in 2004 was almost confirmed by the OIOS in 2005 when, at the 
end of an investigation, the UN found that certain UN peacekeepers in the DRC were having 
sex with women in exchange for food and money.
42
 According to one report, the Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations, in 2003, conducted an investigation into the allegations of sexual 
                                                             
35 Human Rights Watch ‘MONUC:  A Case for Peacekeeping Reform’ (Testimony of Anneke Van Woudenberg 
before the U.S. House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights 
and International Operations 1 March  2004) www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/03/01/congo10222.htm [last 
accessed 21 December 2012]; Hanlon H ‘Implications for Health Care Practice and Improved Policies for 
Victims of Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ 2008 (10) Journal of International Women’s 
Studies 64-72, 65. 
36 Human Rights Watch op cit (n 35). 
37 Didier Bourguet is the name of a United Nations senior official from France accused of running an Internet 
paedophile ring in the Congo, where the U.N. was supposed to be protecting vulnerable people. See Malkin M 
‘UN Sex Scandal: Heads Are Starting to Roll’ (12 February 2005) http://michellemalkin.com/2005/02/12/who-is-
didier-bourguet/ [last accessed 21 December 2012]. Bourguet has been sentenced to nine years in prison. See 
article entitled ‘RDC: Didier Bourget condamné à 9 ans de prison’ of 12 September 2008 referring to the 
judgment of the preceding day. The article is available at www.laconscience.com/article.php?id_article=7787 
[last accessed 21 December 2012]. 
38 Notar SA ‘Peacekeepers as Perpetrators: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse of Women and Children in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo’ 2006 (14) American University of Gender, Social Policy and the Law 413-
429, 413. 
39
 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 The age of consent to sexual intercourse is set at 18. Therefore any sexual intercourse with a minor who has 
note reached the age of consent is rape perpetrated with violence. See article 170 of the Congolese Penal Code. 
42 UNGA A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping 
Operations by Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein (UN. Doc. A/59/710 of 24 March 2005). 
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exploitation and abuse by peacekeeping personnel, military, and civilians.
43
 Five staff and 19 
military members were involved.
44
 It is mentioned in the report that the allegations might not 
reflect the true extent of these deplorable incidents for lack of complaint procedures and 
victim support mechanisms.
45
  
In 2004, between May and September, MONUC received 72 allegations of sexual 
exploitation and abuse: 68 against military personnel and four against civilian MONUC 
employees.
46
 After Prince Zeid’s visit to the DRC in October 2004, and particularly to the 
town of Bunia, he wrote that he sensed the plight was widespread and involved civilian and 
military personnel.
47
 Of a total of 105 allegations, 16 related to civilians, nine to civil police 
and 80 to military personnel.
48
 All concerned sex with under-aged persons (under 18)
49
; 31% 
of the cases were classified as sex with prostitutes, 13% as rape, and 5% as sexual assault.
50
 
Should the widespread term be accorded the same meaning as in the Rome statute?
51
 
According to Miller, acts of sexual exploitation and abuse of Congolese women and girls by 
MONUC personnel in Bunia indicated a pattern of widespread sexual abuse in the sense 
contemplated in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
52
 She compares these 
acts to those that occurred in Rwanda, Somalia, and Srebrenica in the 1990s.
53
  
From the OIOS report of investigation relating to the period between January and 
December 2007, one can infer that, where allegations have not been substantiated, it does 
not mean the alleged crimes were not actually committed, but, perhaps, that the perpetrators 
                                                             
43 UNGA op cit (n 42) para 7. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 UNGA op cit (n 42) para 8. 
47 UNGA op cit (n 42) paras 8-9. 
48 Ibid. 
49 It must be noted that not all countries have the age of consent to sex as high, at 18, as it is in the DRC. The fact 
that the age of consent differs from country to country, for instance in France agent of consent is 15, in Canada it 
is 14 for sexual intercourse male-female or female-female but 18 for male-male. In Belgium and in South Africa 
the age of consent is 16. See Legal Search Site ‘Legal Age of Consent’ www.ageofconsent.com.indix.htm [last 
accessed 16 August 2012]. These variations in the setting of the age of consent in different country law systems 
do not give peacekeepers an excuse and cannot excuse their lack of accountability.  
50 Ibid. 
51 In article 7 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, “widespread” is used to distinguish crimes against humanity from 
ordinary crimes.  Widespread, therefore, means on a large-scale. Crimes are said to have been committed on 
widespread level if their perpetration involves large participation of perpetrators, large numbers of victims, or 
large numbers of similar criminal acts. 
52 Miller SK ‘Accountability for the Conduct of UN-Mandated Forces under International Human Rights Law: A 
Case Study Concerning Sexual Abuse of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)’ in 
Arnold R & Knoops GJA (eds) Practice and Policies of Modern Peace Support Operations under International 
Law (Transnational Publishers Ardsley 2006) 261-286, 267.  
53 Ibid. 
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had been rotated or commanders and other responsible staff had decided to cover up the 
incident to maintain the image of the contingent. For instance, with respect to MONUC, 
the Office of Internal Oversight Services indicated that it substantiated an allegation of 
sexual exploitation and abuse of a 9-year-old boy.
54
 Although the commanders of the 
national contingent made the offending peacekeeper pay compensation to the child’s 
mother, local authorities, and others, they omitted to report the incident to the Head of 
Mission as required. The office found the attitude of the contingent commanders to be 
that of trying to cover up the abuse.
55
 The office recommended that appropriate action 
be considered by the concerned Troop-Contributing Country for appropriate action 
against the peacekeeper and contingent commanders.
56
 As late as 2008, MONUC troops 
have been accused of sexual exploitation and child abuse.
57
 Despite these accusations, 
sexual conduct by UN peacekeepers remains very much underreported, and complaints are 
not well-documented. Contingent commanders are not eager to cooperate with investigating 
teams, and the victims, mostly women and young girls and children, do not report these 
crimes in fear of the negative perception publicity they can cause and reactions on the part 
of their community.
58
 A survey of 2,620 adult residents conducted in the eastern DRC 
confirms this assertion.
59
 The persons surveyed mentioned that they fear to talk openly 
about their experiences in the conflict even though they wish that justice would be done.
60
 
Allegations of rape by peacekeepers, therefore, are not only rare, but also their scarcity 
indicates that reports do not reflect the reality on the ground.
61
 Instances of rape, moreover, 
are disguised as prostitution or referred to only as sexual abuse without any further 
                                                             
54 UNGA Report of the OIOS on UN personnel conduct in the field (A/62/281 (Part II) of 25 February 2008) 
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55 UNGA Report of the OIOS on UN personnel conduct in the field (A/62/281 (Part II) of 25 February 2008) 
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56 Ibid. 
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58 Spencer SW ‘Making Peace: Preventing and Responding to Sexual Exploitation by United Nations 
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60 Ibid. 
61 Supra 2.2.2 Burundi. Also UN OIOS report seems to downplay incidents of crimes by peacekeepers, 
especially those not substantiated. See Report of the OIOS on UN personnel conduct in the field (A/62/281 (Part 
II) of 25 February 2008) para 38. 
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description.
62
 An example reported by Quénivet is that of ‘girls (that) claimed that a 
peacekeeper raped them and then provided them with money or food afterwards to give the 
appearance of a consensual transaction’.63 
The only reported case of pornography is that of Didier Bourguet.
64
 The DR Congo police 
arrested Bourguet in the eastern city of Goma in October 2004 and turned him over to French 
authorities for prosecution.
65
 Interrogated by the French police, Bourguet admitted to having 
had sex with more than 20 girls.
66
 Bourguet, the MONUC logistician, was convicted of 
having raped almost 23 girls under the age of 18. The facts were supported by video pictures 
and records on his computer.
67
 Despite the existence of cases similar to that of Bourguet, the 
reality remains that sexual crimes are in all instances underreported
68
, and official reports do 
not necessarily reflect accurate data.
69
 The existing UN reports on sexual exploitation and 
abuse, therefore, do not accurately reflect the actual extent of the problem in the countries 
hosting the currently ongoing peacekeeping operations.
70
 Reports of NGOs operating in 
conflict zones have also reached the conclusion that sexual exploitation and abuse is 
significantly underreported.
71
 This underreporting is due to the fact that most of victims are 
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66 Ndulo M ‘The United Nations Responses to the Sexual Abuse and Exploitation of Women and Girls by 
Peacekeepers during Peacekeeping Missions’ 2008 (27) Berkeley journal of International Law 126-160, 143-
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68 Sexual violence was generally underreported. See Bastick M, Grimm K and Kunz R Sexual Violence in Armed 
Conflict: Global Overview and Implications for the Security Sector (DCAF Geneva 2007) 159. 
69 Official reports of rape may suggest that the crime is rare event. See Odem ME and Clay-Warner J (eds) 
Confronting Rape and Sexual Assault - Worlds of Women’s (SR Books Delaware 1998) xii. 
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 Chun S Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Peacekeepers (International Peace Research Institute policy 
brief Oslo 2009). Since rape is often underreported and many women do not seek medical care after sexual 
violence, it is likely that these numbers underestimate the true incidence of sexual assault. See HHI ‘Now, the 
World is Without Me’: An Investigation of Sexual Violence in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo 
(Report Harvard Humanitarian Initiative April 2010) 6. 
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unaware of reporting mechanisms, and, where such mechanisms do in fact exist, victims may 
still refrain from reporting because of fearing the stigmatization their reporting might cause.
72
 
The  United  Nations  has  acknowledged this fear of stigmatization in one of its reports which 
reveals that ‘reports from other United Nations organizations, other than peacekeeping 
missions, suggest chronic underreporting of allegations of sexual exploitation  and  abuse, in 
particular of minors, by United Nations personnel, as well as personnel from  the international 
community’.73 A UN official has said that the underreporting issue is being addressed by 
training and monitoring especially of civilian staff.
74
  
 
As crimes by peacekeepers are not limited to sexual-related crimes, it must be noted, 
regarding the case of the DRC, that the media have reported that MONUC personnel looted 
natural resources.
75
 Even though MONUC has been reluctant to acknowledge the facts, 
elephant tusks and rhinoceros horns, as well as lengths of wood ready for export, have been 
found stocked at MONUC Headquarters.
76
  
With respect to the arms-for-minerals trafficking, it is important to recall the existing embargo 
on arms in the restive DRC.
77
 Although the embargo resolution is addressed to States, the 
alleged sale of guns by peacekeepers to armed groups and militia in return for precious stones 
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or minerals is in violation of the Security Council resolution that imposed an arms embargo 
on Ituri and the Kivus.
78
 An embargo resolution on arms, however, is a prohibition which 
does not entail direct criminal responsibility against those who violate it. The UN does not 
have criminal jurisdiction over violators of embargoes.
79
 If a UN peacekeeper trades weapons 
with armed groups, to which person can such conduct be attributed?
80
 If the UN Organisation 
itself, through its deployed soldiers, violates the embargo, the conduct might go unpunished.
81
 
Providing weapons to groups known to perpetrate atrocious acts would be considered to be an 
act of complicity entailing individual criminal liability.
82
 
2.2.4 Synopsis of the crimes allegedly committed by peacekeepers 
From an analysis of the discussion above, it is evident that sexual crimes, in particular the 
crime of rape, are the most prevalent in the three host countries, although this kind of crime is 
greatly underreported. Murder and assault by peacekeepers have been reported in Somalia and 
Burundi, pillaging (looting) has occurred in Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(although the object of pillage differs). Torture has been reported specifically in Somalia; 
weapons trafficking (infringement of Security Council Resolutions imposing embargoes) is 
specific to the Democratic Republic of Congo. Involvement with prostitutes has been reported 
in Burundi and DRC. The following section, therefore, investigates how the domestic law of 
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each Host State deals with these crimes, the focus being on crimes allegedly committed in at 
least one of the three countries.
83
 
2.3 The law of the Host State with respect to the alleged crimes 
From an analysis of the foregoing, the crimes of rape and other sexual acts of violence, 
murder, torture and assault, as well as looting and weapons trafficking have been allegedly 
committed by different peacekeepers in Africa. These acts constitute offences under Somali, 
Burundian, and Congolese (DRC) domestic criminal law.
84
 The aim of this section is to 
discuss the crimes alleged to have been committed by peacekeepers to determine what 
provisions under the domestic law of the Host States are infringed. In each discussion, it will 
be mentioned what is understood by the specific crime and its elements. The defences with 
regard to the crimes will also be discussed where relevant and whether such defences may be 
applicable to peacekeepers. 
2.3.1 Somali law 
2.3.1.1 Rape 
At the outset of the discussion of rape, it is important to note that, regarding the frequency of 
this crime in Somalia, most victims of rape refrain from reporting instances of rape because a 
woman who is raped is often forced to marry her attacker.
85
 This is ostensibly so as to protect 
the woman’s honour and serves to ensure full payment of her dowry by the attacker’s clan to 
the victim’s clan.86 An unmarried and raped woman will, therefore, typically meet a demand 
from her own family and clan to marry the rapist as she will no longer have a chance to marry 
anyone else.
87
 An unmarried woman who gets raped and refuses to marry the rapist may face 
severe consequences from her own family and clan, and she may be excluded from the clan.
88
 
A married woman who has been the victim of rape may also risk being divorced by her 
husband.
89
 As a consequence many rapes go unreported by the women. Although instances of 
rape and killings constituted the majority of the reported human rights violations in Somalia 
                                                             
83 Pillaging (looting) and weapon-trafficking are not part of the discussion that follows because the focus is on 
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84
 The concept ‘domestic law’ refers to the national law of a given country. 
85 See UK Border Agency Country of Origin Information Report (COI Report 24 February 2009) para 23.19.  
86 Ibid. 
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by peacekeepers, many rapes are unreported.
90
 The fear of reporting has some bearing upon 
crimes perpetrated against women by foreign forces, even though the victims would not be 
asked to marry the perpetrators of the crime. 
91
 
(a) Definition of rape 
Rape is not expressly defined in Somali law.
92
 The words used by the Somali penal Code, 
however, suggest that, as in any other jurisdiction, the crime of rape is generally construed as 
referring to non-consensual sexual intercourse. The words ‘with violence or threats’ cause one 
to think that the act is committed by physical force, threat of injury, or other acts of duress. 
Thus, rape includes all forms of coercive sex and any situation in which one person uses a 
position of power or authority to coerce another to have sex with him or her.
93
 The code 
excludes same-sex rape from the ambit of the legislation owing to the fact that for the crime to 
be established, the act must have been perpetrated against ‘a person of the other sex.’94 
Regarding this limitation or exclusion, the concept of rape is narrow. It is not, however, 
possible to envisage that the Code should have brought into rape law all instances of non-
consensual sex at the time the code was devised.
95
 Paragraph 4 of Article 398 defines carnal 
intercourse as ‘penetration by the male sexual organ.’ As Ganzglass comments, however, ‘by 
the use of the word “whoever”, rape can theoretically be committed by a person of either sex, 
a man against a woman or a woman against a man.’96  
From the above definition constructed using Somali law, rape requires four elements, namely 
a material act of penetration, a lack of consent on the part of the other person, unlawfulness, 
and culpability in the form of intention. Although rape is nowadays construed as gender 
natural, the overwhelming majority of rape victims are still women, especially in armed 
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Humanitarian Dialogue Geneva 2005) 38. The demand from the victim’s clan to marry her rapist occurs 
generally in peacetime. Thus, unmarried victims of rape by, for instance, militiamen are not asked to marry the 
rapist who may even not be known to the clan of the victim. See UK Border Agency op cit (n 85) para 23.19. 
92 Article 398 (1) of the Somali Penal Code simply provides that ‘whoever, with violence or threats, has carnal 
intercourse with a person of the other sex, shall be punished with imprisonment from five to fifteen years.’ See 
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conflicts.
97
 During the UN mission of peace in Somalia, all accusations were levelled against 
male peacekeepers.
98
 
(b) The material act of rape  
The act of rape, as described by the Somali domestic criminal law, always requires sexual 
intercourse in the sense of some penetration, however slight, of the penis into the vagina.
99
 A 
rape conviction requires proof that the sexual act was committed forcibly and against the 
victim's will. Thus, where the victim was unconscious, mentally disabled or a minor, forcible 
rape can still be established even in the absence of the use of force and the absence of any 
resistance on the part of the victim.
100
 False pretences will also be sufficient to convict a 
person of rape. This will be the case where the perpetrator resorted to the ruse of 
impersonating another person, or where deception was used to accomplish the crime.
101
 
Resistance on the part of the victim is, therefore, not a requirement in the same way as force. 
Indeed, the main material element of rape in Somali law, apart from sexual penetration by the 
male organ, consists of the use of force or threats of force by the perpetrator against the 
victim.
102
 The threat must convey the danger of immediate harm to the victim unless she 
submits to the offender.
103
 
In most cases of carnal violence before any court of law, the main defence on the part of the 
person accused of rape is that the victim consented and agreed to sexual intercourse. In the 
context of peacekeepers, their position and the coercive environment may suffice to exclude 
any possible consent, especially if the victim complained.
104
 The prosecution, however, still 
has to show, beyond reasonable doubt, that the person charged resorted to violence or 
threats.
105
 It is important to find some traces on the victim’s or accused’s body to show such 
                                                             
97 Hendricks C and Hutton L Defence Reform and Gender (Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces-
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important elements of the crime.
106
 So, if a prosecution is conducted a long time after the 
perpetration of the crimes, it may be difficult to establish such an element.  
(c) Consent element.  
A lack of consent is present whenever the perpetrator uses violence or threats, had carnal sex 
with persons incapable of giving valid consent, in circumstances of intoxication or where 
another person is impersonated in order to deceive the victim.
107
 The provision is broad 
enough to extend to a ‘public officer who by abuse of his power has carnal intercourse with a 
person of the other sex who is under arrest or detained in custody under the said officer by 
reason of his office or entrusted to him in execution of an order of the competent authority’.108  
According to articles 50, 51, 57-59, a person who is mentally deficient, and a person under the 
influence of alcohol or under the influence of drugs, a deaf or dumb person, and an individual 
who has not reached the age of 14 are unable to give valid consent to sexual intercourse.
109
 
Any act of a sexual nature performed with one of these persons is rape and is deemed to have 
been perpetrated with violence. 
(d) Unlawfulness 
As to possible defences regarding anyone charged or prosecuted for any offence, the 
legislation has provided for possible defences. Under Somali law, these defences range from 
physical compulsion; mistake caused by deceit of another, consent of the injured party, 
private defence, and the state of necessity.
110
  
With respect to rape or carnal intercourse, and in the context of peacekeepers, the defence 
most likely to be used is ‘consent’. Such defence tends to assert that the act is lawful, not that 
it is justified. Consent is not a ground of justification when it comes to rape, but a definitional 
element without which the crime of rape does not exist. 
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With respect to Somali women raped by peacekeepers, it is unthinkable to assert that the 
victims might have consented to the sexual atrocities perpetrated against them taking into 
account the circumstances prevailing in Somalia at the time of commission.
111
 In the 
dangerous and coercive environment of war that prevailed in Somalia, any consent extorted 
from the victim cannot be regarded as genuine. In any case, to establish this element the 
accused can invoke this defence in the course of the judicial proceedings launched against 
him. Where such proceedings have not been launched, lack of consent is presumed.
112
 
Where a person applies either physical force or coercion to another and causes the latter to act 
contrary to his or her free choice or will, for instance to commit rape, the forced person acts 
without the required mental element.
113
 The application of such force must be of a certain 
severity or apprehension to deprive the person to whom it is inflicted of his or her free choice, 
or to destroy his or her volition.
114
 Duress of the circumstances or necessity, however, cannot 
justify rape.  
Defendants who actually committed the crime of rape can be found ‘not guilty by reason of 
insanity’ because of the belief that people should be punished for their crimes only if they 
could control their behaviour and knew that what they were doing was wrong.
115
 Whenever it 
may be proven that an accused lacked capacity to appreciate or control his conduct, no 
criminal responsibility can attach.
116
 If an insane person raped a woman, he cannot be held 
responsible for the act.
117
 It is, therefore, recognized that an individual who is insane when the 
crime is committed is criminally irresponsible owing to his inability to distinguish right from 
wrong, or to appreciate the nature and quality of his conduct regardless of whether such 
conduct consists of act or omission.
118
 Thus, every person charged with an offence is 
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presumed to be of sound mind and to have been of sound mind at any relevant time until the 
contrary is proven.
119
 It is for the accused to establish insanity.
120
 The defence of insanity 
relates to culpability.  
(e) Culpability  
From the legal perspective, culpability describes the degree of the accused’s blameworthiness 
in the commission of the prohibited act.
 
In Somali criminal law, it is expressly indicated that 
no person can be held criminally liable if it is not proven that such a person is capable of 
understanding and of volition to be blamed for his/her acts.
121
 Apart from cases of conditional 
liability,
122
 the type of severity of the punishment attached to an offence follows the degree of 
blameworthiness. Actually culpability encompasses criminal capacity and mens rea (intent 
and negligence). Intent is required for rape, not negligence. 
 Criminal capacity.  
Criminal capacity is understood as the state of being considered criminally responsible with 
respect to the mental state of the actor.
123
 It is not the capacity or ability to commit crime, but 
the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct and the capacity to act in 
accordance with that appreciation. As Ganzglass points out, the question here relates to the 
actual capacity of the person accused to understand the consequences of the act when he or 
performed the said act.
124
 The inquiry is whether at the time of his/her conduct he or she had 
any understanding of what he or she was doing.
125
 If it is found that the accused did 
understand what he or she was actually doing, he or she will be considered criminally liable. 
  
                                                             
119 The Somali Penal Code excludes instances of self induced mental deficiency. See article 49 of the Somali 
Penal Code. 
120 It remains possible to suggest that before the number of troops from each contributing country is determined, 
there should be a test of psychological and mental screening. Such a test may minimize the possibility of mental 
disorder while on mission. It must be said that the situation of mental disease among peacekeepers will not 
usually present itself. The defence of insanity remains available to an accused peacekeeper. 
121 Article 47(1) of the Somali Penal Code. 
122
 Article 22 of the Somali Penal Code provides for conditional criminal liability. It states that a person can be 
criminally responsible for the offence even though the consequence constituting the necessary condition for the 
act to be punishable was not desired by the offender. 
123 Ganzglass MR op cit (n 93) 68. 
124 Ganzglass MR op cit (n 93) 69. 
125 Ibid. 
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In Somali law, anyone over the age of 14 is presumed to be capable of committing a crime, 
but this presumption can be rebutted by proof of either mental or physical incapacity. This 
means that a minor between the age of 14 and 18 can be considered to have perpetrated a 
crime of ‘carnal violence’ if he or she has carnal intercourse with a person of the opposite sex 
against his or her consent or because such a person is minor.
126
 
Regarding rapes committed by peacekeepers, however, it is not possible to think of a single 
situation where peacekeepers could claim to have not reached the age of criminal capacity. 
For that reason, it is not relevant to discuss this aspect further.  For a peacekeeper to be held 
guilty of a sexual crime, however, it must be shown that he or she had the required mens rea 
for such a crime. 
 Mens rea: Intention. 
Intention is the mental fault requirement of rape.
127
 The defendant's state of mind at the time 
of the offence is sometimes called the guilty mind which is actually inferred from the means 
used to accomplish the act, i.e. violence or threats.
128
 Indeed, the main element of the crime of 
carnal violent intercourse is actually the use of force or threat by the offender against the 
victim and without the victim’s consent.129 The crime of carnal violence or rape in the Somali 
Penal Code also requires intention in the sense that the offence exists if the offender resorts to 
violence or a threat of violence or abuses his power or authority.
130
 This means that rape 
cannot be committed by negligence, save for situations of command responsibility
131
 and 
superior orders which is encountered under international criminal law.
132
  
                                                             
126 Articles 47-60 of the Somali Penal Code. A person of an age between 14 and 18 years old is criminally liable 
but the punishment is reduced. Before the age of 14, the person is considered to have not capacity of 
understanding and volition to be held liable. 
127 The mens rea of rape in form of intention is usually expressly mentioned in the statutory provision. 
128 See combined reading of articles 32 and 398(1) of the Somali Penal Code.  
129 Ganzglass MR op cit (n 93) 444. 
130 Article 398 of the Somali Penal Code. 
131 A force commander is personally responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for having 
disregarded information available that such crimes were about to be committed or neglected to act upon such 
information. Thus, Tomoyuki Yamashita, the Japanese commanding general in charge of the Philippines, was 
tried and convicted by a U.S. military tribunal for war crimes committed by troops under his command and 
ultimately executed. His troops were accused of starvation, execution or massacre without trial, torture, rape, 
murder and wanton destruction of property which were foremost among the outright violations of the laws of 
war and of the conscience of a civilized world. See Yamashita v. Styer 327 U.S. 1 (1946). The United States 
Supreme Court, in In re Yamashita, described command responsibility as "an affirmative duty to take such 
measures as [are] within his power and appropriate in the circumstances to protect prisoners of war and the 
civilian population." 327 U.S. 1, 16 (1946). See The Yale Law Journal Company, Inc. ‘Command Responsibility 
for War Crimes’1973 (82) The Yale Law Journal 1274-1304, 1275. See also, The American Society of 
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2.3.1.2 Other sexual acts and sexual offences involving children 
Civilians in a conflict zone in Africa, such as Somalia, particularly women and children, are 
often vulnerable to sexual violence from state forces and non-state actors.
133
 Some abuses 
appear to be opportunistic, owing to an overall breakdown in the rule of law and social order 
during conflicts.
134
 Regarding armed groups, sexual violence has been employed by 
combatants as a tool of war, seemingly designed to wreak damage on entire communities.
135
  
As far as Somalia and the mission of peace deployed there in the 1990s are concerned, it is 
important to mention that sexual activities involving children have not been reported. This 
does not necessarily mean that they did not occur in Somalia.
136
  Regarding sex with children, 
it has also been indicated that the Somali Penal Code considers it to be rape if the victim, at 
the time of the act, was not capable of giving a valid consent.
137
  
With respect to prostitution, it is important to note that there have not been allegations that 
peacekeepers have adopted such conduct.
138
 It is also noteworthy to mention that the Somali 
penal code does not indicate that the client of a prostitute incurs criminal liability.
139
 With 
respect to fraternisation with prostitutes or ‘engaging the services of a prostitute’, therefore, if 
a peacekeeper happens to be prosecuted back in his country on the charge of engaging the 
services of a prostitute, he can assert that the conduct alleged to have been committed is not 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
International law (ASIL) ‘Judicial Decisions in re Yamashita Supreme Court of The United States [February 4, 
1946.]’ 1946 (40) The American Journal of International Law 432-480, 447. 
132 In the Akayesu case for instance, the ICTR decided that the accused was guilty of crimes against humanity 
that included encouraging rapes of Tutsi women during the genocidal campaign while he was a communal 
leader, even if he himself was not charged with the act of rape (The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-
4, 2 September 1998). In the Celebici decision, the ICTY found Zdravko Mucic guilty, on the basis of command 
responsibility, of crimes of sexual violence committed by the guards at the Celebici prison camp (The Prosecutor 
v. Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo, IT-96-21-T, 16 November 1998). In these two 
cases, the crime for which the superiors are prosecuted should be considered different. Encouraging rape in the 
former, and failure to prevent or punish in the latter, but not rape per se. It may actually appear absurd to 
consider a commander a rapist because one of his soldiers commits a rape.Where vicious, revengeful actions 
have been widespread and there has been no attempt by a commander to discover and control the criminal acts, 
such a commander may be held responsible, even criminally liable, for the lawless acts of his troops, depending 
upon their nature and the circumstances surrounding them. See Parks WH ‘Command Responsibility for War 
Crimes’1973 (62) Military Law Review 1-104, 30. 
133 Arieff A Sexual Violence in African Conflicts (Congressional Research Service 25 November 2009). 
134 Ibid. 7 et passim. 
135 Ibid.  
136 Only discovered criminality is considered. Whenever there is no report alluding to such an occurrence, it is 
difficult to try to depict its occurrence. 
137 Supra 2.3.1.1. (c). 
138 There is nosingle report indicating that UNOSOM personnel fraternized with prostitutes in Somalia. The 
circumstances were not favourable for such conduct. 
139 See Articles 405-408 of the Somali Penal Code. These articles relate to practising prostitution, brothel 
keeping, and compulsion in prostitution. 
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an offence under the law of the host country.
140
 Such a peacekeeper is asserting that he did 
observe his obligation to respect local laws.
141
  
2.3.1.3 Murder  
(a) Definition of murder 
Murder is not defined by the Somali Penal Code as such. It provides solely that ‘whoever 
commits murder shall be punished with death.’142 It does not give the elements of the crime of 
this kind of homicide. When, however, one combines the interpretation of article 24 of the 
code which relates to the mental attitude of the offender and article 445 which provides for 
prosecution and punishment of homicide by negligence, the understanding is that murder is 
always a wilful killing.
143
 In Somalia, this crime receives the death penalty.
144
 In a situation 
where the accused intended to commit an assault or another crime against the deceased but 
had no intention to inflict death, the sentence varies from ten to fifteen years of 
imprisonment.
145
 If homicide is brought about by negligence, the punishment is imprisonment 
of six months to five years.
146
With respect to peacekeepers, the findings of the Italian 
Government Commission of Inquiry into Events in Somalia indicate that instances of torturing 
and ill-treating of Somalis to death did actually occur.
147
 Similar allegations were made by the 
                                                             
140 The Somali law cannot prosecute a peacekeeper for visiting prostitutes. See articles 1 and 2 of the Somali 
Penal Code, which relate to the principle of legality. 
141 Annex II - Standards of conduct for United Nations peacekeeping personnel (UN Doc. A/61/645 of 18 
December 2006) para 5. See also Rule 2 of the Ten Rules - Code of Conduct for Blue Helmets; We Are United 
Nations Peacekeepers [Obligations]. 
142 Article 434 of the Somali Penal Code. 
143 Ibid.  
144 In the case of Jama Hassan Wais v State (Criminal Appeal No.2 of 1965), the Supreme Court held that where 
the homicide against Mohammed Aden was accidental was in that Wais did not shoot him from a distance but 
during a struggle as the presence of the powder of the rifle could be found on the corpse of the victim. The trial 
court erred to convict Wais of murder and sentence him to death. It set the conviction and sentence aside. See the 
discussion of the Wais by Ganzglass MR op cit (n 93) 481-482. 
145 Article 441, Somali Penal Code. 
146 Article 445, Somali Penal Code. 
147
 There were also allegations that, around 23 October 1993, a child caught stealing food had been locked in a 
container, in stifling heat, without food or drink, for two days and two nights, and that its cries of distress were 
ignored; when the container was finally opened the child was found to be dead. See ‘Belgium-Alleged Human 
Rights Violations by Members of the Armed Forces in Somalia’, OSCE Human Dimension Implementation 
Meeting, Warsaw, November 1997: Human Rights Are an Essential Component of European Security, Amnesty 
International September 1997AI Index: EUR 01/06/97, 16. 
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Somalis and by Somali human rights monitors against
 
Belgian, Canadian, and other 
contingent members.
148 
 
(b) Definitional elements of murder  
Although the Somali Penal Code in itself does not give information regarding the elements of 
the crime of murder, it is considered that the material act of murder consists in the intentional 
taking off a person’s life.149 As one author has put it, ‘murder is a crime that is clearly 
understood and well defined in the domestic law of every state’150 and the way the act of 
taking the victim’s life takes place does not matter, ‘the death may be caused by shooting, 
stabbing, poisoning, burning, starving, torturing, exploding, electrocuting, beating, running 
over, or any other method, so long as the act caused the death’.151  
Murder is a materially defined crime; this means that the conduct ought to result in death.
152
 
In fact murder can be perpetrated only against a living being, i.e. a person who has been born 
alive and who is still alive when the fatal conduct occurs, and the act must have been 
perpetrated deliberately and unlawfully.
153
 This means that an intentional killing of a human 
being is not unlawful if done under circumstances where the perpetrator has available a 
defence excluding unlawfulness. The unlawfulness of the act must be established.
154
 
  
                                                             
148 Amnesty International ‘Italy: A briefing for the UN Committee against Torture’ Amnesty International (May 
1999 AI Index: EUR 30/02/99) 9-14. For instance, refrence is made to the alleged rape and murder of a 13-year-
old Somali boy by an army major inside the former Italian Embassy in Mogadishu in March 1994, and to the 
allegations of Hashi Omar Hassan that in September 1993 he had been hooded, bound hand and foot, tortured 
and together with some 20 other male prisoners, all bound and hooded, thrown into the sea where all but he 
drownedThe Commission also indicated that members of the Italian armed forces had presented false 
documentation to investigators to cover up their involvement in the ill-treatment of Somalis. A case in point is 
the killing of Mr. Ahmed Afraraho Aruush, who was challenged, fled, and was subsequently fatally shot by 
Detachment 64A. See Canadian Commission of Enquiry into events in Somalia, available at www.dnd.ca/site-
/reports-rapports/som/vol5/index-eng.asp [last accessed 25 March 2012]. 
149 Ganzglass MR op cit (n 93) 481. 
150 Zimmermann A ‘Preliminary Remarks on para 2(c)-(f) and para 3 (of article 8 of the Rome Statue): War 
Crimes Committed in an Armed Conflict not of an International Character’ in Triffterer O (ed) Commentary on 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes Article by Article (C. H. Beck Baden-
Baden 2008) 262-288. 
151 Ganzglass op cit (n 93) 480.  
152 Articles 435 and 437 of the Somali Penal Code use concepts ‘infanticide and of suicide’. The ‘cide’ suffix 
used in those words means to kill or to cause death. Death is only possible with respect to a living being. 
Therefore, murder cannot be conceived of without the proof that the person was alive before the conduct of the 
accused. The death must have been the result of the conduct of the person accused. 
153 If the act was not deliberate, the accused may be found guilty of preterintentional homicide or homicide by 
negligence. See articles 441 and 445 of the Somali Penal Code. 
154 The act must not be covered by the grounds listed in articles 32-36 of the Somali Penal Code. 
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(c) Unlawfulness  
A criminal act is punishable only if it is not legally justifiable.
155
 None of the circumstances 
excluding punishment ought to be present. In other words, victim’s consent, performance of a 
duty imposed by law or executing superior orders, private defence, lawful use of a weapon by 
a public officer, the state of necessity and any mistake about any of the above circumstances 
must not be present for the offender to be punished.
156
 The allegations of instances of murder 
by UNOSOM peacekeepers, therefore, fall under the Somali Penal Code and are punishable 
wherever no grounds for justification exist. 
 Consent of the victim157 
It is important to mention from the outset that the general rule is that human beings are free to 
waive their available legal rights if they so choose.
158
 This rule, however, is not applicable in 
all circumstances. In criminal acts, such as murder, it does not lie within the power of the 
victim to render the unlawful act lawful by consenting to suffer the harm.
159
 Indeed, a 
person’s consent to have his or her life taken is not a valid defence.160 Consent as a ground of 
justification operates in specific crimes related to individual interests or rights at his or her 
disposal.
161
 For this reason, consent is not an available ground of justification for murder, 
even in Somali criminal law, though Somali law does not punish homicide perpetrated with 
the consent of the deceased with the death penalty as it does for murder, but with 
imprisonment from six to fifteen years, save where the victim was a person under the age of 
eighteen, an insane person, or if the consent was obtained by violence.
162
 The next issue to be 
considered is whether the performance of a right or of a legal duty may serve as justification 
for the crime of murder. 
                                                             
155 Ibid. 
156 Articles 32-38 of the Somali Penal Code. 
157 Article 32 of the Somali Penal Code. 
158 By available rights one has to understand the rights that a person can legitimately dispose of. See article 32 of 
the Somali Penal Code. 
159
 Ganzglass MR op cit (n 93) 43. 
160 In Somali law the person consenting to being killed can be prosecuted for attempting to commit suicide and 
the one who actually causes the death of the suicide is criminally liable for instigating or aiding the victim to 
commit suicide. See articles 437-438 of the Somali Penal Code. 
161 Article 32 of the Somali Penal Code. 
162 Article 436 of the Somali Penal Code. 
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 Performance of a duty imposed by law or executing superior orders 163 
This ground of justification found in article 33 of the Somali Penal Code provides that a 
person who has acted in the circumstances contemplated by the provision can avail 
him/herself of the defence, provided that he or she did not exceed the limits imposed by law 
or by the order. The actor must have acted in pursuance of the duty, right, or order.
164
 Where 
the order given by a superior was an unlawful one, the subordinate can still be exempt from 
his or her criminal liability if he or she could not question such an order or was mistaken in 
believing that the order was lawful.
165
 One may, therefore, call into question the permission 
by a Canadian commander to fire at intruders or fugitives from the compound.
166
 Whether 
such an order amounts to any defence is open to debate.
167
 Rowe writes that the instruction 
led to the killing of a Somali called Ahmed Aruush on 4 March 1993 by a subordinate.
168
 If 
the perpetrator is identified and prosecuted under Somali law, he can raise the defence of 
superior orders, and the prosecution will have to demonstrate that the order or permission was 
manifestly unlawful.
169
 An accused person can also resort to the defence of private defence.
170
  
Private defence 
The Somali Penal Code does not define or elaborate on this ground of justification. It provides 
only that ‘whoever has committed an act, having been compelled by the necessity of 
defending his own or another person’s right against the actual danger of an unlawful injury, 
shall not be punishable provided that the defence is proportionate to the injury.’171  
                                                             
163 Article 33 of the Somali Penal Code. 
164 Ganzglass MR op cit (n 93) 44. 
165 Article 33 (2) of the Somali Penal Code. 
166 Rouillard LPF ‘Canada’s Prevention and Repression of War Crimes’ 2005 (2) Miskolc Journal of 
International Law 43-58, 50. 
167 Tittemore BD ‘Belligerents in Blue Helmets: Applying IHL to UN Peace Operations’ 1997 (33) Stanford 
Journal of International Law 6-117, 90; Committee Against Torture (UN) Consideration of Reports Submitted 
By States Parties Under Article 19 of The Convention, Third periodic report of States parties due in 1996 – 
Addendum Canada [19 October 1999], CAT/C/34/Add.13 of 31 May 2000, para 33; Rouillard LPF ‘Canada’s 
Prevention and Repression of War Crimes’ 2005 (2) Miskolc Journal of International Law 43-58, 50. 
168 Rowe P ‘Maintaining Discipline in UN Peace Support Operations: The Legal Quagmire for Military 
Contingent’ 2000 (5) Journal of Conflicts & Security Law 45-62, 60. 
169 It is possible that the defence of superior orders can be raised but cannot stand. Also, under Somali law, the 
officer who has unlawfully given an order bears criminal liability for the execution of the order. See article 33(2) 
of the Somali Penal Code. 
170 Article 34 of the Somali Penal Code. 
171 Ibid. 
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Since the Somali Penal Code does not define the ground of justification it establishes, it may 
simply be indicated that a person cannot be held criminally liable if he or she lawfully defends 
himself or herself against an attack by another.
172
 The limitations to such a principle are that 
firstly, the person invoking this ground must be defending herself against an actual danger of 
unlawful injury and that such a danger must actually exist, i.e. it must not be imagined or 
thought that it may happen in a far distant future.
173
 Secondly, a person cannot defend himself 
or herself against a police officer lawfully using force to arrest her or him.
174
 Thirdly, the 
force used to repel the threat or the attack must be proportionate to the interest threatened, 
and, finally, private defence may be used to protect or to defend another person.
175
  
As far as crimes committed by peacekeepers are concerned, it is important to note that a 
soldier is not deprived of the right to defend himself or another person, even by killing the 
aggressor.
176
 Drawing on the information available, however, there are no indications that the 
alleged perpetrators acted in self-defence. The ground of justification called private defence is 
also available to a public officer who used the firearms in his possession in the absolute 
necessity of repelling violence or overcoming violent resistance to the authorities.
177
  
Since peacekeepers in Somalia may be considered to be public officers vested with the duty of 
creating conditions which would allow for the dispatching of humanitarian aid to a starving 
population, they might possibly invoke the defence. All the cases of murder as reported, 
however, did not show that such a defence would stand because in none of the instances did 
the victims seek to attack peacekeepers, nor were the latter killed as an act of self-defence nor 
in a state of necessity.  
 State of necessity 
In Somali criminal law, necessity is a defence available to a person who, at the time of the act 
he or she found himself/herself in actual danger of serious bodily injury, performed an 
otherwise unlawful act. The danger must not have been voluntary caused by the person 
                                                             
172 Ganzglass MR op cit (n 93) 46. 
173
 Ibid. 
174 Ibid. 
175 This ground of justification is widely accepted regarding threats to life or to inflict grievous bodily harm. See 
Ganzglass MR op cit (n 93) 46. 
176 Private defence is available to each and every individual. 
177 In this case it is as if the public officer defended another person. See Article 35 of the Somali Penal Code. 
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invoking the defence and must not have been otherwise avoidable.
178
 The other condition for 
the defence to stand is that of proportionality, and is also dependent on the proof that the 
person was not legally bound to expose himself to such danger.
179
 
It must be noted that, regarding the specific crimes committed by peacekeepers in Somalia, 
especially murder, necessity is not an available ground of justification by considering that the 
requirement of actual and imminent danger which is not preventable in any other way is not 
met.
180
 In fact killing out of necessity is a very controversial issue, especially when it refers to 
military necessity
181
 which may be over-encompassing in that it may sufficient to declare that 
the destruction of civilians were incidentally unavoidable in the armed contests of the war.
182
 
This matter cannot be debated here because, when it comes to military operations, this 
defence is called ‘military necessity’,183 which may be too all-encompassing to serve as a 
smoke screen to protect peacekeepers from any charge of war crimes.
184
 Any military force 
may claim to have acted in order to win the war.
185
 For instance, one rule pertaining to 
military necessity requires warning before launching a military operation.
186
 Military 
necessity, however, will also require that the rule be flouted if compliance would result in 
annihilating, or at least seriously compromising, the chances of success of a military 
                                                             
178 Article 36 of the Somali Penal Code. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Somali intruders did not injure any Canadian soldiers, and a medical officer has noted during the Inquiry that 
he did not know of any conflict-related Canadian casualties during the entire deployment. See Siver C ‘The Dark 
Side of Canadian Peacekeeping: The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia’ (Paper presented at Politics, 
Philosophy and Economics Seminar Series University of Washington -Tacoma 23 November 2009) 10. 
181 In pursuance of achieving military superiority over the enemy at the minimum cost, commanders must 
minimize civilian casualties. See Jaworski E ‘“Military Necessity’’ and ‘‘Civilian Immunity’’: Where is the 
Balance?”’ 2003 (1) Chinese Journal of International Law 175-206, 175. 
182 Carnahan BM ‘Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: The Origins and Limits of the Principle of Military 
Necessity’ 1998 (92) ASIL 213-231, 216. 
183 Referring to Article 14 of the Lieber Code, Carnahan defines ‘military necessity’, as understood by modern 
civilized nations, as consisting of the necessity of those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends 
of the war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war. See Carnahan BM op cit (n 
182), 215; Military necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or of armed enemies, and of other persons 
whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable in the armed contests of the war. See Jaworski E op cit (n 181) 
179; Henckaerts J-M and Doswald-Beck L (eds) Customary International Humanitarian Law Volume II: 
Practice (Cambridge University Press for ICRC-Geneva Cambridge 2005) 17. 
184 Anderson M and Zukauskas E (eds) Operational Law Handbook (International and Operational Law 
Department The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center & School U.S. Army Charlottesville 2008) 12. 
185
 For full discussion of military necessity, see D’Amato A Defences to War Crimes: a Conceptual Overview 
(Public Law and Legal Theory Series No. 07-04 North-western University School of Law) 1-24. For the issue of 
whether peace operations are military operations or whether peacekeepers are military, see the discussion on 
‘War crimes’ infra 4.2.1.3. 
186 Quéguiner JF ‘Precautions under the Law Governing the Conduct of Hostilities’ 2006 (88) International 
Review of the Red Cross 793-821, 807. 
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operation.
187
 This means that every action may qualify as military necessity
188
 whenever it 
may lead to some military advantage in waging the war.
189
  
 Presumed circumstances excluding punishment 
The Somali Penal Code considers any putative justification as a mitigating circumstance 
if the mistake relates to crimes requiring intention. For crimes committed with culpa, any 
mistake as to the existence of circumstances excluding punishment does not exclude 
liability in favour of the perpetrator.
190
 The rationale for this ground of exemption is that 
the accused’s state of mind in such a situation is necessarily not the same mind as the 
mind of a person intending to commit an offence. This is so because the accused 
performed some acts knowing that, because of certain circumstances, he or she cannot be 
punished for such acts.
191
 Obviously the putative existence of a ground of justification is 
not in itself a justification but a ground excluding culpability.
192
  
(d) Culpability 
Since deployed peacekeepers are adults, the issue of criminal capacity does not arise, except 
where the capacity issue includes the issue of lack or diminished capacity owing to mental 
illness or intoxication.
193
 Issues pertaining to insanity and intoxication are usually studied 
together with the questions of justification and the mental element of the crime. The mens rea 
required for the crime of murder is intention, save for the case of culpable homicide where 
negligence is required.
194
  
                                                             
187 Ibid. 
188 Anderson M and Zukauskas E (eds) Operational Law Handbook (International and Operational Law 
Department The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center & School U.S. Army Charlottesville 2008) 12. 
189 Sassòli M ‘State Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law’2002 (84) International 
Review of the Red Cross 401-434, 417. 
190 Article 38 of the Somali Penal Code. 
191 Ganzglass MR op cit (n 93) 51. 
192
 Article 38 of the Somali Penal Code provides that in cases of mistaken belief of grounds of justification, the 
circumstances which led to forming such a belief are taken into account and used in favour of the accused. 
Indeed, such a person did not intend the crime because of his belief. This is why article 38 does not apply to 
negligent crimes. 
193 Articles 50-51 of the Somali Penal Code. 
194 Article 445 of the Somali Penal Code. 
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2.3.1.4 Assault 
The treatment of detained suspected criminals
195
 by UNOSOM members, the use of telephone 
wire to inflict electric shocks to individuals while interrogating them,
196
 beating,
197
 
threatening, and the holding of a person over a burning brazier,
198
 as well as firing at unarmed 
civilians, constitute acts of serious injury to the physical integrity of the person or to his 
health. Under Somali law, such conduct amounts to assault or to hurt as the case may be.
199
  
The Somali Penal Code distinguishes between the offence of assault and the offence of 
hurt.
200
 Whereas the former is understood as consisting of any attack that does not result in 
physical or mental illness, the latter consists in a bodily harm that results in physical or mental 
illness.
201
 The offence of hurt can also be perpetrated with aggravating circumstances as set 
                                                             
195 Tittemore BD ‘Belligerents in Blue Helmets: Applying IHL to UN Peace Operations’ 1997 (33) Stanford 
Journal of International Law 6-117, 89-90; Horn B ‘An Absence of Honour: Somalia – The Spark that Started 
the Transformation of Canadian Forces Officer Corps’ a paper presented at an International Seminar 
‘Leadership, Education & Multilateralism in Armed Forces: Challenges and Opportunities’ (La Paz Bolivia 13-
15 September 2004). 
196 Lupi N ‘Report by the Inquiry Commission on the Behaviour of Italian Peacekeeping Troops in Somalia’ 
1998 (1) Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 375-379; See UN Committee against Torture 
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 19 of the Convention - Fourth periodic 
reports of Italy (CAT/C/SR.761of 11 May 2007) para 45. 
197 See de Waal A ‘US War crimes in Somalia’1998 (30) New Left Review 131-144.  
198 De Waal A op cit 136 of the 1998 New Left Review. 
199 It is important to mention that acts of assault may also amount to torture. ‘Torture’ means any act by which 
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person 
has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any 
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity(Article 1(1) of 
the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(hereinafter UNCAT). See also Ferdinandusse W ‘Prosecutor v. N. Case No. AO7178’ 2005 (99) American 
Journal of International Law 686-690). Before a country criminalises torture as a crime sui generis, it usually 
punishes acts of torture as assault. Despite the fact that the definition of torture is now considered as jus cogens, 
i.e. to be accepted and enforced by each and every state (Sweetser CE ‘Providing Effective Remedies to Victims 
of Abuse by Peacekeeping Personnel’ 2008 (83) New York University Law Review 1643-1677, 657), States that 
have not ratified or accessed the UN Convention against torture continue to punish acts of torture as assault. 
Thus Somalia before accession to the UNCAT in January 1990 (Somali accessed the UNCAT on 24 January 
1990. See ‘International Human Rights Treaties and the Somali Republic (1960-1991)’ http://wfrt.net/humanrts-
/research/ratification-somalia.html [accessed 8 November 2012]; IRCT ‘States Which Have Ratified or Acceded 
to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ www.irct.org 
[last accessed 8 November 2012]). 
200
 Hurt is an aggravated assault. See articles 439-440 of the Somali Penal Code. 
201 Mental illness refers to a pathological lasting disturbance of mental faculties (disease of mind). Temporary 
clouding of the mental faculties ascribed to mere external stimuli such as alcohol, drugs or provocation does not 
amount to mental disease. Physical illness is understood as a medical condition that results in pathological 
symptoms but is not the direct result of physical injury. Temporary suffering is excluded. Compare articles 431, 
with 439-440. 
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out in the code.
202
 Where the consequence of the offence is the unintended death of the 
victim, the crime becomes one of manslaughter.
203
 The perpetrators or the acts indicated 
under 2.2.1, other than sexual crimes, can be prosecuted under Somali law, provided that no 
justification is available to the perpetrators. It must also be established that the alleged 
peacekeeper perpetrators performed their acts intentionally.  
(a) Assault 
From the provision of article 439 of the Somali Penal Code, assault may be defined as any 
physical aggression which does not result in any illness or any long lasting consequences.
204
 
Ganzglass gives the example of a punch in the arm, spitting on a person, or grabbing his or 
her clothes.
205
 This offence can be prosecuted only upon a complaint of the victim.
206
 This is 
certainly because any consent to physical aggression which does not result in illness 
constitutes a ground negating the unlawfulness of the conduct. Where the offence was the 
means utilised to perpetrate another crime, it is that end-result crime which will be punished. 
For instance if a person X pulls another person Y who he has just purchased as a slave, X 
cannot be prosecuted for assault but only for purchasing a slave, a crime under article 457 of 
the Somali penal Code.
207
 In any instance, assault requires intention as mens rea. However, 
aggravating assault by negligence does exist in the Somali Penal Code; it is called ‘hurt by 
negligence’, i.e. an unintended assault resulting in illness.208 As it transpires, hurt is in itself 
an aggravated assault. 
(b) Hurt209 
As distinguished from assault which does not require any injury or harm to result from any 
conduct, ‘hurt’ is a crime which results in those consequences. Indeed, ‘hurt’ is the act of 
                                                             
202 Article 440 of the Somali Penal Code. An example of this is where a person spits in the face of the victim 
with menace. There is no physical harm but a kind of contempt against the victim. Another example may be that 
of spraying dirty water to the victim. 
203 Where the accused intended only to inflict physical pain but the act resulted in death, he or she may 
considered to have committed manslaughter punished with imprisonment from ten to fifteen years. See articles 
24 & 441 of the Somali Penal Code.  
204 Article 439 (1) of the Somali Penal Code use the verb ‘strike’ and refers to the absence of physical or mental 
illness. See note 201 above. 
205 Ganzglass MR op cit (n 93) 490. 
206 Article 439 (1) of the Somali Penal Code. 
207 Article 439(2) of the Somali Penal Code. 
208 See article 446 of the Somali Penal Code. 
209 Article 440 of the Somali Penal Code.  Its prosecution does not require the complaint of the victim. 
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causing physical or mentally injury to a human being of minor intensity.
210
 If the injury or 
illness is serious, the gravity of the conduct may amount either to ‘grievous hurt’ or to ‘very 
grievous hurt’. Simple hurt is punished with three months to three years imprisonment.211 
In the case of grievous hurt,
212
 the gravity of injuries or illness is considered with regard to the 
danger they pose to the life of the victim. Thus, if the injury or illness keeps the victim away 
from attending to his or her ordinary occupation for a maximum period of forty days, or the 
conduct weakens any sense or organ of the victim permanently or accelerates premature birth 
if the victim was a pregnant woman,
213
 the sentence incurred by the accused, if found guilty, 
will be three to seven years imprisonment. 
On the other hand, hurt is considered to be very grievous hurt
214
 whenever the illness or injury 
it causes is certainly or probably incurable, or it results in the loss of sense, a limb, or in 
mutilation that renders the limb useless. In a case where the injury results in the loss of an 
organ or provokes a permanent incapacity to procreate or serious difficulty in speech, it is also 
considered as grievous hurt. Deformities or permanent disfigurements of the face of the 
victim, as well as miscarriage to the person injured, also amount to very grievous hurt. In all 
these circumstances, the sentence imposed on the accused, if found guilty, is six to twelve 
years imprisonment. 
Whatever the degree of hurt caused, the prosecution must establish that the conduct was 
performed wilfully. This means that hurt requires intention as mens rea but, as already 
indicated with respect to assault; causing negligent hurt does exist in the Somali Penal Code. 
Causing negligent hurt is punished with a maximum imprisonment term of three months or 
with a fine upon the complaint of the victim,
215
 where the sentence for grievous hurt is one to 
six months imprisonment or a fine, and where it amounts to very grievous hurt the incurred 
sanction is imprisonment from three months to two years.
216
 Where such a negligent act has 
                                                             
210 Article 440 (1) of the Somali Penal Code refers to physical or mental illness (wounds and burns being 
physical illnesses). 
211 Ibid. 
212
 Article 440 (2) of the Somali Penal Code. 
213 The five senses which may be weakened are sight, hearing, smell, touch, and taste. Organs are usually 
internal parts of the body. 
214 Article 440 (3) of the Somali Penal Code. 
215 Articles 446 (1) and 446 (4) of the Somali Penal Code. 
216 Article 446 (2) of the Somali Penal Code. 
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injured more than one person, the court shall aggregate punishments pronounced with respect 
to each hurt, but the total sum should not exceed five years imprisonment.
217
 
2.3.1.5 Synopsis of the findings on Somali criminal law 
With respect to Somali law regarding crimes committed by peacekeepers, it is sufficient to 
mention that Somali law as the territorial law is applicable to the conduct of peacekeepers
218
 
on the grounds of territoriality principle and of the fact that the victims are Somali citizens.
219
 
If it cannot, therefore, be suggested that members of the UN mission of peace to Somalia be 
prosecuted before Somali jurisdictions, it is because of an agreement which might have 
existed between the UN and Somalia or the model Status-of-Forces Agreement which is 
applicable until a proper Status-of-Forces Agreement is reach with the Host State.
220
 By the 
model Status-of-Forces Agreement, peacekeepers are immune from the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the Host State, but subject to the justice of their nationality.
221
 Their immunity is, 
therefore, not absolute but dependent on the willingness of each contributing country to 
prosecute any offences committed by their nationals while serving under the UN flag. 
2.3.2 Burundian law 
Among the reported allegations of crimes by peacekeepers in Burundi, there are sexual 
offences and one case of murder.
222
 It may be assumed that a certain percentage of the 
misconduct was never reported, whether it constituted violations of international law or of 
domestic legislation.
223
 
                                                             
217 Article 446 (3) of the Somali Penal Code. 
218 Built on the concept of sovereignty, criminal jurisdiction follows the law of the state where a crime was 
committed. See Musselman GS (ed) Law of War Deskbook (International and Operational Law Department U.S. 
Army Charlottesville 2011) 198; Cahillane A ‘International Law, Sexual Violence and Peacekeepers’ 2010 (17) 
Irish Student Law Review 1-16, 15. The principle of territoriality is not an absolute principle to preclude from 
observing engagements under SOFA for instance. See PCIJ Collection of Judgments the Case of the S.S. "Lotus" 
(Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice Series A -No.70 of 7 September 1927) 20. 
219 Zappala  S ‘Are Some Peacekeepers Better Than Others? UN Security Council Resolution 1497 (2003) and 
the ICC’ 2003 (1) Journal of International Criminal Justice 671-678, 673. 
220 Para 47(b) of the Model Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) UN. Doc. A/45/594 of 9 October 1990. No 
country has been willing to subject its military contingents to the jurisdiction of a foreign nation. See  Defeis EF 
‘U.N. Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse and Exploitation: An End to Impunity’ 2008 (7) Washington University 
Global Studies Law Review 185-214, 206. 
221 If not prosecuted back home, their immunity amounts to impunity with the effect of future repetition. See 
O’Brien M ‘The Ascension of Blue Beret Accountability: International Criminal Court Command and Superior 
Responsibility in Peace Operations’ 2010 (15) Journal of Conflict & Security Law 533–555, 553-554. 
222 Supra 2.2.2. 
223 Ibid. 
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2.3.2.1 Rape  
(a) Definition of rape 
Burundian law defines rape as ‘any act of sexual penetration, whatever the nature of such an 
act, committed by an adult person against another person without the consent of the latter’.224 
The Burundian Criminal Code not only defines what is understood by the term ‘rape’, but also 
who the perpetrator or the victim of such a crime may be, the punishment incurred, and 
aggravating circumstances.
225
 In Burundian criminal law, the crime of rape is established if its 
material elements, unlawfulness, and the culpability of its perpetrator have been established. 
These elements will be discussed below in more depth. 
(b) Definitional and Consent elements of rape 
According to the Burundian criminal code, rape is an act of sexual penetration, regardless of 
its nature or the means used to perpetrate the act. It must be perpetrated against a person who 
did not give an informed consent. Thus any act of sexual penetration by an adult person 
against a person who has not celebrated his or her eighteenth birthday, even if such a person 
has consented is regarded as rape.
226
 Rape is also committed in the circumstances indicated in 
article 555 of the Burundian Penal Code, and the perpetrator may be male or female.
227
 The 
                                                             
224 Loi  N°1 / 05 du 22 avril 2009 portant révision du code pénal burundais. This Code will be referred to as the 
Burundian Penal Code.  Article 554 equates the minority of the victim to lack of consent. Therefore sex with a 
person below the age of 18 is considered rape even if such a person consented to the act. 
225 Articles 554-562 or the Burundian Penal Code. 
226 Article 554 of the Burundian Penal Code. This article deals specifically with sex with minors. The following 
articles then describe what acts between adults also constitute rape. The age of consent to sexual intercourse is 
18 under Burundian Law. 
227 Article 555 : Commet un viol, soit à l’aide de violences ou menaces graves ou par contrainte à l’encontre 
d’une personne, directement ou par l’intermédiaire d’un tiers, soit par surprise, par pression psychologique, soit à 
l’occasion d’un environnement coercitif, soit en abusant d’une personne qui, par le fait d’une maladie, par 
l’altération de ses facultés ou par toute autre cause accidentelle aurait perdu l’usage de ses sens ou en aurait été 
privé par quelques artifices, et même si la victime est l’époux de cette personne : 1°. Tout homme, quel que soit 
son âge, qui introduit son organe sexuel, même superficiellement dans celui d’une femme ou toute femme, quel 
que soit son âge, qui a obligé un homme à introduire, même superficiellement, son organe sexuel dans le sien ; 
2°. Tout homme qui a fait pénétrer, même superficiellement, par la voie anale, la bouche ou tout autre orifice du 
corps d’une femme ou d’un homme son organe sexuel, toute autre partie du corps ou tout autre objet quelconque;  
3°. Toute personne qui introduit, même superficiellement, toute autre partie du corps ou un objet quelconque 
dans le sexe féminin ; 4°. Toute personne qui oblige à un homme ou une femme de pénétrer, même 
superficiellement, son orifice anal, sa bouche par un organe sexuel ; Est puni de cinq ans à quinze ans de 
servitude pénale et d’une amende de cinquante mille francs à cent mille francs. (Below this author’s non official 
translation in English). 
A rape is committed, either by means of violence or serious threats or by duress against a person, directly or 
through the intermediary of a third person, either by surprise, by psychological pressure, on the occasion of a 
coercive environment, either while abusing a person who, by the fact of an illness, by the change of his/her 
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absence of consent is critical for the crime to be committed,
228
 and official capacity is not a 
defence.
229
 Penetration is still an element of the crime but it is no longer limited to the 
vagina.
230
 Penetration of the vagina, anus, or mouth whether by the male genital organ or by 
an object or by any part of the body is sufficient.
231
 The actus reus of rape includes the action 
of sexual intercourse and the circumstances in which such action occurred. The circumstances 
may be connected to the victim, to the perpetrator, or to the presence of the public. They all 
constitute aggravating facts that elevate the punishment incurred by the perpetrator if found 
guilty.
232
 Rape against a person under the age of 18 is always considered to have been 
committed with violence.
233
  
The criminal act of rape has to fulfil the following requirements:  
(1) The sexual penetration must be committed by means of a sexual organ, other body parts, 
and objects. The body parts concerned by penetration are the vagina, anus, mouth, and other 
bodily orifices.
234
 When the vagina is the target to invade the victim’s body, the crime is 
performed by the perpetrator’s penis, or by means of other parts of the body or objects. The 
perpetrator can be a man or a woman.
235
 Resorting to the anus or mouth as the place to 
perpetrate rape, the penetration is deemed to be by means of the male sexual organ.
236
 
Otherwise, the act is not of a sexual character. This will be the case, for example, where the 
actor intended to inflict serious bodily harm. With respect to any other opening of the body, 
the means used must be the male sexual organ.  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
faculties or by all other accidental reasons would have lost the use of his/her senses or would have been 
deprived of such by some artifices, and even though the victim is this person's spouse:   
1.  by any man, whatever his age, who introduces his sexual organ, even superficially into that of a woman or 
any woman, whatever her age, who obliged a man to introduce, even superficially, his sexual organ into hers;  
 2. by any man who did penetrate, even superficially, the anus, the mouth or any other opening of the body of a 
woman or a man with his sexual organ, or any other part of the body or any other any object;   
3.  by any person who introduces, even superficially, any other part of the body or any object in the woman’s 
sexual organ;   
4. by any person who obliges a man or a woman to penetrate, even superficially, his/her anal opening, his/her 
mouth by a sexual organ;   
Rape is punished by five years to fifteen years of penal servitude and a fine worth fifty thousand francs to 
hundred thousand francs.   
228 Articles 554 and 555 combined. 
229 Article 560 of the Burundian Penal Code. 
230 Penetration of anus and mouth has been added. 
231
 Article 555 of the Burundian Penal Code. 
232 Articles 556-558 of the Burundian Penal Code. 
233 Article 554 of the Burundian Penal Code. Thus the case of raping Therese Nkeshimana, 14-year-old. 
234 Articles 555 of the Burundian Penal Code.  
235 Ibid. 
236 Articles 555 of the Burundian Penal Code. 
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(2) Violence with respect to rape is inferred from the means resorted to by the perpetrator, viz 
violence or serious threats or duress (either directly or through the intermediary of a third 
person), surprise, psychological pressure, coercive environment, exploiting the victim’s 
weaknesses (physical or psychological weaknesses).
237
 Spousal status is not an excuse,
238
 and 
the Code itself indicates that the official position of a person accused of offences of sexual 
violence cannot, on any account, exonerate him or her from his or her criminal liability of 
rape or constitute a reason to reduce the punishment.
239
 What is important to note is that the 
defence of superior orders or the command of a civil or military legitimate authority is not 
available to the perpetrator of a crime of sexual violence.
240
    
(c) Unlawfulness  
Articles 27, 28 and 31 of the Burundian Penal Code recognise that, if some circumstances are 
present, the perpetrator may be exonerated from criminal liability. These circumstances 
include any situation in which sexual violence does not amount to international crimes.
241
 The 
Code should have also excluded any possibility of exemption regarding ordinary sexual 
crimes. No defence should be available to a perpetrator of rape,
242
 except where it may be 
shown that he or she was mentally disordered at the time of the act, and where it has been 
shown that the mental disorder actually suppressed his or her capacity to understand what he 
or she was doing.
243
 Indeed, the defence of mental illness relates to culpability, even though 
the distinction is not of any practical avail since the accused who asserts insanity and the one 
asserting any ground of justification at the time of the act incurs no punishment.
244
 
With respect to the specific case of the UN peacekeepers in Burundi, it must be indicated that 
the defence of superior orders cannot be available to UN soldiers because it does not seem 
possible to imagine a UN force commander or one commander of a national contingent 
involved in peacekeeping to threaten the life of a soldier if the latter does not perform an 
                                                             
237 Ibid. 
238 Ibid. 
239 Article 560 of the Burundian Penal Code. 
240 Article 561 of the Burundian Penal Code. 
241 The said circumstances are duress, minority of age (under 15), legal authorisation and lawful superior order, 
necessity, and private defence. See articles 27-28 and 31 of the Burundian Penal Code. 
242 The situation where the accused was deceived as to the age of the victim, a defence to culpability should be 
considered available. 
243 Article 25 of the Burundian Penal Code. 
244 Article 25 considers acts of persons who are mentally ill as not prosecutable. It does not provide that the 
person has to be assigned to psychiatric facilities. 
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illegal act. If this happens, the order given is manifestly and palpably unlawful, and in such a 
situation the subordinate is under no duty to obey such an order, and, therefore, the defence 
cannot stand.
245
  
(d) Culpability: capacity and mens rea 
As indicated earlier, criminal capacity refers to the question whether the perpetrator possessed 
the mental ability to realise the nature of his/her conduct and to the ability to act in accordance 
with this realisation of unlawfulness.
246
 Thus, a person who lacks the mental ability to 
appreciate the nature of his or her actions or to align such actions to the appreciation she or he 
has made, cannot be held criminally responsible for his or her conduct.
247
 A person, therefore, 
who has not reached a given age, or a mentally ill person at the moment of action, is 
considered to lack criminal capacity.
248
 Mental illness is considered as a defence. It is never 
presumed. 
Regarding lack of criminal capacity, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child in December 1989. One of its provisions recommends 
that States enact laws setting up the minimum age under which a child shall be presumed 
criminally irresponsible for lack of criminal capacity.
249
 In fulfilment of this requirement, 
Burundi set the minimum age of criminal capacity at 15. Before an individual has reached 
such an age, his or her ‘would be criminal’ actions can entail only civil responsibility, but not 
criminal responsibility since any person under the age of fifteen is presumed totally incapable 
of giving a thorough thought to criminal activity.
250
 
Since the question here is that of crimes committed by peacekeepers in Burundi, one needs to 
take cognisance of the fact that UN forces are made up of adult soldiers.
251
 Rape is an 
                                                             
245 See Burundian Penal Code, article 27. 
246 Ibid.  
247 To stand as a defence, the privation of the capacity to understand or to make one’s conduct conform to legal 
norms must not be the fault of the performer of the criminal act. See article 26 of the Burundian Penal Code. 
248 A person who has not reached his/her 15th birthday is considered criminally incapable. See article 28 of the 
Burundian Penal Code. 
249 Article 40 (3) Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (12 December 1989).  
250 Article 28 of the Burundian Penal Code reads (in French): Les mineurs de moins de quinze ans sont 
pénalement irresponsables. Les infractions commises par ces derniers ne donnent lieu qu’à des réparations 
civiles. 
251 States are not allowed to recruit children under the age of fifteen into their armed forces, nor implicate them 
in hostilities. See articles 38 of the Convention of the Right of the Child: States Parties shall take all feasible 
measures to ensure that persons who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in 
hostilities. And 38 (3) provides that States Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who has not attained 
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intentional offence in Burundian law. The prosecution must demonstrate that the mens rea in 
the form of intent did exist. This can easily be inferred from the means used by the 
perpetrator. Since the age of consent to sexual activities is 18 in Burundian criminal law, any 
sexual intercourse consented to by a person under the above age is considered not to be 
valid.
252
 Any sexual contact with a person under that age, even consenting, is considered rape. 
Whether the child-victim consented and received money to make the act appear as prostitution 
is irrelevant. 
2.3.2.2 Other sexual acts and sexual offences involving children 
As far as ONUB is concerned, it is important to mention that sexual activities involving 
children, other than the case of rape aforementioned, have not been reported. This does not 
necessarily mean that they did not occur in Burundi. Sex with children is rape if the victim, at 
the time of the act, was not capable of giving a valid consent.
253
 Therefore, prostitution is the 
remaining sexual offence relevant to the present discussion. 
The Burundian Penal Code defines prostitution as ‘the fact of submitting his/her body to the 
pleasure of others and to make a profession of it.’254 Prostitution per se is not a crime in 
Burundian law, with the exception of soliciting, which consists of any acts tending to attract 
some customers.
255
 Living upon the earnings of another person’s prostitution, either by 
brothel-keeping or by inciting, procuring, or facilitating prostitution, is criminalised.
256
 All 
these offences are characterised as offences against good mores and do not qualify as 
enforced prostitution.
257
 Enforced prostitution falls under Burundian provisions regarding 
domesticated international law, namely under crimes against humanity and war crimes.
258
 It is 
within the latter category that peacekeepers may be considered to commit prostitution, since 
the ‘client or customer’ of voluntary prostitution does not infringe any domestic law.259 But 
keeping a brothel or coercing a person into prostitution suffices to qualify as enforced 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
the age of fifteen years into their armed forces. In recruiting among those persons who have attained the age of 
fifteen years but who have not attained the age of eighteen years, States Parties shall endeavour to give priority 
to those who are oldest. 
252 Article 554 of the Burundian Penal Code. 
253 Ibid. 
254 Article 538. Present author’s translation from French. 
255
 Article 548. 
256 Articles 539, 542-547 of the Burundian Penal Code. 
257 Articles 538-548 of the Burundian Penal Code. 
258 Article 196, 7° for crimes against humanity and Articles 198 (2) (v) and 198 (5) (f) of the Burundian Penal 
Code. 
259 Prostitution per se and visiting a prostitute is not an offence under the Burundian Penal Code. 
 61 
 
 
prostitution. Although it is reported that some peacekeepers had acted with sexually 
promiscuous behaviour and, by so doing, had contributed to the encouragement of prostitution 
among young girls in Burundi,
260
 their conduct did not amount to enforced prostitution
261
 or 
to pimping or brothel-keeping.
262
  
2.3.2.3 Murder  
(a) Definition of murder 
In Burundian criminal law, murder is ‘any act by which a person voluntarily inflicts death 
upon another person.’263 This definition does not differ from any other definition found in 
other legal systems. For the crime of murder to be established, the following elements must be 
present, material elements, unlawfulness of the conduct, and culpability. 
(b) Definitional elements of murder 
The definitional act of murder consists in a positive act that causes the death of a human 
being.
264
 Although the provisions of the code do not specify the means by which murder can 
be perpetrated,
265
 article 211 is formulated in a manner that indicates that murder is brought 
about by an act of direct commission, therefore excluding omissions.
266
 An abstention can 
indeed be considered as a positive by inference from the conduct of the accused in the 
material circumstances under which death occurred.
267
 The relationship between the 
perpetrator and the victim,
268
 as well as the reason why the perpetrator killed the victim, is 
irrelevant.
269
 
                                                             
260 Krasno J External Study: Public Opinion Survey of ONUB's Work in Burundi (City College of New York and 
Yale University New York 2006) 6.  
261 Enforced prostitution is a crime against humanity in the Burundian Penal Code [article 196(7)] and it may 
amount to war crime [article 198 (v)].  
262 Articles 542-547 of the Burundian Penal Code. 
263 Article 211 of the Burundian Penal Code. 
264 Ibid. Positive act refers to action, contrary to inaction or omission. 
265 Poisoning the victim or inflicting barbaric acts to the victim constitutes murder. See articles 214 and 216 of 
the Burundian Penal code, 
266
 The act by which a person causes death of another person is qualified as murder. See article 211 of the 
Burundian Penal Code.  
267 Article 212 para 3 of the Burundian Penal Code is fulfilled where for instance a parent withdraws any food 
and abstains from breastfeeding a newborn. He or she can be prosecuted for having killed his/her child. 
268 Article 212 of the Burundian Penal Code.  
269 Article 211 para 2 of the Burundian Penal Code. 
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Reports regarding the case of murder against Therese Nkeshimana
270
 for instance do not 
inform about whether this victim died as a consequence of rape, i.e. such as bleeding after 
being raped, or whether she was killed to silence her, as she might have denounced the 
perpetrator. The only knowledge gleaned from the report regarding the incident is that she 
was raped and then killed. The positive material element of murder is, therefore, present.
271
 
Although the act was so grave, it must be noted that it did not meet the requirement of the 
Burundian criminal provision on war crimes because, for an act to fall under the category of 
war crimes under the Burundian law, it must fit in a plan, a policy, or form part of widespread 
conduct.
272
 The case is still, however, an unlawful murder that falls under ordinary crimes of 
the same Burundian criminal law.
273
  
(c) Unlawfulness 
In Burundian criminal law, intentional homicides are excluded from the benefit of 
necessity.
274
 An accused person cannot, therefore, assert necessity where he is charged with 
murder. In the situation where the accused was under obligation to obey superior orders of a 
legitimate civil or military authority, he can assert the defence of superior orders, except 
where the offence falls under international crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes.
275
 In cases of exclusion of the defence of superior orders, however, the 
existence of such an order regarding an international crime may still count with respect to 
sentencing in that the sentence of the accused may be reduced.
276
 With respect to murder, the 
defence of private defence remains available to any accused.
277
 In specie, i.e. in the incident 
of the killing of Therese Nkeshimana, however, it does not seem that the 14-year-old girl 
attacked Sergeant Phillipus Jacobus Venter for this accused person to assert self-defence. No 
other defence exists for the murder perpetrated horrendously after raping the victim.
278
 
Perhaps the remaining possible defence may be that of mental illness, a defence which 
actually relates to culpability. 
                                                             
270 Supra 2.2.2. 
271 The trial court found the perpetrator guilty and sentenced him to 24 years imprisonment. See United States 
Department of State 2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - South Africa (25 February 2009) 
available at www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/119025.htm [last accessed 21 December 2012]. 
272 Article 198 of the Burundian Penal Code. The provisions of this article actually come from the Rome Statute. 
273
 Article 211 of the Burundian Penal Code. 
274 Article 31 of the Burundian Penal Code. 
275 Ibid. 
276 Ibid. 
277 Ibid. 
278 Williams K op cit (n 24) and supra footnote 270.  
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(d) Culpability 
The accused peacekeeper did not lack culpability upon the ground of youth.
279
 The accused 
may still convince a court before which he is arraigned that, at the time of the act, he lacked 
culpability because he was mentally ill.
280
 
Apart from capacity, the prosecution has to establish that the murder was a wilful act of the 
perpetrator. The intentional element of murder may be inferred from the killing of the victim. 
The intentional element of the crime of murder can first be established by considering the 
means used by the perpetrator. For instance, if the weapon the perpetrated used had an 
intrinsic power to inflict death, the intentional element is proven.
281
 The part of the body 
targeted may constitute signs of intent to inflict death.
282
 Why the perpetrator resolved to kill 
the victim is irrelevant. 
2.3.2.4 Assault 
 
Whoever has voluntarily caused injuries or has assaulted others is punished with imprisonment 
from two months to eight months and with a fine of fifty thousand to two hundred thousand 
francs, or with one of these two sentences. 
In the case of premeditation the person found guilty is punished with a term of imprisonment 
from one month to two years and with a fine of two hundred thousand francs.
283
 
For assault to be present in Burundian Criminal Law, the conduct must meet the definitional 
elements, be unlawful and be perpetrated wilfully. However, in case of premeditation, the 
situation may be aggravated.
284
 For example, It has been reported that a guesthouse employee 
                                                             
279 The perpetrator was 33-year-old when he committed the act. See DPP: Transvaal v Venter (430/2007) [2008] 
ZASCA 76 (30 May 2008) para [13].  
280 Mental illness may exclude capacity. If, at the time of the commission of the act, the accused could not know 
the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or he did not know what he was doing was wrong, he cannot be 
held criminally responsible. Article 25 of the Burundian Penal Code excludes responsibility in such a situation. It 
reads: « N’est pas punissable, celui qui souffrait d’une maladie ou d’une déficience mentale qui le privait de la 
faculté de comprendre le caractère délictueux ou la nature de son comportement, ou de maîtriser celui-ci pour le 
conformer aux exigences de la loi. » The provisions of this Burundian law expressly exclude criminal liability 
for mentally ill persons. 
281 Compare Fay TA ‘Responsibility and the Requirement of Mens rea’ (Reason Papers No. 14 Spring 1989) 59-
69. 
282 Elis. 11 janvier 1916 (Jur. Col., 1926, p. 305). 
283 Article 219 of the Burundian Penal Code. 
284 Articles 219-221 of the Burundian Penal Code. 
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was assaulted by a peacekeeper in Burundi, for allegedly having refused to rent him a room 
for a night.
285
 Such conduct infringes article 219 of the Burundian penal code. 
(a) Definitional elements of assault 
For the crime of assault to be present, the conduct must have caused injuries which were 
inflicted directly or indirectly to the body of the victim. It is sufficient to prove that the 
victim’s injuries stem from the perpetrator’s conduct. This may be the case in a situation 
where the perpetrator sets a dog on a victim who falls down or who is bitten by the dog. The 
requirement is met by establishing the causal link between the conduct of the perpetrator and 
the injuries caused to the victim.
286
 Mere threats which cause no injuries to the victim are not 
considered as assault in Burundian Criminal Law.
287
 Assault is only possible against a human 
being who is alive at the moment of the conduct.
288
 The act must have been perpetrated 
unlawfully and voluntarily. 
(b) Unlawfulness 
Causing injuries to the victim must have been unlawful to entail criminal liability. This means 
that there must be no ground of justification for the perpetrator’s act. Indeed, where the 
perpetrator assaulted the victim out of private defence, or in an official capacity, or with the 
victim’s consent, such in surgery activities or in sports, the performer of the assault cannot be 
held criminally liable.
289
 This has not been reported to be the case with respect to the assault 
inflicted to the guesthouse keeper in Burundi in the illustration above.
290
 Where the alleged 
perpetrator suffered from a sudden mental illness at the time of the conduct, he may plead the 
lack of the required culpability. 
  
                                                             
285 Supra 2.2.2. 
286
 Nyabirungu mwene Songa Droit pénal général zaïrois (DES Kinshasa 1989) 269-287.  
287 Whoever has … caused injuries. Indeed the French version of assault is the phrase ‘coups et blessures’. See 
article 219 of the Burundian Penal Code. 
288 Injuries to a dead body of a person is punished according to article 234 of the Burundian Penal Code. 
289 Article 31 of the Burundian Penal Code. 
290 To refuse to rent a room cannot be considered as an attack against the peacekeeper. 
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(c) Culpability 
The required mens rea for assault in Burundian Criminal Law is intention. This is clear cut by 
the use of the concept ‘voluntarily’ in the provisions of the code.291 If the perpetrator did not 
intend to cause harm to the victim or erroneously believed the act fell within the ambit of one 
of the grounds of justification, he or she lacks the required mens rea for the crime of assault to 
be established.
292
  
(d) Aggravating circumstances 
Three different sets of aggravating circumstances exist with respect to assault in Burundian 
Criminal Law. Firstly, premeditation amounts to an aggravating circumstance in that it 
elevates the punishment incurred for simple assault. If the prosecution establishes beyond 
reasonable doubt that the perpetrator thought about and planned the assault beforehand, viz he 
did not act on impulse in a moment of passion or mindlessness, the punishment incurred will 
be one month to two years in jail in lieu of two to eight months.
293
 
If the consequences of the assault result in an illness, permanent inability to work, severe 
impairment of any body organ or serious mutilation, or if the victim of the crime is a pregnant 
woman and the perpetrator knew or should have know of such a state of pregnancy, he may 
incur a punishment ranging from two years to ten years imprisonment and a fine.
294
 In the 
case of a special relationship between the perpetrator and the victim, the latter being a parent 
or a grandparent, a spouse or a child or grandchild or any other relative of the perpetrator, as 
well as an in-law of or any person living with the perpetrator, the punishment incurred will be 
double the punishment provided for in articles 219 and 220 of the Code.
295
 
2.3.2.5 Synopsis of the findings on Burundian Criminal Law 
With respect to the Burundian Criminal Law regarding crimes committed by peacekeepers, it 
is sufficient to mention that Burundian Criminal Law as the territorial law is applicable to the 
conduct of peacekeepers on the grounds of the territoriality principle and due to the fact that 
the two victims were Burundian citizens. Therefore, the lack of prosecution of the 
                                                             
291
 Article 219 of the Burundian Penal Code uses ‘… voluntarily …’ Indeed negligently causing injuries to a 
person is punished according to articles 227-228 of the same code. 
292 In such situation the act is no longer voluntarily performed. Article 219 of the Burundian Penal Code. 
293 Article 219 of the Burundian Penal Code. 
294 Article 220 of the Burundian Penal Code. 
295 Article 221 of the Burundian Penal Code. 
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peacekeeper alleged to have committed the crime of rape, murder and assault against 
Burundian civilians, may be attributable to the provisions of a specific Status-of-Forces 
Agreement.
296
 By the model Status-of-Forces Agreement, peacekeepers are immune from the 
jurisdiction of the courts of the Host State, but subject to the justice of their nationality.
297
  
2.3.3 DR Congolese law 
Under this heading the discussion deals essentially with crimes of sexual violence, but it also 
presents substantive issues with respect to murder, assault, and torture. In the discussion of 
each crime, the elements are examined. With respect to the non-sexual crimes such murder, 
assault or torture, it must be noted from the outset that no allegations exist against MONUC 
personnel.  
2.3.3.1 Rape 
(a) Definition of rape 
The act constituting rape,
298
 the person who may perpetrate rape, and the individuals who may 
be victims of rape are provided for in article 170 of the Congolese penal code which reads as 
follows:
299
 
A person commits a rape, either by means of violence or serious threats or by duress against a 
person, directly or through the intermediary of a third person, either by surprise, by 
psychological pressure, on the occasion of a coercive environment, either while abusing a person 
that, by the fact of an illness, by the change of his/her faculties or by all other accidental reason 
would have lost the use of his/her senses or would have been deprived of such by some artifices:   
a) Any man, whatever his age, who introduces his sexual organ, even superficially into that of 
a woman or any woman, whatever her age, who coerces a man to introduce, even 
superficially, his sexual organ in hers;  
                                                             
296 Para 47(b) of the Model Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) UN. Doc. A/45/594 of 9 October 1990. No 
country has been willing to subject its military contingents to the jurisdiction of a foreign nation. See Defeis EF 
‘U.N. Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse and Exploitation: An End to Impunity’ 2008 (7) Washington University 
Global Studies Law Review 185-214, 206. See infra 6.2 more details in this context. 
297 If not prosecuted back home, their immunity amounts to impunity with the effect of future repetition. See 
O’Brien M ‘The Ascension of Blue Beret Accountability: International Criminal Court Command and Superior 
Responsibility in Peace Operations’ 2010 (15) Journal of Conflict & Security Law 533–555, 553-554. 
298 See Mutata L Protection du droit à la sexualité responsable (Editions du service de documentation  et d’étude 
du ministère de la justice  Kinshasa 2009) 128. 
299 This author’s own translation from French. See article 170 de la Loi n° 06/018 du 20 juillet 2006 modifiant et 
complétant le Décret du 30 janvier 1940 portant Code pénal congolais Journal Officiel de la RDC 1er aout 2006.  
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b) Any man who did penetrate, even superficially, the anus, the mouth, or any other opening 
of the body of a woman or of a man with his sexual organ, with any other part of the body 
or with any other object;   
c) Any person who introduces, even superficially, any other part of the body or any object 
into the woman’s sexual organ;   
d) Any person who coerces a man or a woman to penetrate, even superficially, his/her anal 
opening, his/her mouth or any other opening of the body with a sexual organ, with  any 
object or with any part of the body.  
Any person convicted of rape shall be punished with penal servitude from five to twenty years 
and a fine of not less than one hundred thousand Congolese constant francs. 
Sexual intercourse with a person who has not reached the age of 18, regardless of the consent of 
such a person, is considered rape committed by means of violence. 
The Congolese Penal Code lists who may commit rape and under which circumstances the 
crime of rape is committed. From an analysis of the different acts which may constitute rape, 
however, this crime must be understood as the act by which a person of the one or the other 
sex imposes sexual intercourse on another person, against such a person's will.  
Compared to the previous definition of rape in Congolese criminal law which recognised rape 
as a crime that could only be perpetrated by men against female victims, the new formulation 
of the provisions regarding this offence is wide enough to capture any instance of non-
consensual sex.
300
 The lack of consent may be the result of physical or psychological 
weaknesses such as illness, psychological pressure, coercive environment, impaired senses or 
faculties owing to illness or any accidental cause, or may result from any other means of 
duress or surprise.  
A distinction between two enacted laws prior to and after 2006 needs to be drawn with respect 
to the age of consent in Congolese criminal law. Prior to 1 August 2006, a girl who has 
attained the age of 14 could consent to sexual intercourse.
301
  
  
                                                             
300 Likulia Bolongo Droit pénal spécial zaïrois (LGDJ Paris1985) 329. 
301 See Articles 167 and 170 of the Congolese Penal Code prior to August 2006. By Law No. 06/018 of 20 July 
2006 (Loi n° 06/018 du 20 juillet 2006), the age of consent to sexual activities was shifted from 14 to 18. 
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(b) Definitional elements of rape in DRC law 
Prior to August 2006, the material element of rape was characterized by sexual intercourse, an 
act of penile penetration into a woman’s vagina.302 Penetration of the vagina or of the anus by 
other means such as objects and digital rape (by fingers), other than male genital organs, was 
not considered an act of rape.
303
 The new law defines rape in a way that includes any means 
of penetration or invasion of the victim’s body. Thus, acts of penetration whether with a 
sexual organ or with another part of the body such as fingers, tongue, or the insertion of any 
other object into an orifice of the body constitute the material element of rape, as well as 
compelling a person to perform such an act of penetration.
304
 
Regarding the perpetrator and the victim of rape, it must be noted that either a man or a 
woman can commit rape.
305
 Rape is construed nowadays as gender-neutral. The victim can 
also be a man or a woman although the majority of victims of rape remain women (and 
children of either sex).
306
 
The means of bodily invasion are considered material elements to the crime of rape: the 
perpetrator resorts to force; or to threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of 
violence; duress; detention;
307
 psychological oppression; or abuse of power, against such 
person or another person.
308
 
(c) Absence of consent on the part of the victim  
For rape to be established, it must be shown that the victim did not consent to the invasion of 
his or her body, or that he or she was in a situation that precluded her/him from giving valid 
and informed genuine consent.
309
 A person may be incapable of giving genuine consent if 
                                                             
302 Own interpretation of article 170 of the Congolese Penal Code prior to 1 August 2006. See also Likulia 
Bolongo op cit (n 300) 329. 
303 Ibid.  
304 Any invasion of the victim’s body by either sexual organ or body parts or objects amounts to rape. See Article 
170 of the Loi n° 06/018 du 20 juillet 2006. 
305 Ibid. 
306 Lutz C, Gutmann M and Brown K Conduct and Discipline in UN Peacekeeping Operations: Culture, 
Political Economy and Gender Report submitted to the Conduct and Discipline Unit Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations United Nations (Watson Institute for International Studies 19 October 2009) 7; 
Compare Jewkes R et alii ‘Why, When and How Men Rape: Understanding Rape Perpetration in South Africa’ 
2010 (34) South Africa Crime Quarterly 23-31, 27. 
307 The situation of a detainee or a person awaiting trial but held in custody. 
308 Article 170 of the Loi n° 06/018 du 20 juillet 2006 modifying the D.R. Congolese Criminal Code. 
309 The DRC Penal Code places the age of consent to sex at 18 as from 2006. Before, a person could give consent 
to sex at the age of 14. The so-called child prostitution falls under the lack of genuine consent owing to age-
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affected by natural incapacity,
310
 induced or age-related incapacity.
311
 Whenever a perpetrator 
resorted to threat, violence, ruse, or abused a person whose senses and faculties have been 
affected by illness,
312
 or who has lost the use of his/her senses or has been deprived of such 
senses and faculties, any consent given by such a victim cannot be deemed genuine.
313
 The 
age of consent is 18.
314
 Thus, child prostitution exposed by media and other reporters must be 
classified as rape and not as prostitution because persons must be considered adults (or 
individuals who have reached the age of consent) in order to consent to the nature of acts to 
be performed validly.
315
 Thus the person engaging the services of a prostitute who has not 
reached the age of consent is committing rape, whether such person paid for such sexual 
services or not. Indeed paying for sex with children is no different from raping a person 
incapable of giving valid consent.
316
  
(d) Unlawfulness  
In Congolese criminal law, grounds of justification are considered to have their basis in 
general principles of law, which are not necessarily enacted in written law.
317
 The DRC 
Constitution, however, provides that a public agent is relieved of the duty to obey and to 
execute superior orders when the received order constitutes either a manifest attack on human 
rights and public liberties, or an attack on good mores.
318
 Superior orders, therefore, self-
                                                                                                                                                                                              
related incapacity. A distinction is, therefore, crucial as to acts prosecuted today but committed before August 
2006 in DRC. 
310 Congenital deafness and dumbness are considered natural impairment conditions which render the person 
concerned incapable. 
311 Thus a person under 18 years old as from 2006, a person who has impaired senses and faculties whether such 
condition proceeds from accidental cause or from illness. See Article 170 of the DRC Penal Code. 
312 Meningitis can leave a sequel of deafness. 
313 Ibid. 
314 See articles 167-168 of DR Congolese Criminal Code as modified and supplemented by the Law n° 06/018 of 
20 July 2006. 
315 See Kakala T and Clifford L (AR No. 186, 12-Sep-08) ‘UN Sexual Misconduct Allegations Won’t Go Away’ 
available at www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=hfrfacr346657&l=en&s=f&o=346697 [last accessed 19 December 
2012]. 
316 Holt K and Hughes S ‘South Africa: Army silent on sex scandal in DRC’ available at www.iol.co.za/news-
1.216984 [last accessed 21 December 2012]. For numbers of victims of sexual misconduct by peacekeepers in 
DRC in 2004, and comments by investigative team, see Report on DRC A/59/661 paras 7-11. 
317 Nyabirungu mwene Songa Traité de droit pénal général congolais 2e éd. (Éditions Universitaires Africaines 
Kinshasa 2007) section sur les causes de justification. 
318 Constitution  de la République démocratique du Congo 18 février 2006 Journal Officiel de la RDC 18 février 
2006. Article 28 : Nul n’est tenu d’exécuter un ordre manifestement illégal. Tout individu, tout agent de l’État 
est délié du devoir d’obéissance, lorsque l’ordre reçu constitue une atteinte manifeste au respect des droits de 
l’homme et des libertés publiques et des bonnes mœurs. Translation: The defence of superior orders or the 
command of a legitimate civil or military authority does not exonerate the perpetrator of his/her responsibility 
with respect to a crime of sexual violence. See article 42 (ter) of the DR Congolese Criminal Code as modified 
and supplemented by Law N° 06/018 of 20 July 2006. 
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defence and necessity are not applicable defences to crimes of rape because any of the 
requirements for asserting those defences actually exist.
319
 Where consent may be asserted 
and the victim was an adult not deprived of any of her or his faculties, who was able to give a 
genuine consent, the crime is not committed. It is rare, however, especially in the case of 
Congolese culture, for a victim, especially a woman, to pretend to have been raped when no 
such an act occurred. It gives her no advantage at all, only tremendous social shame in 
addition to the harm already done. The only possible defence that may be raised by the 
perpetrator of the crime of rape may be based on a lack of criminal capacity owing to mental 
illness. 
(e) Culpability  
With respect to criminal capacity in DR Congolese criminal law, it must be indicated that 
only between the ages of 14 and 18 is the minor criminally liable as a perpetrator.
320
 A person 
of an age less than 14 years incurs no criminal liability. An adult person with an impaired 
mental state, however, has not the required culpability to be held criminally liable.
321
  
The crime of rape requires intention, and this intention is established by inference from the 
circumstances of perpetration, from the means used by the perpetrator and from the element 
of lack of consent.
322
 With regard to the young victims (under the age of 18), the perpetrator’s 
intention to commit the crime is always presumed, except where he was deceived by the 
victim as to the latter’s age and could not foresee that the victim was a minor.323 With regard 
to peacekeepers, the intentional element can be established by inference from the 
peacekeeper’s knowledge that he or she has been deployed in the host country to protect 
                                                             
319 Consent is not a defence for rape but a definitional element. Official capacity cannot justify rape. See article 
42 (bis) of the DR Congolese Criminal Code as modified and supplemented by Law N° 06/018 of 20 July 2006. 
Self-defence and necessity cannot be upheld as valid defences to rape. 
320 Article 2(9) of Law No. 09/001 of 10 January 2009 on the protection of children DRC Official Journal of 12 
January 2009. Youth as ground excluding culpability does not apply to peacekeepers. 
321 If a person suffers from a mental disease or defect that destroys that person's capacity to appreciate the 
unlawfulness or nature of his or her conduct, or capacity to control his or her  conduct to conform to the 
requirements of law, such a person cannot be held criminally responsible. See Article 31(1) (a) Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court. See Nyabirungu mwene Songa Droit pénal général zaïrois (DES Kinshasa 
1989) 240 et seq. 
322 Likulia Bolongo op cit (n 300) 336. 
323 Ibid. 
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vulnerable civilians and the knowledge that he or she is all the times under the obligation to 
observe local laws and UN standards.
324
 
2.3.3.2 Other sexual acts and offences involving children 
With respect to Congolese Criminal Law, two conducts are discussed and relate to 
prostitution and child pornography. It is also important to take note of the fact that any 
conduct involving children into sexual activities, whether prostitutional or not amount to rape 
as indicated above, due to the absence of genuine consent.
325
 
Prostitution per se is not a crime in the DRC.
326
 Where the parties to such a transaction are 
consenting adults, they can, therefore, not be prosecuted under Congolese criminal law. The 
fact that it is no violation of any local law to be involved with prostitutes constitutes one of 
the reasons why peacekeepers in the DRC have gained their particular reputation for 
fraternisation with local women.
327
 A Norwegian researcher who conducted an interview with 
MONUC personnel was told by his interviewees that fraternisation with prostitutes was a 
positive intervention, since girls and women get money from them.
328
 The interview did not 
reveal, however, the ages of the girls involved, although one should not lose sight of the fact 
that engaging the services of a prostitute as young as 12 or 13 years old remains punishable as 
rape.
329
 Despite the unjust economic power imbalances between local women and UN 
personnel, instances in which the latter may have paid for the services of adult prostitutes are 
not considered unlawful conduct
330
 under Congolese Criminal Law.
331
 In fact prostitution per 
se is not criminalised in DRC as well as in most of the countries who have contributed 
MONUC personnel. It is probably, therefore, difficult for peacekeepers to see how they are 
violating the law.
332
 If peacekeepers, however, were accused of running brothels of one kind 
or another, playing the role of intermediaries between prostitutes and their clients, then they 
                                                             
324 Article 7 ter of the Revised Draft Model Memorandum of Understanding (UN. Doc. A/61/494 of 3 October 
2006). 
325 Supra 2.3.3.1. 
326 As prostitution per se is not criminalised, the Penal Code does not deal with the issue. No legal definition 
exists. 
327 Higate PR ‘Men, Masculinities and Peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa’ in Karamé K (ed) Gender and 
Peace-building in Africa (Training for Peace – NUPI (Norsk Utenriskpolitik Institutt) Oslo 2004) 67-90, 75. 
328
 Ibid. 76. 
329 Article 170 of the Congolese Penal Code. 
330 Quenivet N ‘The Dissonance between the UN Zero-Tolerance Policy and the Criminalization of Sexual 
Offences on the International Level’ 2007 (7) International Criminal Law Review 657-676, 668. 
331 See supra (n 326). 
332 Ibid. 
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might be found to be in the situation of enforced prostitution.
333
 These aspects are 
criminalised in Congolese criminal law.
334
  
(a) Enforced prostitution:
335
 Article 174 c 
Whoever compels one or several persons to perform an act or several acts of a sexual nature, by 
force, by threat of force or coercion or by taking advantage of their inability to give an informed 
consent, in order to obtain a pecuniary advantage or other benefit, shall be punished with a penal 
servitude of three months to five years.336 
The elements of the crime of enforced prostitution under the above article are the same as 
under article 8 (2) (b) (xxii) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in that the 
preamble to the law that criminalises enforce prostitution under the DR Congolese Penal 
Code expressly indicates that the aim of enacting that law was to keep up with international 
law.
337
 It is, however, not apparent from the reading of the preamble how the requirement of 
connection to an armed conflict can actually be fulfilled. For this crime, therefore, to be 
established, the prosecution must prove that (1) the perpetrator caused one or more persons to 
engage in one or more acts of a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or coercion 
caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, 
against such person or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive 
environment or such person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent; (2) the 
perpetrator, or another person, obtained or expected to obtain pecuniary or other advantage in 
exchange for, or in connection with, the acts of a sexual nature; and (3) the perpetrator knew 
that he was compelling the victim to engage in or to remain in, prostitution. With respect to 
the grounds of justification, one sees none excluding the unlawfulness of the crime of 
enforced prostitution as consent forms part of the definitional elements. 
Where the perpetrator can establish that the victim was a willing party in engaging in 
prostitution, the crime cannot be proved, but the perpetrator can still be prosecuted for 
‘pimping’ or brothel keeping. 
                                                             
333 UN Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of 
Others, approved by UN.G.A. Res. 317 (IV) of December 2, 1949 entered into force July 25, 1951. 
334 Articles 174 b and 174 c of the Loi nº 06/018 du 20 juillet 2006 JORDC du 1er aout 2006, or article 174 bis 
avant ladite modification. The crime of enforced prostitution may overlap with the crime of rape in that the 
victim is compelled to perform a sexual act. 
335 The term ‘Enforced prostitution’ used in Congolese Penal Code is the same as the one used in Articles 7-8 of 
the Rome Statute of the ICC.  
336 Article 174 c of the DR Congolese Penal Code. 
337 See para 4 of the preamble to the the Loi nº 06/018 du 20 juillet 2006 JORDC du 1er aout 2006. 
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(b) Pimping and brothel keeping: Article 174 b
338
 
Shall be punished with a penal servitude of three months to five years and with a fine of fifty 
thousand to one hundred thousand Congolese constant Francs:   
1. Whoever, in order to satisfy someone else’s passions, hires, drives or causes a person of 
eighteen years of age or older to engage in prostitution, even with the consent of such a 
person; where the age of the person cannot be determined, this will be determined by medical 
expertise;  
2. Whoever owns or keeps a house of prostitution;   
3. The pimp: a pimp is someone who lives wholly or in part on the earnings of  the prostitution 
of another  person, at the expense of the person whose prostitution the pimp is exploiting;  
4. Whoever exploits habitually, whatever the strategy used, the prostitution of others.   
Shall be punished with the same sentence as in the previous paragraph of this article: 
1. Whoever distributes a document or pornographic movie to children under 18 years of age;   
2. Whoever broadcasts on television obscene dances or indecent clothes, susceptible of 
corrupting good morals.  
When the victim is a child who has not reached 18 years of age, the sentence will be five to 
twenty years.   
From an analysis of the above provisions, it appears that the perpetrator may be a male or a 
female person. The prohibition deals with the fact that a person earns a living from the 
proceeds of the prostitution of others.
339
 The conduct consists of a number of acts, such as 
recruiting prostitutes, owning or keeping a house of prostitution, and living on the earnings of 
the prostitution of another person.
340
 
A person can also be punished with the sentence incurred by a pimp where such a person 
distributes documents or movies, broadcasts lewd dances, or indecent clothes to children 
under the age of 18. The legislator considers such conduct as a way of enticing young people 
into obscene behaviour since the conduct is susceptible of corrupting good morals.  
                                                             
338
 The provisions of this article have not been changed by the law supplementing the DR Congolese Penal Code. 
339 See also Kakule Kalwahali The Criminalisation of Prostitution in South African Criminal Law (unpublished 
LLM thesis UNISA 2005) 30. 
340 Living on ... refers to the habitual exploitation of prostitution of another person. The prosecution has to show 
an element of repetition to constitute the habit which is actually punishable but a single act of pimping or 
receiving money from a prostitute is not.  
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From an analysis of the crime of displaying pornographic material to children, it is obvious 
that, for such crime to be established, the prosecution has to show that the persons to whom 
the document was distributed or the viewers to whom the broadcast was directed are actually 
children under the age of 18. If the movie or document was produced using children or adults 
disguised as children, the perpetrator can be charged with child pornography. 
(c) Child pornography: Article 174 m 
Shall be punished with a penal servitude of five to ten years and a fine of one hundred fifty 
thousand constant Congolese Francs, whoever makes any representation, by whatever means, of a 
child taking explicit play in sexual activities, whether real or simulated, or any representation of 
the sexual organs of a child, mainly for sexual ends. 
With respect to the specific case of child pornography, Congolese law explicitly criminalizes 
the depiction of images or representations involving child pornography, even if such depiction 
is simulated.
341
 The crime consists of the possession of pornographic materials even if such 
material was actually produced using consenting adults. A person who is found in possession 
of such material, and it is discovered subsequently that he or she produced them using 
children, may be charged with crimes such as rape, or with the crime of being found in 
possession of pornographic material involving children.
342
  
2.3.3.3 Murder  
Although there are no reported instances of unlawful killing of civilians by peacekeepers in 
the DRC, it remains necessary to discuss the specific elements of the crime of wilful killing or 
murder in the DR Congolese criminal law for the purposes of comparative analysis.  
(a) Definition of murder 
Murder is defined as a homicide perpetrated wilfully, with the intention of causing the death 
of a human being.
343
 Where the killing has been premeditated, it is subsumed under the term 
                                                             
341 Article 174 m of the Congolese Penal Code. 
342
 Ibid. 
343 Homicide intentionally committed to cause death is called murder.  Murder committed with premeditation is 
assassination. They are both punished with death. See Articles 44-45 of the D.R. Congolese Penal Code. See also 
Avocats Sans Frontières Étude de jurisprudence : l’application du statut de Rome de la cour pénale 
internationale par les juridictions de la République démocratique du Congo (Francesca Boniotti Bruxelles 2009) 
40. 
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‘assassination’.344 They are both punished by the death penalty.345 There is no practical 
interest, therefore, regarding the distinction between murder and assassination.
346
  
(b) Definitional elements  
The definitional element of murder consists in the act which causes the death of human 
being.
347
 The said act must be not only material to the death of the victim, it must also be both 
the factual and the legal cause of the death of the victim,
348
 although, and generally the act 
consists in a commission, an omission in specific circumstances can cause the death of a 
human being. Thus, where a person has voluntarily omitted to execute a legal duty to act 
positively and a link can be established between such an omission and the death of the victim, 
the perpetrator can be held criminally accountable for the death of the victim.
349 
Indeed, there 
is no difference between causing death of a victim by assaulting the victim and reaching the 
same result (death of the victim) by refraining from executing a legal duty. This would be the 
case where a mother, without justification or just cause, refuses to breastfeed a newborn 
defenceless child or in a situation where a prison custodian does not give food to the 
inmates.
350
 The omission is in such a case an act of commission by omission.
351
 
Since murder can exist only in respect of a living human being, murder must be committed 
against a person who has been born alive and was still alive at the moment of the act.
352
 There 
is, therefore, no such a thing as murder on a corpse, nor on an unborn foetus not yet separated   
                                                             
344 Articles 44-45 of the D.R. Congolese Penal Code. Although the term ‘assassination’ is usually linked to the 
murder of political figures, in penal codes of French-speaking countries the term is used to mean any murder 
perpetrated with premeditation, even if the victim is not a political leader. See for instance article 394 of the 
Belgium Penal Code; article 144 of the Burundian Penal Code; 221-3 of the French Penal Code. See also Article 
3(a) of the ICTR French version which uses the term assassinat ‘assassination’ where the English version uses 
the term ‘murder’ [Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda U N Doc. S/RES/955 (1994)]. 
345 Boma 10 décembre 1907 (Jur. Etat, II, p. 204). 
346 See Likulia Bolongo op cit (n 300) 49. 
347 Avocats Sans Frontières Étude de jurisprudence : l’application du statut de Rome de la cour pénale 
internationale par les juridictions de la République démocratique du Congo (Francesca Boniotti Bruxelles 2009) 
40. 
348 Ibid. 
349 Ire inst. Stan. 23 décembre 1952 (J.T.O. 1954, 360); Kakule Kalwahali Droit Penal Special (unpublished 
course ULPGL-Goma 2011) 14. 
350 For comparison, see English cases R v Gibbins and Proctor [1918] CCA where failure to feed a 7-year-old 
child constituted the required mens rea for murder for the accused to be found guilty of murder; R v Instan 
[1893] CCR where similar failure to feed a person constituted manslaughter. 
351 Kakule Kalwahali op cit (n 349) 14. 
352 Likulia Bolongo op cit (n 300) 61.  
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from its mother.
353
 Murder can be established and its perpetrator convicted only if no ground 
of justification exists. 
(c) Unlawfulness  
It is an element of murder that the crime must be unlawful. Grounds of justification such as 
performance of a duty imposed by law or executing superior orders, private defence, lawful 
use of arm by public officer, and a state of necessity may have some bearing on the criminal 
liability of the perpetrator. 
 Performance of a duty imposed by law and the lawful use of arms by a public officer 
This ground of justification applies when it has been legally enacted as such. The individual 
who has, for instance, overseen the process and execution of a person sentenced to death, in 
observance of the required procedure, cannot be considered to have committed murder.
354
 
Likewise, policemen who make use of firearms to disperse demonstrators or to repress riots 
cannot be found guilty of murder if death to some victims results from their conduct; no 
condemnation can be pronounced against them because they are justified.
355
 This would apply 
to peacekeepers prosecuted to have caused the death of a person during a rampage directed at 
UN peace mission headquarters. 
 Private defence 
Under DR Congolese criminal law, private defence is not a written principle. This explains 
the absence of any reference to enacted legislation. It has been decided by courts that private 
defence should be resorted to only if one finds one’s self in imminent unavoidable grave 
danger, without any other way out.
356
 The reaction must be proportionate to the aggression.
357
  
 State of necessity 
Necessity is an available defence to any person accused of having committed a crime under 
Congolese criminal law. It remains, however, an unwritten general principle of criminal law. 
                                                             
353 Killing a foetus in the womb is treated as an abortion.  
354
 For instance a pregnant woman cannot be executed if it has been proven that she is an expecting mother. The 
execution has to be suspended until the child is born. See article 3 of the Arrêté du gouverneur général – 
Exécutions capitales. (R.M., 1898, p. 59; Rec. Us., III, p. 46)  du 9 avril 1898. 
355 Likulia Bolongo op cit (n 300) 74. 
356 Boma 30 septembre 1902 (Jur. Etat I. 216). 
357 Elis. 30 décembre 1915 (Jur. Col. 1926, 225); Léo. 13 mai 1954 (R.J.C.B. 1954, 246). 
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Indeed, when a person acting under a threat of severe and irreparable harm to his life or limb, 
or to the life or limb of another person, perpetrates an offence, the person under such a threat 
cannot be punished. To stand as defence and justify the would-be-perpetrator, four 
requirements have to be met: (1) the act which would constitute the offence must be 
performed under an immediate threat of severe and irreparable harm to life or limb; (2) there 
must be no other adequate way of averting the evil; (3) the crime committed is not 
disproportionate to the evil threatened, i.e. the violation of the law is a lesser evil than the evil 
avoided; and (4) sometimes the threatening situation must not have been created by the person 
asserting the justification.
358
 Since there has been no allegation of murder against MONUC 
personnel, it suffices to refer to the discussion under Somali and Burundian law regarding the 
issue of whether necessity can justify murder.
359
 
 Presumed circumstances excluding punishment 
The envisioned instances here are those in which a person attacked viewed the attack as 
unlawful whereas it was lawful. The defence of self-defence cannot, therefore, stand. This 
will be the same where a person mistakenly believed himself or herself to be in danger and to 
avoid the danger such a person committed a crime. It cannot be said he or she has committed 
the crime wilfully. Intention cannot be established for he or she presumed he or she was 
acting in circumstances excluding liability. In such situations the accused lacks culpability. 
(d) Culpability 
As it has been argued above, peacekeepers are adults; the issue of criminal capacity, 
therefore, does not arise, except where the capacity issue includes that of mental illness and 
intoxication.
360
 The latter defences, however, are usually discussed together with the issue of 
the mental element of the crime. The mens rea required for the crime of murder is intention. 
This requirement is clear from the formulation of the provisions on murder and assassination 
which reads that a homicide must be ‘intentionally committed to cause death’.361 
                                                             
358
 Nyabirungu mwene Songa Traité du droit pénal général congolais 2
e
 éd. (Editions Universitaires Africaines 
Kinshasa 2007) 168-175. If a person put himself into a situation of necessity to be able to perpetrate a prohibited 
act, such a person cannot be justified. See Ibid. 175. 
359 See supra 2.3.1.3 and 2.3.2.3. 
360 See supra 2.3.1.3. 
361 Article 44-45 of the DR Congolese Penal Code. 
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2.3.3.4 Assault 
The provision of the DR Congolese Criminal Code which criminalises assault defines this 
crime in terms of voluntarily causing injuries to another human being.
362
 Premeditation, viz 
the planning of the perpetration of such a crime is not only a psychological element of mens 
rea but also an aggravating circumstance.
363
 Therefore, for assault to be present, the 
prosecution must prove that there was a voluntary conduct which resulted in a human being 
suffering and such act produced unlawful consequences. 
(a) Definitional elements of assault 
For the crime of assault to be present, the conduct must have caused injuries to the body of the 
victim.
364
 The injuries may be inflicted by direct contact with the body of the victim or 
indirectly. It is sufficient to prove that the victim’s injuries stem from the perpetrator 
conduct.
365
 Whenever a causal link may be established between the conduct of the perpetrator 
and the injury to the victim, this requirement is met.
366
 Mere threats which cause no injuries to 
the victim are not considered as assault in DR Congolese Criminal Law. Assault is only 
possible against a human being who is alive at the moment of the conduct.
367
  
(b) Unlawfulness 
Causing injuries to the victim must have been unlawful to hold the perpetrator criminally 
liable. This means that there must be no ground of justification for the perpetrator’s act. 
Indeed, where the perpetrator assaulted the victim out of private defence, in a duty of carrying 
out superior orders,
368
 or with the victim’s consent, such is the case with surgery activities or 
in sports, the performer of the assault cannot be held criminally liable. If the alleged 
                                                             
362 Article 46 para 1 of the DR Congolese Penal Code. 
363 Article 46 para 2 of the DR Congolese Penal Code. 
364 Article 46 of the DR Congolese Penal Code. 
365 In instances of negligent injuries to the victim, the provisions will apply are those of article 54 of the DR 
Congolese Penal Code. 
366 Comparison between voluntary assault of article 46 with assault which resulted in death of the victim (article 
48). With respect to the latter instance, old court decisions allude to the requirement of causal link. See Léo, 23 
février 1928 (R.J.C.B., p. 153); Léo, 23 mai 1941 (R.J.C.B., p. 187); I
re
 inst. Usa, 22 octobre 1946 (R.J.C.B., 
1947, p. 71). 
367 Assault and any barbaric acts against a corpse are punished according to articles 61-62 of the DR Congolese 
penal Code. 
368 Carrying out obvious illegal orders entails no defence to the accused. See article 28 of the DR Congolese 
Constitution of 18 February 2006. 
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perpetrator suffered from a sudden mental illness at the time of the conduct, he may however 
plead a lack of culpability.
369
 
(c) Culpability 
The required mens rea for assault is intention in DR Congolese Criminal Law is intention. 
This is clear as the legislation uses the concept ‘voluntarily’ in the provisions of the code. 
Negligence is not sufficient mens rea for the crime of voluntary assault. Premeditation and 
other enumerated situations linked especially to the consequences of the conduct constitute 
aggravating circumstances of assault.
370
 
(d) Aggravating circumstances 
Unlike the Burundian Penal Code which provides aggravating circumstances where the victim 
is a pregnant woman or where a special relationship exists between the victim and the 
perpetrator, the DRC Criminal Code only recognizes premeditation
371
 and consequences as 
illness, permanent inability to work, severe impairment of any body organ or serious 
mutilation,
372
 as aggravating circumstances to assault. 
With respect to premeditation, and in order to elevate the punishment incurred for simple 
assault, the onus of proof rests with the prosecution to establish that this aggravating 
circumstance actually exists. It must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrator 
thought about and planned the assault beforehand. If the trial court is satisfied that the 
prosecution has discharge the onus of proof, the punishment incurred is one month to two 
years in jail in lieu of eight days to six months.
373
 
With respect to illness, which is not otherwise explained or defined in the code, it has been 
decided that such an illness ought to be of certain seriousness to warrant the difference 
between the punishment for simple assault and that of aggravated assault by the circumstance 
of illness.
374
 Regarding the inability to work, this circumstance exists whenever the victim has 
been kept from work for a considerable period
375
 or can no longer work the way he or she 
                                                             
369 Ire inst. Kas., 22 mars 1950 (J.T.O., 1950-1951, 44). 
370
 Articles 46-48 of the DR Congolese Penal Code. 
371 Article 46 para 2 of the DR Congoles Penal Code. 
372 Article 47 of the DR Congolese Penal Code. 
373 Article 46 para 2 of the DR Congoles Penal Code. 
374 Boma, 26 mai 1908 (Jur. Etat, II, p. 239). 
375 For example two months away from work. See Boma, 15 janvier 1909 (Jur. Etat, II, p. 239).  
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used to,
376
 or where there is a reduction in efficiency of carrying out the worker’s 
assignment.
377
 By severe impairment of any body organ or serious mutilation, it is understood 
for example the loss of an eye,
378
 a hand but not a finger,
379
 or the tearing of an eardrum.
380
 
Where these circumstances are present, the perpetrator incurs a punishment ranging from two 
to five years imprisonment and a fine. Intended assault which results in the death of the victim 
without such result being intended, the perpetrator may be punished with an imprisonment of 
five to twenty years.
381
 If the perpetrator is a state agent or a person acting at the instigation of 
a state agent or with the acquiescence of such state agent, the crime is no longer one of assault 
but the crime of torture. 
Before the criminalisation of torture per se,
382
 wilful causing of severe pain and suffering to 
an individual was prosecuted as assault or as an aggravating circumstance. This was the case 
even where the public official element existed to qualify as torture.
383
 The definition of torture 
under the new provisions is verbatim the definition of torture under the UNCAT.
384
 For the 
crime of torture to be established, the prosecution must prove the following elements:
385
 
1. The victim was a person in the custody or under the control of the perpetrator; 
2. The perpetrator inflicted severe physical or mental pain or suffering upon the victim; 
3. Such pain or suffering did not arise only from, and was not inherent in or incidental to, 
lawful sanctions; 
4. The perpetrator inflicted the pain or suffering for such purposes as: obtaining information 
or a confession; punishment; intimidation; or coercion or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind. 
5. The perpetrator must be a public official or a person who performed the act at the 
instigation of such a public official. 
                                                             
376 Boma, 26 mai 1908 (Jur. Etat, II, p. 258). 
377 Ire inst. Stan., 24 mars 1953 (J.T.O., 1955, p. 43, no. 19). 
378 Boma, 13 octobre 1908 (Jur. Etat, II, p. 269). 
379 Ire inst. Stan., 19 avril 1955 (J.T.O., 1956, p.14). 
380 Ire inst. Eq., 15 avril 1955 (J.T.O., 1956, p. 43, no. 19). 
381 Article 48 of the DR Congoles Penal Code. 
382
 Articles 48bis, 48ter and 48quater of the DR Congolese Penal Code introduced by article 1 of the Law No. 
11/008 of 9 July 2011. DRC accessed the UNCAT on 18 May 1996. 
383 See articles 46-48 and 67 of the DR Congolese Penal Code. 
384 UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (S. Treaty 
Doc. No.100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85). 
385 Article 48bis of the DR Congolese Penal Code. 
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From an analysis of the provisions criminalizing torture in DR Congolese law, no defence 
such as a defence of superior orders is available for the crime of torture because such an order 
would be manifestly unlawful.
386
 Prosecution vis-à-vis the person who committed acts of 
torture cannot be barred by the passing of time.
387
 It has also been indicated that no case of 
torture or assault has been reported regarding peacekeepers deployed in the RD Congo.
388
 
2.3.3.5 Synopsis of the findings on DR Congolese Criminal Law 
With respect to the DR Congolese regarding crimes committed by peacekeepers, it evident 
that the position is the same as that of Burundian law, in that the territorial law is also 
applicable to the conduct of peacekeepers on the grounds of territoriality principle. DR 
Congolese law is further applicable to the conduct of peacekeepers on the ground of the 
passive nationality principle. Therefore, the lack of prosecution of the peacekeeper alleged to 
have especially committed crimes of rape and sexual crimes such of pornography with 
children may be explained upon other grounds than issues of substantive law. One could 
therefore infer that peacekeepers are immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the Host 
State.
389
 The reasons for this will be investigated later in this thesis.
390
 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the relevant allegations of crimes by peacekeepers in Somalia, 
Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It has shown that the different 
allegations of crimes presented in the chapter, especially sexual offences and murder, as well 
as torture and assault, are provided for in the domestic law of the selected host countries. In 
the Congolese criminal code, the provisions on rape are similar to those of the Burundian 
code, save for the distinction that must be drawn with respect to the age of consent prior to 
August 1, 2006 and thereafter.
391
 Indeed, before the coming into force of the law on sexual 
                                                             
386 Article 28 of the 2006 DRC Constitution. 
387 No statute of limitation applies to acts of torture. See Article 48quater of the DR Congolese Penal Code. 
388 See supra 2.2.4. 
389 Para 47(b) of the Model Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) UN. Doc. A/45/594 of 9 October 1990. No 
country has been willing to subject its military contingents to the jurisdiction of a foreign nation. See  Defeis EF 
‘U.N. Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse and Exploitation: An End to Impunity’ 2008 (7) Washington University 
Global Studies Law Review 185-214, 206. 
390 Infra 4.4. 
391 Apart from the distinction relating to the sentence to be inflicted on any convicted person, rape requires, in 
both criminal systems, sexual penetration of the victim without her or his consent; that persons who have not 
reached their 18th birthday be considered incapable of giving an informed consent to sex; the means used by the 
perpetrator be violence, threats or menaces, coercion, surprise, psychological pressure, and abusing persons 
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violence in the DRC,
392
 the age of consent was fourteen.
393
 The new law elevated this age to 
eighteen.
394
 In Burundian criminal law, the age of consent did not change with the new penal 
code.
395
 In both criminal systems, as in most other domestic criminal law, for sexual 
intercourse to amount to a crime, the prosecution has to prove that there had been a material 
act of a sexual nature against the will of the victim.
396
 Prior to the revision of the above-
mentioned laws, the victim was always a female and the perpetrator a male.
397
 In Somali 
criminal law, rape can theoretically be committed by a person of either sex, vis-à-vis a man 
against a woman or a woman against a man.
398
  
In these three criminal systems as they appear today, the criminalization of rape and the use of 
violence, threats, deceptive means or ruse to carry out this crime are common to all. From an 
analysis, it is evident that the crime of rape has almost the same comparable elements in all 
these legal systems. This chapter has shown that rape and other sexual offences, murder, 
torture, and assault constitute crimes under domestic criminal law.
399
 These crimes have been 
allegedly committed by peacekeepers in Somalia.
400
 Regarding Burundi, the reported 
allegations of crimes by peacekeepers are sexual offences and murder. 
With respect to the crime of rape, and in all three of the domestic law criminal systems, 
consent is never a ground of justification, but a definitional element of the crime itself. That is 
why the perpetrators, and in the case of peace mission personnel, the defence available to 
them is that of proving the act was consensual. Any person charged with an offence has 
indeed the right to assert any defence. It is the duty of the court to assess and appreciate the 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
weakened by illnesses or by any accidental cause that deprived them of the use of their faculties. See Articles 
554-555 of the Burundian Criminal Code, 171 of the Congolese Criminal Code. 
392 Loi n° 06/018 du 20 juillet 2006 modifiant et complétant le Décret du 30 janvier 1940 portant Code pénal 
congolais Journal Officiel de la RDC, 1er aout 2006.  
393 Article 167 of the Congolese Penal Code prior to the law on sexual violence August 1, 2006. 
394 Articles 167 et 168, Loi n° 06/018 du 20 juillet 2006 modifiant et complétant le Décret du 30 janvier 1940 
portant Code pénal congolais, Journal Officiel de la RDC, 1er aout 2006. 
395 In Burundian law the age of consent to sexual acts is 18. See Article 382 du Décret-loi n°1/6 du 4 avril 1981 
portant réforme du Code pénal ; Article 554 Loi N°1 / 05 du 22 avril 2009 portant révision du Code pénal 
burundais. 
396 No crime exists where two adult consenting persons engage in sexual activity. 
397 See Likulia Bolongo op cit (n 300). 
398 Article 398 of the Somali Penal Code: whoever with violence or threats has carnal intercourse ‘with a person 
of the other sex...’ 
399
 Criminalisation of torture is an obligation that binds each State party to the UNCAT. 
400 The human right ‘not be subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life’ Exists. The violation of such a right 
constitutes murder, whoever the culprit may be. Members of the UN forces cannot be excused if they violate 
such an important right on the basis that the perpetrator is allowed by the UN to use force. See McLaughlin R 
‘The Legal Regime Applicable to Use of Lethal Force When Operating Under a UN Security Council Chapter 
VII Mandate Authorizing “All Necessary Means”’ 2008 (12) Journal of Conflict & Security Law 389-417. 
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pertinence of the defence raised. Sex between two consenting adults for reward is not a crime 
in Burundian and Congolese Criminal Law; peacekeepers who may have engaged the services 
of prostitutes infringed no law of the Host State. Prostitution is punished in Somali law with 
imprisonment and a fine.
401
 Both sanctions have to be inflicted.
402
  
Instances where it may be established that UN soldiers helped militia to keep on perpetrating 
criminal acts, armed groups to carry on their fight against government forces, and on the way 
to that end killed or raped civilians, should be held accountable for their criminal 
participation.
403
 Indeed, the involvement of MONUC soldiers with rebels may render any 
individual found guilty as an accomplice to all the atrocities committed by the armed groups 
in the eastern part of the DRC.
404
  
Regarding grounds of justification, it is recognized that anyone accused and prosecuted before 
a court of law for having committed a crime has the right to raise any circumstance that may 
avail him or her as defence. It is, therefore, during proceedings that one may absolutely 
conclude the absence or assertion of any ground of justification. It was noted that insanity 
may exculpate a person where it is shown sufficiently that the perpetrator, at the time of the 
commission of the offence, suffered a sudden fit.
405
 A peacekeeper can also assert insanity as 
a defence to culpability. In that case the burden of proof rests with the peacekeeper raising the 
                                                             
401 Article 405 of the Somali Penal Code. 
402 Ibid. 
403 Where participants in a crime did not perform the actus reus of the said crime, they are accomplices in that 
they willingly sought to further the crime. Compare with a Dutch case Van Anraat trial and appeal, discussed by 
van der Wilt HG ‘Genocide, Complicity in Genocide and International v. Domestic Jurisdiction Reflections on 
the van Anraat Case’ 2006 (4) Journal of International Criminal Justice 239-257; van der Wilt HG ‘Genocide v. 
War Crimes in the Van Anraat Appeal’ 2008 (6) Journal of International Criminal Justice 55-567: On 23 
December 2005, the District Court of The Hague delivered its judgment in the van Anraat case. During the 
1980s, the Dutch businessman Frans van Anraat sold huge quantities of the chemical thiodiglycol (TDG) to the 
regime of Saddam Hussein to serve as a raw material for the production of mustard gas. The court sentenced the 
accused to 15 years in jail. On appeal, the Court of Appeal concluded that the appellant was guilty of aiding and 
abetting war crimes; the evidence at the trial demonstrated that Van Anraat knew that the chemical weapons for 
which he provided the basic materials could and indeed would be used against Iraq’s enemies. The Court of 
Appeal sentenced Van Anraat to a term of imprisonment of 17 years, thus increasing by two years the sentence 
imposed by the District Court. In explaining the severity of the sentence, the Court of Appeal referred to the 
seriousness of the offences, the considerable contribution made by the defendant, and his lack of remorse or 
compassion for the victims. 
404 Articles 21-22 for the different modes of participation in a criminal act and article 23 for the incurred 
punishment according to each degree of participation. 
405 Supra culpability discussion. 
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mental illness defence.
406
 The intervention of expertise during the investigation of such 
instances must be recommended.
407
  
The analysis has shown that the law of the Host States is competent with respect to the 
prosecution of any conduct within the boundaries of the said states. It is clear that the lack of 
accountability of peacekeepers is not one relating to substantive definition or defences in the 
domestic Criminal Law of the Host States. The issue is then if peacekeepers may fall within 
the ambit of substantive definition, why are they not being held accountable? This problem of 
lack of accountability will next be investigated in the context of the law of Troop-
Contributing Country as an attempt to answer this question. 
The next chapter will, therefore, examine how the domestic law of troop- contributing 
countries deals with crimes committed by peacekeepers. Since the discussion of all states that 
sent troops in Africa on UN mission cannot be undertaken,
408
 South Africa is taken as an 
example of an African country to illustrate whether or not the country of origin of the alleged 
perpetrator has enacted adequate laws to deal with the crimes committed abroad.  
                                                             
406 Article 50 of the Somali Penal Code and Article 25 of the Burundian Penal Code. Mental illness applies in 
DR Congolese Criminal Law as a general principle of Criminal Law; it is not expressly provided for by specific 
legislation. 
407 Strong evidence is necessary criminal matters that may lead to privation of liberty of the accused. 
408 Supra 1.6. 
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CHAPTER III 
PEACEKEEPERS AND THE DOMESTIC CRIMINAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA AS 
A TROOP-CONTRIBUTING COUNTRY 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter two of this thesis discussed the incidence and prevalence of crimes perpetrated by 
peacekeepers against civilians. The manner and extent to which the criminal law of the Host 
States - Somalia, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo - is applicable to crimes 
committed by peacekeepers was also investigated in order to ascertain whether problems exist 
with the substantive definitions which result in peacekeepers not being held liable. It was 
clear that the problem does not rest with substantive definitions in the host country.  
This chapter seeks to establish whether the lack of accountability relates to the domestic 
criminal law of an African Troop-Contributing Country, such as South Africa, with respect to 
the crimes committed by peacekeepers while on mission. South Africa is selected as the 
example by reason of the fact that South Africa is actively involved in two of the three UN 
missions of peace, is an African state, and that there have been allegations of crimes by South 
African troops.
1
 At this juncture, it is critical to note that criminal conduct by a peacekeeper 
may fall under the domestic law of the state where it took place (i.e. the host country), but it 
may simultaneously constitute a violation of the laws of the perpetrator’s State of nationality 
(i.e. the Troop-Contributing Country).
2
  
In the present chapter, the crimes alleged to have been committed by South African 
peacekeepers will be analysed. These include the crimes of rape, engaging the services of a 
prostitute, murder, and assault. The elements of each crime will be discussed, and possible 
defences examined. It will also be shown that sexual crimes committed outside the Republic 
of South Africa can be prosecuted before South Africa courts in the same manner as if they 
                                                             
1 It should be noted that the selection of South Africa is dictated by the fact that South Africa is an African state 
which has contributed troops to peacekeeping missions in Burundi and in the DRC. South Africa is also selected 
to keep in line with the theme of the thesis. 
2 Troop-Contributing Countries (hereinafter TCC) have exclusive criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by 
peacekeeping soldiers. The TCC must apply their national law, which must have integrated International 
Humanitarian Law.  See para 47 (b) of the UN Model SOFA (UN Doc A/45/594 of 9 October 1990); O’Brien M 
‘The Ascension of Blue Beret Accountability: International Criminal Court Command and Superior 
Responsibility in Peace Operations’ 2010 (15) Journal of Conflict & Security Law 533–555, 553-554; UNGA 
Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations 2012 substantive session: New York 21 February-
16 March and 11 September 2012 (UN Doc. A/66/19 of September 2012) para 53; Ladley A ‘Peacekeeper 
Abuse, Immunity and Impunity: The Need for Effective Criminal and Civil Accountability on International 
Peace Operations’ 2005 (1) Politics and Ethics Review 81-90. 
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have occurred within the Republic. It will further be explored, with reference to case law, 
whether state liability for omissions or for failure to protect citizens from crimes can properly 
fit situations of crimes committed by peacekeepers. The chapter will also look at how the 
vicarious liability of a state may be relevant in the context of alleged crimes committed by 
peacekeepers. 
3.2 Law of South Africa as a Troop-Contributing Country 
It is important to mention at the outset that sexual crimes committed outside the Republic of 
South Africa can be prosecuted before South Africa courts in the same manner as if they have 
occurred within the Republic.
3
 South African soldiers have been accused of involvement in 
various crimes
4
, including a massive sex abuse scandal in the DRC.
5
 Although the said sex 
scandal abuse involved many other contingents of peacekeepers, including the one from South 
Africa, the allegations include a staggering 50 cases of sexual attacks on minors in the form of 
prostitution in Bunia throughout 2003.
6
 South African soldiers were among peacekeepers 
involved in those cases.
7
 It has been reported that a South African colonel had to be sent home 
after investigations substantiated that he had molested his young male interpreter.
8
 Other 
allegations of sexual crimes relate to South African MONUC troops stationed in Kindu.
9
  
One case of murder and one case of assault are reported to have been committed by a South 
African soldier deployed in Burundi.
10
 This section, therefore, explores rape, prostitution with 
respect to the client, murder, and assault in the light of South African law since South African 
MONUC and ONUB personnel have been accused of sexual crimes, murder and assault. 
                                                             
3 S 61 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 (hereinafter 
Sexual Offences Act 32 of 2007). The perpetrator may a South African citizen, a person residing with the 
Republic of South Africa, or any other person currently found or arrested in the RSA. 
4 Examples of such crimes are essentially rape. The discussion, however, also covers the crimes of prostitution, 
murder, culpable homicide, and other crimes.  
5 Holt K and Hughes S ‘South Africa: Army silent on sex scandal in DRC’ available at www.iol.co.za/news-
/south-africa/army-silent-on-sex-scandal-1.216984 [last accessed 21 December 2012]. 
6 Ibid; Rasmussen J ‘MONUC: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse -End of Assignment Report’ 25 February 2005, 2. 
Child prostitution is rape since a minor cannot give a valid consent to sex. See supra 2.3.3.1 
7 Ibid 
8 ‘Investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services into Allegations of Sexual exploitation and Abuse in 
the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ UN. Doc. A/59/661; Du 
Plessis M & Pete S ‘Who Guards the Guards? The ICC and serious crimes committed by United Nations 
Peacekeepers in Africa’ 2004 (13) African Security Review 5-17, 8. 
9 Du Plessis M & Pete S Who Guards the Guards? The International Criminal Court and Serious Crimes 
Committed by Peacekeepers in Africa (ISS Monograph Series No 121 Pretoria February 2006) 6. 
10 Otto H ‘SA soldier facing murder charge in Burundi’ http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/sa-soldier-facing-
murder-charge-in-burundi-1.267660 [last accessed 21 December 2012]; DPP Transvaal v Venter (430/2007) 
[2008] ZASCA 76 (30 May 2008) paras [5] [10]-[15]. 
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3.2.1 Rape  
Under South African law, rape is no longer a common law crime.
11
 Each and every analysis 
of the crime must, therefore, refer to the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) 
Amendment Act 32 of 2007 
12
 that defines, categorises, and indicates elements deemed to 
constitute rape.
13
 The Act prohibits sexual activities that occur without mutual consent.
14
 It 
distinguishes between rape and compelled rape.
15
 With regard to other non-consensual sexual 
activities,
16
 the Act differentiates between sexual assault,
17
 compelled sexual assault, and 
compelled self-sexual assault.
18
  
Although the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 
2007 has provided for a range of non-consensual prohibited activities, this statute will be 
discussed only in the context of rape. Indeed, the sources used to support the allegations of 
sexual crimes by peacekeepers deployed on the African continent as part of UN peace 
operations do not reveal the existence of compelled rape, sexual assault, compelled sexual 
assault, and compelled self-sexual assault. The discussion will, therefore, essentially cover the 
elements of the crime of rape in South African law. For rape to be present, four elements must 
be established: sexual penetration of another person, a lack of consent on the part of the latter 
person, unlawfulness, and intention.
19
  
  
                                                             
11 Preamble to the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 (hereinafter 
the Sexual Offences Act 32 of 2007). Before the enactment of this act, rape was defined as ‘the intentional 
unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent.’ This meant that only men could commit the 
crime and only females could be victims of rape. See Snyman CR Criminal Law 5 ed (LexisNexis Durban 2008) 
355-6; Van der Bijl C ‘Rape as a materially-defined crime: Could ‘any act which causes sexual penetration’ 
include omissions?’ 2010 (2) SACJ  224-238, 224; See also Fanuel Sitakeni Masiya v DPP and Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development, Constitutional Court of South Africa, Case CCT 54/06 [2007] ZACC 9, 
10 May 2007 para [26]. 
12 The Sexual Offences Act 32 of 2007. 
13 Ibid. 
14 See ss 3-7 of the Sexual Offences Act32 of 2007. 
15 Ss 3-4 of the Sexual Offences Act 32 of 2007. 
16 This consent, provided it be free, and fairly obtained, is the best proof that can be produced, that, to the person 
who gives it, no mischief, at least no immediate mischief, upon the whole, is done. For no man can be so good a 
judge as the man himself and what it is that gives him pleasure or displeasure. See Bentham J An Introduction to 
the Principles of Morals and Legislation 1781 (Batoche Books Kitchener 2000)135. 
17 Sexual assault, which encompasses all forms of sexual violation without consent, replaces the common law 
crime of indecent assault. 
18 Ss 5-7 of the Sexual Offences Act 32 of 2007. 
19 Snyman CR op cit (n 11) 355.  
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(a) The conduct requirement 
The meaning of ‘sexual penetration’ is defined in the Sexual Offences Act,20 in section 1(1) as 
including any act which causes penetration to any extent whatsoever by: 
(a) The genital organs of one person into or beyond the genital organs, anus, or mouth of another 
person; 
(b) Any other part of the body of one person or, any object, including any part of the body of an 
animal, into or beyond the genital organs or anus of another person; or 
(c) The genital organs of an animal, into or beyond the mouth of another person, and ‘‘sexually 
penetrates’’ has a corresponding meaning.  
From the analysis of the above meaning of ‘sexual penetration’ it appears that rape actually 
includes oral sex and male rape. These two instances were inadequately addressed by the 
common law since the definition of rape referred only to the sexual penile invasion of the 
vagina.
21
 The definition of rape as it stood before the enactment of the Sexual Offences Act 
was gender-specific
22
 and a forceful act of sodomy could not amount to rape.
23
 Thus, the 
South African colonel who was sent home on allegations that he had been molesting his 
young male interpreter could not be prosecuted of rape under South African law since the 
incident took place before the enactment of the gender-neutral Sexual Offences.
24
 The 
conduct remained prosecutable as the common law offence of indecent assault.
25
 
The Masiya case serves as the locus classicus in this regard and relates to the issue regarding 
‘the manner in which the definition of rape has been understood, developed and interpreted in 
South African law.’26 In this case, the accused, Mr Masiya, at the time 44 years of age, was 
initially brought before the District Court at Sabie on a charge of rape. The state alleged that 
on or about 16 March 2004 at or near Sabie he wrongfully and unlawfully had sexual 
                                                             
20  S 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 32 of 2007. 
21 Snyman CR op cit (n 11) 355-356. 
22 Fanuel Sitakeni Masiya v DPP and Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, Constitutional Court 
of South Africa, Case CCT 54/06 [2007] ZACC 9, 10 May 2007 paras [27], [30]. 
23 para [92]. 
24 National Assembly Allegations of Abuse by Members of SANDF in DRC: Question No.14 For Oral Reply  
Question time: 08 September 2004 - Written question No. 390 Transferred for Oral Reply (Published in The 
Internal Question Paper No 8 of 06 August 2004) available at www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2004pq/pq14.htm [last 
accessed 21 December 2012]; Du Plessis M &  Pete ‘Who Guards the Guards? The ICC and serious crimes 
committed by United Nations Peacekeepers in Africa’ 2004 (13) African Security Review  5-17, 8; Fanuel 
Sitakeni Masiya v DPP and Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, Constitutional Court of South 
Africa, Case CCT 54/06 [2007] ZACC 9, 10 May 2007 para [7].  
25 S 69 (3) of the Sexual Offences Act 32 of 2007. 
26 Masiya v DPP and Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development para [1]. 
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intercourse with a nine-year old girl (the complainant), without her consent. The case was 
transferred to the Regional Court at Graskop where he was tried on that charge. At the trial 
Mr Masiya, represented by an attorney from the Nelspruit Justice Centre, pleaded not guilty. 
The evidence established that the complainant was penetrated anally.
27
  
The Regional Court remarked that: 
In terms of the existing common law definitions of crime, the non-consensual anal penetration of 
a girl (or a boy) amounts only to the (lesser) common law crime of indecent assault, and not rape, 
because only non-consensual vaginal sexual intercourse is regarded as rape. One’s initial feelings 
of righteousness would however immediately rebel against such thought. Why must the 
unconsensual sexual penetration of a girl (or a boy) per anum be regarded as less injurious, less 
humiliating and less serious than the unconsensual sexual penetration of a girl per vaginam? The 
distinction appears on face value to be irrational and totally senseless, because the anal orifice is 
no less private, no less subject to injury and abuse, and its sexual penetration no less humiliating 
than the vaginal orifice. It therefore appears that the common law definition of rape is not only 
archaic, but irrational and amounts to arbitrary discrimination with reference to which kind of 
sexual penetration is to be regarded as the most serious, and then only in respect of women.28  
The Regional Court held that the common law definition of rape as it currently stood was 
unconstitutional, and it extended it to include acts of non-consensual sexual penetration of the 
male penis of the perpetrator into the vagina or anus of another person.
29
 This order was 
upheld by the High Court on Appeal
30
 and the Constitutional Court.
31
 It was noted, however, 
that the development of the common law definition of rape, to include anal penetration, 
should only be done prospectively, not retrospectively to apply to the applicant Fanuel 
Sitakeni Masiya, because retrospective application would offend the constitutional principle 
of legality.
32
  
The current definition of rape ‘refers to a widened notion of sexual penetration.’33 It is an 
inclusive provision which prohibits any unlawful invasion of the body of a person with any 
                                                             
27 Masiya v DPP and Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development para [6]. 
28 Para [9]. 
29 Paras [2], [11]. 
30 Para [15]. 
31
 Para [93]. 
32 Para [51]. 
33 Van der Bijl C and Rumney PNS ‘Attitudes, rape and law reform in South Africa’ 2010 (73) Journal of 
Criminal Law 414-449, 417; S and Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development v Acting Regional 
Magistrate, Boksburg: Mr Phillip Venter  and Lucas van der Merwe, Case CCT 109/10 [2011] ZACC 22, para 
[3]. 
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part of the body or any object.
34
 It must be noted that if the invasion of the body is performed 
by a part of the body or object (other than the genital organ of a human or an animal), and the 
targeted body orifice is the mouth of the victim, the crime of rape is not committed, but the 
conduct will qualify as sexual assault where such conduct amounts to a sexual violation.
35
 
What needs to be proven is the issue of whether the victim consented or not, as non-consent 
forms part of definitional element of the crime of rape.  
(b) Definitional elements  
It is clear that a lack of consent still forms part of the definitional elements of sexual crimes 
such as rape. The crime of rape, therefore, does not exist if the actors were two consenting 
adults. What is meant by the notion of consent? According to section 1(2) ‘consent’ means 
voluntary, uncoerced agreement.
36
 Whatsoever the offence, a complainant ‘B’ does not 
voluntarily or without coercion agree to an act of sexual penetration whenever the following 
circumstances are present, although this list is not exhaustive:
37
 
(a) Where B (the complainant) submits or is subjected to such a sexual act as a result of — 
 (i) the use of force or intimidation by A (the accused person) against B, C (a third person) or D 
(another person) or against the property of B, C or D; or 
(ii) a threat of harm by A against B, C or D or against the property of B, C or D; 
(b) where there is an abuse of power or authority by A to the extent that B is inhibited from 
indicating his or her unwillingness or resistance to the sexual act, or unwillingness to 
participate in such a sexual act; 
(c) where the sexual act is committed under false pretences or by fraudulent means, including 
where B is led to believe by A that— 
(i) B is committing such a sexual act with a particular person who is in fact a different person; or 
(ii) such a sexual act is something other than that act; or 
(d) where B is incapable in law of appreciating the nature of the sexual act, including where B is, 
at the time of the commission of such sexual act— 
(i) asleep;38 
(ii) unconscious; 
                                                             
34 The slightest or ineffective penetration by whatever means consummates the crime of rape. See the utilization 
of the words ‘into or beyond the genital organs or anus of another person’ in the definition of ‘penetration’ in S 
1of the Sexual Offences Act 32 of 2007. 
35 S 5 read with S 1(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 32 of 2007. See also Snyman CR op cit (n 12) 371-378. 
36 See also Van der Bijl C ‘Rape as a Materially-Defined Crime: Could “Any Act which Causes Sexual 
Penetration” Include Omissions?’ 2010 (2) SACJ 224-238, 225. 
37 S 1(3) of the Sexual Offences Act 32 of 2007. 
38 S v Mangokoane and Others (CC49/05) [2006] ZA HC (TPD 4 January 2006) para [5]. 
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(iii) in an altered state of consciousness, including under the influence of any medicine, drug, 
alcohol or other substance, to the extent that B’s consciousness or judgment is adversely 
affected; 
(iv) a child below the age of 12 years; or 
(v) a person who is mentally disabled. 
From an analysis of the above provisions, therefore, even under the new Act, rape can be 
committed only if the penetration takes place without conscious consent.
39
 Lack of consent is 
established whenever it is shown that force or intimidation have been resorted to.
40
 The 
question may, however, arise as to how to ascertain the agreement of ‘B’ with respect to an 
act of penetration. If ‘B’ manifested physical resistance or verbally proclaimed his or her 
opposition to the proposed sexual act, there is no problem in concluding that the absence of 
consent was present.
41
 
Where force, intimidation, abuse of power,
42
 fraudulent means, unconsciousness, or altered 
consciousness, and threats, as well as where ‘B’ was surprised while asleep or is intoxicated, 
valid consent is negated.
43
 Generally the allegations of rape by peacekeepers can be 
established with regard to lack of consent in that the victims can assert that they consented to 
sexual acts out of intimidation, abuse of power or authority, and the fact that the victim was 
below a certain age. 
(i) The use of force or intimidation by alleged perpetrator
44
 
Whenever a person submitted to an act of sexual penetration as a result of force, intimidation, 
or threats, the ostensible consent by such a person cannot be considered as a valid consent for 
the purposes of rape.
45
 It is important to note that the intimidation may stem not only from the 
actual use of force, but also from the fact that the perpetrator is a specific person or from the 
surrounding circumstances. Thus, the fact that peacekeepers wear uniforms and carry 
weapons and are not deployed in peacetime can cause a victim to feel intimidated. Indeed, 
peacekeepers are deployed in areas where civilians have experienced intimidation from 
                                                             
39 See Snyman CR op cit (n 11) 363-367. 
40 Ibid. 
41 S 56 (1) of the Sexual Offences Act 32 of 2007. 
42
 Since peacekeepers are deployed in war-torn societies, consent may not be genuine owing to the coercive 
environment. But it may also be said that peacekeepers in military uniform overpowered the victim. 
43 For further discussion of the requirement of consent and example in South African law, see Snyman CR op cit 
(n 11) 363-367. 
44 S 1(3) (a) of the Sexual Offences Act 32 of 2007.  
45 Ibid; Notito v The State (123/11) [2011] ZASCA 198 (23 November 2011) paras [7]-[8]. 
 92 
 
individuals in uniform belonging to warring parties. This does not, however, preclude the 
possibility of consensual sexual contact in certain circumstances. In situations of armed 
conflict, autonomous relationships between individuals remain possible. Nonetheless, it 
should not be overlooked that such a possibility does not preclude the possibility of victims 
being intimidated and, therefore, submitting themselves to a sexual act without consent.
46
 
Whenever a victim has come forth and averred that the sexual conduct was not consensual, 
the course of justice should be triggered and the issue investigated until the suspect is proven 
guilty or is acquitted. Indeed, it could be argued that while a civilian may resist a person in 
civilian clothes, he or she may more easily succumb and submit to individuals in uniform or 
those carrying a weapon. It is not inconceivable that peacekeepers might abuse their position 
as it has been indicated in chapter two of this thesis.
47
 
(ii) Abuse of power or authority 
Where there is an abuse of power or authority by perpetrators to the extent that the victim is 
not in a position to indicate that he or she is unwilling or not, it is impossible to consider the 
absence of resistance to sexual act as genuine consent.
48
 The hypothesis refers to cases where 
the victim is not threatened by physical violence, but the perpetrator expressly or tacitly uses 
the position of power which he or she exercises over such victim to influence her/his 
consent.
49
 An example of such abuse of power or authority is the situation where a policeman 
threatens to lay a charge against the victim that she has committed a crime if she does not 
consent to intercourse, and, owing to the threat, the victim does consent. Such consent is 
invalid.
50
 In a situation of the absence of consent which is not so obvious, it can still be held 
that the victim did not consent. Thus, it has been held that a policeman committed rape when 
he had intercourse with the victim in circumstances in which he had not threatened such a 
victim with some or other form of harm, but where the victim believed that the policeman had 
the power to harm her. The perpetrator was aware of this fear.
51
 Indeed,  in the case of 
                                                             
46 In circumstances of armed conflict, and where accoutrement is associated with those who have perpetrated 
atrocities or acts of rape, consent cannot exist. 
47 See supra 2.3.1.1; UN Criminal Accountability of United Nations and Experts on Mission: Current Situation, 
available at www.gtmun.org/documents/2008/GA6Topic3currentSituation.pdf  [last accessed 30 July 2011].There 
is an imbalance of power between members of the military or the police and the civilian population. See Ross J 
‘Blaming the Victim: “Consent” Within the Fourth Amendment and Rape Law’ 2010 (26) Harvard Journal 
Racial & Ethnic Justice 1-74, 6. 
48 S 1 (3) (b) of the Sexual Offences Act 32 of 2007. 
49 Snyman CR op cit (n 11) 365. 
50 Volschenck 1968 2 PH H283 (D); Botha 1982 2 PH H112 (E) referred to by Snyman CR op cit (n 11) 365. 
51 S 1971 (1) SA 591 (A) referred to by Snyman CR op cit (n 11) 365. 
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somebody like a policeman who is in a position of power over Y, Y’s ‘consent’ will not be 
regarded as valid if the evidence reveals that she apprehended some form of harm other than 
physical assault upon her. This may well be the case regarding peacekeepers since abuse of 
power or authority refers to cases where the perpetrator exercises power or authority over the 
victim, for example over a detained person. The victim’s consent would in any event not be 
considered as valid where the apprehension caused by such perpetrator’s position includes the 
possibility that the victim may be harmed. Victims may have such an apprehension from the 
fact that peacekeepers wear military uniforms. 
(iii) The age of consent  
A person can be considered unable to give valid consent because of his or her age. Indeed a 
child under a certain age is incapable in law of appreciating the nature of the sexual act he 
engages in. Thus, paragraph (iv) of subsection (3)(d) of section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 
2007 provides that if, at the time of the commission of the sexual penetration, the victim was 
a child under the age of 12 years, any consent given by such a child is invalid in law. Such a 
child is irrefutably presumed to be incapable of consenting to the act of sexual penetration.
52
 
What is critical to note is that the allegations with respect to peacekeepers were perpetrated in 
countries where the age of consent is different from those of a Troop-Contributing Country 
such as South Africa.
53
 If the prosecution, therefore, had to be led according to the laws of the 
latter State, the appreciation of the age of consent must be done according to the age of 
consent of the Host State. If this is not the approach adopted, the crime may go unpunished 
for not meeting the requirement of double criminalisation. Double criminalisation means that 
the given conduct must amount to a crime both in the law of the country where it was 
committed and in the law of the country where the conduct is actually being prosecuted.
54
  
                                                             
52 S 1 (3) (d) (iv) of the Sexual Offences Act 32 of 2007.  
53 The age of consent is 14 in Somali law, articles 398(2) and 433; 18 in Burundian and Congolese criminal 
codes, articles 554 and 167, 170 respectively and 16 under South African criminal law. 
54 The United Nations has urged all States to consider establishing, to the extent that they have not yet done so, 
jurisdiction, particularly over crimes of a serious nature, as known in their existing domestic criminal laws, 
committed by their nationals while serving as United Nations officials or experts on mission, at least where the 
conduct as defined in the law of the State establishing jurisdiction also constitutes a crime under the laws of the 
Host State. See UN. Doc. A/RES/62/63, para3. See also, in connection extraditable offences, United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Revised Manuals on the Model Treaties on Extradition and Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters (Group of Experts Siracusa - Italy 6 to 8 December 2002) paras 15, 20-21; 
Dugard J and Van den Wyngaert C ‘Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights’ 1998 (92) American Journal of 
International Law 187-212, 188; Carlisle JJ ‘Extradition of Government Agents as a Municipal Law Remedy for 
State-Sponsored Kidnapping’ 1993 (86) California Law Review 1541-1586, 1576-1577. 
 94 
 
The difference in the age of consent should, therefore, not lead to the conclusion that the 
double criminalisation requirement is not met to exculpate a peacekeeper from a troop- 
contributing country where the age of consent to sexual intercourse is low, for instance 14. 
Indeed, a peacekeeper from such a country who indulges in sex with a girl of 16 may not see 
that he is committing an offence according to a local law where the age of sexual consent is 
18. For rape to be established and prosecuted, the conduct must have been perpetrated 
unlawfully and with intention. 
(c) Unlawfulness 
 As indicated earlier, consent is not a ground of justification in the crime of rape as it forms 
part of the definitional elements of the crime itself. The implication or reason for this is that if 
it were otherwise, the only element of the crime of rape would consist in sexual penetration.
55
 
The Sexual Offences Act 2007 enumerates the categories of defences which can be raised to a 
charge of sexual offence,
56
 including when such alleged offences are committed abroad. With 
respect to rape, two defences are available; viz the belief in the victim’s being mature enough 
to consent legally to acts of sexual penetration,
57
 and the minority of the offender.
58
  
As far as a belief in the victim’s maturity to consent is concerned, section 56 (2) (a) states that 
whenever an accused person is charged with statutory rape under section 15 or statutory 
assault under section 16, it is a valid defence to such a charge to contend that the child 
deceived the accused person into believing that he or she was 16 years or older at the time of 
the alleged commission of the offence and that the accused person reasonably believed that 
the child was 16 years or older.
59
 For the defence to succeed, the accused must demonstrate 
the deception and the physical appearance of the complainant that led the accused to believe 
the minor’s allegation regarding age.60 If such a belief is unreasonable, the defence has to be 
                                                             
55 Snyman CR op cit (n 11) 367. 
56 S 56 of the Sexual Offences Act 32 of 2007. 
57 S 56 (2) (a) of the Sexual Offences Act 32 of 2007. 
58 Ss 56 (2) (b), 56 (4) and 56 (5) of the Sexual Offences Act 32 of 2007.  
59 S 56 (2) (a) of the Sexual Offences Act 32 of 2007. Thus in Bongi Biyela v the State (859/10) [2011] ZASCA 
43 (29 March 2011) a plea of apparent age situated between 28-20 was accepted even though the real age was 15 
and the victim consented. Injuries to the victim were considered not conclusive. Referring to R v V 1957 (2) SA 
10 (O); S v F & others 1967 (4) SA 639 (W) para [29]. The Court indicated that an accused may escape liability 
for engaging in sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of 16 years if he can prove that he was deceived as to 
the age of the girl. 
60 Bongi Biyela v The State (859/10) [2011] ZASCA 43 (29 March 2011) para [29]. 
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rejected and the accused convicted as charged.
61
 The defence of deception in the belief that 
the victim consented can be asserted where the accused is charged with rape. This may be the 
sole defence available to peacekeepers when prosecuted for sexual misconduct under South 
African law and before South African courts. Sexual crimes committed outside the Republic 
of South Africa can be prosecuted before South African courts in the same manner as if they 
had occurred within the Republic in terms of section 61 which provides that:  
(1) Even if the act alleged to constitute a sexual offence or other offence under this Act occurred 
outside the Republic, a court of the Republic, whether or not the act constitutes an offence at the 
place of its commission, has, subject to subsections (4) and (5), jurisdiction in respect of that 
offence if the person to be charged— 
(a) is a citizen of the Republic; 
(b) is ordinarily resident in the Republic; 
(c) was arrested in the territory of the Republic, or in its territorial waters or on board a ship or 
aircraft registered or required to be registered in the Republic at the time the offence was 
committed; 
(d) is a company, incorporated or registered as such under any law, in the Republic; or 
(e) anybody of persons, corporate or unincorporated, in the Republic. 
(2) Subject to subsections (4) and (5), any act alleged to constitute a sexual offence or other 
offence under this Act and which is committed outside the Republic by a person, other than a 
person contemplated in subsection (1), is, whether or not the act constitutes an offence at the 
place of its commission, deemed to have been committed in the Republic if that— 
(a) act was committed against a person referred to in paragraphs (a) or (b) of subsection (1); 
(b) person is found in the Republic; and 
(c) person is, for any reason, not extradited by the Republic or if there is no application to 
extradite that person. 
(3) Any offence committed in a country outside the Republic as contemplated in subsection (1) 
or (2), is, for purposes of determining the jurisdiction of a court to try the offence, deemed to 
have been committed— 
(a) at the place where the complainant is ordinarily resident; or 
(b) at the accused person’s principal place of business. 
(4) ...  
(5) The institution of a prosecution in terms of this section must be authorized in writing by the 
National Director of Public Prosecutions. 62 
                                                             
61 The State bears the burden of establishing beyond reasonable doubt that the belief of the accused is 
unreasonable. See Mapule v The State (817/11) [2012] ZASCA 80 (30 May 2012) para [7].  
62 S 61 of the Sexual Offences Act 32 of 2007. 
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Based on the above section, an analysis of these provisions reveals that, even though the 
criminal jurisprudence of a good number of States has traditionally embraced a territorial 
conception of legislative power, no rule of international law prohibits nations from effecting 
an extraterritorial application of penal legislation.
63
 International law contains no general 
prohibition to States to extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts 
to persons, property, and acts 'outside their territory.’64 Consequently, South Africa has 
chosen to apply its criminal law to sexual acts committed by its own nationals abroad as if 
they have occurred within the Republic.
65
 Although there may still be a legal hurdle with 
respect to sexual acts committed by peacekeepers serving with any UN mission of peace 
outside the Republic of South Africa, for instance with respect to investigating their crimes, 
the defence that the crime occurred outside the jurisdiction of South Africa cannot stand. It is, 
therefore, clear that peacekeepers can be prosecuted in South Africa for crimes they are 
alleged to have committed outside the Republic of South Africa while on a mission of peace. 
The remaining defence of the minority of the offender
66
 cannot apply to peacekeepers for the 
reason that most, it not all, of Troop-Contributing Countries are parties to the UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child.
67
 The implication of this is that States party to the latter convention 
must refrain from recruiting children into their armies.
68
 It is thus sufficient for the 
prosecution to show that the allegations are substantiated, and the alleged acts have been 
committed intentionally.
69
  
(d) Culpability 
Sexual offences require intention as part of their mens rea element.
70
 Regarding rape, it has 
been held that ‘the element of intention is vital because rape can only be committed 
                                                             
63 In applying and interpreting domestic legislation, courts are sometimes required to refer to, or to be 
enlightened by, international law or foreign law. See S 39 of the South African Constitution Act 108 of 1996. 
64 Case of the S.S. “Lotus”, P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, 7 Sept. 1927, 19. 
65 S 61 of the Sexual Offences Act 32 of 2007. 
66 Whenever an accused person is charged with an offence under section 16, it is a valid defence to such a charge 
to contend that both the accused persons were children and the age difference between them was not more than 
two years at the time of the alleged commission of the offence. See S 56 (2) (b) of the Sexual Offences Act32 of 
2007. 
67
 Article 38 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 of 12 December 1989). 
68 Ibid. 
69 Intention is expressly included in the definition of the crime of rape. The expression ‘intentionally’ is used in S 
3 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act, 2007, Act 32 of 2007. 
70 Ss 3-24 of the Sexual Offences Act32 of 2007 use ‘intentionally’ or ‘with intention’ to underline that the mens 
rea required for a sexual offence is intention. 
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intentionally.’71 Indeed, one of the most important principles of most criminal justice systems 
lies in the maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea which means ‘the act is not wrongful 
unless the mind is guilty.’72 Since the burden of proving the intentional element rests with the 
prosecution, any reasonable doubt should favour the person accused of rape - in dubio pro 
reo.
73
 Whenever there is any reasonable doubt about the intention of the accused, he must be 
acquitted,
74
 for the intentional element is not proved, and it cannot be presumed that the 
accused intended the consequences of his/her acts.
75
 The establishment of the intentional 
element beyond a reasonable doubt, especially with respect to rape, may prove difficult. The 
intention element of rape is usually inferred from the absence of consent.
76
 The description of 
the situation in which the sexual act took place must clearly indicate to the court that consent 
was not given.
77
 Ascertaining that consent was lacking, however, does not mean that it has 
been proven beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty. He or she may still assert that 
the penetration was consensual, because he or she may have believed that the victim 
consented.
78
 The intention at the time of the crime cannot be inferred from either the conduct 
or the lack of consent where this was not expressed.
79
 The former merely shows that sexual 
penetration occurred, and the latter merely shows that the victim was forced into this. 
Whether the accused believed that the victim had consented or not is a separate issue. This 
raises the question of how exactly the court considers intent to be proven beyond ‘reasonable 
doubt’? To prove intent beyond ‘reasonable doubt’ is synonymous with proving that there is 
                                                             
71 S v Zuma 2006 (7) BCLR 790 (W) at 828. 
72 Ibid. 
73 In dubio pro reo is a principle of criminal procedure which provides that if there are reasonable doubts 
remaining after an assessment of the evidence, the accused has to be acquitted. See Langbein JH Comparative 
Criminal Procedure: Germany (American Casebook Series West Publishing Co. Chicago 1977) 53; Diesen C 
Beyond Reasonable Doubt Standard of Proof and Evaluation of Evidence in Criminal Cases (Stockholm 
Institute for Scandianvian Law 1957-2009) 178. One other author has warned that Judges may be tempted to 
convert a pre-trial period of incarceration into a sentence to avoid for instance any compensation to the person 
acquitted. See Michels JD ‘Compensating Acquitted Defendants for Detention before International Criminal 
Courts’ 2010 (8) Journal of International Criminal Justice 407-424, 419. For reference to the principle with 
respect to international crimes, see Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo chui ICC-01/04-02/12-4 18-12-2012 3/34 SL 
T Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert para [18]. She indicates that the in dubio pro reo is 
a principle of paramount importance.  
74 The imposition of criminal liability in the absence of a criminal intention is regarded as an abhorrent concept 
in South African law. See S v Coetzee 1997 (1) SACR 379 (CC) para [94]. 
75 Burchell J South African Criminal Law and Procedure -Volume I: General Principles of Criminal Law (Juta 
Cape Town 2011) 386-387. 
76 Burchell J Principles of Criminal Law (Juta Lansdowne 2005) 712-713. Further references to this author will 
be followed by the year of the edition after the name. 
77 Ibid. 708-712. 
78 Even where a belief is manifestly unreasonable, an accused can still be acquitted for lack of fault element on 
the ground of a genuine belief that the plaintiff consented. See Bongi Biyela v The State (859/10) [2011] ZASCA 
43 (29 March 2011) para [29]. 
79 G Smit v The State (144/08) [2010] ZASCA 84 (31 May 2010) paras [13], [16]. 
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no ‘reasonable doubt’ in the mind of a reasonable person that the defendant had the intention 
in question.
80
 Thus, in the light of denial of the necessary intention, such proof is reached by 
declaring the accused as untrustworthy, interpreting his or her testimony as a lie, or actually 
believing the accused when he or she claims that he or she did believe the victim wanted to 
have sex with him or her and that he or she had consented.
81
 However, where the victim was 
less than 12 years of age,
82
 the prosecution must establish that the perpetrator was aware of 
the age of the victim at the time of the act; otherwise, the perpetrator’s mistake could avail 
him or her of an exemption.
83
  
3.2.2 Other sexual act and sexual offences involving children 
The only issue discussed under this rubric relates to fraternisation with prostitute. Such a 
conduct falls under the South African provisions on engaging the services of a prostitute. 
(a) Definition 
Prostitution per se may be defined as the act of a person offering his/her body for 
promiscuous sexual intercourse for reward, whether in money or in kind.
84
 As one author puts 
it, the briefest definition of prostitution is ‘sex for reward’.85 This definition aims at the 
conduct of the person receiving the reward.
86
 On the part of the person giving the reward, 
whether in money or in kind, his or her involvement in the sexual activity is well captured by 
the penalization of the conduct of ‘engaging the sexual services of persons 18 years or older’ 
                                                             
80 If the prosecution succeeds in establishing the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, it must also have 
proved the mens rea of the accused because a court must always be satisfied not merely that the exculpatory 
evidence of the accused is not true but also that every element of the offence has been established by evidence 
that is truthful and reliable beyond reasonable doubt. See Vilakazi v The State (576/07) [2008] ZASCA 87 (2 
September 2008) para [47]; Notito v The State (123/11) [2011] ZASCA 198 (23 November 2011) para [17]. 
81 para [16], [20]-[21]. 
82 Snyman CR op cit (n 11) 367. 
83 In South African law, the age of consent to any sexual act is 16 years. Bongi Biyela v The State (859/10) 
[2011] ZASCA 43 (29 March 2011). See also preamble to the Sexual Offences Act32 of 2007: Among other 
objectives of the Sexual Offences Amendment Act was the elimination of the differentiation drawn between the 
age of consent for different consensual sexual acts and providing for special provisions relating to the 
prosecution and adjudication of consensual sexual acts between children older than 12 years but younger than 16 
years. 
84
 D'Cunha J ‘Prostitution Laws: Ideological Dimensions and Enforcement Practices’1992 (27) Economic and 
Political Weekly WS34-WS44, WS35. See also Kalwahali K The Criminalization of Prostitution in South 
African Criminal Law (LLM dissertation UNISA November 2005) 5-6. 
85 Snyman CR op cit (n 11) 383. 
86 Before the amendment of the South African Sexual Offences Act 1957, the section did not specifically 
penalise the person who gives the reward in return of sexual intercourse. See Burchell J (2005) op cit (n 75) 886.  
 99 
 
under South African law.
87
 Article 11 of the Sexual Offences Act 2007, which criminalises 
‘engaging the services of a prostitute’, reads as follows: 
A person (‘‘A’’) who unlawfully and intentionally engages the services of a person 18 years or 
older (‘‘B’’), for financial or other reward, favour or compensation to B or to a third person 
(‘‘C’’)  
(a) for the purpose of engaging in a sexual act with B, irrespective of whether the sexual act is 
committed or not; or 
(b) by committing a sexual act with B, is guilty of engaging the sexual services of a person 18 
years or older.88 
An analysis of the aforesaid provision requires five definitional elements, namely an act 
of engaging, the services engaged, a person 18 years or older who offer the said services, 
the reason for the transaction, and the requirement of a reward. These different 
components of this crime will be discussed under the definitional elements of the crime. 
(b) Definitional elements of the crime  
The offence of prostitution on the part of the client requires five material elements: (aa) 
engaging (bb) the services (cc) of a person 18 years or older (dd) in order to commit a 
sexual act (ee) for reward.  
 Act of engaging 
As Snyman puts it, ‘the act of ‘engaging’ may consist of an express request by X to Y to 
commit a sexual act with him or her, or in tacit conduct on the part of X.’89 He gives the 
example of the conduct of a person ‘who makes certain suggestive movements with her (or 
his) body in public, sending out a ‘message’ or ‘code’ to somebody else that she or he is 
available for sex for reward.’90 The person committing the offence is the one proposing a 
reward to the other person who will render to him/her some kind of sexual services. Such a 
person can be prosecuted only for being on the side of the demand of prostitution if the 
                                                             
87 Engaging the services of a prostitute is a different offence from prostitution per se.  
88 The genuine interpretation of these provisions is that only the person giving the reward commits the crime. 
Indeed the demand of prostitution is constituted generally by males and criminalising the demand is thought to 
be the response to the evils associated with prostitution. See Raymond JG ‘Prostitution on Demand Legalizing 
the Buyers as Sexual Consumers’ 2004(10) Violence against Women 1156-1186, 1158. The prostitute himself or 
herself can still be prosecuted on the basis of S 20 (1) of the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957 as amended in the 
Schedule to the Sexual Offences Act 32 of 2007. 
89 Snyman CR op cit (n 11) 385. 
90 Snyman CR op cit (n 11) 386. 
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conduct is criminalised.
91
 For the act of ‘engaging’ to be truly present, the prostitute and his 
or her client must have gone farther. The sexual services must have been performed or at least 
promised to be performed, and the prostitute must have received the reward.
92
 Most of the 
persons paying the reward are men and those receiving the reward are women.
93
 The latter are 
also the persons offering the sexual services.  
 Sexual services 
The law refers to sexual services without further elaboration.
94
 The acts or conduct 
constituting sexual services are not determined by the law. It may, however, be assumed that 
sexual services relate to a sexual act, i.e. sexual intercourse, penetration, or other related 
activities, performed between two consenting adults.
95
 The offence is deemed to exist from 
the moment the parties agree to perform the sexual act. Whether the sexual act actually takes 
place is immaterial.
96
 
 A person 18 years or older 
The parties to sexual activities for reward must be consenting adults, older than 18. Where Y 
is below the age of 18, the other party X will be contravening the law by committing the 
crime of sexual exploitation of children.
97
 Whether Y consented to the sexual activity or not is 
irrelevant.
98
 
 The purpose of the sexual act 
The perpetrator A is considered to have committed the crime if she or he engages the services 
of another person B, ‘for the purpose of engaging in a sexual act with B, irrespective of 
                                                             
91 Rather than sanctioning prostitution, states could address the demand. Without male demand, there would be a 
much-decreased female supply. See Raymond JG op cit (n 87) 1158. 
92 S 11(1) (a) of the Sexual Offences Act 32 of 2007. 
93 Raymond JG op cit (n 88) 1157. 
94 Snyman CR op cit (n 11) 386. 
95 S 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 32 of 2007 defines a sexual act as ‘an act of sexual penetration or an act of 
sexual violation.’ Although penetrative sexual activities refer to rape, the definition extends to prostitution where 
the act is performed for reward. 
96 S. 11(a) of the Sexual Offences 32 of 2007. 
97 Where the victim is a child below the age of 12 years, the perpetrator has committed rape for such a child is 
incapable in law of appreciating the nature of the sexual act. See section 1(3)(d)(iv) of the Sexual Offences 
Act32 of 2007. 
98 S 17 of the Sexual Offences Act 32 of 2007; Snyman CR op cit (n 12) 386. 
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whether the sexual act is committed or not.’99 This must be understood as meaning that the 
crime exists from the moment A and B agree to the performance of the sexual act, even if 
arrested before actually performing the act they have agreed upon.
100
 This may be difficult to 
prove, especially where the reward was not yet given. 
 Reward 
The term ‘reward’ denotes any financial favour or compensation or other reward. Thus, the 
reward is not limited to patrimonial or monetary gain. It may consist in rendering a service 
other than a sexual act.
101
 The reward is either received by the person rendering sexual 
services or by a third person. The perpetrator is the person giving the reward. These elements, 
which are part of the act, must have been performed unlawfully and intentionally. 
(c) Unlawfulness 
 It has been demonstrated, in the discussion of unlawfulness with respect to rape, that not 
many defences are available to sexual crimes.
102
 Regarding prostitution, it does not appear 
possible that coercion or duress can be an available defence to a charge of engaging the 
services of a prostitute.
103
 If a person, X, is prosecuted for having committed sexual acts with 
another person, Y, and had given a reward to Y as contemplated in the provision under 
analysis, X does not have any available ground for justification.
104
 A South African 
peacekeeper who is prosecuted on the charge of engaging the services of a prostitute can still 
assert that the conduct alleged to have been committed is not an offence under the law of the 
host country. Such a peacekeeper is asserting that he did observe his obligation to respect 
local laws. The military prosecution will certainly engage proceedings against such a 
                                                             
99 S 11 (a) of the Sexual Offences Act 32 of 2007. This section specifically penalises the person giving the 
reward in return for sexual intercourse. The receiver of the reward, i.e. the prostitute, is still penalised under the 
provisions of section 20 of the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957 which has not been repealed. See S 68 of the 
Sexual Offences Act32 of 2007. 
100 The fact that ‘A’ commits the offence, but not ‘B’ is interesting. See S 11 of the Sexual Offences Act 32 of 
2007. Professor Snyman points to the possibility of prosecuting B as an accomplice of A. This would be 
misinterpreting the provision determining ‘A’ ... is guilty of an offence, not ‘B’. Snyman CR op cit (n 11) 387. 
101 Snyman CR op cit (n 11) 387. Snyman gives the following example: ‘X, a female, agrees to have sex with Y, 
a male, on condition that Y moves certain heavy furniture for her in her apartment or takes her dog for a walk in 
the park.’ 
102 Supra 3.2.1(c). 
103 From the perspective of the prostitute, coercion can exculpate her or him, and she or he has to indicate the 
person enforcing her/him into prostitution. 
104 Defences available to sexual crimes as provided for in South African law do not include section 11 as 
concerned under those defences. See Section 56 of the Sexual Offences Amendment Act 32 of 2007. 
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peacekeeper if the conduct is considered as constituting an act of indiscipline in the ranks of 
the contingent.
105
 Where the alleged perpetrator is a member of the civilian personnel not 
subjected to the military code of discipline, engaging the services of a prostitute can still be 
prosecuted in conformity with the Sexual Offences Act 2007 if the National Director of 
Public Prosecutions so decides.
106
  
(d) Culpability 
The section which provides for the crime of engaging sexual services of persons 18 years or 
older expressly mentions intention as the mens rea required for this crime by using the 
expression ‘intentionally’. Therefore, X must be voluntarily engaging the sexual services of 
another person Y, and Y must have agreed to the act for reward.
107
 Where Y agrees to the act 
for the sake of it, without expecting any reward, X has not committed the offence.  By 
accepting the reward, however, Y also commits an act of prostitution punishable under South 
African law.
108
  
The difference between prostitution and rape lies in the issue of consent. Prostitution is a 
consensual sexual activity whereas the crime of rape is not.
109
 Some jurisdictions have 
prohibited prostitution in order to outlaw commercial sexual activities and to prevent the 
social maladies prostitution is capable of creating.
110
 Sexual activities between two consenting 
adults for reward does not amount to a crime in Burundian and Congolese criminal law, as 
shown above, but remains a crime in South African law.
111
 It is important to note that 
                                                             
105 S 3(1) of Act No. 16 of 1999 - Military Discipline Supplementary Measures Act of 23 April 1999. According 
to S 3(3) of the same Act No. 16 of 1999, if a person who is subject to the Military Discipline Code is suspected 
of having committed murder, treason, rape, or culpable homicide in the Republic, the matter will be dealt with in 
accordance with section 27 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act, 1998 (Act No. 32 of 1998), and any 
ensuing trial shall take place in a civilian court. This implies that ordinary crimes of murder, treason, rape, or 
culpable homicide can only be prosecuted by military courts if such acts occurred outside the RSA. The other 
non-grave offences to military discipline fall under the jurisdiction of military courts, whether they were 
perpetrated in or outside the Republic. 
106 S 61 of the Sexual Offences Act 32 of 2007. 
107 S 11 of the Sexual Offences Act 32 of 2007. 
108 See the schedule to the Sexual Offences Act32 of 2007 amending section 20 of the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 
1957.  
109 Children under 12 years and persons who are mentally disabled cannot consent to sexual acts. Any 
involvement of a person of these two categories in prostitution, therefore, is rape, not prostitution. See SS 1 (3) 
(d)(iv); 1(3)(d)(v); 57 of the Sexual Offences Act 32 of 2007. 
110 Snyman CR op cit (n 11) 385. 
111 Regarding the prostitute, S 20 (1) of the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957 as amended in the Schedule to the 
Sexual Offences Act 32 of 2007 reads 20 (1) Any person who— (a) knowingly lives wholly or in part on the 
earnings of prostitution; or (aA) has unlawful carnal intercourse, or commits an act of indecency, with any other 
person for reward … shall be guilty of an offence. Regarding the client of the prostitute, he or she may be 
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peacekeepers are under an obligation to observe both the law of the Host State as well as the 
law of the State of origin. Thus, if it is established that members of SANDF deployed with 
UN missions of peace in the above two countries visited prostitutes, had consensual sexual 
intercourse with girls who had already reached the age of consent,
112
 such peacekeepers can 
be prosecuted in terms of South African criminal law.
113
 It is upon such possibility that the 
discussion under the domestic law of South Africa remains pertinent.
114
 According to the 
current law regarding prostitution, a person can be prosecuted for having engaged the services 
of a person 18 years or older.
115
 The conduct which is criminalised here is that of the purchase 
of sexual services, the conduct of the prostitute partner, her customer or client.
116
 
3.2.3 Murder  
With regard to the criminal conduct of the South African peacekeeper accused of killing a 
person in Burundi,
117
 a United States Department on human rights reported that the trial 
military court had prosecuted the alleged perpetrator (Phillipus Jacobus Venter) and sentenced 
him to 24 years of imprisonment.
118
 It is also reported that the accused is challenging the 
decision on appeal on the grounds of the violation of his constitutional right to a fair trial.
119
 
Although there have been limited allegations of murder by peacekeepers, it remains important 
to discuss whether a soldier can be prosecuted under the law of his/her home country for this 
crime committed abroad.
120
 For instance, can the South African sergeant that murdered a 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
prosecuted either under S 11 of the Sexual Offences Act32 of 2007 or under S 20(1A) of the Sexual Offences 
Act 23 of 1957 as amended. 
112 UN OIOS report on DRC, A/59/661 of 5 January 2005 paras 12-18: cases A, B, C, E and F are instances in 
which peacekeepers engaged the services of prostitutes.  
113 S 61 of the Sexual Offences Act 32 of 2007. 
114 Actually there will be no complaints as to acts of prostitution from Burundian and Congolese citizens 
regarding the conduct of peacekeepers, but the contingent commander of South Africa can still launch an action 
before South African court, or a disciplinary action regarding soldiers frequenting prostitutes while serving 
outside as peacekeepers. 
115 S 11 of the Sexual Offences Act 32 of 2007. 
116 Raymond JG op cit (n 88) 1158. 
117
 Supra 2.2.2. 
118 United States Department of State 2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - South Africa (25 
February 2009) available at www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/119025.htm [last accessed 21 December 2012]. 
119 Ibid. Unfortunately the trial court decision is not available for a proper discussion. 
120 It has already been indicated that cases of murder were committed against Somali civilians, and that only one 
case of murder was reported regarding South African peacekeepers. See supra chapter II and infra chapter VI. 
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Burundian teenager in the host country be prosecuted under South African law (the Troop-
Contributing Country)?
121
  
In South African criminal law, murder is ‘the unlawful and intentional causing of the death of 
another human being.’122 The number of crimes committed, of course, is not relevant as far as 
substantial issues are concerned. Suffice it to say that murder cannot be considered to be an 
act violating only military discipline; it amounts also to an offence under common law. On the 
other hand, it is important to note that not every criminal act committed by a soldier is a 
military offence to be tried by a military court.
123
 For instance, murder, treason, rape, and 
culpable homicide which are both military and ordinary crimes, when committed within the 
Republic of South Africa by a person subject to the Military Discipline Code of South Africa, 
will be tried in a civilian court.
124
 When committed outside the Republic, they fall under 
military jurisdiction.
125
 The only requirement is that the elements of the crime of murder must 
be present and the elements of murder committed by a person subject to military discipline are 
not different from the elements of murder committed by a civilian. The said elements are the 
following: the action of causing the death (a) of another person (b) unlawfully (e) and 
intentionally (d).  
(a) Conduct 
Inflicting death results from the act, i.e. the physical motions or movements either taken by 
the perpetrator or attributable to him or her. Since acting often takes thought and planning, 
inflicting death is necessarily and closely tied to the mental element.
126
 As Burchell puts it, 
                                                             
121 Kent V ‘Protecting Civilians From UN Peacekeepers and Humanitarian Workers: Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse’ in Aoi C, de Coning C & Thakur R (eds) Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations (United 
Nations University Press Tokyo 2007) 44-66 
122 See Snyman CR op cit (n 11) 447 and the case law referred to in footnote 1. 
123 Rowe P ‘Maintaining Discipline in United Nations Peace Support Operations: The Legal Quagmire for 
Military Contingents’ 2000 (5) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 45-62. 
124 ‘When a person who is subject to the Code is suspected of having committed murder, treason, rape, or 
culpable homicide in the Republic, the matter will be dealt with in accordance with section 27 of the National 
Prosecuting Authority Act, 1998 (Act No. 32 of 1998), and any ensuing trial shall take place in a civilian court.’ 
S 3(3) of Act No. 16 of 1999 - Military Discipline Supplementary Measures Act of 23 April 1999.  
125
 S 7 (1) (a) of Act No. 16 of 1999 - Military Discipline Supplementary Measures Act of 23 April 1999 
provides that ‘The Minister shall appoint a Court of Military Appeals - in matters where treason, murder, rape, or 
culpable homicide is committed outside the Republic, or …’ 
126 Snyman refers the concept of voluntary act or omission to show how the act relates to the subjective element 
of the crime. Snyman CR op cit (n 11) 448. See also S v Nivathi (57/2003) [2003] ZAHC (Bisho 11 August 
2003) para [98]. 
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‘since every person must die sooner or later’,127 it must be proved that without the conduct of 
the perpetrator, the deceased would still be alive.
128
  
(b) Definitional elements of murder 
Murder, as any other homicide, can be committed only against a living human being.
129
 By 
human being is understood a person who has been born alive and who is still alive when the 
conduct took place.
130
 The conduct of the perpetrator must qualify as the cause of the victim’s 
death, in that the death of the victim actually stems from the action of the person being 
prosecuted.
131
 This leads to the question of a causal link.
132
 Indeed, the causal link is an 
important element in all crimes that consist in a result.
133
 For such crimes it is the result of 
some conduct that is actually prohibited. This is the case regarding murder.
134
 For this crime 
to be established there must have been an act of a person X which brought about the death of 
the victim Y. It must be shown that the conduct of X caused the death of Y.
135
 The 
relationship between X’s act and Y’s death constitutes a causal link. There must be a physical 
connection between X’s conduct and Y’s death. X cannot be criminally liable if his conduct is 
not shown to have caused the death of the victim.
136
  
Applied to the case of murder of a Burundian teenager, the causal link can be established only 
by irrefutable evidence; the prosecution must prove that the conduct of the accused 
contributed to the death of the victim.
137
  
  
                                                             
127 Burchell J Principles of Criminal Law (Juta Lansdowne 2005) 668. 
128 The definition of murder incorporates a reference to a ‘living person’. See S v Ndlovu 1984 (3) SA 23 (A) at 
26.  
129 Milton JRL South African Criminal and Procedure Volume II: Common-Law Crimes 3 ed (Juta Cape Town 
1996) 357. 
130 Ibid. Killing of an unborn child is not murder. See S v Mshumpa 2008 (1) SACR 126 (EC) para [71].  
131 Snyman CR op cit (n 11) 83 et seq. See also Colvin E ‘Causation in Criminal Law’ 1989 (1) Bond Law 
Review 253-271, 258. 
132 Motaung and Others v State (190/88) [1990] ZASC (AD) at 99.  
133 Burchell J (2005) op cit (n 75) 209. 
134
 Ibid. 
135 Burchell J (2011) op cit (n 75) 110-111. 
136 Snyman CR op cit (n 11) 448 et passim; Reinach A ‘On the Concept of Causality in the Criminal Law’ 2009 
(1) Libertarian Papers 1-40, 8-10 et passim.  For extensive discussion of the issue of causation, see Snyman CR 
op cit (n 11) 79-94 
137 Burchell J (2005) op cit (n 75) 225. 
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(c) Unlawfulness 
Generally, the discussion of unlawfulness relates to grounds of justification.
138
 An accused 
who has committed a criminal act can still escape liability by raising a defence susceptible of 
excluding the unlawfulness of his or her conduct.
139
 With respect to an attack on vital interest 
such as life and limb, private defence is a universally accepted justification
140
 available to a 
person charged with the crime of murder.
141
 It is important to mention that, under South 
African law, necessity has been recognised as a defence available to a person charged with 
murder, leading evidence that he or she was compelled or coerced by another person and had 
no other way to escape the life-threatening danger.
142
 It remains a debatable issue whether the 
defence of necessity in the form of compulsion or coercion actually excludes unlawfulness as 
such or culpability.
143
 During prosecution, the South African sergeant alleged to have killed a 
Burundian teenager girl is not deprived of his right to assert one of those defences to 
exculpate him if the court is convinced of the validity of the defence presented and the 
prosecution is not in position to prove beyond reasonable doubt the non existence of such a 
defence. 
(d) Culpability  
For murder to be established, the prosecution must prove that the accused acted wilfully.
144
 If 
his or her wilful action is doubted, the crime of murder is not established.
145
 It may be 
                                                             
138 The presence of a ground of justification removes the social need to punish the conduct. See Burchell (2011) 
op cit (n 75) 114. 
139 Ibid. 
140 The maxim naturalis ratio permittit se defendere (`natural reason allows a person to defend himself or herself 
against danger') reveals the universality of the defence. See Snyman CR ‘The two reasons for the existence of 
private defence and their effect on the rules relating to the defence in South Africa’ 2004 (17) SACJ 178-192, 
179. 
141 Burchell (2011) op cit (n 75) 124. 
142 S v Goliath 1972 (3) SA 1 (A). The reason is considered to have been that ‘the law does not expect persons 
who find themselves in an emergency situation to value the lives of others higher than their own.’ See Van der 
Walt J ‘Blixen's Difference: Horizontal Application of Fundamental Rights and the Resistance to Neo-
Colonialism’ 2003 (2) TSAR 311-331,325. 
143 Burchell (2011) op cit (n 75) 160-161. 
144 The mens rea required for murder is intention. If such element is not established, if the prosecution cannot 
prove beyond reasonable doubt a wilful action, the accused cannot be convicted of murder but of culpable 
homicide if it he or she acted negligently. See S v Norbert Glenn Agliotti - Case No: SS 154/2009: South 
Gauteng High Court-Johannesburg, date: 25/11/2010, para 10.1; Zaibonisha Herman v.  S - Case No. 
A679/2009/South Gauteng High Court-Johannesburg Date: 6 May 2010, para [20]; Naidoo and Two Others v. 
The State ZASCA- Case no. 321/2001 (14 November 2002) para [2]; Whitehead v The State [2007] SCA 171 
(RSA) para [37]. 
145 The appreciation of culpability is by reference to the commission of the crime. See Van der Westhuizen v S 
(266/10) [2011] ZASCA 36 (28 March 2011) para [52]. 
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culpable homicide where the accused did not take the necessary care to avoid the death that 
stemmed from his actions.
146
 The requirement of intention is satisfied whether the mens rea 
resides within dolus directus or within dolus eventualis.
147
 It must be noted that the proof of 
each and every element must be brought before a court.  
3.2.4 Assault 
It is important to discuss assault here since the same South African peacekeeper in Burundi, 
referred to above, also assaulted a guesthouse employee for allegedly having refused to rent a 
room to Venter and the girl for the night.
148
 Such conduct infringes the fundamental principle 
of everyone’s right to bodily integrity.149 The requirement of assault will now be examined. 
(a) Definitional elements of the crime of assault 
Assault consists of unlawfully and intentionally applying force to the person of another or 
inspiring a belief in that other person that force is immediately to be applied to him or her.
150
 
The above definition has its origin in case law. In Mostert the court defined assault as 
consisting of ‘unlawfully and intentionally applying force to the person of another directly or 
indirectly; or threatening another with immediate personal violence in circumstances which 
lead the threatened person to believe that the other intends or has the power to carry out such 
threat.’151 
The above definition gives enough description of the prohibited conduct of assault, from 
which description some requirements need to be met for the crime of assault to be 
established.
152
 Since the conduct of assault consists of the application of force against the 
                                                             
146 Crossberg v S [2008] 3 All SA 329 (SCA) 346. 
147 Radebe v State (case no. 45/2009 A178/10) [2011] ZA HC (Bloemfontein 28 July 2011) para [15]. Dolus 
directus refers to the aim and object of the accused to perpetrate the unlawful act. With respect to dolus 
eventualis, a perpetrator acts with dolus eventualis if two conditions are fulfilled. Firstly he or she must consider 
the prohibited result (e.g., a death) as a possible but not certain effect of his or her conduct. Secondly he or she 
must accept or approve of the forbidden result. See Snyman CR op cit (n 11) 419; Burchell J (2005) op cit  (n 
75) 152. 
148 See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 
South Africa 11 March 2010,  available at www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/af/135977.htm [last accessed 21 
December 2012]. 
149 S 12 (2) of the Constitution of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996; Burchell J (2005) op cit (n 76) 680. 
150 See Burchell J (2005) op cit (n 75) 161, 680; Snyman CR op cit (n 11) 455; Van Der Bijl C ‘“Psychological” 
Assault: The Crime of Assault Revisited’ 2012 (25) SACJ 1-23, 2. 
151 Mostert v S [2006] 4 All SA 83 (N), at 90. 
152  Snyman CR op cit (n 11) 455.  
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victim, whether directly and indirectly,
153
 or in inspiring fear of immediate application of 
force against the victim, the law punishes not only the actual infliction of force upon the 
person of another but also the mere inducement in the mind of the victim of an apprehension 
that he or she is to be assaulted.
154
 Thus, in a situation where a perpetrator punches or kicks or 
slaps the victim, the crime of direct assault is committed.
155
 A perpetrator commits indirect 
assault against a given victim in the situation where the latter’s physical integrity is infringed 
by the fault of the former, but without direct physical contact between the perpetrator and the 
victim. This is the case where the perpetrator frightens the victim who falls down and injures 
himself or herself or if the perpetrator causes the victim to take a poison or noxious 
substance.
156
 
The difference between indirect assault and assault which is caused by inspiring fear or a 
belief in the victim he or she will be assaulted, resides in the fact that assault by inspiring fear 
is performed with no impact on the victim’s body.157 The assault by inspiring fear consists of 
a threat, which threat must be one of violence to the physical integrity of the victim.
158
 This is 
why a threat to damage property cannot be considered sufficient. Such a threat must be 
immediate, unlawful, and serious so that the victim believes that the perpetrator can actually 
carry out the said threat. 
(b) Unlawfulness 
The use of force or the inspiring of fear must be unlawful in order to entail criminal liability. 
There must be no ground of justification for the perpetrator’s act.159 Indeed, where the 
perpetrator assaulted the victim out of private defence,
160
 in an official capacity,
161
 or with the 
                                                             
153 Ibid 456-458. 
154 Burchell J (2005) op cit (n 76) 680. 
155 Van Der Bijl C op cit (n 150), 4.  
156 Milton JRL op cit (n 129) 407-409; Burchell J (2005) op cit (n 76) 684. 
157
 Burchell J (2005) op cit (n 76) 685. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Grounds of justification are the legal convictions of the community, now as informed by the values in the 
Constitution. See Grant J ‘The Double Life of Unlawfulness: Fact and Law’ 2007 (20) SACJ 1-16, 2. 
160 For discussion, see Burchell J (2011) op cit (n 75) 121-141. 
161 Burchell J (2011) op cit (n 75) 198-201. 
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victim’s consent, in surgery activities or in sports,162 the performer of the assault cannot be 
held criminally liable.
163
  
(c) Culpability
164
 
For the physical or verbal attack or the inspiring of fear of the application of force to another 
person to be present, the perpetrator must have acted with the required mens rea.
165
 The 
required mens rea for assault is intention.
166
 With respect to assault by inspiring fear, it is 
important to note that the perpetrator must know that his/her conduct will actually inspire fear 
in the victim. Where he or she cannot believe that the conduct will inspire such a feeling, the 
required intention is not present. Intention incorporates knowledge of the unlawfulness of the 
conduct.
167
 Thus, where the perpetrator believed his conduct to be covered by any ground of 
justification, he lacks the necessary intention to assault.
168
 
3.2.5 Synopsis of the findings on South African criminal law as a TCC 
Under South African law as an example of a Troop-Contributing Country, the discussion of 
crimes committed by peacekeepers during UN missions of peace focuses on rape, engaging 
the services of a prostitute, murder and assault. Other crimes such as pillaging and weapon 
trafficking have not been discussed since no allegations of crimes of that kind have been 
levelled against South African soldiers.  
In the presentation of the elements of crimes, especially those alleged to have been committed 
by members of the South African contingent in Burundi and DRC, no ground of justification 
was found to be available to peacekeepers with respect to sexual crimes, save in the instance 
where a South African soldier might have been prosecuted before a South African court for 
‘engaging the sexual services of persons 18 years or order’ since visiting a prostitute is not 
criminalized in Burundian and Congolese (DRC) law. With respect to other crimes, such as 
                                                             
162 Burchell J (2011) op cit (n 75) 228-231. 
163 Grounds of justification are criminal defences that ratify the conduct of the defendant as acceptable under the 
circumstances, despite fulfilling all the elements of the criminal offence. See Schopp RF ‘Justification Defenses 
and Just Convictions’ 1993 (24) Pacific Law Journal 1233-1321, 1235. 
164 S v Coetzee 1997 (1) SACR 379 (CC) para [162]. Mental illness or mental defect negates criminal 
responsibility. See S 78 (1) of Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.  
165
 Mens rea is a requirement of each and every criminal offence without which no criminal liability can attach. 
See Mbatha v State (Case No. AR 265/11) [2011] KZN HC (sine die) paras [45], [62]. 
166 S v Sikakane (Supreme Court Ref. No. 26/09, Review No. B/DH3625/08) [2009] ZA HC (Johannesburg 14 
April 2009) para [6]. 
167 S v Mangokoane and Others (CC49/05) [2006] ZA HC (TPD 4 January 2006) para [24]. 
168 See for putative grounds of justification, Burchell J (2011) op cit (n 75) 416-422. 
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murder and assault, since a defence can be raised only during prosecution, it suffices to 
mention that private defence, necessity in the form of compulsion or coercion as well as 
obedience to superior orders are available to any accused. During prosecution, an accused can 
also lead evidence tending to negate culpability, namely the defence of mental illness. It is 
therefore evident from the above that the problem lies not so much with substantive definition 
but lies elsewhere. Since prosecutions have not, however, been conducted with respect to so 
many allegations, the following section investigates the possibility of invoking state liability 
where a state fails to prosecute peacekeepers crimes. 
3.3 State liability for failure to prosecute the crimes of peacekeepers 
South African courts have adjudicated cases where State liability has been invoked regarding 
prejudice inflicted even by a party not related to the State.
169
 Indeed, even if courts refrain 
from imposing the so-called punitive damages
170
 on States,
171
 judges have frequently allowed 
complaints of the victim against the State, especially those which relate to the protection of 
human rights.
172
 In circumstances where the life or dignity of the victim is in danger and the 
State is aware of such a danger but fails to act to prevent the harm, where it has the authority 
and the ability to intervene, it must be held liable for not intervening.
173
 The reason for this is 
that a state may be held liable for the consequential damage if it fails to comply with its duty 
to protect.
174
 In such a situation, the proceedings seek to establish the civil liability of the 
accused State. It is important to investigate vicarious state liability for the failure to protect or 
to prosecute with reference to South African law in order to ascertain whether the issue of 
state liability is applicable to South Africa as a Troop-Contributing Country. 
                                                             
169 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and another [2000] 4 All SA 537 (A), Van Duivenboden v 
Minister of Safety and Security [2001] 4 All SA 127 (C). 
170 Punitive damages refer to ‘an amount of money paid to the aggrieved party, not only to compensate the latter 
for harm suffered, but also to punish the wrongdoer and discourage future violations.’ See von Bonde JC Redress 
for victims of crime in South Africa: A comparison with selected Commonwealth jurisdictions (Unpublished 
doctoral thesis Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University 2006) 56. 
171 Application of punitive damages to State or municipalities would unjustifiably burden the taxpayer. See Fose 
v. Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) paras [29] [52] [84]. 
172
 von Bonde JC ‘State Liability Vis-à-vis Victims of Crime in Post-1994 South African Case Law - Something 
New or a Reinvented Wheel?’ 2009 Obiter 211-223. 
173 Van Dam C ‘The Netherlands Found Liable for Srebrenica Deaths’ 2011 (15) ASIL: Insights 1-5, 3. 
174 Compare Burchell J ‘A Saga of Snitches and Whistleblowers: the Boundaries of Criminal Liability for Breach 
of Statutorily-imposed Duties Especially in the Context of Organised Crime’ in Joubert JJ (ed) Essays in Honour 
to CR Snyman (University of South Africa 2008) 10-30.  
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3.3.1 Vicarious liability of the State for crimes committed by peacekeepers  
In principle, criminal liability is personal in that, for an individual to be prosecuted for a 
criminal act, it has to be established that such an individual participated in its commission.
175
 
As a device to ensure the implementation of public welfare legislation, however, a statute can 
expressly impose vicarious liability upon an employer, who may be a corporate body, for the 
act of another individual, the employee.
176
 Thus, under public welfare legislation and for its 
proper enforcement, the act may provide that a specific person will be held liable in case of a 
violation of the provisions of the Act.
177
 Vicarious liability, therefore, depends on the 
existence of the relationship between the parties.
178
 The same should be said where the 
employer is the State. Under the law of most jurisdictions where criminal liability of corporate 
bodies has been recognized, however, such liability does not extend to the State.
179
 State 
criminal liability is thus excluded.
180
 The exclusion of criminal liability of the State is more 
cogently explained by the role played by the State in the criminal system of each and every 
State.
181
 Since the State alone exercises the right to punish, it does not seem possible for the 
State to inflict criminal sanctions on itself.
182
 It must be indicated from the aforementioned 
that State liability which is discussed with respect to criminal conduct of peacekeepers is State 
civil liability.
183
 Indeed vicarious liability of the State can be envisioned only as civil 
liability.
184
  
                                                             
175 Burchell J (2011) op cit (n 75) 459.  
176 S v Coetzee 1997 (1) SACR 379 (CC) para [85]. 
177 Pantazis A ‘Criminal Law: Case Law’ 2001 Annual Survey of South African Law 685-697, 691. 
178 Burchell J (2011) op cit (n 75) 462, 465. 
179 Desportes F et Le Gunehec F Droit pénal général 10e éd (Economica Paris 2003) para 579; Article 109 of the 
Burundian Criminal Code. 
180 The existence of a remedy for compensation from the State in delict, based on a broad form of vicarious 
liability, would be a further reason for not making concessions to any criminal form of vicarious liability, 
whether in a limited or expanded form, whether under statute or in the common law. See Burchell J (2011) op cit     
(n 74)  465. 
181 Desportes F et Le Gunehec F op cit (n 179) 536. 
182 Ibid. 
183 S 1 of the State Liability Act 20 of 1957 (State Liability Amendment Act, 2011): Any claim against the State 
which would, if that claim had arisen against a person, be the ground of an action in any competent court, shall 
be cognizable by such court, whether the claim arises out of any contract lawfully entered into on behalf of the 
State or out of any wrong committed by any servant of the State acting in his capacity and within the scope of his 
authority as such servant. 
184 With respect to civil liability, the rules of vicarious liability apply to the State as they do to any employer. See 
von Bonde JC Redress for victims of crime in South Africa: A comparison with selected Commonwealth 
jurisdictions (unpublished LLD thesis Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University 2006) 169. 
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The notion of vicarious civil liability refers generally to the strict civil liability of one person 
for the damage caused by another.
185
 It usually applies in certain conditions amongst which it 
is important to cite the relationship between the wrongdoer and the person held liable.
186
 
Thus, an employer is civilly liable for the damage caused by his employee, especially where 
such damage came about in the course of the employer’s employment. The State stands in the 
place of employer when it comes to military personnel as well as members of the police, even 
when these people are deployed abroad.
187
 When soldiers and members of the police are 
deployed outside the country, they cannot be said to be working outside of their employment 
even when they perform an act off-duty.
188
 The responsibility of the State for such personnel 
can be engaged for isolated acts that do not amount to war crimes.
189
 It is noteworthy to 
mention that, under the domestic law of South Africa, the State can be held liable where the 
act performed was even obviously detached from the actual employment of the public 
servant.
190
 Indeed, the Republic of South Africa has been held vicariously liable for rape 
perpetrated by policemen.
191
 
In F v Minister of Safety and Security,
192
 a policeman on standby duty brutally raped a 
thirteen year old girl
193
 to whom he had offered a lift home.
194
 While on their way to the home 
                                                             
185 See Neethling J, Potgieter JM, Visser JP and JC Knobel Law of Delict 4 ed.(LexisNexis Durban 2001) 373; 
Roederer CJ ‘The Constitutionally Inspired Approach to Vicarious Liability in Cases of Intentional Wrongful 
Acts by the police: One Small Step in Restoring the Public's Trust in the South African Police Services’ 
2005(21) SAJHR 575-606, 578; Loots BE ‘Sexual Harassment and Vicarious Liability: A Warning to Political 
Parties’ 2008(1) STELL LR 143-169, 145-6; Manamela ME ‘Vicarious Liability: “Paying for the Sins of 
Others”’ 2004(16) SA Merc LJ 125-132;  F v Minister of Safety and Security (CCT 30/11) [2011] ZACC 37 
(judgment of 15 December 2011) para [40]. 
186 The relationship is present when one person in terms of an agreement makes his working capacity or energy 
available to another for remuneration in such a way that the latter may exercise control (authority) over the 
former.  See Neethling J, Potgieter JM, Visser JP and Knobel JC op cit (n 185) 374. The concept of control here 
meets with the criterion of attribution of responsibility to a State as indicated above. One author has opined that 
the risk doctrine should have been espoused by South African courts as the basis for vicarious liability. See 
Calitz K ‘Vicarious Liability of Employers: Reconsidering Risk as the Basis for Liability’ 2005(3) TSAR 215-
235. Even if it is not strictly speaking of a risk as basis for vicarious liability, the close connection test may be 
viewed as the risk created by the employment itself. See Grobler v Naspers Bpk En 'N Ander 2004 (4) SA 220 
(C) ; Minister of Defence v Von Benecke (115/12) [2012] ZASCA 158 [24]-[26]. 
187 See Minister of Police v Rabie 1986 (1) SA 117 (A) at 118. 
188 Even though the sexual offences of peacekeepers have been performed for their sole purpose, the State of 
nationality can still be considered vicariously liable if it may be established that there was nevertheless a 
sufficiently close link between the peacekeepers’ acts for their own interests and the purposes of the State they 
represent within the UN mission of peace. See for comparison NK v Minister of Safety and Security ZACC (13 
June 2005) para [32]. 
189 Military and police members are state personnel empowered by the State. 
190 K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC). 
191 Ibid. 
192 F v Minister of Safety and Security (CCT 30/11) [2011] ZACC 37 (15 December 2011) para [82]. 
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of the victim, the policeman unexpectedly turned off the road near Kraaibos. The victim 
attempted to escape but the policeman prevented her from fleeing. He then assaulted and 
raped her. Thereafter, he took her to her home. He threatened to harm or even kill her should 
she report the attack to anybody.
195
 Despite the threats, the young victim laid criminal charges 
against the policeman. He was convicted of assault and rape and sentenced to 12 years’ 
imprisonment, of which five years were suspended.
196
 The victim waited to reach the age of 
majority to institute an action for damages against the two respondents (the Minister and the 
policeman himself, Mr. van Wyk).
197
  
The Cape Town High Court found the Minister vicariously liable for the delictual damages 
suffered by Ms F as a result of Mr van Wyk’s conduct.198 It applied the test laid down in K v 
Minister of Safety and Security
199
 which is resorted to in ‘deviation’ cases. The said test, 
commonly referred to as the ‘standard test’, consists of ascertaining whether the employee 
was pursuing the business of the employer at the moment of the act.
200
  
Where there is a deviation, the inquiry, in short, is whether the deviation was of such a degree 
that it can be said that in doing what he or she did the employee was still exercising the 
functions to which he or she was appointed or was still carrying out some instruction of his or 
her employer. If the answer is positive, the employer will be liable no matter how badly or 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
193 para 1 raised the issue of ‘whether the Minister of Safety and Security (Minister) should be held vicariously 
liable for damages arising from the brutal rape of a thirteen year old girl by a policeman who was on standby 
duty.’ 
194 para [8]. 
195 para [14]. 
196 para [15]. 
197 para [16]. 
198 para [18]. There was a sufficiently strong link between Mr van Wyk‘s actions and his employer ‘s business to 
justify the imposition of vicarious liability, because of three factors:  
a. Mr van Wyk was in possession of a police vehicle. This provided him with the means to commit the 
offences and was the single most important connection between the business of the employer and the 
commission of the crime.  
b. The fact that Ms F understood Mr van Wyk to be a policeman to some extent operated to lull her suspicions 
that he might be a danger to her. In other words, it gave her some basis for trusting Mr van Wyk, in spite of 
her suspicions.   
c. The coincidence between the nature of the assistance that Mr van Wyk pretended to offer and the normal 
obligations of members of the police service, which is, in particular, to protect vulnerable groups such as 
women and children. 
199 For the discussion of case K, see infra 3.3.2.4.  
200 K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC) para [9]; F v Minister of Safety and Security (CCT 
30/11) [2011] ZACC 37 (15 December 2011) paras [16]-[17]. 
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dishonestly or negligently those functions or instructions were being exercised by the 
employee.
201
  
Applying the above test, the Court held that there was a sufficiently strong link between Mr 
van Wyk’s actions and his employer’s business to justify the imposition of vicarious 
liability.
202
 In the Supreme Court of Appeal, the High Court decision was set aside.
203
 The 
Supreme Court of Appeal held that the state was not liable because the state would be liable 
only for the delictual omission of the on-duty policemen.
204
 The court indicated that an 
intentional criminal act of rape cannot attract the vicarious liability of the state, that an off-
duty police official has no duty to protect members of the public, and cannot, therefore, be 
held personally liable for his or her failure to protect a victim of crime from the harm that 
occurs in his or her presence.
205
 Ms F sought leave to appeal the decision of the Supreme 
Court of Appeal before the Constitutional Court. 
The requirements for granting leave to appeal to this Court are that the application must raise 
a constitutional issue, and that it must be in the interests of justice to grant leave. Factors to be 
considered in determining whether it would be in the interests of justice to grant leave to 
appeal include the public interest in the matter, the importance of the constitutional issue 
raised, and the prospects of success.
206
 Other important factors to grant leave to appeal was 
the constitutional importance of the right of a citizen to be protected by the state, the victim’s 
right to claim damages based on the state’s liability for delictual conduct of its employees, 
and the need to develop the common law, including the delictual principle of vicarious 
liability, in accordance with the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights.
207
 
The substantive issue before the Constitutional Court is whether the state is vicariously liable 
for damages arising from the rape of a young girl committed by a policeman who was on 
                                                             
201 K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC) para [4]. 
202
 F v Minister of Safety and Security (CCT 30/11) [2011] ZACC 37 para [18]. 
203 Paras [20-22]. 
204 Para [20]. 
205 Ibid. 
206 F v Minister of Safety and Security (CCT 30/11) [2011] ZACC 37, para [35]. 
207  Para [36]. 
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standby duty.
208
 It has already been indicated that the Constitutional Court concluded that the 
State was actually liable.
209
 
To reach that decision, the Court revisited and interpreted the applicable K test to determine 
State’s vicarious liability. The test lies in enquiring about whether there is a connection 
between the wrongful conduct of the policemen and the nature of their employment.
210
 
Applied to the case before it, the Court noted that Mr van Wyk did not rape Ms F in the 
furtherance of the constitutional mandate of his employer; he acted in pursuit of his own 
selfish interests.
211
  The application of the first leg of the K test, therefore, did not establish 
State liability.
212
 The second leg of the enquiry, however, is also of equal importance. This 
second leg involves issues pertaining to the constitutional obligations of the state to protect 
the public, the trust that the public is entitled to place in the police, the role of the 
simultaneous act of the policeman’s commission of rape and his omission to protect the 
victim, and the existence of an intimate link between the policeman’s employment and the act 
he committed.
213
 
The court indicated that the State’s constitutional obligations, and the constitutional rights of 
Ms F, are the prism through which this enquiry had to be conducted.
214
 Rape of women and 
children violates a cluster of interlinked fundamental rights treasured by the Constitution.
215
 
These rights include the constitutional right to the freedom and security of the person,
216
 but 
also the constitutional right to have the inherent dignity of a person respected and protected.
217
 
The latter and the former rights are infringed by the assault and rape which were perpetrated 
against the person of Ms F.
218
 These are rights the state is under a constitutional obligation to 
respect, protect, promote, and fulfil. The vital mechanism through which this is to be done is 
the police service.
219
 The state, therefore, through its foremost agency against crime, the 
                                                             
208  F v Minister of Safety and Security (CCT 30/11) [2011] ZACC 37 (15 December 2011) para [27]. 
209 Para [82]. 
210  Para [50]. 
211  Para [51]. 
212 Ibid. 
213  Para [52]. 
214  Para [53]. 
215 The right to the inherent dignity of the person (S 10), the right to be free from violence from public or private 
source (S 12(1)(c)), the right to security in and control over one’s body (S 12(2)(b)) and the right to privacy (S 
14). 
216 S 12 (1) of the Constitution of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
217 S 10 of the Constitution of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
218 F v Minister of Safety and Security (CCT 30/11) [2011] ZACC 37 para [54]. 
219 Para [58]. 
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police service, bears the primary responsibility to protect women and children against this 
prevalent plague of violent crimes. It is also the duty of courts to ensure that the fundamental 
rights of women and girl-children in particular are not made hollow by actual or threatened 
sexual violence. When they perform their functions, they must acknowledge the policy-
drenched nature of the common law rules of vicarious liability.
220
 The constitutional duties 
resting upon the state, and more specifically the police, are significant in that they suggest a 
normative basis for holding the state liable for the wrongful conduct of even a policeman on 
standby duty, provided a sufficiently close connection can be determined between his misdeed 
and his employment.
221
 A further factor connecting the wrongful act at issue here with the 
policeman’s employment is trust. This factor operates both normatively, in laying the basis 
for holding the state liable for the misdeed of even an off-duty policeman, provided there is a 
sufficient connection with his employment, and factually, in that it creates the connection 
between the employment and the wrongful conduct.
222
 
In the context of vicarious liability, when a policeman rapes a woman instead of protecting 
her, his failure to protect the victim who has placed her trust in him is inseparable from the act 
of commission. They are two sides of the same coin and both stem from and revolve around 
the same incident. In this case they are both about the employer and the employee’s 
constitutional obligations to safeguard the well-being of members of the public.
223
 The 
Minister’s vicarious liability will arise only if a sufficiently close connection exists between 
the policeman’s delictual conduct and his employment.224 The connection between the 
conduct of the policemen and their employment was sufficiently close to render the 
respondent liable.
225
 In keeping with an apparent appreciation of the police service’s 
obligation to protect her, Ms F looked to Mr van Wyk for protection. She did so as a result of 
his employment as a policeman, which placed him in a position of trust. It is this trust that is 
necessary for the fulfilment of the constitutional mandate of the police service.
226
  
                                                             
220 F v Minister of Safety and Security (CCT 30/11) [2011] ZACC 37 para [57]. 
221
 Para [61]. 
222 Para [62]. 
223 Para [72]. 
224 F v Minister of Safety and Security (CCT 30/11) [2011] ZACC 37 para [74]. 
225 Para [76]. 
226 Para [78]. 
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As the Constitutional Court concluded, the police vehicle, which was issued to him precisely 
because he was on standby duty, enabled Mr van Wyk to commit the rape.
227
 It enhanced his 
mobility and enabled him to give a lift to Ms F. Further, when Ms F re-entered the vehicle, 
she understood Mr van Wyk to be a policeman. She made this deduction from the dockets and 
the police radio in the vehicle. In other words, he was identifiable as a policeman. And, in 
fact, he was a policeman. Beyond her subjective trust in Mr van Wyk is the fact that any 
member of the public, and, in particular one who requires assistance from the police, is 
entitled to turn to and to repose trust in a police official.
228
 For these reasons the Minister was 
held vicariously liable.
229
  
As with the analogy above, there would appear to exist no reason precluding holding the State 
vicariously liable for damages with respect to similar acts perpetrated by SANDF who are 
members of a UN mission of peace in Burundi or in DRC. The grounds supporting such 
analogy are that (1) peacekeeping military personnel represent South Africa as their State of 
origin; (2) they wear the SANDF uniform to identify themselves as such.
230
 The problem that 
may arise will certainly be that of the jurisdiction or the court before which to invoke state 
liability and the person who will be vested with the power to invoke such responsibility of the 
State.
231
 Where prosecution has been initiated against the alleged perpetrator, individual 
victims should be authorized to bring an action against the State of nationality of the said 
perpetrators. In the case where no prosecution was brought against the alleged perpetrator, the 
State of origin of the victims should institute proceedings on their behalf, and, in the case of a 
failure to do so, the victim can possibly bring an action against their State of the nationality. 
Although South African peacekeepers are considered as being employed both by the UN and 
South Africa, they remain under the disciplinary and effective control of their respective 
Troop-Contributing Countries.
232
 Where a peacekeeper commits a crime, it is the 
responsibility of the TCC to prosecute, and, if it fails to do so, it must engage its responsibility 
                                                             
227 Para [81]. 
228 Para [81]. 
229  Para [82]. 
230 Uniformed troops of a national contingent are agents of their state of origin. See Kraus D ‘Acquiring a Fire 
Engine before the Fire Breaks Out: A proposal for a UN Emergency Peacekeeping Service’ 2006 (2) Journal of 
International Peace Operations 7; Schenkel CM ‘Finding Suitable Peacekeepers: Who Do You Want to Keep 
Your Peace?’ 2006 (2) Journal of International Peace Operations 8. 
231 Victims cannot be allowed to bring proceeding before the courts of the State of the nationality, because 
international law as it stands today does not allow such an action. See Rau M ‘State Liability for Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law - The Distomo Case before the German Federal Constitutional Court’ 2005 (7) 
German Law Journal 701-720, 706. 
232 Based on the criterion of effective controle, South Africa as a TCC is therefore the effective employer. 
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in the same way as it does when its agent causes prejudice to any of its citizen under domestic 
law.
233
 
3.3.2 State liability for failure to protect 
This paragraph critically examines a number of South African situations related to policemen 
who are employees of the State in a similar way to the South African soldiers deployed with 
UN missions as peacekeepers. Four cases will be discussed with respect to state liability to 
establish whether they can be applicable to the crimes committed by South African 
peacekeepers during UN missions. The first case, Ewels,
234
 relates to an instance of assault 
inflicted on an individual in police custody. Other policemen were present but never tried to 
stop the assault. The second and third cases relate to state liability for failure to protect the 
victims. The fourth and last case concerns State liability for a crime committed by state 
agents, policemen on-duty, in furtherance of their own selfish interests.  
3.3.2.1 Minister van Polisie v Ewels (1975) 3 SA 590 (A) 
In Minister van Polisie v Ewels the respondent, who was an ordinary citizen of South Africa, 
was assaulted by an off-duty police sergeant on the premises of a police station in the 
presence of policemen on duty, for whom it was, as the court put it, reasonably possible and 
easy to prevent the attack or to put an end to such an attack.
235
 The respondent, who was in 
the court a quo the plaintiff, claimed damages from Barnard, the off-duty policeman who 
assaulted him and the Minister of Police on the ground that on 20 December 1971 he was 
assaulted twice by the well-identified policeman, Barnard.
236
 The Minister of Police excepted 
to the plaintiff’s claim that the provision relied on did not place a duty on policemen to protect 
the plaintiff and that it created no civil liability, and that the mere presence of the policemen 
when Barnard assaulted the plaintiff did not create a legal duty to protect him.
237
 
                                                             
233 Most times it is omissions on part of individuals that are considered as offences in domestic law. See Burchell 
J ‘A Saga of Snitches and Whistleblowers: the Boundaries of Criminal Liability for Breach of Statutorily-
imposed Duties Especially in the Context of Organised Crime’ in Joubert JJ (ed) Essays in Honour to C.R. 
Snyman (University of South Africa 2008)10-30, 11, 12. 
234 Minister van Polisie v Ewels (1975) 3 SA 590 (A). 
235
 Minister van Polisie v Ewels (1975) 3 SA 590 (A) [translation published in South African Law Report 1974 
(3) 680-685]. 
236 Minister van Polisie v Ewels 594 [681]. 
237 Minister van Polisie v Ewels (1975) 3 SA 590 (A) 594 [681]. The exception to the general rule that a person 
is not under legal duty to protect another person from harm is certainly that the exeption does not include a 
policeman. See Burchell J and Milton J Principles of Criminal Law (Juta Lansdowne 2005) 189, 196. 
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The trial court dismissed the exception brought by the appellant but granted leave to appeal. 
The appellate division confirmed the trial court decision. It held that the duty which rested on 
the policemen was to come to the assistance of the respondent. This was a legal duty and, 
because it constituted a failure which took place in the course of the policemen’s duty, the 
appellant was liable for the damages claimed by the respondent.
238
  
Minister van Polisie v Ewels is, as Von Bonde puts it, the locus classicus of a victim of a 
crime successfully to hold the State liable for the prejudice suffered.
239
 Liability of the State is 
significant on a number of grounds, namely the role services of the State have to play, the 
failure to prevent the assault and the relationship between the individual who actually inflicted 
the damage and the State. Furthermore, not all failure on the part of the police, for instance, 
would attract State liability.
240
 Failure to investigate or to prosecute, however, is an actionable 
State liability.
241
 
3.3.2.2 Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden (2002) 6 SA 431 (SCA). 
The respondent Van Duivenboden was the neighbour of Brooks, who lived in Bothasig on the 
Cape peninsula with his wife and their two children. Brooks had a drinking problem and was 
inclined to become aggressive and to abuse his family when under the influence of alcohol. 
He possessed two legally licensed firearms.
242
 On the 21 October 1995 in the late afternoon, 
Brooks, who was drunk again, threatened his wife and his two children.
243
 A domestic 
squabble erupted. Brooks loaded his firearms and placed a holster and more ammunition 
around his waist.
244
 His wife, who also possessed a firearm, sought Van Duivenboden’s help, 
and gave her pistol to him. While Brooks’ wife was looking for help, Brooks killed his 
daughter, and then followed his wife and son to shoot and kill them.
245
  In the process of 
trying to help, Van Duivenboden was shot in the ankle and then in the shoulder, but managed 
to ward off Brooks by firing the pistol he had been given by Brooks’ wife.246 The respondent 
                                                             
238 Minister van Polisie v Ewels 597-598 [684].  
239 von Bonde JC ‘State Liability Vis-à-vis Victims of Crime in Post-1994 South African Case Law - Something 
New or a Reinvented Wheel?’ 2009 Obiter 211-223, 213. 
240 An instance could be the failure to arrest a fugitive despite the effort to do so unless police complicity in the 
escaping of the suspect is shown. 
241
 See Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden (2002) 6 SA 431 (SCA) para [22]. 
242 Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden (2002) 6 SA 431 (SCA) para [1]. 
243 Ibid. 
244 Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden (2002) 6 SA 431 (SCA) para [1]. 
245 Ibid. 
246 Ibid. 
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sought to recover damages from the appellant for injuries he sustained on the following 
grounds:
247
 (1) in spite of the existence of an easy procedure to declare an individual unfit to 
be in possession of a firearm; and (2) despite the police being aware of Brooks’ history of 
threatening to kill his family when under the influence of alcohol, the police failed to re-
possess the firearm from Brooks before the tragedy occurred.
248
 It was also averred that the 
appellant’s negligence was the cause of the respondent’s being shot.249 The action was tried in 
the High Court at Cape Town before Desai J who ordered, by agreement, that the question of 
liability should be decided separately from the question of damages.
250
 At the conclusion of 
the trial on that issue the respondent’s claim was dismissed with costs but on appeal the 
decision was reversed.
251
 A further appeal was launched before the Supreme Court of 
Appeal.
252
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal pointed out that the claim of the respondent was based on the 
omission on the part of the police to deprive Brooks of his licensed firearms.
253
 It, however, 
indicated that a negligent omission is unlawful only if it occurs under circumstances where 
the law recognises a legal duty to avoid negligently causing harm.
254
 The court attenuated this 
position by pointing out that even though the law might have recognised the existence of a 
legal duty, it does not follow that an omission will necessarily attract liability.
255
 It will attract 
liability only if the omission was also culpable. Negligence is present whenever it may be 
ascertained that a reasonable person in the position of the defendant would not only have 
foreseen the harm but would also have acted to avert it.
256
 The court held the State liable 
owing to the failure of the police to prevent Van Duivenboden from being shot.
257
 In reaching 
the decision, the court referred to the Carmichele case which also relates to State liability.
258
  
                                                             
247 Para [2]. 
248 Ibid 
249 Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden (2002) 6 SA 431 (SCA) para [2]. 
250 Ibid. 
251 Van Duivenboden v Minister of Safety and Security [2001] 4 All SA 127 (C). 
252 Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden (2002) 6 SA 431 (SCA) para [2]. 
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255 Ibid 
256 Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden (2002) 6 SA 431 (SCA) para [12]. See also reference to 
Kruger v Coetzee 1966 (2) SA 428 (A) 430E-F. 
257 Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden (2002) 6 SA 431 (SCA) paras [29]-[30]. 
258 paras [17], [18] & [20]. 
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3.3.2.3 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC)  
In the present case, the applicant Carmichele was brutally attacked by a certain Coetzee.
259
 
The applicant instituted a claim of damages against the State on the ground that the police and 
prosecutors failed to protect her against the aggressor. It was argued on her behalf that 
members of the police and prosecutors negligently failed to comply with a legal duty they 
owed to her to take steps to prevent Coetzee from causing her harm.
260
 
The trial court held, and its decision was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal, that the 
arraigned parties did not owe the applicant in casu the alleged legal duty, and, therefore, did 
not act wrongfully against her.
261
 However, the Constitutional Court referred the matter back 
to the trial court mainly because the court of first instance, as well as the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, misdirected themselves regarding the demands of the Constitution to develop the 
common law. Courts are required to develop the common law with due regard to the spirit, 
purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights.
262
 Even where the pleading parties did not assert 
that State’s immunity from being sued infringes their constitutional rights, courts are under 
the obligation to hold that to invoke State immunity against civil actions from the public is not 
in line with the fundamental rights entrenched in the South African Constitution.
263
 
Carmichele is a landmark Court ruling regarding State liability for failure to protect its 
citizens since it is the state’s constitutional duty to respect, to protect, to promote, and to fulfil 
the rights in the Bill of Rights.
264
 This State liability stems not only from the obligations 
imposed by the Constitution, but also from the fact that South Africa has a duty under 
international law to prohibit all gender-based discrimination that has the effect or purpose of 
impairing the enjoyment by women of fundamental rights and freedoms.
265
 It has also the 
obligation to take reasonable and appropriate measures to prevent the violation of those 
                                                             
259 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) para [1]. 
260 Para [2]. 
261 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) para [ 3]. 
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Bill of Rights.’  
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colonialism’ 2003 (2) TSAR 311-331. 
264 See S 7(2) of the Constitution. 
265 Article 9 (3) of the Constitution proscribe any discrimination from the State. The state may not unfairly 
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rights.
266
 With respect to discrimination, the State is under an obligation to enact law in this 
regard.
267
 The members of the police constitute one of the primary agencies of the State 
responsible for the protection of the public in general, and women and children in particular, 
against the invasion of their fundamental rights by perpetrators of violent crime.
268
 It is also 
important to note that even prosecutors are under a general duty or an obligation to ensure that 
by their action constitutionally-protected values are not infringed.
269
 Prosecutors have to place 
before the court any information relevant to the refusal or grant of a bail, and, if they fail to 
fulfil such an obligation, they may be held liable.
270
 By reference to prosecutors failing to 
fulfil their duty, one scholar has stated that state liability should, in these kinds of instances, 
no longer be viewed in terms of the traditional vicarious liability, but construed à la civilian 
systems, as a form of direct liability arising from an organizational failure or faute de 
service.
271
  
Before one can attempt to discuss whether or not these cases are applicable to the situation of 
peacekeepers, it is prudent to mention one further case in this regard. It is indeed a case where 
the State was again held to be liable for the actions of members of the police. 
3.3.2.4 K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC) 
The applicant in this case was a woman who was raped by three policemen she encountered at 
a petrol station where she was stranded in the early hours of the morning of 27 March 1999.
272
 
The policemen were in uniform and on duty at the time and were in a marked police vehicle. 
They offered to take her home, and she readily accepted. Instead she was driven to a quiet 
place where she was raped.
273
 She sued the respondent and the three policemen for damages 
in the Johannesburg High Court but subsequently abandoned her claim against the policemen, 
each of whom was sentenced to life imprisonment for rape and 10 years’ imprisonment for 
kidnapping. The sole question in issue in the trial court below was whether the respondent 
                                                             
266 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) para [62]. 
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was vicariously liable for the conduct of the rapists.
274
 The High Court ordered absolution 
from the instance, but granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
275
 The issue 
was whether or not the State, represented by the Minister of Safety and Security, was 
vicariously liable for the conduct of the three policemen who raped the Appellant.
276
 The 
Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed the Appeal, thus upholding the trial Court decision of 
absolution of the State on the grounds that, on the existing principles of vicarious liability, the 
respondent was not liable for the damages suffered by Ms K.
277
 The other ground of 
absolution of the minister regarding vicarious liability was to hold the Minister of State 
vicariously liable for the delict of an employee, and in this case it has to be shown that the 
delict was committed by the employee in the course and scope of his or her employment.
278
 
Where there is a deviation from the course of employment, the inquiry is whether, despite the 
deviation, the employee was still exercising the functions to which he or she was appointed.
279
 
At the time of the employee’s conduct, was she or he still carrying out some instruction of his 
or her employer? If the answer is in the affirmative, the employer will be liable no matter how 
badly or dishonestly or negligently those functions or instructions were being exercised by the 
employee.
280
 The Supreme Court of Appeal held, however, that the Minister could not be held 
liable for the rape of the applicant.
281
 It rejected arguments relating the development of the 
common-law in the light of the spirit, purport, and objects of the Constitution.
282
  
The Applicant applied to the Constitutional Court which granted her application for leave and 
set aside the orders of the Supreme Court of Appeal and the High Court.
283
 The Constitutional 
Court declared that the respondent was liable
284
 to the applicant for the damages suffered by 
the applicant as a result of the wrongful conduct of Sergeants Rammutle, Gabaatlholwe and 
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284 Grounds supporting the decisions: the need to develop the common law of vicarious liability in light of the 
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Nqandela in the early morning of 27 March 1999, and referred the case back to the 
Johannesburg High Court to determine the quantum of damages in the light of its judgment.
285
 
To reverse the ruling of the courts below, the Constitutional Court referred to its decision in 
Carmichele with respect to developing the common law to promote the spirit, purport, and 
objects of the Constitution.
286
 It restated the general principle of vicarious liability which 
holds an employer responsible for the wrongs committed by an employee during the course of 
employment. It further elucidated the practice of the courts to hold an employer liable in cases 
where the employee acted ‘within the course and scope of his or her duty’ or was ‘engaged 
with the affairs of his master’.287 Where the damage caused by the employee was done while 
deviating from the normal performance of the employee’s duties, the questions the courts 
need to answer are whether the employee is still acting within the course and scope of his or 
her duty, or whether such an employee is still engaged with the affairs of the employer.
288
 The 
answers to these questions are not easy to find, especially when the deviation itself is 
intentional and constitutes an intentional wrong.
289
 An intentional deviation from duty, 
however, does not automatically mean that an employer will not be liable
290
 even where such 
deviation may have been done solely for the purposes of the employee.
291
 Here the 
adjudicating judicial authority will have to analyze whether there can be a sufficiently close 
link between the employee’s acts for his own interests and the purposes and the business of 
the employer.
292
 Indeed, when committing an offence such as rape, the State servant is 
simultaneously omitting to perform his/her duties as required.
293
 Employees committing a 
rape cannot be said to be furthering the employer’s purposes or obligations.294 This is 
effectively the same situation for the three policemen who raped the applicant. They were 
indeed, subjectively viewed, acting in pursuit of entirely their own objectives and not those of 
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their employer but yet the State was found vicariously liable.
295
 The decision of the court was 
based on the sufficiently close nexus between their employment and the wrongful conduct.
296
 
As to the sufficient closeness of the conduct of the three policemen to their employer’s 
business, it must be noted that several facts point to a connection between the conduct of 
policemen and their employment. First, the policemen all bore a statutory
297
 and constitutional 
duty to prevent crime and protect the members of the public.
298
 That duty is a duty which also 
rests on their employer, and they were employed by their employer to perform that obligation. 
Secondly, in addition to the general duty to protect the public, the police here had offered to 
assist the applicant, and she had accepted their offer. In so doing, she placed her trust in the 
policemen although she did not know them personally. One of the purposes of wearing 
uniforms is to make police officers more identifiable to members of the public who find 
themselves in need of assistance.
299
 The constitutional rights of the applicant, the 
constitutional obligations of the respondent, and the connection between the conduct of the 
policemen and their employment was sufficiently close to render the respondent liable.
300
 
Whether such a situation is applicable to peacekeepers is something that requires further 
scrutiny. 
3.3.2.5 The relevance of State liability cases to peacekeeping forces (if any) 
All four of the cases discussed above involve State liability for the conduct of police 
personnel vis-à-vis the citizens of the Republic of South Africa. Indeed, the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa provides that ‘the objects of the police service are to prevent, 
combat and investigate crime, to maintain public order, to protect and secure the inhabitants 
of the Republic and their property, and to uphold and enforce the law.’301 It cannot, therefore, 
a priori be appropriate to argue that the rulings from the above cases apply to victims of the 
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conduct of peacekeepers.
302
 The constitutional protection invoked does not necessarily extend 
to non-South African citizens living outside the country.
303
 It is on grounds of constitutional 
imperatives and the control the police had over the borders of the Republic that a domestic 
court of South Africa can hold the State vicariously liable for the failure of the police to 
protect a victim from harm.
304
 Indeed, since section 12(1)(c) of the South Africa Constitution 
avails the citizens protection from all forms of violence whether from public
305
 or private 
sources, and section 7(2) of the same supreme law provides that the State must respect, 
protect, promote, and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights, the Constitution places a duty on 
the State to protect individuals, both by refraining from invasions of their individual rights 
itself and by taking active steps to prevent the violation of their rights.
306
 This constitutes a 
positive duty on the State to protect everyone from violent crime.
307
  
In the case of K v Minister of Safety and Security presented above, in which the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa held that the common law provisions relative to vicarious liability must 
be applied by the courts in a way consistent with the terms of the Constitution as well as the 
spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights,
308
 the Minister was found to be vicariously 
liable for the conduct of the state employee, despite the fact that the rape in the instance was a 
deviation from the employment duties of the policemen.
309
 It can, therefore, be concluded in 
this regard that there is an obligation on the State to observe the constitutional provisions and 
to ensure that it fulfils the constitutional duty of protection of everyone within its jurisdiction. 
It is, however, obvious that ‘everyone’ does not include individuals who are not citizens of a 
State and who live outside the boundaries of the State. However, nationals of a given State 
who have the status of public servants of that State can engage their State of origin liability on 
an international level.  
                                                             
302 Although even outside the boundaries of the RSA, members of the SANDF and the SAPS remain agents of 
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In this context it is crucial to take cognisance of the fact that, under International Law, a State 
is under an obligation to bear responsibility for the acts of persons serving such State.
310
 
Peacekeeping forces fall under the scope of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 
especially article 8 which provides that ‘the conduct of a person or group of persons shall be 
considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact 
acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the 
conduct.’311 Members of a contingent from a specific country act on the instructions of, or 
under the direction or control of, that State. Even when the conduct does not actually fit 
within the scope of instruction, direction or control, it can still be attributed to the State if the 
person or group of persons who have performed such an act were exerting elements of 
governmental authority.
312
 The military component of a contingent from a specific country, 
therefore, identifiable by the military uniform and flag of that country should be considered as 
exercising governmental authority of the State which clothed them. Indeed, acts of 
empowered individuals are attributable to the State or government that empowered them.
313
  
Apart from State liability, which can arise where a duty is imposed by international law and 
when there is a failure to adhere to such a duty,
314
 the duty to protect, to promote, and fulfil 
the rights in the Bill of Rights has been imposed on the Republic of South Africa by the 
Constitution.
315
 Indeed, if the liability of a state can be activated for failure to prevent an 
action by its juristic persons who violate Human Rights, whether within or outside that State’s 
territory, then it can be activated a fortiori when such rights are violated by its troops serving 
outside the State, on UN mission of peace.
316
 This should not be solely limited to failure to 
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prevent or to protect, but state liability for omissions also arises when a State fails to 
prosecute.
317
 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined how the domestic law of South Africa as a Troop-Contributing 
Country deals with the allegations of the crimes of rape, prostitution in its form of engaging 
the services of a prostitute, murder, and assault committed by peacekeepers in Somalia, 
Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It has been shown that the different 
allegations, especially sexual offences and murder, are provided for in terms of South African 
domestic law. The analysis reveals that the substantive law and defences are not the reasons 
behind why peacekeepers escape liability for crimes they commit where they are deployed as 
they may in fact be held accountable under substantive law. One therefore suspects that the 
problem may lie in procedural issues which will be investigated later in this thesis.
318
  
The example of South Africa as a Troop-Contributing Country has shown that the liability of 
a State is actionable whenever organs of State fail to prevent or to protect a citizen against 
harm, especially where a duty rests on the State. The finding under domestic law, however, 
was that such a duty to protect citizens or to prevent harm does not actually extend to citizens 
of other countries who live outside the boundaries of South Africa.
319
 As it is in South African 
law, the law may allow for the prosecution of crimes committed outside the jurisdiction of the 
country, thus for sexual offences committed outside the South Africa, but it does not provide 
for an actionable remedy to victims of such sexual offences who are not within the Republic. 
It must be noted that the discussion regarding State liability relates only to South Africa 
because it has deployed peacekeepers in Africa, and it is not the aim of this thesis, nor is it its 
purpose, to undertake an analysis of all domestic countries which have contributed troops to 
the UN missions of peace to the above mentioned countries, as this would merit the discourse 
of an entire thesis on its own.   
                                                             
317 It is obvious that State civil liability for failure to protect or to prevent does exist, and in the case of South 
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319 South African law and the Constitution apply to members of SANDF deployed as peacekeepers outside the 
Republic. They may invoke the protection the Constitution avails them. Non South African citizens cannot 
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It was also indicated that conduct by a peacekeeper may constitute a violation of domestic law 
of the Host State or constitute a crime under the domestic law of the Troop-Contributing 
Country. The violated provision may have been incorporated within the domestic law in 
fulfilment of an international convention to which the State is a party.
320
 Indeed, crimes dealt 
with at a domestic level may have proceeded from international law, founded upon treaties or 
conventions. The criminalization of certain conduct is dictated to a State in terms of its 
obligations under international law.
321
 Such a State incorporates the treaty into its domestic 
law by enacting a law implementing the international convention, or the courts may have been 
allowed to apply any ratified treaty immediately.
322
 South Africa, for instance, has passed a 
law with respect to the Rome Statute implementation.
323
 Whereas some treaties may not 
explicitly require that legislation be passed to implement it at the domestic level of a State 
party to such treaties, some conventions and treaties are explicit thereto. Thus, the Genocide 
Convention
324
 and the Geneva Conventions
325
 explicitly require that the State Parties enact 
the necessary legislation in order to implement them.
326
 States may adopt implementing 
legislation, such as is the case with South Africa
327
; others rely upon direct application of 
international law in their domestic system, for example the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo.
328
  
The next chapter examines the issue of criminal conduct by peacekeepers under International 
Criminal Law. It analyses the different allegations of crimes by peacekeepers in the light of 
international law, their elements and defences thereto, in order to ascertain whether it is still a 
problem of substantive law for peacekeepers to escape liability with respect to crimes 
committed during a UN mission of peace. 
                                                             
320 Davidson MJ A Guide to Military Criminal Law (Naval Institute Press Annapolis 1999) 149. 
321 Ibid. 
322 Katz A ‘An Act of Transformation: The Incorporation of the Rome Statute of the ICC into national Law in 
South Africa’ 2003 (12) African Security Review 25-30, 26. 
323 Act No. 27 of 2002 (18 July 2002): Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
Act, 2002 (hereinafter South African Rome Statute Implementation Act 27 of 2002). 
324Article V Genocide Convention: Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A of the U.N. General Assembly on 9 December 1948.  Entry into force: 12 
January 1951.  
325 Articles 49 of GC I; 50 of GC II; 129 of GC III & 146 of GC IV. 
326 It also considered that Geneva Conventions have reached the status of international customary law which 
binds all States. If a given State, therefore, did not expressly enact implementing law, its courts can still consider 
the Geneva Convention as applicable as international customary law.   
327 South African Rome Statute Implementation Act 27 of 2002. 
328 Article 153 of the DRC Constitution (2006) gives primacy to the rules to be applied by the different 
jurisdictions of the countries that ratified the International Convention, so there is no need for a special law of 
implementation, even though domestic law may still have to be harmonised in cases where disparities exist 
between the law and the duly ratified treaties. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE CRIMES COMMITTED BY PEACEKEEPERS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates how International Criminal Law deals with crimes committed by 
peacekeepers. The criminal conduct by a peacekeeper may fall under the domestic law of the 
State where it took place, i.e. the ‘host’ State; it may also constitute a violation of the laws of 
the State of nationality of the perpetrator, i.e. the Troop-Contributing Country, and, in 
addition, contravene the provisions of international law.
1
 In fact, it will be shown that 
peacekeepers are not exempt from observing international law, especially in the context of 
humanitarian and human rights law.
2
 Their crimes may fall under international law, where 
they constitute violations of international norms and fulfil the requirements of an international 
crime.
3
  
Many of the allegations of crimes committed by peacekeepers are of a sexual character as 
alluded to earlier. One needs, therefore, to investigate under which category of international 
crimes they fall. Do crimes allegedly committed by peacekeepers amount to genocide, to 
crimes against humanity, or war crimes? Do all three categories of core international crimes 
include sexual crimes and abuses such as rape? Further discussion relates to the sexual crime 
of prostitution from the point of view of the prostitute, client, murder, assault, and torture. It 
is, therefore, important to define and discuss first of all the core international crimes. 
Thereafter, the different allegations of crimes committed by peacekeepers will be examined to 
determine in which category they actually fall. 
                                                             
1 The issue regarding the manner in which a peacekeeper’s conduct fits into the domestic law of the Host State 
and the Troop-Contributing Country has been the object of chapters II and III of this thesis. How this same 
conduct infringes international law is the focus of this chapter IV. 
2 The discussion will also be concerned whether the recognition by the SOFA that jurisdiction over peacekeepers 
lies with TCC applies when the conduct falls under international criminal law. 
3 For the definition of an international crime and a complete discussion of core international crimes, see 
Damgaard C Individual Criminal Responsibility for Core International Crimes: Selected Pertinent Issues 
(Springer Berlin 2008); Gaeta P ‘International Criminalisation of Prohibited Conduct’ in Cassese A (ed) The 
Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (OUP New York 2009) 63-73. It may also be indicated that 
the phenomena of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes may be as old as mankind, though their 
recognition as crimes punishable under international law is a fairly recent occurrence. See Matanga FK ‘The 
Challenges Facing the ICC in Prosecuting Cases of Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes’ 2009 
(39) Africa Insight 103-113, 103. 
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The aim of the discussion under this heading is to investigate whether the crimes alleged to 
have been committed by peacekeepers, namely rape, prostitution, and sexual offences 
involving children, murder
4
, and wilfully causing of serious injury to body or health (torture 
and assault) are dealt with under any international law applicable to peacekeepers.
5
 The 
discussion further investigates whether or not international jurisdiction can assert competence 
with respect to such crimes, especially when they have not been prosecuted at domestic level? 
It must be borne in mind that acts criminalised under domestic law may also be found to be 
criminalised under international law.  
4.2 The core international crimes categories 
4.2.1 Definition of the core international crimes  
 If the crime of aggression is not taken into account, the core international crimes are 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
6
 Each of these crimes will now be 
examined to ascertain whether the allegations discussed in chapter II of this thesis, regarding 
the conduct of peacekeepers, may fall under any of these categories and thus qualify as 
international crimes which can be prosecuted in both national and international courts.
7
  
                                                             
4 There exists the human right ‘not be subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life.’ The violation of such a right 
constitutes murder, whoever the culprit may be. Members of the UN forces cannot be excused if they violate 
such an important right on the basis that the perpetrator is allowed by the UN to use force. See McLaughlin ‘The 
Legal Regime Applicable to Use of Lethal Force When Operating Under a UN Security Council Chapter VII 
Mandate Authorizing ‘All Necessary Means’’ 2008 (12) Journal of Conflict & Security Law 389-417. 
5 Rape is a war crime and a crime against humanity. See UN Doc. S/2004/616 The Rule of Law and Transitional 
Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies (Report of the Secretary-General 23 August 2004) para 41. It has 
been used as a method of war. See Prosecutor v. Dragoljob Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic (Foca 
case, IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1, 22 February 2001). In connection with the trial of Dragoljob Kunarac, Radomir 
Kovac and Zoran Vukovic, Trial Chamber II announced in a press release on 22 February 2002 that the three 
accused had been found guilty of crimes against humanity in that rape had been ‘used by members of the 
Bosnian Serb armed forces as an instrument of terror’ (ICTY, Press Release, The Hague, 22 February, 
2001JL/P.I.S./566-e). See Olsson L, Skjelsbæk I, Barth EF & Hostens K Gender Aspects of Conflict 
Interventions: Intended and Unintended Consequences: Case Studies on the United Nations Mission in 
Eritrea/Ethiopia (UNMEE), the NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) and the 
Tempo‐ray International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) (Final Report to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
International Peace Research Institute Oslo 2004) 33. 
6 Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court; Damgaard C Individual Criminal 
Responsibility for Core International Crimes: Selected Pertinent Issues (Springer Berlin 2008).  Whereas crimes 
against humanity can be committed in both times of peace and times of war, war crimes can be perpetrated only 
in relation to an armed conflict. War crimes consist in violations of the jus in bello, i.e. violations of international 
humanitarian law. See Kemp G Individual criminal liability for the international crime of aggression 
(unpublished doctoral thesis Stellenbosch University 2008) 4. 
7 Violations of the rules of international humanitarian law are treated as war crimes and can lead to individual 
criminal liability.  
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4.2.1.1 Genocide 
The term genocide was coined as such only after 1944, when a Polish-Jewish lawyer named 
Raphael Lemkin used the concept for the first time to describe the Nazi’s policy of systematic 
murder, including the destruction of the European Jews.
8
 Thus, acts directed against members 
of a specific group in a way that threatens the existence of the group as a whole fall under the 
ambit of the crime of genocide.
9
 Although the concept was thus formulated after the Second 
World War, genocide denotes conduct that is centuries old.
10
  
                                                             
8 Lemkin R Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress 
(Carnegie Endowment for Peace Washington 1944) 79, referred to by Schabas WA Genocide in International 
Law: The Crime of Crimes 2nd ed (Cambridge University Press New York 2009) 120.  
9 Quigly J The Genocide Convention: An International Law Analysis (Ashgate Publishing Company Burlington 
2006) 3. 
10 Nersessian DL Genocide and Political Groups (Oxford University Press New York 2010) 7. It is recognised 
that genocide is as old as humanity. See Sartre J-P ‘On Genocide’ in Falk RA, Kolko G and Lifton RJ (eds) 
Crimes of War (Random House New York 1971) 534-549, 534 referred to by Schabas WA Genocide in 
International Law: The Crime of Crimes 2 ed (Cambridge University Press Cambridge (UK) 2009) 1. The 
historical example dated almost one and half century BCE (before the Common Era) and relates to the sacking of 
Carthage by the Romans (Nersessian DL op cit  (n 10) 7). However, the massacre of Armenians is sometimes 
considered to be the first example of this type of atrocity and threat to the existence of a group, especially of the 
twentieth century. The Armenians, not more than two million, were deported en masse to Syria and 
Mesopotamia by the Turkish regime. The deportation that began in 1915 was carried out with brutality, included 
mass executions which caused several hundred thousand Armenians to perish en route. See Quigly J op cit (n 9) 
3. Whereas violence targetting groups have occurred throughout history, the crime was never beenprosecuted 
prior to the implementation of the 1948 Genocide Convention. In the 1990s, the international outcry with respect 
to the situations in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Rwanda inspired the UN to 
establish international criminal tribunals to prosecute the crime of genocide. See UN SC Res 827 (1993) of 25 
may 1993 the ICTY was established and by UN SC Res 955(1994) of 8 November 1994 the ICTR. See also 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1996, Volume II, Part II: Report of the Commission to the 
General Assembly on the work of its forty-eighth session (A/CN.4/SER. A/1996/Add. l (Part 2))19; Maison R 
‘La décision de la Chambre de première instance n° I du Tribunal pénal international pour l'ex-Yougoslavie dans 
1' affaire Nikolic’ 1996 EJ1L  284-299, 288; Darcy S ‘Prosecuting the War Crime of Collective Punishment Is It 
Time to Amend the Rome Statute?’ 2010(8) Journal of International Criminal Justice 29-51, 34; Clark JN ‘The 
Limits of Retributive Justice: Findings of an Empirical Study in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ 2009 (7) Journal Of 
International Criminal Justice 463-487; Møse E ‘Main Achievements of the ICTR’ 2005 (3) Journal Of 
International Criminal Justice 920-943. The killings during the conflicts in Yugoslavia and Rwanda reveal the 
difficulty of relying on the obligation put upon states to prevent genocide, and this major obligation of the 
Convention is a continuing challenge for nations and individuals. The Srebrenica Massacre, July 1995: it is 
estimated that 7,000 to 8,000 Bosnian males were killed, ranging in age from young teens to the elderly, in the 
region of Srebrenica in Bosnia and Herzegovina by units of the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) under the 
command of General Ratko Mladic. See Abudu NG et al. ‘Human Rights’ 2008 (42) The International Lawyer 
755-795, 765. Rwanda atrocities are estimated at 800,000.- deaths in the a period of 90 days: see Lee S 
‘Unintended Consequences of Peace Operations on Humanitarian Action’ in Aoi C, de Coning C and Thakur 
R(eds) Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations (United Nations University Press Tokyo 2007) 
90-108; Aning K ‘Keeping the Peace in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities’ 2005 (14) African Security 
Review 1-3; Fortna VP ‘Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace 
after Civil War’ 2004 (48) International Studies Quarterly 269-292. Nevertheless, prosecutions do serve a 
preventative function, a fact acknowledged by the UN when the ICTY was established: ‘that the prosecution and 
punishment of the guilty would contribute to preventing future human rights violations.’   See UN. Doc. 
S/RES/827 (1993) referred to by Werle G et al. Principles of International Criminal Law (T.M.C. Asser Press 
The Hague 2005) No. 86. 
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All threats to the existence of a group, such as extermination and deportation, amount to 
genocide as contemplated in the Genocide Convention, adopted after the Holocaust.
11
 The 
preamble of the Genocide Convention refers to the fact that throughout all periods of history 
genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity, implying certainly that the Holocaust is not 
the first occurrence of genocide.
12
 On 9 December 1948, in the shadow of the Holocaust, the 
United Nations approved the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide.
13
 This convention establishes ‘genocide’ as an international crime, and State parties 
‘undertake to prevent and punish’ acts of genocide.14 It defines genocide by its elements.15 
According to the Convention, genocide means any acts committed with the intent to destroy, 
in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.
16
 Included acts are: (a) killing 
members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
17
; 
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group; and (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
18
 
To infer that genocide occurred, the perpetrator must have performed one of the acts listed in 
the Genocide Convention. The prosecutor has to establish that such an act has been performed 
with the required intentional element that lies in the aim or objective pursued, namely the 
destruction in whole or in part of the group to which the victims belonged. The latter must 
                                                             
11 Dumont H ‘Le crime de génocide : construction d’un paradigme pluridisciplinaire’ 2006 (39) Criminologie 3-
22, 8 et passim; Kemp G Individual criminal liability for the international crime of aggression (unpublished 
doctoral Thesis Stellenbosch University 2008) 7; Lemasson AT La victime devant la justice pénale 
internationale (Thèse doctorale Université de Limoges 2010) 397 et passim. 
12 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A 
of the U.N. General Assembly on 9 December 1948.  Entry into force: 12 January 1951 (hereinafter, Genocide 
Convention). 
13 See preamble to the Genocide Convention op cit (n 12). 
14 Cassese A ‘On the Use of Criminal Law Notions in Determining State Responsibility for Genocide’ 2007 (5) 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 875-887. The law on genocide is younger than the conduct itself. See 
Schabas WA Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes 2 ed (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 
(UK) 2009) 1. 
15 The elements legally enumerated may also constitute other international crimes such as war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, but genocide also typically occurs in the context of war and is often composed of specific acts 
that can also be qualified as war crimes. The most prominent element of genocide, therefore, in contrast to the 
other two categories of international crimes, is the mental element embodied in the intent to destroy, as a goal to 
be attained, in whole or in part, a particular group of people. See Alvarez A Genocidal Crimes (Routledge 
London 2010) 8-13. 
16 Article II of the Genocide Convention. 
17
 Acts of of murder, rape, assault can be committed by peacekeepers. Because of the intent element requirement 
for genocide, it is, however, unlikely that such conduct would be associated with peacekeepers. They are never 
deployed to a country to destroy any of the four mentioned groups. The conduct lacks the state policy or 
organisational element. See Schabas WA ‘State policy as an Element of International Crimes’ 2008 (98) Journal 
of Criminal Law & Criminology 953-982. 
18 Article II of the Genocide Convention. 
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have been members of a protected group, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.
19
 Any 
acts perpetrated against members of groups that do not belong to the four categories above, 
for instance a political group, cannot be classified as the crime of genocide.
20
 Likewise, 
gender is not mentioned as constituting a separate protected group.
21
  
The elements of the crime of genocide are, as for every crime, an actus reus and a mental 
element.
22
 When it comes to genocide, the mental element is of great importance. The element 
of intent appears in the definition of genocide itself.
23
 The listed acts directed against the 
protected group must be committed ‘with intent to destroy in whole or in part’ the said 
group.
24
 This specific intent or dolus specialis consists of the specific purposes motivating the 
commission of the crime.
25
 The dolus specialis requirement with respect to genocide 
distinguishes this crime from that of ordinary murder.
26
 Indeed, as it transpires from the 
Musema judgment,
27
 the special intent requires that the perpetrator ‘clearly intended the 
result’, the existence of ‘a psychological nexus between the physical result and the mental 
state of the perpetrator’.28 This distinguishing aspect of the crime of genocide applies to all 
acts of genocide and must be formed prior to the commission of the genocidal acts, but the 
individual acts themselves do not require premeditation.
29
 
Since article IV indicates that private individuals can commit genocide, the prosecutor’s 
difficult task is to demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that the accused possessed the 
necessary intent to destroy, completely or in part, the group to which the victim or victims 
                                                             
19 Genocide is a denial of the right to existence of an entire human group, just as homicide is the denial of the 
right to life of an individual human being. See Schabas WA Genocide in International Law: The Crime of 
Crimes 2 ed (Cambridge University Press Cambridge (UK) 2009) 55. 
20 The definition of ‘ethnic group’ has evolved to include a group which distinguishes itself as a group (self-
identification), or a group identified as such by others, including perpetrators of the crimes (identification by 
others) [Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T (21 May 1999) para 
[98]. This definition cannot be construed as making gender a protected group as described in the Genocide 
Convention. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ratner SR, Abrams JS & Bischoff JL Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law 2d ed 
(OUP Oxford 2001) 135. 
23 Article II of the Genocide Convention. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Olásolo H The Criminal Responsibility of Senior Political and Military Leaders as Principals to International 
Crimes (Oregon Oxford 2009) 73. 
26 Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T (21 May 1999), para 91; Prosecutor v. 
Akayesu Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998), para 498-499; Martinez JS ‘Understanding Mens Rea in 
Command Responsibility: FromYamashita to Blaškić and Beyond’ 2007 (5) Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 638-664, 644. 
27 Prosecutor v. Musema, case No. ICTR-96-13-A ( 27 January 2000).  
28 Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A ( 27 January 2000) para166. 
29 Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T (21 May 1999), para 91. 
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belong.
30
 Even if an individual has the intent to destroy a group, his single, isolated act of 
killing one or two members of the targeted group cannot amount to genocide.
31
 For such an 
act to be punished as genocide it must be part of widespread violence or in furtherance of a 
policy at the state or organisational level.
32
 The accused must have seen his act as part of that 
state or organisational plan.
33
 Otherwise, a single act by an individual, even with the required 
intent, can be considered only to be an ordinary crime of murder.
34
 Moreover, ‘many of those 
who participate in a genocide may well fall outside this definition … they may lack the 
requisite intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the targeted group.’35 Indeed, the crime of 
genocide, by its very nature has a quantitative dimension in that this gravest of crimes will be 
prosecuted only when it has been shown that it was planned or committed on a large scale.
36
 It 
has, for example, been disputed whether the Khmer Rouge committed genocide against 
Khmer people of Cambodia because it cannot easily be established whether the Khmer Rouge 
had the intent of destroying the Khmer people
37
 in whole or in part.
38
 It is indubitable, 
                                                             
30 See Paust JJ et al. International Criminal Law: Cases and Materials (Carolina Academic Press Durham 2007) 
No. 781 referring to the ICTY decision in Prosecutor v. Jelisic, IT-95-10-T (Trial Chamber, December 14, 1998 
and Appeal Chamber, July 5, 2001).  
31 There must be an intention to destroy in whole, or a considerable number of, individuals who are part of the 
group targeted. The numerical factor is, therefore, important. See Aksar Y Implementing International 
Humanitarian law: From the Ad Hoc Tribunal to a Permanent International Criminal Court (Routledge London 
2004) 215. 
32 Zahar A & Sluiter G International Criminal Law: A Critical Introduction (Oxford University Press New York 
2008) 175: The intent to commit genocide will be difficult to prove against an individual acting alone, the 
evidence tending to establish mental instability rather than the necessary resolve. At the same time, the present 
position is that a plan or policy, even on a small scale, is not a legal ingredient of genocide. If a plan can be 
demonstrated, it will of course be given pride of place.  
33 Compare Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para [100] where 
executors were goaded to ‘destroy’ the RPF infiltrators and attack and kill their neighbours (Tutsi). The crime 
of genocide, owing to its nature, is almost impossible to commit without some direct or indirect involvement on 
the part of the State given the magnitude of this crime. Aksar Y op cit (n 31) 216. 
34 See Schabas WA ‘State Policy as an Element of International Crimes’ 2008 (98) The Journal of Criminal Law 
& Criminology 953-982. 
35 Du Plessis M & Peté S ‘Who Guards the Guards? The ICC and Serious Crimes Committed by United Nations 
Peacekeepers in Africa’ 2004 (13) African Security Review 5-17, 10. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Khmer people are the greatest ethnic group in Cambodia (94%). Khmer rouge refers to the movement that 
took power from King Norodom Shihanouk in 1970. In 1975, the Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot instituted a 
regime of terror which controlled Cambodia till 1979. The regime deported people from towns to rural areas and 
separated families. Intellectuals were mostly targeted. The atrocities against Khmer people may well fit into the 
concept of ‘auto-genocide’. What is sometimes called ‘auto-genocide’, which is the mass killing of members of 
the group to which the perpetrators themselves belong, has been presented under the rubric of national group. 
The expression appears to have been coined by a UN rapporteur referring to the Khmer Rouge atrocities in 
Cambodia…While agreeing that the Khmer people of Cambodia constituted a national group within the meaning 
of the Convention, the Group of Experts, in its 1999 report, said that ‘whether the Khmer Rouge committed 
genocide with respect to part of the Khmer national group turns on complex interpretative issues, especially 
concerning the Khmer Rouge’s intent with respect to its non-minority group victims’. The group declined to take 
a position, leaving the question to the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia in the trials of former 
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however, that they committed genocide against the Buddhist monks as an entire religious 
group.
39
 
The crucial issue for the present study is the question whether peacekeepers can commit 
genocide as defined by the Convention, especially if they have been deployed to restore or 
keep the peace on behalf of the UN. Can their performance of criminal acts be analysed as 
genocide, endeavouring to destroy one or other of the protected groups in a host country? The 
answer is that peacekeepers cannot be held responsible for genocide, individually or 
collectively, because their acts cannot amount to genocide.
40
 Indeed, if it may be possible to 
identify the required intent for genocide with respect to leaders or decision-makers, this will 
not necessarily be the case when it comes to proving genocidal intent with respect to material 
perpetrators of this heinous crime.
41
 Furthermore, leaders and decision-makers in the case of 
peacekeeping missions are essentially the UN and its State members. It is, therefore, 
inconceivable that the United Nations Security Council would resolve to deploy armed forces 
to ‘destroy in whole or in part’ some group.42 The conclusion, therefore, is that peacekeepers 
cannot commit genocide, nor may they be prosecuted for acts of genocide whether 
individually or collectively. The next issue is to investigate whether peacekeepers can be held 
criminally responsible for perpetrating crimes against humanity. 
4.2.1.2 Crimes against humanity 
Crimes against humanity are serious criminal acts committed during peacetime as well as 
during armed conflict.
43
 They consist of a widespread or systematic attack against a specific 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Khmer Rouge leaders. See Schabas WA Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes 2 ed (Cambridge 
University Press Cambridge (UK) 2009) 138-139. 
38 Ratner SR, Abrams JS & Bischoff JL Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law 3rd ed. 
(OUP New York 2009) 320-322. 
39 Ibid. 
40 The analysis of the genocide convention makes it clear that isolated sexual offences against members of 
different ethnic groups or religions cannot be defined as acts of genocide, even where the perpetrators believe 
that their conduct will destroy the women in whole or in part, and intend the destruction that takes place on a 
psychological level as well. As to what constitutes the destruction of a group, the ICTR in the Akayesu case held, 
among other things, that rape may constitute an act of genocide by preventing births in the group when the 
person raped refuses subsequently to procreate or is forced to bear the children of the enemy, and, in the same 
way, members of a group can be led, through threats or trauma, not to procreate. See Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul 
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para [508]. Akayesu referred also to physical and mental 
harm as act of genocide which rape actually meets. See para [113]. 
41 Paust JJ et al. International Criminal Law: Cases and Materials (Carolina Academic Press Durham 2007) No. 
772. 
42 Du Plessis M & Peté S op cit  (n 35) 10. 
43 Human Rights Watch World Report 2010 (Human Rights Watch 2010) 31. 
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civilian population.
44
 Paust has noted that ‘defining crimes against humanity presented one of 
the most difficult challenges at Rome, for no accepted definition existed, either as a matter of 
treaty or customary international law.’45 According to Gaeta, the absence of a definition is 
understand-able as, before this category of crimes came into legal existence, atrocities by state 
authorities against their own nationals were considered a sovereign matter of no concern to 
third states.
46
 In fact crimes against humanity were unheard of prior to the two World Wars. 
In order to extend the protection that the laws of war reserve to persons affected by an armed 
conflict, therefore, it became necessary to criminalise atrocities committed by a State against 
its own nationals.
47
 Crimes against humanity were, therefore, linked to the situation of war 
that prevailed.
48
 The prevailing situation of crimes against humanity will often involve the 
havoc of civil strife,
49
 though of key importance is that the Rome Statute of the ICC
50
 
indicates that such crimes may occur in peacetime since the chapeau element
51
 does not 
                                                             
44 Human Rights Watch World Report 2010 (Human Rights Watch 2010) 31. 
45 Paust JJ et al. International Criminal Law: Cases and Materials (Carolina Academic Press Durham 2007) No. 
767. 
46 Gaeta P ‘International Criminalisation of Prohibited Conduct’ in Cassese A (ed) The Oxford Companion to 
International Criminal Justice (OUP New York 2009) 63-73, 66.  
47 Akhavan P ‘Reconciling Crimes Against Humanity with the Laws of War: Human Rights, Armed Conflict, 
and the Limits of Progressive Jurisprudence’ 2008 (6) Journal of International Criminal Justice 21-37; Ratner 
SR, Abrams JS & Bischoff JL Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law 2d ed. (OUP 
Oxford 2001) 10. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Osiel M Making Sense of Mass Atrocity (Cambridge University Press New York 2009) vii. 
50 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 17 July 1998 (Entry into force 2 July 2002) - 2187 U.N.T.S. 
38544. 
51 By chapeau element must be understood a specific requirement that must be met or otherwise it must be 
considered that the crimes are not proved. The concept ‘chapeau’ is widely used in international law, especially 
international criminal law, even when applied by domestic courts. With respect to war crimes in the Rome 
Statute (Article 8), it means all war crimes do not fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC, which deals only with 
the gravest of those crimes. Some other crimes, therefore, that exist in customary international law or those of 
Geneva Conventions not incorporated in the Rome Statute are still war crimes but not of ICC competence. For 
general and other use of the concept ‘chapeau’ in international legal discourse, see Report of the International 
Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session, Yearbook of the International Law Commission (UN. 
Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1996/Add. l (Part 2)); Stahn C ‘Complementarity, Amnesties and Alternative Forms of 
Justice: Some Interpretative Guidelines for the International Criminal Court’ 2005 (3) Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 695-720, 713; Jia BB ‘The Doctrine of Command Responsibility in International Law 2004(3) 
Chinese JIL 1-42, 30-31; Akhavan P op cit (n 47) 29; Cullen A ‘The Definition of Non-International Armed 
Conflict in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: An Analysis of the Threshold of Application 
Contained in Article 8(2)(f)’ 2008 (12) Journal of Conflict & Security Law  419–445, 424 et passim; Beruto GL 
(ed) International Humanitarian Law Human Rights and Peace Operations, 31st Round Table on Current 
Problems of International Humanitarian Law Sanremo, 4-6 September 2008 (The International Institute of 
Humanitarian Law In collaboration with the International Committee of the Red Cross); Cryer R ‘The 
Definitions of International Crimes in the Al Bashir Arrest Warrant Decision’ 2009 (7)  JICJ  283-296, 289; 
Akhavan P ‘The Crime of Genocide in the ICTR Jurisprudence’2005(3) JICJ  989-1006, 992;  Hildering A 
‘International criminal responsibility for abuse of power?’ 2007 (3) ISYP Journal on Science and World Affairs 
15-28; Darcy S ‘Prosecuting the War Crime of Collective Punishment: Is It Time to Amend the Rome Statute?’ 
2010(8) JICJ 29-51, 46; Huisman W and van Sliedregt E ‘Rogue Traders: Dutch Businessmen, International 
Crimes and Corporate Complicity’ 2010(8) JICJ 803-828, 808; van den Herik L ‘A Quest for Jurisdiction and an 
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require a nexus between this category of crimes and an armed conflict.
52
 Article 7 of the 
Rome Statute of the ICC codified the existing customary law of crimes against humanity. The 
elements of a crime against humanity are the following:
53
 
(a) One of the prohibited acts listed in paragraph 1 of the article; 
(b) Committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack; 
(c) Pursuant to or in furtherance of a state or organisational policy54; 
(d) Directed against any civilian population; and 
(e) With knowledge of the attack. 
It is obvious from the definition of a crime against humanity that this category of crime 
encompasses acts that are inhumane in nature and character, that cause great suffering or 
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
55
 Such acts are committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack against members of the civilian population, on one or more 
discriminatory grounds, namely, national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds.
56
 Acts 
not proven to fulfil such features cannot be considered as crimes against humanity.
57
  
Clarifying the term ‘attack’, the ICC Statute refers to the multiple commissions of acts 
referred to in Article 7(1) of the Statute and stresses the pursuance to a state or organisational 
policy.
58
 It must, however, be borne in mind that the requirement that the attack must have a 
widespread or systematic nature does not mean that a crime against humanity cannot be 
perpetrated by an individual who commits only one or two of the designated acts (murder, 
extermination, torture, rape, political, racial, or religious persecution, and other inhumane 
acts), or who engages in only one such offence against only one or a few civilians. What is 
important to note is that as long as the individual’s act or acts are part of a consistent pattern 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Appropriate Definition of Crime Mpambara before the Dutch Courts’ 2009(7) JICJ  1117-1132,1123. Article 7 
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court lists acts that constitute crimes against humanity when 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population. 
52 Paust JJ et al. International Criminal Law: Cases and Materials (Carolina Academic Press Durham 2007) No. 
767; Quénivet NNR Sexual Offenses in Armed Conflict & International Law (Transnational Publishers New 
York 2005)113. See also Seibert-Fohr A Prosecuting Serious Human Rights Violations (OUP Oxford 2009) 3. 
53 Rome Statute -Addendum: Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes (U.N. Doc. 
PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.2 (6 July 2000). 
54
 Article 7 (2) (a) ICC Statute. 
55 Article 7(1) (k) of the Rome Statute. 
56 Articles 7(1) (h) of the Rome Statute. 
57 Du Plessis M & Peté S‘Who Guards the Guards? The ICC and Serious Crimes Committed by United Nations 
Peacekeepers in Africa’ 2004 (13) African Security Review 5-17, 10. 
58 Article 7(2) (a). 
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of offences by a number of persons linked to that offender, he or she may be properly charged 
with crimes against humanity.
59
 
In striving towards understanding whether these crimes can be committed by peacekeepers, 
and whether their criminal acts can qualify as crimes against humanity, it is important to try to  
analyse briefly some of the elements mentioned above, especially the chapeau element. 
For an act to qualify as a crime against humanity, the act must have been committed as part 
of a widespread or systematic attack.
60
 This means that the conduct targets a multiplicity of 
victims but also the existence of some kind of preconceived plan or policy by government, an 
organisation or a group whose members execute the plan or policy.
61
 The victim of the crime 
is understood as a group
62– a civilian population independently of the particular members 
who directly bear the brunt.
63
 The group becomes the victim of acts flowing from an 
organised group of perpetrators. When the Rome Statute requires the existence of acts 
pursuant to, or in furtherance of, a state or organisational policy, it means that, even though 
executors are individuals, the crime is perpetrated by a collective, by a group (with a State or 
organisational element).
64
 
As has been shown in the study of the alleged crimes by peacekeepers in the domestic law, 
most of their misconduct consists of sexual crimes, although they may be found guilty of 
other crimes as well, such as assault or killing. The question is whether these crimes can 
                                                             
59 Zwanenburg M ‘The Statute for an International Criminal Court and the United States: Peacekeepers under 
Fire’ 1999(10) EJIL 124-143, 135, footnote 61 where it is pointed out that the investigations against 
peacekeepers (for instance the investigation into the behaviour of Italian peacekeeping troops in Somalia) 
routinely underline the isolated nature of peacekeepers’ criminal conduct. 
60 Akhavan P op cit (n 47) 24-25. 
61 See commentary on Article 18 of the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind: Report 
of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session (6 May-26 July 1996) Yearbook of 
the International Law Commission 1996 vol. II (part two) U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.l (Part. 2). In the 
Rome Statute this contextual element is not insisted upon, certainly to differentiate from genocide and to ensure 
that not any multiplicity of victims would entail a charge for crime against humanity. Thus, ‘Instead of insisting 
upon a State plan or policy, the contextual element for crimes against humanity comes to depend solely on their 
“widespread or systematic” nature, but this has the potential to make crimes against humanity applicable to serial 
killers, mafias, motorcycle gangs, and small terrorist bands.’ See Schabas WA ‘State Policy as an Element of 
International Crimes’ 2008 (98) The Journal Of Criminal Law & Criminology 953-982, 960.  
62
 The notion of group victims should not lead to confusing crimes against humanity with acts of genocide. 
Whereas the former necessitate a large-scale or systematic pattern, the latter necessitate a special intent to 
destroy a protected group. See Seibert-Fohr A Prosecuting Serious Human Rights Violations (OUP Oxford 
2009) 293. 
63 Osiel M op cit (n 49) 5. 
64 Ibid. 6. 
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constitute crimes against humanity.
65
 To explain the scope of the widespread and systematic 
element of the crime, Quénivet writes that for a given act, such as rape, to qualify as a crime 
against humanity, it should be committed or approved of by the government [or a de facto or 
organisational authority] and be of a mass, widespread and/or systematic nature.
66
 She 
effectively explains ‘widespread’ to mean criminal acts directed against a multiplicity of 
victims and ‘systematic’ to mean that the same criminal acts are performed pursuant to a 
preconceived plan or policy of the state or of the organisation.
67
 
The requirement of policy is not an element per se of the crime, but highly relevant to 
establishing the materiality of the crime.
68
 It is evidentially relevant, especially in regard to 
rape as a crime against humanity.
69
 If rape is perpetrated in a certain context of crimes against 
humanity, however, for instance ‘ethnic cleansing’ pursuant to a plan or policy, then the 
requirement is met accordingly in respect of rape.
70
 The lack of such a policy or contextual 
element may imply that the act is treated as an ‘ordinary’ crime. In the Akayesu case it was 
stressed that this policy must not necessarily be adopted formally as the policy of a state. 
There must, however, be some kind of preconceived plan or policy.
71
 This will obviously not 
hold true for peacekeepers.  
It must be noted, therefore, that crimes committed by peacekeepers can rarely amount to 
crimes against humanity. Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
lists the requirements needed to be met for each and every crime against humanity of sexual 
violence:
72
  
(1) the perpetrator committed an act of a sexual nature against one or more persons or caused 
such person or persons to engage in an act of a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or 
coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression 
or abuse of power, against such person or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of 
a coercive environment or such person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent;  
                                                             
65 Article 7(1) (g) of the ICC St. 
66 Quénivet NNR Sexual Offenses in Armed Conflict & International Law (Transnational Publishers New York 
2005) 129.  
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid 133 and Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, ICTY, A.C., IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1 (June 12, 
2002) para [98]. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Quénivet NNR Sexual Offenses in Armed Conflict & International Law (Transnational Publishers New York 
2005) 136. 
71 The Prosecutor  v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, case No. ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para [580]. 
72 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3). 
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(2) Such conduct was of gravity comparable to other offences in article 7(1) (g);  
(3) The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the gravity of the 
conduct;  
(4) The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a 
civilian population; and  
(5) The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.  
The latter element will not be easily be established regarding peacekeepers because, for a 
conduct to meet such a requirement, a state or organizational involvement must be proved, or 
it must be established that the individual perpetrator acted in furtherance of a state or 
organizational policy.
73
 It is difficult to believe that the UN, as an organization in command of 
the UN forces, would devise a policy that would allow its forces to commit crimes against 
humanity. It is actually absurd to imagine that a State may send its troops on a peace mission 
and instruct them to commit offences, whether such offences amount to crimes against 
humanity or not.
74
 As was noted with respect to the crime of genocide, therefore, criminal acts 
by peacekeepers cannot be construed to be crimes against humanity owing to the lack of state 
or organizational policy.
75
 The last possibility relating to core international crimes which 
needs to be considered in true context is the category of war crimes.  
                                                             
73 See Elements of the Crimes, Introduction to Article 7 of the Rome Statute, ICC-ASP/1/3; Schabas WA ‘State 
policy as an Element of International Crimes’ 2008 (98) Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 953-982, 965. 
See also O’Brien M National and International Criminal Jurisdiction over United Nations Peacekeeping 
Personnel for Gender-Based Crimes Against Women (unpublished doctoral thesis University of Nottingham, 
July 2010) 240 et seq.; Sweetser C  Ensuring Accountability of Peacekeeping Personnel for Human Rights 
Violations (Center for Human Rights and Global Justice Working Paper No. 16) 2007, 6. 
74 Du Plessis M & Peté S op cit  (n 35) 11. 
75 Under the Rome Statute provisions, for peacekeepers to be prosecuted they need to be found ‘to have been 
part of a concerted and organized effort to rape or otherwise sexually abuse the local population with the goal of 
harming the population as a whole.’ See Harrington AR Victims of Peace: Current Abuse Allegations against 
U.N. Peacekeepers and the Role of Law in Preventing them in the Future (The Berkeley Electronic Press Paper 
630- 2005) 22, http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/630 [last accessed 26 October 2012]. Even if some 
allegations have been considered widespread (see Zeid Report A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future 
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UN. Doc. A/59/710 of 24 March 
2005) para 8, therefore, there is not a UN protocol or plan to perpetrate such crimes against the local populations 
in the mission areas (Harrington AR op cit (n 75) 22).  For contra argument, see Hyde HJ United Nations 
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Case for Peacekeeping Reform (House of 
Representatives, Subcommittee on Africa Global Human Rights and International Operations- Committee on 
International Relations Washington DC March 1, 2005) 7: A summary of the report of the OIOS, released this 
past January, mentioned that interviews with women and girls in the Congo provided descriptions of some of the 
sexually explicit encounters with peacekeepers, which included sex in exchange for food or small amounts of 
money. This is terrible. This kind of behaviour is deplorable and morally reprehensible for the very people who 
are supposed to protect civilians – particularly women and children, the most vulnerable among us – actually to 
actually their responsibilities and become the actual perpetrators of crimes against humanity itself. 
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4.2.1.3 War crimes 
A war crime is defined as ‘any act constituting a violation of the laws and customs of war, 
that is, any violation of International Humanitarian Law.’76 Serious violations of international 
humanitarian law such as firing at civilians, torturing unarmed persons, raping defenceless 
women, and pillaging houses ... do not need to be part of any organizational policy or be 
committed to a widespread degree to qualify as war crimes.
77
 
Simply put, a war crime is any act constituting a violation of the laws and customs of war, 
which is any violation of International Humanitarian Law.
78
 This law is found in the Hague 
Convention (IV) and in the Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols. Both bodies 
of law (The Hague and Geneva Conventions) have been re-enacted in the Rome Statute of the 
ICC.
79
 Article 8(2) of the Rome Statute gives the meaning of  ‘war crimes’ by listing acts 
constituting such crimes whether pertaining to international armed conflict or to non-
international armed conflict. In the latter form of armed conflict, the Statute excludes certain 
internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence, or 
other acts of a similar nature. 
                                                             
76 Article 6(b) of the Nuremberg Charter; Article 5(2) (b) of the Tokyo Charter. See Cassese A ‘The Italian Court 
of Cassation Misapprehends the Notion of War Crimes: The Lozano Case’ 2008 (6) Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 1077-1089, 1085. 
77 Cassese A ‘The Italian Court of Cassation Misapprehends the Notion of War Crimes: The Lozano Case’ 
2008(6) Journal of International Criminal Justice 1077-1089,1089; Karagiannakis M and Shemberg A 
Complicité des entreprises et Responsabilité juridique volume2: Droit pénal et crimes internationaux : Un 
rapport de la Commission internationale de juristes Comité d'experts juridiques sur la complicité des entreprises 
dans les crimes internationaux (Commission internationale de juristes Genève 2010) 4. 
78 Damgaard C Individual Criminal Responsibility for Core International Crimes: Selected Pertinent Issues 
(Springer Berlin 2008) 65. 
79 Hague Convention (IV) - Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land with its Annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907.  Second Protocol to the Hague 
Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, 26 
March 1999. ; No. 970 - Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949;  No. 971 - Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949; No. 972 - 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949; No. 973 - Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949. These four 
Geneva Convention came into force on 21 October 1950, six months after the deposit with the Swiss Federal 
Council of the second instrument of Ratification; No. 17512 - Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I) (with 
annexes, Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference on the reaffirmation and development of international 
humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts dated 10 June 1977 and resolutions adopted at the fourth 
session). Adopted at Geneva on 8 June 1977; No. 17513 - Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts (Protocol II) (with the 
Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference on the reaffirmation and development of international humanitarian law 
applicable in armed conflicts dated 10 June 1977 and resolutions adopted at the fourth session 1)- Adopted at 
Geneva on 8 June 1977. 
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War crimes include grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and other 
serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict. This also 
includes serious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, namely acts committed against persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including 
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by 
sickness, wounds, detention, or for any other cause.
80
 It is clear, therefore, that those victims 
of criminal acts committed by peacekeepers fall under the category of persons taking no part 
in the hostilities, whether the armed conflict is considered international or non-international. 
An international armed conflict opposes ‘High Contracting Parties’, i.e. States.81 It is in this 
perspective that Byron writes that an international conflict is the one that takes place between 
two States.
82
 He also observes that ‘a conflict taking place on the territory of one State may be 
internationalized by the intervention of the military forces of a second State’ or by the fact 
that some of the participants in an internal armed conflict act on behalf of another (second) 
State.
83
 The Commentary of the Geneva Conventions confirms that ‘any difference arising 
between two States and leading to the intervention of armed forces is an armed conflict within 
the meaning of Article 2, even if one of the Parties denies the existence of a state of war.’84 It 
makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter takes place.
85
 Of 
crucial importance is that an international organisation which is not, and cannot become, party 
to the Geneva Conventions cannot be considered as a party to an international armed conflict 
although its armed forces may be engaged in hostilities against one of the ‘High Contracting 
Parties’.86 This is why it is sometimes considered difficult to qualify an armed conflict in 
which the UN forces have become involved as an international armed conflict. As Kolb and 
Vité have noted, a UN force is by its nature an international force bound by rules relating to 
                                                             
80 Article 8 of the Rome Statute. 
81 Article 2 GC. 
82 Byron C War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(Manchester University Press Manchester 2009) 17. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Pictet J Commentary on the  Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (ICRC Geneva 1952) 32 quoted by ICRC How is the Term "Armed Conflict" 
Defined in International Humanitarian Law? (International Committee of the Red Cross Opinion Paper March 
2008) 2. 
85 Ibid. 
86 See ‘Memorandum to the Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs’ United Nations Yearbook, 
1972, 153-154. 
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the conduct of an armed conflict.
87
 Furthermore, even if the UN as such cannot become party 
to the Geneva Convention, only armed forces of State members of the organisation, parties to 
the Geneva Conventions or capable of becoming parties thereto, are visible in the field and 
actively engaged in the armed conflict as combatant.
88
 They are involved in the conflict 
through an organisation; they cannot deny their obligations to observe the laws of war.
89
 The 
latter body of law provides for rules which must be observed by individuals involved in the 
hostilities. Criminal responsibility for failure to abide by the said law may be incurred by 
anybody considered a combatant.
90
 The State of nationality of a combatant, who has infringed 
the rules to be observed in the conduct of war, as well as an organisation such the UN, can 
incur international civil liability.
91
 Indeed, the UN has paid damages in the past, pursuant to 
its international civil liability.
92
 
War criminal acts that may occur in an international armed conflict are listed by Articles 147 
Geneva Convention IV and 85 Additional Protocol I.  These articles deal with the so-called 
‘grave breaches’. All grave breaches are synonymous with war crimes. Article 147 refers to 
Article 146 which evokes Article 2 defining an international armed conflict. It reads: 
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the 
following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the present Convention: 
wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments,  wilfully causing 
great suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful 
confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a 
hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial 
                                                             
87 Kolb R et Vité S Le droit de l’occupation Militaire : Perspectives historiques et enjeux juridiques actuels 
(Bruylant Bruxelles 2009) 99-100; Kolb R ‘Applicability of international humanitarian law to forces under the 
command of an international  organization’ in Faite A and Labbé Grenier J (eds) Report Expert Meeting on 
Multinational Peace Operations: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and International Human 
Rights Law to UN Mandated Forces, Geneva, 11-12 December 2003 (ICRC Geneva 2004) 61-69. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Article 2(2) of the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel (New York 9 
December 1994) clearly mentions that UN forces can be considered as combatant under chapter VII of the UN 
Charter Operations. 
90 The presence of an international force should internationalise the conflict, but because of the fact that the force 
acts as facilitating the solution of the conflict, it is difficult to consider it as party to such armed conflict. 
Whenever engaged as combatants, the conflict is international. 
91 Zwanenburg MC Accountability of Peace Support Operations (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Leiden 2005) 229. 
Regarding conduct of Belgian troops in Somali and the prejudice caused to civilian population, a sum of US$ 
2,800,000.00 was paid by the UN, after consultation with the Belgian Ministry of Defence. 
92 Payment to Belgian nationals for prejudice incurred during ONUC in the 1960s. It has always been the policy 
of the United Nations, acting through the Secretary-General, to compensate individuals who have suffered 
damages for which the Organization was legally liable. See Zwanenburg MC Accountability under International 
Humanitarian Law for United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty Organization Peace Support Operations 
(Thesis Leiden 2004) 87. 
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prescribed in the present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and 
appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and 
wantonly. 
Article 85 insists on the repression of breaches of the protocol and tells when acts violating 
the Geneva Convention and its Additional Protocol 1 are considered to be grave breaches. A 
grave breach occurs when a violation of the laws and customs of war is committed against 
protected persons: combatants who are prisoners of war,
93
 refugees, and stateless persons.
94
 
Grave breaches also include crimes against the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked of the 
adversary power, or against those medical or religious personnel, medical units, or medical 
transports which are under the control of the adverse Party and are protected by this 
Protocol.
95
 They further include six listed wilful acts against civilians or damage to civilian 
objects, against persons hors de combat, undefended zones or perfidious use of the Red Cross 
emblem.
96
 
During a civil war or armed conflict not of an international character, violations of laws and 
customs of war considered as crimes are essentially violations of common article 3 to the 
Geneva Convention. This article reads: 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of 
the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, 
the following provisions: 
(l) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have 
laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any 
other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction 
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. 
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place 
whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
 (a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and 
torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
                                                             
93 Articles 44-45 GC IV. Spies and mercenaries are not protected persons nor prisoners of war:  Articles 46, 47 
GC AP I 
94 Article73 GC AP I. 
95 Article 85 GC AP I. 
96 Ibid. 
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(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced 
by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples. 
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. 
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its 
services to the Parties to the conflict. 
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special 
agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention. 
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the 
conflict. 
Although the UN as such cannot be a party to the conflict, its forces may be engaged as 
combatants. States contributing such forces must ensure that the law of armed forces is 
observed by their troops.97 By parties to an armed conflict it must be understood to refer to 
two States where the conflict is of international character, one State waging war against an 
armed group
98
 and vice-versa.
99
 The individuals participating directly in hostilities and who 
belong to one party to the armed conflict are considered combatants.
100
 They enjoy combatant 
privilege, i.e. an excuse for engaging in hostilities which could otherwise be considered 
violations of domestic criminal law of the country where hostilities are being conducted.
101
 
Acts of murder or assault by a combatant against an enemy combatant does not constitute a 
crime where such an act is actually connected to the armed conflict, and the victim was not 
yet placed hors de combat.
102
 These same acts of murder, assault, or anything else in violation 
                                                             
97 See ‘Memorandum to the Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs’ United Nations Yearbook 
(1972) 153-154. 
98 State parties to Geneva Conventions and its Additional Protocols are bound by the law of conducting 
hostilities.  When waging war against a non-party to the Geneva, a State still has to observe such law. See Article 
2 common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions.  
99 The armed group which is not a State as such may be considered to be a power not party to the Geneva 
Conventions. See Article 2 common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
100 A combatant is a person who engages in hostile acts in an armed conflict on behalf of a party to the conflict. 
He may be lawfully targeted and murdered by the enemy without such an act constituting a war crime. See 
Bialke J ‘United Nations Peace Operations: Applicable Norms and the Application of the Law of Armed 
Conflict’ 2001 (50) Air Force Law Review 1-63, 21. 
101 Worster WT ‘Immunities of United Nations Peacekeepers in the Absence of a Status of Forces Agreement’ 
2008 (47) Military Law and the Law of War Review 277-376, 310. 
102 Bialke J ‘United Nations Peace Operations: Applicable Norms and the Application of the Law of Armed 
Conflict’ 2001 (50) Air Force Law Review 1-63, 21. In an international armed conflict, an "enemy combatant" is 
not a criminal per se, even if that person has killed soldiers during the war. When he is captured, the only point 
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of the law applicable to the conduct of armed conflict, perpetrated by a combatant against 
persons no longer taking part in hostilities, however, constitute war crimes. The crucial issue 
may be whether peacekeepers
103
 are considered combatants, i.e. members of a party to an 
armed conflict, to be able to account for war crimes.
104
 The conclusion is affirmative in that 
international humanitarian law applies to peace operations whenever peacekeepers are 
engaged as combatants.
105
 
Combatants are members of armed forces who have the right to participate directly in 
hostilities.
106
 Even if article 2(1) of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 refers specifically to 
international conflict between two States as an international armed conflict, where the UN 
forces are engaged as combatants they are under an obligation to observe the law applicable to 
an international armed conflict.
107
 Since they operate under the responsible command of the 
organisation, they use the fixed and distinctly recognisable emblem of the UN and are called 
‘blue helmets’, they carry their arms openly, they meet the requirements of the 1907 Hague 
Regulations providing for the laws, rights, and duties of war applicable to ‘armies’ and to 
‘militia and volunteers corps.’108 They have to comply with the laws and customs of war.109 
Peacekeepers are, thus, under the obligation to observe the laws and customs of armed 
conflict, and, where they violate the prescribed laws, they commit a prosecutable war crime. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
of his "prisoner of war" status is simply to keep him away from the conflict and from helping his own country; 
capturing him/her is not meant to "punish" him. In non international armed conflict, a combatant who is a 
member of a rebel group is not entitled to the status of prisoner of war. See Saura J ‘Lawful Peacekeeping: 
Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’ 2006-2007 (58) 
Hastings Law Journal 479-531, 492. 
103 In peace operations, UN forces have been involved in fighting against rebels. For instance MONUC forces 
supported the DRC government against rebels. See See Saura J ‘Lawful Peacekeeping: Applicability of 
International Humanitarian Law to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’ 2006-2007(58) Hastings Law 
Journal 479-531, 483. 
104 Violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions (threshold of protection afforded to non 
combatants) constitute war crimes. Peacekeepers can be suspected of such crimes. See Saura J op cit  (n 102) 
486 with reference to paragraph 47 of the Model SOFA. The presence of peacekeepers in an armed conflict, 
even if helping governmental forces against rebels, internationalises the conflict. See Article 2(2) of the 
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel; Porretto G & Vité S ‘The Application of 
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law to International Organizations’ 2006 (1) Research 
Paper Series/Collection des travaux de recherche (CUDH/UCHL 2006)1-105,33-34. 
105 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel (UN GA res. 49/59 of 9 December 
1994, 49 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 49 U.N. Doc. A/49/49 (entered into force 15 January 1999)). Article 2(2) reads:  
‘This Convention shall not apply to a United Nations operation authorized by the Security Council as an 
enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in which any of the personnel are 
engaged as combatants against organized armed forces and to which the law of international armed conflict 
applies’. 
106 Article 43 GC AP I. 
107 Rowe P ‘Maintaining Discipline in United Nations Peace Support Operations: The Legal Quagmire for 
Military Contingents’ 2000(5) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 45-62.  
108 Melzer N Targeted Killing in International Law (Oxford Monographs in International Law 2008) 304. 
109 Ibid. 
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Section 1 of the Secretary-General’s Bulletin uses the concept of ‘combatants.’110 It states that 
the fundamental principles and rules of International Humanitarian Law set out in the Bulletin 
are applicable to the UN forces whenever, in situations of armed conflict, they are actively 
engaged therein as ‘combatants’ to the extent and for the duration of their engagement. The 
said rules accordingly apply in enforcement actions or in peacekeeping operations when the 
use of force is permitted in self-defence.  
Individuals not directly fulfilling the conditions of a combatant can be held responsible for 
war crimes if they are persons who, by virtue of their authority, are responsible for the 
outbreak of hostilities. Public officials, administrators, and agents or persons legitimately 
mandated or otherwise holding public authority, or de facto representing the Government to 
support or fulfil the efforts of war, are, therefore, considered as perpetrators of war crimes.
111
 
The conduct of peacekeepers, such as rape and assault, may therefore fall within the ambit of 
the war crimes. This forms the conduct of inflicting great suffering, serious injury to the body 
or to the health of victim. Health cannot be construed as physical, but also as includes 
psychological aspects. Indeed, whereas murder and assault are criminal acts of violence to life 
and to the person, rape constitutes a humiliating and degrading treatment imposed on the 
victim.
112
  
Regarding peacekeepers, their criminal acts of rape, even if not part of a government policy or 
the furtherance of any state business, should not be excused on the ground of being criminal 
activities of a few rogue officers or “bad apples”.113 Under international law, the state has 
                                                             
110 UN Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 of 6 August 1999. 
111 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu paras [630- 631]. 
112 Pearce H ‘An Examination of the International Understanding of Rape and the Significance of Labeling it 
Torture’ 2003 (14) International Journal of Refugee Law 534 referred to by Edwards A ‘The ‘Feminizing’ of 
Torture under International Human Rights Law’ 2006 (19) Leiden Journal of International Law 349-391, 351. 
113 Horn B (ed) From the Outside Looking In: Media and Defence Analyst Perspectives on Canadian Military 
Leadership (Canadian Defence Academy Press Kingston 2005) 134; Razack S ‘From the "Clean Snows of 
Petawawa": The Violence of Canadian Peacekeepers in Somalia’ 2000 (15) Cultural Anthropology 127-163, 
158; Sepinwall AJ ‘Failures to Punish: Command Responsibility in Domestic and International Law’2009 (30) 
Michigan Journal of International Law 251-303; Gallagher K ‘Universal Jurisdiction in Practice: Efforts to Hold 
Donald Rumsfeld and Other High-level United States Officials Accountable for Torture’ 2009 (7) Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 1087-1116, 1097. In, for instance, the case of Aydin v. Turkey, the plaintiff, a 
Kurdish girl, was tortured and raped by security forces. See Aydin v. Turkey 1997-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1866, 25 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. 251 (1997). The European Court of Human Rights held that the state was responsible for the violation 
of article 3 of the European Charter on Human Rights (para 87). In this case, rape in detention by state officials 
was described as being an especially grave and abhorrent form of ill-treatment, causing deep psychological scars 
(para 83). The accumulation of physical and mental violence suffered and ‘the especially cruel act of rape to 
which she was subjected’ constituted torture (paras 84, 86). 
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responsibility for its officials, even when they act in violation of their prescribed roles and 
orders.
114
 Indeed, peacekeepers outside their country have to be considered their State’s 
representatives at all times. 
Violations of common article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions constitute war crimes, but are 
not grave breaches. A war crime is prosecutable, however, whether it constitutes a grave 
breach of the laws and customs of war or another breach.
115
 The ICC Statute in its Article 8 
distinguishes between ‘grave breaches of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949’116 and 
‘other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed 
conflict...’117 Concerning non-international armed conflict, the ICC Statute presents four 
instances of violations of article 3, common to the four Geneva Conventions,
118
 which 
constitute obviously grave breaches, and 12 instances of ‘other serious violations of the laws 
and customs applicable in armed conflict not of an international character within the 
framework of international law ...’119  
For a person to commit grave breaches to the Geneva Conventions during an armed conflict, 
she or he must have some specific features. He or she must be a person susceptible of 
violating the laws and customs of war and be a combatant. Indeed, for a combatant to be 
prosecuted as having violated the law of armed conflict, such an individual must have 
belonged to the armed forces of a party to the conflict as provided for in Article 43 of the 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions which gives the characteristics of a 
combatant: 
1. The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units 
which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even 
if that Party is represented by a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party. 
Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall 
enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict. 
                                                             
114 Edwards A ‘The ‘Feminizing’ of Torture under International Human Rights Law’ 2006 (19) Leiden Journal 
of International Law 349-391, 365.  
115 Article 1 of GC AP I; Ambos K ‘Article 25: Individual Criminal Responsibility’ in Otto Triffterer (ed) 
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (C. 
H. Beck Oxford 2008) 743-770, referring to the Tadic case of the ICTY in respect to violations of Common 
Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions. 
116 Article 8(2) (a). 
117 Article 8(2) (b). 
118 Article 8(2) (c). 
119 Article 8(2) (2). 
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2. Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and 
chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they 
have the right to participate directly in hostilities. 
3. Whenever a Party to a conflict incorporates a paramilitary or armed law enforcement agency 
into its armed forces it shall so notify the other Parties to the conflict 
Members of a party to an armed conflict, combatants, or others in another capacity may 
commit war crimes.
120
 Thus, Ruzindana, who was neither an administrative official nor a 
member of the army, police, or gendarmerie,
121
 was indicted for having violated Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Convention.
122
 If X kills his neighbour Y because of an old dispute 
over a farm strip
123
, however, X may be convicted of murder but not of the war crime of 
wilful killing even if the murder took place during a time of armed conflict, since X and Y 
were not taking part in the hostilities and did not belong to any of the opposing parties in the 
armed conflict nor was such a murder connected to the armed conflict.
124
  
It could be argued, therefore, that individuals who do not take part in a conflict cannot be 
prosecuted for war crimes, save where such individuals belong to one party to the armed 
conflict and their conduct was connected to the said armed conflict.
125
 Even though the United 
Nations as an organisation is not a party to the Geneva law,
126
 the law of armed conflicts 
applies to its peace operations.
127
 State members of the United Nations and their different 
                                                             
120 The expression ‘Members of a party to an armed conflict’ does not means combatants. Officials in civilian 
territorial administration may adopt conduct that amounts to a war crime. See Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema 
and Obed Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-T (21-05-1999) para [22]. 
121 Obed Ruzindana was a commercial trader in Rwanda during the time period in which the crimes alleged in 
the indictment occurred.  
122 Count 23 of the indictment.  
123 Innocent people can be imprisoned, for instance for being involved in a land dispute. See Hintjens H ‘Post-
Genocide Identity Politics in Rwanda’ 2008 (8) Ethnicities - Institute of Social Studies 5-41, 17. 
124 Cassese A ‘The Italian Court of Cassation Misapprehends the Notion of War Crimes: The Lozano Case’ 2008 
(6) Journal of International Criminal Justice 1077-1089, 1082, 1086 et seq. 
125 In most military manuals Geneva Conventions have been incorporated into the national law in order to apply 
to service members of those individuals subject to military law. Military members and persons bound by military 
law are, therefore, aware of the laws and customs applicable to armed conflict. See Davidson MJ A Guide to 
Military Criminal Law (Naval Institute Press Annapolis 1999) 138. 
126 Knoops G-J Defenses in Contemporary International Criminal Law (Transnational Publishers Ardsley 2001) 
132. 
127
 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel (UN GA res. 49/59 of 9 December 
1994, 49 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 49 U.N. Doc. A/49/49 [entered into force 15 January 1999]). Article 2(2) reads:  
‘This Convention shall not apply to a United Nations operation authorized by the Security Council as an 
enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in which any of the personnel are 
engaged as combatants against organized armed forces and to which the law of international armed conflict 
applies’. 
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armed forces are not exempt from the obligations under the laws and customs of war.
128
 
Although, multilateral conventions applicable to the conduct of armed conflicts are 
established by States, they are primarily addressed to individuals; they provide for individual 
liability of persons who are involved in the hostilities. The category of persons to be held 
accountable in this respect would in most cases, therefore, be limited to commanders, 
combatants, and other members of the armed forces.
129
 Where the UN forces are engaged as 
combatants, the laws to be observed during times of war will apply to them, with the 
exception of their medical and religious personnel.
130
 Approached by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross to become party to the Geneva Conventions by accession, the 
UN maintained that it was unable to become party to such treaties. It, however, insisted that 
governments which contribute troops to UN operations have the obligation to ensure their 
contingents observe the law related to armed conflicts.
131
  
The aforementioned discussion shows that peacekeepers can commit war crimes where they 
are engaged as combatants. What is problematic, however, is that an international crime does 
not necessarily call for prosecution before an international tribunal or court.
132
 Most 
international conventions indicate that it is the duty of the States to take all measures to 
prosecute acts criminalised within the treaty.
133
 To this end, each State party is obliged to 
enact domestic legislation to empower national courts to deal with such crimes.
134
 Since 
national criminal jurisdictions can function as ‘organs of the international community’, the 
integration of international criminal norms in domestic systems is of great importance.
135
 
                                                             
128 UN forces can be engaged in a conflict as combatants. See UN Secretary-General Bulletin, Observance by 
United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law (U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 August 6, 1999); 
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel (Dec. 9, 1994, S. Treaty Doc. 107-I, 34 
I.L.M. 482 (995)) (into force January 15, 1999). 
129 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, case No. ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para [630]. The head of 
State is the supreme commander of the army of that state. 
130 Melzer N Targeted Killing in International Law (Oxford Monographs in International Law Oxford 2008) 
309. Medical personnel and chaplains are not considered to be combatants.   
131 UN ‘Memorandum to the Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs’ United Nations Yearbook, 
1972, 153-154. 
132 Davidson MJ A Guide to Military Criminal Law (Naval Institute Press Annapolis 1999) 149. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Du Plessis M ‘Bringing the International Criminal Court home: The Implementation of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court Act 2002’ 2003(16) SACJ 1-16. 
135 Kleffner J Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdiction (Doctoral thesis 
University of Amsterdam 2007) 29-31 referred to by Kemp G Individual criminal liability for the international 
crime of aggression (unpublished doctoral thesis Stellenbosch University 2008) 173. A State that ratifies 
international conventions, especially those related to human rights, may directly have provided in its legal 
system that such international norms are directly applicable at the national level. Thus, the constitutions of some 
Francophone African countries provide that international treaties apply directly within domestic law. They are 
monist legal systems. An example of this is article 153 of the Constitution of the DRC. In other states, 
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Thus, State parties to the Geneva Conventions undertake to respect and to ensure respect for 
the present Convention in all circumstances.
136
  
In an internal bulletin promulgated on 6 August 1999, the Secretary-General outlined the 
fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law that are applicable to 
United Nations forces conducting operations under UN command and control, and he 
reminded all personnel that peacekeepers are bound by international humanitarian law.
137
 The 
crimes presented in the following section, therefore, constitute war crimes
138
 and are 
punishable according to the provisions of international humanitarian law.
139
 
4.3. Alleged specific crimes committed by peacekeepers under international law 
4.3.1 Rape, prostitution, and sexual offences involving children 
Even though the crime of rape and many other forms of sexual violence were not expressly 
indicated as grave breaches in the Geneva Conventions or in the Common Article 3 to the 
four Geneva Convention,
140
 there is no doubt that rape and any other forms of sexual violence 
are prohibited under international humanitarian law.
141
  
Although there are a number of cases where boys have been sexually abused, most of the 
cases have affected women.
142
 The prohibition states that, ‘Women shall be especially 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
international law is not necessarily part of domestic law. In such a system, it may be necessary to incorporate 
international law into domestic law, by, for example, a domestic legislative act. Such systems are said to apply 
the dualist theory. In South Africa, for example, the dualist approach is followed when it comes to the 
incorporation of international instruments as treaties were negotiated, signed, ratified and acceded to by the 
executive. According to section 231 of the 1996 Constitution, parliamentary ratification of treaties is required. 
136 Article 1 is common to all the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. Ensuring respect for a given law should 
imply prosecution of its violations. See the function of intimidation and prevention recognised to criminal 
sanctions. 
137 Secretary-General’s Bulletin: Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law - 
United Nations ST/SGB/1999/13 0f 6 August 1999; Kolb R and Vité S Le droit de l’occupation militaire : 
perspectives historiques et enjeux juridiques actuels (Bruylant Bruxelles 2009) 100. 
138 War crimes consist of violations of international humanitarian law and constitute one category of 
international core crimes. See supra 4.2.1.3. 
139 Every alleged crime will be covered by invoking the applicable provisions, where possible.  
140 Rape is the most commonly committed act of sexual violence, which strikes at the very core of human dignity 
and physical integrity. It is not considered as a grave breach under Geneva law. See Sellers PV ‘The Cultural 
Value of Sexual Violence’ 1999 American Society of International Law (ASIL) 312-324, 322-3224. 
141 For instance, in the seventeenth century Sweden humanitarian rules made rape a war crime. Seven of the 150 
Articles of War decreed in 1621 by the King Gustavus II Adolphus of Sweden provided that the rape of women 
was punishable by death.see Beigbeder Y Judging War Criminals: The Politics of International Justice 
(MacMillan Press London 1999) 5. Article 44 of the Lieber Code (promulgated in 1863) punished rape as war 
crime with death penalty. See Bill BJ (ed) Law of War Deskbook (General Legal Centre and School 
Charlottesville January 2010) 93. 
142This refers to the alleged rape and murder of a 13-year-old Somali boy by an Italian army major inside the 
former Italian Embassy in Mogadishu in March 1994 – see Amnesty International, ‘Italy…’ op cit  ; for instance, 
 153 
 
protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, 
or any form of indecent assault.’143 Despite the existence of this prohibition, instances of rape 
and gang-rape, and beating women victims to semi-consciousness, have been reported 
regarding the UN mission of peace to Somalia. These allegations, if confirmed, constitute 
violations of the laws and customs of war as indicated at the beginning of this paragraph. 
Pornography involving children may also be considered as falling under the same provisions. 
The case of Didier Bourguet which involved the possession of pornographic material showing 
the perpetrator having sex with the victims constitutes an example.
144
 
Though no specific provision in the law of conducting armed conflicts uses the term 
‘pornography’, this conduct may be construed as fitting those provisions proscribing cruel 
treatment, outrages upon personal dignity, humiliating and degrading treatment, and serious 
injury to health.
145
 The involvement of children in the production of pornographic material 
complies with the prohibition. The provisions invoked above and below, therefore, apply 
mutatis mutandis here.
 146
 The pornographic acts of Bourguet, however, should also be treated 
as rape.
147
 
What is important to note is that the Rome Statute has codified the crime of rape as a war 
crime when committed in connection with, and in the context of, war. Such rape is defined in 
neutral terms with reference to victims as well as to perpetrators.
148
 The formulation of the 
provision encompasses the traditional elements of the crime of rape and adds a contextual 
element and awareness of the circumstances establishing the context of armed conflict. 
Consent, however, is not expressly mentioned in the provision. The Elements of the Crimes
149
 
under the jurisdiction of the ICC allude to the lack of consent by giving the circumstances 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
in a recent case, a South African colonel in Goma was allegedly found to have sexually molested his young male 
interpreter, see Plessis M & Pete S ‘Who Guards the Guards? The ICC and serious crimes committed by United 
Nations peacekeepers in Africa’ 2004 (13) African Security Review 5-17, 8. See also Chinkin C ‘Rape and 
Sexual Abuse of Women in International Law’1994 (5) European Journal of International Law (EJIL) 326-341. 
143 Art. 27 (2) of GC IV, Art. 76 (1) of AP I, Article 4 (2) (e) of AP II and Art. 75 (2) (b) of AP I. 
144 Amnesty International Fin de l’impunité pour un ancien employé de l’ONU violeur d’enfants (Amnesty 
International no. 10 La lettre de la Commission Enfants, Sept./Octobre 2008) Public SF 08-ENF 29. 
145 Article 3 GC I, II, III and IV; MacKinnon CA ‘Women’s September 11th: Rethinking the International Law 
of Conflict’ 2006 (47) Harvard International Law Journal 1-31, 8. 
146
 Art. 50/ 51/130/147 of GC I-IV respectively and Common Article 3 (1)(a) & (c) of GC I-IV. 
147 Sex with persons who cannot consciously consent is rape. Askin KD ‘Gender Crimes Jurisprudence in the 
ICTR: Positive Developments’ 2005 (3) Journal of International Criminal Justice 1007-1018, 1009. 
148 Article 8(2) (b)(xxii) of the Rome Statute. 
149 Rome Statute: The Elements of Crimes, available at www.acicc.org/part_ii_b_e.pdf [last accessed 30 
November 2012]. {Hereinafter Rome Statute - Elements of Crimes}. 
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under which the war crime of rape must be perpetrated.
150
 Indeed, under the Rome Statute the 
elements of the crimes of rape are found at Article 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-1 of the Elements of the 
Crimes which reads as following: 
1. The  perpetrator  invaded the  body  of  a  person  by  conduct  resulting  in penetration,  
however  slight,  of  any  part  of  the  body  of  the  victim  or  of  the perpetrator with a sexual 
organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of the 
body. 
2. The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by 
fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such 
person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion 
was committed against a person incapable of giving genuine consent. 
3. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed 
conflict. 
4. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed 
conflict.151  
Since allegations of rape by peacekeepers may fall
152
 under the war crime provisions of the 
Rome Statute, the possible defence a perpetrator can assert would consist of a reasonable 
belief that the victim consented.
153
 Such a defence, if not rejected by the court, negates the 
mens rea element of rape. The other defence to a charge of rape is that of a mental disease or 
defect.
154
 If ‘the person suffers from a mental disease or defect that destroys that person's 
capacity to appreciate the unlawfulness or nature of his or her conduct, or capacity  to control 
                                                             
150 Consent is not considered a ground of justification to a charge of rape under international law, but its absence 
forms part of the definitional elements of the crime which must be established by the prosecution. See 
Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic - Case No.: IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, 
22 February 2001, paras 461-464. See also Fitzgerald K ‘Problems of Prosecution and Adjudication of Rape and 
Other Sexual Assaults under International Law’1997(8) EJIL 638-663, 640. 
151 Article 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-1, Rome Statute-Elements of Crimes. 
152 Secretary-General’s Bulletin Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law (U.N. 
Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 of 6 August 1999). The Bulletin applies to ‘United Nations forces when in situations of 
armed conflict they are actively engaged therein as combatants.’  Both enforcement operations and peacekeeping 
operations with the possibility of the use of force for self-defence are field of application. See para 1.1.  
153 ‘...sexual activity with children (persons under 18) is prohibited regardless of the local age of majority or 
consent, and that mistaken belief in the age of the child is not a defence.’ See section 3.2 of the Secretary-
General’s Bulletin Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (U.N. Doc. 
ST/SGB/2003/13 of 9 October 2003). See also the UN OIOS report on DRC (U.N. A/59/661 of 5 January 2005) 
para 19. 
154 A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or 
defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law. See Fingarette H ‘The Concept of Mental Disease in Criminal 
Law Insanity Tests’ 1966 (33) The University of Chicago Law Review 229-248, 231. 
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his or her conduct to conform to the requirements of law’, such a person is not criminally 
responsible.
155
  
4.3.2 Murder  
Many provisions of the Geneva Conventions proscribe any violation of the individual right to 
life.
156
 There have been allegations that, during the UN peacekeeping mission to Somalia, 
Canadian, Belgian, Italian soldiers and other peacekeepers committed acts of murder
157
 by 
directly firing at civilians,
158
 by throwing children and other civilians into a river or into the 
sea, and allegations of instances of murder by suffocation or by any other means.
159
 It is 
important to enquire whether such conduct falls under the Geneva Convention on war crimes, 
and, furthermore, to establish whether the case of murder of a Burundian teenager also falls 
under the provisions relative to grave breaches or under article 3 common to the four Geneva 
Conventions. 
Persons not involved in military operations, especially civilians, must be afforded humane 
treatment in all circumstances with regard to their status as victims of war.
160
 Acts of violence 
to life, for instance murder of all kinds, are prohibited in all circumstances against such 
persons.
161
 Persons engaged in the hostilities as combatants are under an obligation to observe 
this rule relative to the treatment of civilians. Peacekeepers, in enforcement operations and 
peacekeeping operations in which the use of force is allowed by the UN Security Resolution 
establishing the force, are considered combatants, i.e. under the obligation of observing 
international humanitarian law, including the rule on treatment of civilians.
162
 Instances of 
murder as aforementioned violate rules of international humanitarian law. They constitute war 
                                                             
155 Article 31(1) (a) Rome Statute. 
156 Articles 50/ 51/130/147 of GC 1-IV respectively, and Common Article 3 (1)(a) of GC I-IV. 
157 Amnesty International Belgium-Alleged Human Rights Violations by Members of the Armed Forces in 
Somalia (OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting Warsaw November 1997): Human Rights Are an 
Essential Component of European Security Amnesty International September 1997, 16.  
158 De Waal A ‘US War Crimes in Somalia’ 1998 (30) New Left Review 131-144, 136-137. On 6 April 1993, 
Gunnery Sergeant Harry Conde was convicted of using excessive force in an incident where he shot and killed a 
Somali youth who tried to steal his sunglasses.  
159 Amnesty International Italy: A briefing for the UN Committee against Torture (Amnesty International May 
1999 AI Index: EUR 30/02/99); de Waal A ‘US War Crimes in Somalia’ 1998 (30) New Left Review 131-144, 
137. 
160 Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Ss. 1.1 and 7.1 of the Secretary-General Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations forces of international 
humanitarian law (UN. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 of 6 August 1999). 
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crimes of murder whenever committed by members of armed forces of the parties to an armed 
conflict, or by peacekeepers engaged as combatants.
163
    
4.3.3 Causing serious injury to body or health: torture and assaults 
Since the High Contracting Parties to the four Geneva Conventions undertake to respect and 
to ensure respect in all circumstances,
164
 incidents such as assaults on hospital staff
165
 by 
peacekeepers would constitute a violation of the said Conventions with regard to the 
obligation to ensure respect and protection vis-à-vis persons engaged in the operation and 
administration of civilian hospitals.
166
 Medical personnel in civilian hospitals, as well as 
civilians not taking part in hostilities, are protected persons. The assaults on medical 
personnel, therefore, and assaults inflicted on three Somali men, including Abdullhai Sheik 
Abdulkadir,
167
 may constitute violations of the law and customs of war and amount to torture 
or cruel treatment if all the requirements for these crimes are present.
168
 
Articles 50, 51, 130 and 147 of the Geneva Conventions I-IV respectively and article 4 (2) (a) 
of Additional Protocol II to these Conventions have provided that torture and outrages upon 
personal dignity are war crimes whenever such acts are inflicted against protected persons. 
The war crime of torture, however, must have a connection with an armed conflict and be 
inflicted by a public official or at his/her instigation or with the consent of such public 
official. Where such official capacity of the torturer cannot be established, the act constitutes 
isolated conduct that amounts to assault.  
For a person to be prosecuted for having performed acts of torture, the following four 
elements have to be present:
169
  
(1) Inflicting severe pain or suffering which may be physical or mental;  
(2) A person (human being); 
                                                             
163 The nature of the armed conflict in which peacekeepers are engaged does not matter since article 3, common 
to Geneva Conventions, applies in both international and internal armed conflict. See Cassese A International 
Criminal Law 2nd ed (Oxford University Press New York 2008) 86. 
164 Article 1 GC IV. 
165 De Waal A ‘US War Crimes in Somalia’1998 (30) New Left Review 131-144, 138. 
166 Articles 20 (1) and (2) of GC IV, Articles 15 (1) and (5) of AP I and Article 9 (1) of AP II. 
167
 TV footage corroborates the occurrence of the incidents. See Amnesty International Italy: A briefing for the 
UN Committee against Torture (Amnesty International May 1999 AI Index: EUR 30/02/99). 
168 Supra 2.2.1. 
169 Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984)) (hereinafter 
CAT). 
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(3) The purposes of such conduct; obtaining from the victim or a third person information or a 
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of 
having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based 
on discrimination of any kind; 
(4) The instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity. 
Whenever the third element enumerated is lacking, the crime that has to be prosecuted is that 
of inflicting cruel or inhuman treatment.
170
 Indeed this crime consists of acts which cause 
serious mental pain or suffering, or which constitute a serious outrage upon individual 
dignity.
171
 Cruel or inhuman treatment distinguishes itself from torture by the absence of the 
purpose of obtaining information or confession.
172
 It is important to mention that peace-
keepers can inflict cruel and inhuman treatment in that they perform such an act in a situation 
that cannot be linked to their official presence in the host country. For example, when the 
perpetrators were in plain clothes without any insignia linking them to the mission of peace, 
they must be considered as not acting in official capacity.
173
 
Generally torture occurs when the victim is in detention or in instances of deprivation of 
liberty. There may, however, be situations, as the ICRC has indicated, where people are not 
actually deprived of their liberty but the conduct of officials amounts to a certain form of 
conduct that could be considered as constituting an outrage upon the dignity of the person, as 
an act of torture.
174
 Thus, any kind of discrimination, limitation to access to medical care, 
illegal destruction of homes, and sexual assault committed in connection with military or 
                                                             
170 ICRC ‘International Committee of the Red Cross policy on torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
inflicted on persons deprived of their liberty, Policy adopted by the Assembly Council of the ICRC on 9 June 
2011’ 2011 (93) International Review of the Red Cross 5547-562, 548.  
171 Ibid. 
172 Ibid. 
173
 Fletcher GP ‘The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt’ 2002 
(111) The Yale Law Journal 1499-1573, 1521. The acts of a state officer within the ambit of his personal pursuits 
are not acts which may trigger that state’s liability; they remain personal. 
174 ICRC ‘International Committee of the Red Cross policy on torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
inflicted on persons deprived of their liberty, Policy adopted by the Assembly Council of the ICRC on 9 June 
2011’ 2011 (93) International Review of the Red Cross 5547-562, 549. 
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police operations
175
 may be described as cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, or even as 
torture.
176
 There cannot be a situation where these acts can be tolerated.
177
 
Torture is prohibited and criminalized by the laws and customs of war.
178
 Peacekeepers 
deployed in Somali in the 1990s and who are alleged to have electrically shocked a detained 
Somali man,
179
 to have tortured a garage proprietor to the point of his becoming blind in one 
eye, and other reported instances such as hooding and tying people to a lorry to drag them 
along the ground and other similar treatments of Somali civilians should, therefore, qualify as 
acts of torture.
180
 Consequently it is submitted that the peacekeepers who have committed 
these war crimes should be prosecuted. Can the peacekeepers invoke the immunity recognised 
to them under the Status-of-Forces Agreement and the Memorandum of Understanding?
181
 
This issue will now be explored. 
4.4 Issue of immunity of UN peace operations personnel 
4.4.1 Rationale of immunities in general 
The rationale of immunity of heads of States and high-level government officials from the 
jurisdiction of other States is that one state’s judiciary should not sit in judgment over another 
sovereign state,
182
 but also the fact that if there were no respect for the representatives of a 
foreign government, this could lead not only to political tensions between states but also such 
                                                             
175 ICRC ‘International Committee of the Red Cross policy on torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
inflicted on persons deprived of their liberty, Policy adopted by the Assembly Council of the ICRC on 9 June 
2011’ 2011 (93) International Review of the Red Cross 5547-562, 549. 
176 Torture is a cruel and inhuman treatment to which is attached a special stigma. See Schechter RB ‘Intentional 
Starvation as Torture: Exploring the Gray Area between Ill-Treatment and Torture’ 2003 (18) America 
University International Review 1233-1270, 1245-1246. 
177 Droege C ‘‘‘In Truth the Leitmotiv’’: The Prohibition of Torture and Other Forms of Ill-treatment in 
International Humanitarian Law ’ 2007 (89) International Review of the Red Cross 515-541, 517. 
178 Articles 50/ 51/130/147 of GC I-IV respectively; Common Article 3 (1) (c) of GC I-IV. 
179 McCormack T ‘Their Atrocities and Our Misdemeanours: The Reticence of States to Try “Own Nationals” 
for International Crimes’ in Lattimer M and Sands P Justice for Crimes against Humanity (Hart Publishing 
Oxford 2003) 107-142, 139.  
180 Amnesty International Italy: A briefing for the UN Committee against Torture (Amnesty International May 
1999 AI Index: EUR 30/02/99) 9-14. 
181 Peacekeepers and the whole UN operation of peace undertake to respect their obligations under SOFA 
amongst which is the respect of local law. See para 6 of the Model SOFA (UN Doc A/45/594 of 9 October 
1990). 
182 Ratner SR, Abrams JS & Bischoff JL Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law 3d ed. 
(Oxford University Press Oxford 2009) 156; Kemp G et al. Criminal Law in South Africa (Oxford University 
Press Cape Town 2012) 579; Worster WT ‘Immunities of United Nations Peacekeepers in the Absence of a 
Status of Forces Agreement’ 2008 (47) Military Law and the Law of War Review 277-375, 285. 
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a state of affairs that could endanger international peace and security.
183
 Does immunity apply 
where the intervening court is not a domestic one but an international court? For instance, can 
a peacekeeper invoke the fact that he or she is only subjected to the jurisdiction of his/her 
country to escape prosecution before an international criminal court?
184
 
The raison d’être of immunity under the agreements between the UN and Host State and the 
UN and a Troop-Contributing Country is to afford UN personnel and peacekeepers a status 
that allows them necessary privileges and immunities for the fulfilment of the purposes of the 
Organization and for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the 
Organization.
185
 The purpose of recognizing privileges and immunities granted to 
peacekeepers is to ensure that these personnel can perform their tasks without undue and 
uncoordinated interference by domestic courts of the host individual states.
186
 The scope of 
such immunities, therefore, could not extend to acts not actually connected to the tasks the 
organisation endeavours to accomplish. 
4.4.2 Scope of peace operations personnel immunity 
The immunity protections are particularly important when it comes to the personnel of 
peacekeeping missions who are sent into politically unstable environments which lack 
functioning judicial institutions. For the operation and its personnel to carry out their 
mandate, they need some guarantees that they will be exempt from legal prosecution. This 
does not mean peacekeepers are free to commit crimes under the cover of immunity. The 
purpose of the privileges and immunities granted to peacekeeping personnel is essentially 
functional immunity in that it is meant to allow them to perform their functions without 
interference and in order to safeguard the independent exercise of their functions in 
                                                             
183 See Boister N ‘The ICJ in the Belgian Arrest Warrant Case: Arresting the Development of International 
Criminal Law’ 2002 (7) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 293-314, 313-314. 
184 If the crimes allegedly committed by peacekeepers fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC, for example, does 
the principle of exclusive criminal jurisdiction set up in the SOFA ceases to apply owing to the fact that, as 
Miller puts it, ‘the only exception to the exclusive jurisdiction of the TCC in the Host State with respect to 
criminal offences over their contingent members would be if the International Criminal Court asserted 
jurisdiction over crimes falling within its Statute’. See Miller AJ ‘Legal Aspects of Stopping Sexual Exploitation 
and Abuse in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations’ 2006 (39) Cornell International Law Journal 71-96, 80. 
185
 Preamble to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on 13 February 1946, evoking article 105 of the UN Charter. See para 3 of the 
UN Model SOFA (UN Doc A/45/594 of 9 October 1990). 
186 Kwai Hong Ip ‘Peace Support Operations: Establishing the Rule of Law Through Security and Law 
Enforcement Operations’ in Arnold R and Knoops GJA(eds) Practice and Policies of Modern Peace Support 
Operations under International Law (Transnational Publishers Ardsley 2006) 3-34, 14. 
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connection with the United Nations.
187
 It is, therefore, a functional immunity, not personal 
immunity
188
 and it does not extend to purely civilian issues, although for such issues the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General has some power to allow the proceedings to 
continue or not, depending on whether the proceedings relate to official duties of the 
peacekeeper concerned or not.
189
 
The personnel of UN peace operations are not absolutely immune from legal criminal liability 
since their immunity is functional, i.e. immunity ratione materiae, which is not meant to 
protect private interests.
190
 Peacekeepers, therefore, cannot actually assert immunity 
protections when they commit serious violations of human rights which fall outside the scope 
of their official duties,
191
 and most crimes by peacekeepers undoubtedly constitute, in one 
way or another, violations of human rights. ‘The purpose of the privileges and immunities 
[recognized to peacekeepers and the force] is to ensure that the force can perform its tasks 
without undue and uncoordinated interference by courts from individual states ...’192 It should 
not mean that even due legal process towards private acts of peacekeepers are barred by the 
use of privileges and immunities.
 
It does not, therefore, appear that peacekeepers are 
completely shielded from criminal liability by privileges and immunities contained in Status-
of-Forces Agreements and Memoranda of Understanding to the point that, as one scholar has 
considered, any effort to regulate conduct by peacekeepers appears to have been rendered 
totally ineffective.
193
 The absence of prosecution is actually the consequence of unwillingness 
on the part of the home countries of the peacekeepers to prosecute their crimes, as well as the 
                                                             
187 Ss 14 and 20 of the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (1 U.N.T.S. 15 
adopted by the UNGA 13 February 1946). 
188 Personal immunity or ‘immunity ratione personae’ are immunities conferred as long as the official beniciary 
remains in office. See Akande D and Shah S ‘Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes, and Foreign 
Domestic Courts’ 2011 (21) EJIL 815-852, 818; Murungu C & Biegon J (eds)Prosecuting international crimes 
in Africa (Pretoria University Law Press Pretoria 2011) 42. With respect to the distinction between functional 
and personal immunities whether before domestic or international courts, see Kemp G et al. Criminal Law in 
South Africa (Oxford University Press Cape Town 2012) 579-590. 
189 Para 49 of the Model SOFA (UN Doc A/45/594 of 9 October 1990). 
190 Wickremasinghe C and Verdirame G ‘Responsibility and Liability for Violations of Human Rights in the 
Course of UN Field Operations’ in Scott C (ed) Torture as Tort: Comparative Perspectives on the Development 
of Transitional Human Rights Litigation, 2001, 465, 488 referred to by Murray J ‘Who Will Police the Peace-
builders? The failure to ESTABLISH Accountability for the Participation of United Nations Civilian Police in 
the Trafficking of Women in Post-Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina’ 2003 (34) Columbia Human Rights Law 
Review 475-527, 507; Zahar A and Sluiter G International Criminal Law: A Critical Introduction (Oxford 
University Press Oxford 2008) 25-27.  
191 Murray J op cit  (n 193) 507. 
192 Kwai Hong Ip op cit  (n 189) 14. 
193 With respect to sexual offences committed by peacekeepers, agreements seem to have rendered any effort to 
outlaw such conduct by UN peace personnel ineffective. See Simm G ‘International Law as a Regulatory 
Framework for Sexual Crimes Committed by Peacekeepers’ 2012 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 1-34, 9. 
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fact that the UN Secretary General’s office does not promptly waive the immunity of civilian 
personnel.
194
 The possibility of waiving immunity concerns only peacekeepers and employees 
other than members of military contingents over whom ‘the UN usually has little powers and 
refers complaints to the government in question and sends the officers home for further 
prosecution.’195 The UN Status-of-Forces Agreement and Memorandum of Understanding 
recognise exclusive criminal jurisdiction over military personnel of a UN force to the Troop-
Contributing Countries, with the exception of experts on mission.
196
 As Fleck has observed:  
legal immunities in the receiving state should by no means be misunderstood as offering 
impunity for any crimes or inhibiting claims in the event of wrongful acts committed by 
members of a mission. Crimes must be brought to national courts of the sending state or to a 
competent international court.197  
The recurrent problem is that Troop-Contributing Countries are loath to prosecute or to 
execute their undertaken obligation to do so by actually giving assurance to the UN that, in 
the case of criminal conduct by their troops, prosecution will follow.
198
 The responsibility of 
UN personnel and respect for their special protected status should be mutual, observes 
Engdahl.
199
 Since a Status-of-Forces Agreement applies only in the territory of the Host 
State,
200
 immunity should not actually lead to impunity. Where the conduct of a peacekeeper 
amounts to an international crime, the defence of immunity lapses because a third state
201
, as 
well as an international criminal tribunal or court, would not be defeated by such a defence.
202
 
                                                             
194 Hampson FJ and Kihara-Hunt A ‘The Accountability of Personnel Associated with Peacekeeping Operations’ 
in Aoi C, de Coning C and Thakur R (eds) Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations (United 
Nations University Press Tokyo 2007)195-220, 202; S 20 of the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations; Bongiorno C ‘A Culture of Impunity: Applying International Human Rights 
Law to the United Nations in East Timor’ 2001-2002 (33) Columbia Human Rights Law Review 623-692, 662. 
195 Ibid. 
196 Para 46 of the UN Model SOFA; Bothe M and Dörschel T ‘The UN Peacekeeping Experience’ in Fleck D 
(ed) The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces (Oxford University Press Oxford 2001) 487-506, 496  and 498; 
Saura J op cit  (n 102) 485-486. 
197 Fleck D ‘Securing Status and Protection of Peacekeepers’ in Operations’ in Arnold R and Knoops GJA (eds) 
Practice and Policies of Modern Peace Support Operations under International Law (Transnational Publishers 
Ardsley 2006) 148; Fleck D (ed) The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces (Oxford University Press 2001) 5; 
Klappe BF ‘International Peace Operations’ in Fleck D (ed) The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law 2 
ed. (Oxford University Press Oxford 2008) 635-673, 640. 
198 Para 48 of the Model SOFA. 
199 Engdahl O Protection of Personnel in Peace Operations: The Role of the ‘Safety Convention’ Against the 
Background of General International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Leiden 2007) x. 
200
 Para 2 of the model SOFA. 
201 Compare Bedont B International Criminal Justice: Implications for Peacekeeping (report for the Canadian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade December 2001) available at www.peacewomen.org-
/un/pkwatch/DFAIT_rport.doc [last accessed 29 September 2011]. 
202 See UN-ICC Agreement: Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and 
the United Nations. Its Article 19 on the Rules concerning United Nations privileges and immunities excludes to 
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Indeed, no principle of international law provides for non-competency of international 
jurisdiction over peacekeepers; otherwise, any efforts in prosecuting most serious crimes 
would be negated.
203
 Can peacekeepers fall under the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court or can they assert the privilege of being prosecuted only before their national 
courts?  
It is common knowledge that the ICC statute is applicable to all individuals without any 
distinction based on official capacity.
204
 The ICC, therefore, does have jurisdiction over war 
crimes committed by peacekeepers while on UN missions of peace. When States refuse to 
prosecute those who commit heinous crimes such as war crimes, the ICC has to step in and 
prosecute.
205
 Where the prosecution of a given state concludes that there is no basis upon 
which to prosecute, the ICC must still determine whether such a conclusion is seeking to 
shield the accused or not. If the ICC finding is that the state has sought to shield its soldier, it 
must resort to article 17 of the Rome Statute to ascertain the unwillingness of such a state to 
prosecute.
206
 
Since an international criminal court is not party to agreements concluded between the UN 
and a Host State as well between the UN and the Troop-Contributing Countries, if the conduct 
of peacekeepers has reached such a degree of seriousness as to amount to international crimes, 
a third state can assert its criminal jurisdiction,
207
 especially if the individual peacekeeper is 
actually within the boundaries of the said third State on the ground of universal jurisdiction.
208
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
invoke any immunity before to hamper the ICC in its work. See also Cassese A International Criminal Law 2 ed. 
(Oxford University Press New York 2008) 312. 
203 Glueck S ‘By What Tribunal Shall War Offender be Tried?’ 1943 (56) Harvard Law Review 1059-1089, 1059 
et seq; Gaeta P ‘International and Mixed Jurisdictions: Means and Achievements of Mechanisms established by 
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ICC’ (Communication at the ICC-Assembly of States Parties Sixth Session New York 30 November to 14 
December 2007) ICC_ASP/6/INF.2A. Foundation of International Criminal Justice, 14-15. 
205 El ZeidyMM The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal Law: Origin, Development and 
Practice (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Leiden 2008) 157-158. 
206 Ibid. 163-170. 
207 O’Keefe R ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Concept’ 2004 (2) Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 735-760, 737. 
208 The term universal jurisdiction itself refers to a form of jurisdiction in international law which grants the 
courts of any state, the ability to bring proceedings with respect to certain internationally defined crimes, without 
regard to the location of the crime, the nationality of the offender, or the nationality of the victim. This form of 
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It must be noted, however, that most States will actually refrain from prosecuting a national of 
another state for crimes committed while serving on a UN operation. No case exists at this 
stage where such prosecution has come before international tribunals or any courts of a third 
State with respect to war crimes committed by peacekeepers.
209
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter on international law regarding the crimes allegedly committed by peacekeepers 
has endeavoured to ascertain whether such crimes amount to any category of the core 
international crimes, i.e. genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. It has shown that 
rape and other sexual offences, murder, and other violent acts constitute crimes under 
international law.
210
 It is, therefore, evident that conduct by a peacekeeper might amount to a 
war crime under international criminal law.
211
 Not all categories of core international crimes 
include sexual crimes and abuses such as rape. It was shown that it is difficult for rape to 
amount to an act of genocide, and even when committed by a UN peacekeeper, sexual 
offences do not also amount to crimes against humanity because the policy element of the 
state or an organisation cannot be established.
212
 It was further shown that the alleged criminal 
acts by peacekeepers could fall with the category of war crimes. 
From the definition of a ‘war crime’ as ‘any act constituting a violation of the laws and customs 
of war, that is, any violation of International Humanitarian Law’, considering the fact that this 
definition is not dependent on the nature of armed conflict, viz whether the conflict is an 
international armed conflict or a non-international armed conflict, and the fact that the 
requirement of widespread or of policy is not part of the definition of war crime, a criminal 
act by a peacekeeper can well fall within the ambit of war crimes.
213
 This is so on the ground 
that peacekeepers are considered combatants where the UN forces are engaged as combatants 
and are under an obligation to observe the law applicable to an international armed conflict. 
                                                             
209 Extraterritorial conduct seems not to get attention of national or regional authorities and courts. See Roxstrom 
E, Gibney M and Einarsen T ‘The NATO Bombing Case (Bankovic et al. v. Belgium et al.) and the Limits of 
Western Human Rights Protection’ 2005 (23) Boston University International Law Journal 55-136, 58 et seq. 
210 Davidson MJ A Guide to Military Criminal Law (Naval Institute Press Annapolis 1999) 149. 
211 There exists the human right ‘not be subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life.’ The violation of such a right 
constitutes murder, whoever the culprit may be. Members of the UN forces cannot be excused if they violate 
such an important right on the basis that the perpetrator is allowed by the UN to use force. See McLaughlin R 
‘The Legal Regime Applicable to Use of Lethal Force When Operating Under a UN Security Council Chapter 
VII Mandate Authorizing ‘All Necessary Means’’2008 (12) Journal of Conflict & Security Law 389-417. 
212 Supra 4.2.1.1 and 4.2.1.2. 
213 Supra 4.2.1.3. 
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Instances of murder as aforementioned violate rules of international humanitarian law. They 
constitute war crimes of murder whenever committed by members of armed forces of the 
parties to an armed conflict, or by peacekeepers engaged as combatants.  Consequently it is 
submitted that the peacekeepers who have committed war crimes should be prosecuted.  
The discussion sought to determine whether the absence of prosecution of peacekeepers’ 
crimes by an international criminal court, or by the courts of a third State, was owing to the 
privilege to be tried by the  courts of nationality of the alleged perpetrator or not. The finding 
was that, in principle, immunities and privileges under Status-of-Forces Agreement and 
Memorandum of Understanding do not extend to an international jurisdiction or to the 
jurisdiction of a non party to such agreements. There is, however, not a single case of the 
prosecution of peacekeeper reported either before the jurisdiction of an international tribunal 
or before the court of a third State. The next chapter will therefore discuss the problems 
related to investigating crimes by peacekeepers to try to establish what the root cause behind 
the lack of prosecution of peacekeepers. 
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CHAPTER V  
THE LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY RELATED TO PROBLEMS WITH 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
…if a crime is committed in a Host State and that State is unable to prosecute an alleged offender or 
hold an offender accountable, there is a need to rely on other States to do so. If other States have not 
extended the operation of their criminal laws to apply to crimes committed in a Host State - then there 
is a jurisdictional gap and the alleged offender is likely to escape prosecution. In order to close the 
jurisdictional gap, it is important that as many Member States as possible are able to assert and 
exercise criminal jurisdiction.1 
This chapter will analyse and identify the authorities who may investigate crimes committed 
by peacekeepers. The chapter will then discuss the problems that may arise during the 
investigation phase when the competent investigating team is deployed.
2
 The criminal 
jurisdiction over crimes committed by peacekeepers rests with the sending State, especially 
with respect to military contingent members.
3
 The investigating authority of the foreign 
country concerned will be required to travel in order to collect evidence where the crime took 
place. The exertion of such competence abroad would, however, pose a number of practical 
problems inter alia access to victims and witnesses, the communication medium with each 
individual source of information (victims or witnesses), the cost of investigating abroad or of 
getting victims and witnesses flown to the country that has affirmed criminal jurisdiction, and 
various other practical hurdles.  
Since UN forces are sent to a country in order to protect human rights and democratic values, 
it must be considered part of their job to set an example for those societies where these human 
                                                             
1 UNGA Criminal accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission: Note by the Secretariat 
(UN. Doc. A/62/329 of 11 September 2007) para 1. 
2 ‘Investigation is necessary to determine if a crime or wrong has been committed. It is the essential first step in 
any judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding which may result in a prosecution.’ See R. v. Wijesinha, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 
422, para [27]. 
3
 Para 47 (b) of the Model SOFA (UN. Doc. A/45/594 of 9 October 1990); Article 7 quinquiens of the Revised 
Model Memorandum of Understanding Annex to UN. Doc. A/61/19(Part III) of 12 June 2007- Report of the 
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group on the 2007 resumed session; Section 4 
of the Secretary-General Bulletin Observance by the United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law 
(UN. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 of 6 August 1999); Burke R ‘Status of Forces Deployed on UN Peacekeeping 
Operations: Jurisdictional Immunity’ 2011 (16) Journal of Conflict & Security Law 63-104, 67. 
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rights and values are violated. The UN can do so by ensuring that crimes committed by its 
forces do not go unpunished.
4
 It is not far-fetched to argue that peace operations, whether by 
the United Nations or by other international coalition, may ‘add serious international insult to 
existing local injury.’5 It would appear contradictory for an international organisation such as 
the UN to strive to rebuild peace and security in any given country if its personnel on the 
ground can be seen as ‘enjoying effective impunity for their own criminal actions.’6 As Miller 
rightly says, devising good rules against sexual exploitation and abuse cannot achieve 
anything if there is no strategic mechanism to enforce the standards of conduct for peace-
keeping operations and effective investigation into all allegations, with the cooperation of all 
deployed personnel.
7
 With respect to the conduct of military personnel, the Troop-
Contributing Country has to be satisfied that charges against its military members are 
properly established before it can permit the commencement of the prosecution of a military 
member.
8
 For that reason, effective investigation is crucial to ending impunity, but 
investigators and prosecuting authorities must bear in mind that the majority of crimes 
committed by peacekeepers relate to sexual offences.
9
 This poses the difficulty of obtaining 
conclusive evidence. Furthermore, there is no sanction when a State fails in its duty actively 
to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over peacekeepers who have committed sexual crimes 
against women and children. A situation in which peacekeepers are seen as being above the 
law cannot encourage domestic authorities to prosecute members of the Host State forces who 
commit similar acts because ‘the UN and its peacekeepers … compromise their ability to 
legitimately advise on human rights standards and rule of law issues when their own 
personnel do not abide by the same standards.’10 Furthermore, the UN cannot effectively 
                                                             
4 Heide RL ‘Obligation of the Home Front: The Necessity of Cultural Awareness Training for Interventions in 
the New World Order’- Ethical Leadership: Ethical Behaviour in Environments of Chaos and Complexity (Paper 
presented at 7th Canadian Conference Kingston-Ontario 29 November 2006). 
5 Ladley A ‘Peacekeeper Abuse-Immunity and Impunity: The Need for Effective Criminal and Civil 
Accountability on International Peace Operations’ 2005 (1) Politics & Ethics Review 81-90. 
6 Ibid 82. 
7
 Miller AJ ‘Legal Aspects of Stopping Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations’2006 
(39) Cornell International Law Journal 71-96, 83. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ladley A op cit (n 5) 84. 
10 Kent V ‘Peacekeepers as Perpetrators of Abuse: Examining the UN’s Plans to Eliminate and Address Cases of 
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Operations’ 2005 (14) African Security Review 85-92, 87. 
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compel a Troop-Contributing Country, which has criminal jurisdiction over contingent 
members of the UN force, to prosecute.
11
  
5.2 The investigative authority over crimes committed by peacekeepers 
The investigative authority of crimes by UN peacekeepers may come from any entity that has 
an interest in establishing the truth. Such an entity may be the UN itself, in which case its 
Office of Internal Oversight Services will conduct the investigation.
12
 For its investigating 
mandate to succeed, the office needs not only the cooperation of the force commander, but 
also the cooperation of the individuals being investigated.
13
 The organs investigating may also 
come from the Troop-Contributing Country,
14
 or from the Host State.
15
 The question can also 
be raised as to whether a third State has investigative jurisdiction over crimes committed by 
peacekeepers.
16
 This section critically analyses whether cooperation between the Host State, 
the TCC, and the UN is needed for the benefits of justice.  
5.2.1 Investigation by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) 
The UN OIOS was established in 1994, under the General Assembly resolution 48/218B of 
29 July 1994, to enhance the oversight functions within the United Nations.
17
 Member States 
took this action in response to the increased importance, cost, and complexity of the activities 
of the organisation.
18
 The Assembly stressed the proactive and advisory role of the new 
                                                             
11 Spencer SW ‘Making Peace: Preventing and Responding to Sexual Exploitation by United Nations 
Peacekeepers’ 2005 (16) Journal of Public and International Affairs 167-181, 178. 
12 UN OIOS Investigations Manual (Investigations Division March 2009) 2.  
13 Article 7 quater para 3(b) of revised Memorandum of Understanding, Annex to UN. Doc. A/61/19(Part III) of 
12 June 2007. 
14 Article 7 quater of the revised Memorandum of Understanding. TCC has the primary responsibility for 
investigating any acts of misconduct or serious misconduct committed by a member of its national contingent. 
See Annex to UN. Doc. A/61/19(Part III) of 12 June 2007. 
15 The Host State has the duty to investigate any crime committed within the boundaries of its territory. A 
secondary jurisdiction over crimes by peacekeepers may be envisaged since it is on such Host State territory that 
the crime is committed. See Bedont B International Criminal Justice: Implications for Peacekeeping (report for 
the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade December 2001) available at 
www.peacewomen.org/un/pkwatch/DFAIT_rport.doc [last accessed 29 September 2011]. See also para 45 of 
UN. Doc. A/62/329 of 11 September 2007 on Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts 
on Mission: Note by the Secretary where it is said that ‘the Host States’ law enforcement authorities should 
conduct an investigation into alleged criminal activities since that is the place where the alleged crime occurred, 
and it is where the witnesses and evidence are located.’ 
16 By third state it is understood a state other than the Host State and the TCC. 
17 OIOS Mandate available at www.un.org/Depts/oios/pages/mandate.html [last accessed 21 December 2012]; 
US General Accounting Office/ National Security and International Affairs Division (GAO/NSIAD) United 
Nations: GAO Report to Congressional Requesters B-278082 (GAO/NSIAD-98-9 of 19 November 1997). 
18 Ibid. 
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Office, its operational independence, and the fact that it should assist and provide 
methodological support to programme managers in the effective discharge of their 
responsibilities.
19
 It seems that the Office was set up especially to investigate financial and 
administrative issues, but not to conduct criminal investigations.
20
 Despite its specific role, an 
investigation conducted by the Secretariat through the UN Office of Internal Oversight 
Services, can still produce a credible and reliable report which contains information in a 
verifiable form, of sufficient weight to trigger a criminal investigation.
21
 The law enforcement 
authority of the State that has jurisdiction to prosecute the investigated conduct is, therefore, 
in a position to use the findings of the Office in the proceedings.
22
 According to the OIOS 
itself, some investigative processes may simply be seen as fact-finding, depending on the 
ultimate use of the facts.
23
  The nature of the investigation determines the appropriate process 
to follow. The Office submits its reports to the Secretary-General who makes them available 
to the General Assembly.
24
 It, thus, assists the Secretary-General in fulfilling his or her 
internal oversight responsibilities.
25
  
The OIOS is an internal service of the UN. It does not, therefore, seem to be the appropriate 
organ to investigate allegations against military personnel deployed by UN State members.
26
 
Members of national contingents remain under the control of the authorities of the Troop- 
contributing Country.
27
 The aim of the investigating action of OIOS is to establish facts and 
make recommendations in the light of its findings.
28
 The Secretary-General or a delegated 
Programme Manager, in the circumstances of each case, has the responsibility to consider 
                                                             
19 Ibid. 
20 For the OIOS to exercise criminal investigations, it needs police powers. See para 43 of of UN. Doc. A/62/329 
of 11 September 2007 on Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission: Note by 
the Secretary; UN Office of Internal Oversight Services available at www.un.org/Depts/oios/ [last accessed 21 
December 2012]; Siegfried G et al. Peer Review of the Evaluation Function of the Office of Internal Oversight 
Services of the United Nations (the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation Federal Department of 
Foreign Affairs Bern 2009) 25. 
21 Para 50 of UN. Doc. A/62/329. 
22 Ibid. the OIOS itself lacks the jurisdiction, resources and independence to enforce the findings. See GAO 
United Nations: Weaknesses in Internal Oversight and Procurement Could Affect the Effective Implementation 
of the Planned Renovation (Washington D.C 25 June 2006) 1. 
23 UN OIOS Investigations Manual op cit  (n 12) 2. 
24
 OIOS ‘UN Office of Internal Oversight Services available at www.un.org/Depts/oios/ [last accessed 21 
December 2012]. 
25 UN OIOS Investigations Manual op cit (n 12) 4. 
26 Miller AJ op cit  (n 7) 85. 
27 Para 47 (b) of the Model SOFA. 
28 UN OIOS Investigations Manual op cit (n 12) 5, 89-98. 
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what action, if any, is to be taken after receipt of the report.
29
 Indeed, the OIOS is not a law 
enforcement agency; it does not have subpoena or other coercive statutory powers. After 
investigating criminal cases, therefore, the OIOS ought to make recommendations to the 
Office of Legal Affairs for referral to national law enforcement authorities.
30
  
Pursuant to its overall responsibility for internal United Nations investigations, the OIOS has 
conducted investigations regarding the serious and strictly prohibited misconduct of sexual 
exploitation and sexual abuse.
31
 This category of misconduct includes sexual activity with any 
person under the age of 18, which is treated as rape, and the exchange of money, employment, 
goods, or services for sex, as indicated in Chapter II of the current thesis.
32
 To utilize properly 
and appropriately limited investigative resources, the office prioritizes cases which are 
reported as non-consensual sex.
33
 This includes sex through coercion or violence and sexual 
activity with persons under the age of 18, as minors lack the capacity to consent.
34
  
5.2.1.1. The OIOS is not a law enforcement agency 
The first criticism that may be levelled against the investigations conducted by the office is 
that, in its investigative role, the OIOS does not have coercive powers.
35
 It is not a law 
enforcement agency, and it does not have subpoena or other coercive statutory powers.
36
 Its 
investigative findings are, therefore, essentially for administrative ends and are internal to the 
UN.
37
 In cases of serious misconduct that entail criminal responsibility,
38
 the Office makes 
                                                             
29 Ibid. 
30 UN OIOS Investigations Manual op cit (n 12) 5, 89-98. 
31 UN OIOS Investigations Manual op cit (n 12) 4. 
32 UN OIOS Investigations Manual op cit (n 12) 10-11. 
33 Acts of prostitution are, therefore, left out. Since sexual relationships between United Nations staff and 
beneficiaries of assistance are strongly discouraged, and the prohibition against sexual exploitation and sexual 
abuse extends to United Nations personnel, including contractors and personnel provided by the TCC, the OIOS 
investigations may extend to these categories of UN employees as well. See ST/SGB/2003/13 (9 October 2003). 
34 UN OIOS Investigations Manual op cit (n 12) 11. 
35 UN OIOS Investigations Manual op cit (n 12) 5. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Some reforms that have been undertaken, but are still largely limited to the administrative sphere: UN conduct 
and discipline units now serve in all UN operations; the UN's internal system of administrative justice has been 
rebuilt, but this does not deal with criminal matters; the UN has developed the ability to blacklist persons with 
records of serious misconduct; and states have been encouraged to develop the laws needed to prosecute 
nationals who serve in UN missions. While these are necessary and useful tools, the lack of criminal 
accountability remains, accompanied by the realization that these improvements are not enough, either as a 
punishment or a deterrent. See Durch WJ et al. Improving Criminal Accountability in United Nations Peace 
Operations (Stimson Center Report No. 65 Rev. 1 Washington 2009) xi. 
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recommendations to the Office of Legal Affairs for referral to national law enforcement 
authorities.
39
 To hold that serious misconduct has occurred, the investigation must have 
identified actual criminal conduct. To this end, the investigators need the cooperation of the 
personnel investigated. If such cooperation is lacking, the Office may be in difficulty with 
regard to recommending any action, whether internally to the UN or externally by referral to 
the competent authority.
40
  
The UN investigation conducted by OIOS against peacekeeping personnel for sexual offences 
has resulted in a total of 157 dismissals, five staff members, thirty-two civil servants, three 
police officers, and one hundred and seventeen military personnel of whom none was 
prosecuted.
41
 The absence of information regarding whether further action was taken leaves 
the victims with the feeling that the organisation disregards the right to justice by victims. 
This feeling of the absence of justice to victims pushed, in regard to the DRC, the Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Swing, to comment that the findings of OIOS 
made it apparent that the impression of a total absence of prosecution of peacekeepers can be 
explained by the fact that policies aimed at preventing sexual exploitation and abuse in the 
DRC by peacekeepers were not being enforced, and also that the command structures did not 
always give their full cooperation to investigators.
42
 It was revealed that victims could also be 
intimidated if they reported the misconduct of peacekeepers.
43
 Furthermore, since 
peacekeepers are rotated to other posts every six months, it can be difficult to initiate, 
conduct, and complete a thorough investigation before the next rotation takes place.
44
 
Apart from the lack of adequate procedures and mechanisms to facilitate reports of every 
incident of misconduct, what leads to the true extent of those deplorable incidents remaining 
unexposed, is the absence or lack of cooperation with the investigation.
45
 This factor adds to 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
38 Though the General Assembly resolution creating OIOS does not specifically deal with military members of 
national contingents, its mandate gives it complete independence. OIOS can also include TCC members to 
render its findings immediately usable by the TCC concerned. 
39 UN OIOS Investigations Manual op cit (n 12) 5. 
40 UN OIOS Investigations Manual op cit (n 12) 6, 93. 
41 Murphy R ‘An Assessment of UN Efforts to Address Sexual Misconduct by Peacekeeping Personnel’ 2006 
(13) International Peacekeeping 531-546. 
42
 Ladley A op cit (n 5) 82. 
43 Allred KJ ‘Peacekeepers and Prostitutes: How Deployed Forces Fuel the Demand for Trafficked Women and 
New Hope for Stopping It’2006 (33) Armed Forces and Society 5-23, 6. 
44 Du Plessis M & Peté S Who Guards the Guards? The ICC and Serious Crimes Committed by Peacekeepers in 
Africa (ISS Monograph Series No. 121- 2006) 3. 
45 See UN Doc A/59/710 of 24 March 2005 para 7. 
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the difficulty of accessing reality on the ground. The criticism that may be raised is that if it 
were possible to establish the truth, the fact that the UN does not have criminal jurisdiction 
means that the findings of the OIOS remain without judicial consequences.
46
 Investigations 
conducted by the OIOS are translated into summary dismissals, but not into prosecutions as 
this action falls under the jurisdiction of the TCCs who need to conduct their own 
investigations.
47
 
5.2.1.2. Investigation needs UN personnel cooperation 
In principle, all UN personnel, volunteers and experts on mission are required to cooperate 
fully and actively with OIOS investigations.
48
 Since military personnel, however, other than 
experts on mission, are not UN employees, they do not have the same obligation.
49
 Their 
duties and obligations are set out in the Memorandums of Understanding
50
 and the Status-of-
Force Agreements.
51
 Any investigation into the actions of a military contingent will follow 
special procedures and will include the investigation authority of the TCC concerned. Before 
TCC personnel can be interviewed, command level consent (and often, the support of the 
TCC) must be sought and bestowed.
52
 The process of obtaining this consent may be handled 
at the mission level, if the individual being investigated is still there, or it may need to go 
through the command structure, and this will actually be the case when the personnel in 
question have been rotated out of the mission location.
53
 
There may be situations where the personnel under investigation belong to the military 
contingent.
54
 In this case, if the TCC so requests, a National Investigations Officer (hereafter 
referred to as the TCC government representative) must be allowed to participate.
55
 The 
extent of the participation of the TCC government representative in any interview must be 
                                                             
46 The UN, after a lengthy process, can at most repatriate an individual, but it cannot see those cases followed 
through in the country of origin. See Du Plessis M & Peté S Who Guards the Guards? The ICC and Serious 
Crimes Committed by Peacekeepers in Africa (ISS Monograph Series No. 121- 2006) 6-7. 
47 Quénivet N ‘The Dissonance between the UN Zero-Tolerance Policy and the Criminalisation of Sexual 
Offences on the International Level’ 2007 (7) International Criminal Law Review 657-676, 658. 
48 Du Plessis M & Peté S Who Guards the Guards? The ICC and Serious Crimes Committed by Peacekeepers in 
Africa (ISS Monograph Series No. 121- 2006) 21-24. 
49 Ibid. 
50
 Revised Draft Model Memorandum of Understanding as set out in A/61/19 (Part III. 
51 Draft Model Status-of-Forces Agreement as included in A/45/594. 
52 UN OIOS Investigations Manual op cit (n 12) 59. 
53 Ibid. 
54 UN OIOS Investigations Manual op cit (n 12) 3, 25 
55 UN OIOS Investigations Manual op cit (n 12) 80. 
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agreed to in advance.
56
 It is not always easy to harmonize views, and this might constitute a 
problem for the course of investigation. Where DNA evidence is required, in exceptional 
circumstances, and for the purposes of establishing evidence of serious misconduct,
57
 samples 
can be taken only with the consent of the implicated personnel and can be used only for the 
purpose for which consent is given.
58
 The implicated personnel may not necessarily be 
informed of the test results, if any, which shall be kept confidential and used solely for 
investigative purposes and the possible disciplinary action that follows from that 
investigation.
59
 It is required that before handing out a contingent report, the personnel 
implicated therein be given the opportunity to respond to the claims or allegations of 
misconduct.
60
 They may refuse to respond or to cooperate. Where subjects refuse to cooperate 
with investigators, unanswered claims may be addressed with reference to the subject’s lack 
of cooperation.
61
 Reports should, where available, include exculpatory and mitigating 
evidence.
62
 Such reports indicate information regarding prima facie misconduct or serious 
misconduct allegedly committed by a member of a national military contingent. 
In the event that the United Nations has prima facie grounds indicating that any member of 
the national contingent of a Government has committed an act of misconduct or serious 
misconduct, the United Nations shall, without delay, inform that Government.
63
 Upon such a 
report and information delivered to the TCC concerned, it is hoped that, if the Government is 
fully informed, it will set up fact-finding proceedings to verify the information received. If the 
Government does not conduct such fact-finding proceedings, the United Nations may initiate 
an inquiry especially regarding serious misconduct, until the Government starts its own 
investigation.
64
 Such an inquiry is conducted through the Office of Internal Oversight 
Services. It may include, as part of the investigation team, a representative of the 
                                                             
56 Ibid. 
57 UN OIOS Investigations Manual op cit (n 12) 53. 
58 UN OIOS Investigations Manual op cit (n 12) 69 
59 Ibid. 
60 UN OIOS Investigations Manual op cit (n 12) 7, 31, 77. 
61 In 2003, despite lack of cooperation from two of the three military contingents, the OIOS investigated 72 
allegations, resulting in 20 case reports. Of these cases, perpetrators were positively identified in six, not 
identified in 11, and the accusations were not fully corroborated in two.  See ‘Peacekeepers' sexual abuse of local 
girls continuing in DR of Congo, UN finds’ available at www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=12990 [last 
accessed 21 December 2012]. 
62 UN OIOS Investigations Manual op cit (n 12) 77. 
63 Article 7 quater para 2 of the Memorandum of Understanding as revised on 12 June 2007. See UN. Doc. 
A/61/19 (Part III) [hereafter revised MOU]. 
64 Ibid. 
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Government. The complete report of its preliminary fact-finding inquiry is made available to 
the Government at its request without delay.
65
 For the success of such an inquiry, the office 
needs the cooperation of the contingent commanders.
66
 
5.2.1.3. OIOS Investigation needs Contingent Commander Cooperation 
Investigations in the field pose certain problems, in particular uncooperative contingent 
commanders. This was once confirmed by the then Under-Secretary-General, Jean-Marie 
Guéhenno.
67
 He pointed out that, despite the existence of requests to Troop-Contributing 
Countries to coordinate with OIOS in order to ensure investigative findings meet the 
requirements of national jurisdiction; most of the member States of the UN have reserved 
their rights with respect to their military personnel deployed on UN missions of peace.
68
 This 
reluctant official cooperation with the investigation of the UN is a serious obstacle to the 
process of collecting evidence, ensuring that the rights of the victim and the accused are not 
infringed, and, of course, discharging justice fairly.
69
 The task of gathering evidence becomes 
more difficult if the subjects of the investigation threaten the UN investigators.
70
 Indeed, 
instances of such threats have been reported with respect to the investigation into allegations 
of sexual misconduct in the Congo.
71
 Peacekeepers not only threatened investigators, but they 
also sought to bribe witnesses to change incriminating testimony.
72
 Peacekeepers from 
Morocco, Pakistan, and Tunisia reportedly paid or attempted to pay witnesses to change their 
testimony.
73
 In such conditions, it is difficult to ascertain the accuracy of unsubstantiated 
reports, and the public remains unconvinced that the peacekeepers are innocent, feel any 
remorse, or have corrected their behaviour.
74
  
                                                             
65 Ibid. 
66 The Government also undertakes, through the Commander of its national contingent, to instruct the members 
of its national contingent to cooperate with United Nations investigations, subject to applicable national laws, 
including military laws. See paragraph 3(b) of Article 7 quater of the revised MOU. 
67 Guéhenno JM ‘Remarks on Peacekeeping Procurement and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers’, 
Presentation to the Security Council 23 February 2006 available at www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/Resources-
/UN/dpko_remarksguehennoc34_2006.pdf  [last accessed 21 December 2012]. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Durch WJ et al. op cit (n 37) xii, 37 et passim. 
70 Gardiner N ‘The U.N. Peacekeeping Scandal in the Congo: How Congress Should Respond’ 2005(868) 
Heritage Lectures (delivered 1 March 2005) 1-8, 2. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74  Early in 2009, a report found that the number of misconduct allegations against MONUC forces is on the 
decline. According to the report, Category I allegations dropped from 66 in 2007 to 56 last year, and, within 
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It is true that the primary role of investigating the misconduct of their national contingents 
rests entirely with the TCC concerned.
75
 The UN undertakes to cooperate with the National 
Investigations Officers of the various TCCs.
76
 A TCC may, after investigation, inform the 
United Nations without delay that misconduct or serious misconduct has occurred.
77
 It must 
be said, however, that even though the UN has limited authority to discipline peacekeepers 
who commit crimes of sexual exploitation and abuse, it has failed to take the steps that are 
within its power to hold nations accountable when they fail to investigate or punish the 
misconduct of their troops.
78
 There cannot be any prosecution of peacekeepers without the 
good will of the TCC. Under the 1949 Geneva Conventions, States have been obligated to 
prosecute and punish persons accused of serious violations of international humanitarian law 
through their respective national jurisdiction.
79
 To fulfil such obligations, the TCC has to 
conduct its own investigation in order to gather the solid evidence that will allow prosecution. 
This is crucial towards reinstating the criminal accountability of UN personnel in a timely 
fashion.
80
 
5.2.2 Investigation by organs of the Troop-Contributing Country  
Every government has the primary responsibility for investigating any acts of misconduct or 
serious misconduct committed by a member of its national contingent.
81
 When a government 
decides to start its own investigation and to identify or send one or more officials to 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
these instances, the number of sexual abuse and exploitation allegations fell from 48 in 2007 to 38 in 2008. The 
number of Category II allegations is also on the wane, with 202 allegations received last year, as opposed to 294 
the year before. In 2008, 15 of the allegations pertaining to reported sexual abuse and exploitation primarily 
involved breaches of curfew. MONUC peacekeepers are prohibited from visiting bars frequented by prostitutes 
or areas that are off-limits for security reasons. See UN News Centre ‘UN team looking into alleged sexual 
misconduct by blue helmets in DR Congo’ available at www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=31574&Cr-
=monuc&Cr1[last accessed [last accessed 21 December 2012]. 
75 Article 7 quater paras 4(b) & 4(c) of the revised MOU. 
76 Article 7 quater paras 4(b) & 4(c) of the revised MOU. 
77 Article 7 quarter para 1 of the revised MOU. According to para 3(a), in the event that the Government does 
not notify the United Nations as soon as possible, but no later than 10 working days from the time of notification 
by the United Nations, that it will start its own investigation of the alleged serious misconduct, the Government 
is considered to be unwilling or unable to conduct such an investigation, and the United Nations may, as 
appropriate, initiate an administrative investigation of the alleged serious misconduct without delay. 
78 Schaefer BD ‘United Nations Peacekeeping: Challenges and Opportunities’ Testimony before 
the United States House of Representatives-Committee on Foreign Affairs (The Heritage Foundation 
29 July 2009) 1. 
79 Cassese A ‘On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of International 
Humanitarian Law’ 1998 (9) European Journal of International Law 2-17. 
80 Chun S Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Peacekeepers (Policy Brief Paper for International Peace 
Research Institute Oslo October 2009). 
81 Introductory paragraph to article 7 quater of the revised MOU. 
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investigate the matter, such a government is required to inform the United Nations of that 
decision immediately, including the identities of the official or officials concerned.
82
 The 
requirement of having the UN informed aims at preparing the UN to afford the necessary 
support or assistance to the National Investigations Officers leading the investigation.
83
  
Criticism relating to this procedure centres on the fact that, in order to investigate crimes 
committed on foreign territory, foreign national authorities have to overcome legal and/or 
diplomatic hurdles before commencing their investigations, or they must obtain the necessary 
cooperation from the authorities of the foreign state.
84
 They may also lack any of the 
operational infrastructure needed to conduct effective investigations on the ground in a 
foreign country, or to protect potential witnesses or their own investigators.
85
 Saying that the 
government of a Troop-Contributing Country has sovereign rights and primary responsibility 
to investigate reported misconduct against contingent personnel means that the state 
concerned exercises exclusive jurisdiction over its troops with regard to acts of misconduct 
committed while deployed with a peacekeeping operation. Any OIOS investigation activities 
as presented above are, therefore, either complementary or secondary.
86
 Where the OIOS has 
conducted a preliminary fact-finding inquiry or investigation, it will issue a contingent report 
and provide its findings and evidence to the Permanent Mission of the State concerned.
87
  
Even when national authorities decide willingly to investigate allegations against their 
contingent members, the following obstacles may still be present: commissions of inquiry are 
often set up long after the incidents occurred;
88
 the investigation team may not actually visit 
and investigate the place where the crime took place; witnesses’ memories fade with time; 
some victims may not have the gumption to reveal what had happened to them;  and they may 
fear making it common knowledge that they have been sexually abused owing to the negative 
                                                             
82 Para 4(a) of article 7 quater of the revised MOU. 
83 Paras 4(d) & 4(g) of article 7 quater of the revised MOU. 
84 Gallmetzer R ‘Prosecuting Persons Doing Business with Armed Groups in Conflict Areas: The Strategy of the 
Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court’ 2010 (8) Journal of International Criminal Justice 
947-956, 949. 
85 Ibid. 
86 UN OIOS Investigations Manual op cit (n 12) 80. 
87 Ibid. 
88 For instance, Canadian and Italian Commissions of Inquiry looked into the events in Somalia in the 1990s. 
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reaction of their communities.
89
 The financial cost of an investigation in the host country 
might certainly cause a state to refrain from conducting a fact-finding on the ground, as well 
as the high-risk environment such missions involve.
90
 Furthermore, the people involved, 
especially the military personnel being investigated, may refrain from cooperating with the 
investigating team.
91
 To furnish an example: Canada’s initial investigation into the events in 
Somalia reached the conclusion that the Canadian airborne regiment in Somalia acted with 
propriety with regard to acts of brutality and killing a Somali man, but a medical doctor 
believed the contrary to be true.
92
 The doctor believed that the man who died was first shot in 
the back, and, thereafter, in the neck and head.
93
 This medical doctor was pressured to 
suppress the supporting medical records.
94
 TCC investigations may, therefore, be seriously 
flawed and self-serving.
95
  
A Troop-Contributing Country may not be willing to lead high profile prosecutions of its 
soldiers. An example of such an attitude is that of Italy whose authorities prevented the 
prosecution of alleged war crimes committed by Italians on peacekeeping and other military 
operations abroad.
96
 If, indeed, Italy did take the decision to intervene to investigate Somali 
incidents, this move was provoked by the fact that allegations were made by the victims 
themselves and by Somali human rights monitors.
97
 Although the government announced that 
                                                             
89 Italy: The Gallo Commission interviewed people in Ethiopia, Italy, and in Kenya, but did not visit Somalia 
itself, and, among the interviewees, very few were Somalis. See Amnesty International ‘Italy: A briefing for the 
UN Committee against Torture’ (Amnesty International May 1999 AI Index: EUR 30/02/99) 10. 
90 Peacekeepers operate in dangerous environments. For example, in January 2006, eight Guatemalan soldiers 
were killed in the midst of a year old, on-and-off military campaign against armed groups in the eastern 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is in such environment that an investigating team is sent when allegations 
of misconduct by peacekeepers have been brought to the attention of the TCC. See Johnstone I, Tortolani BC 
and Gowan R The evolution of UN peacekeeping: unfinished business (Center on International Cooperation New 
York University 2006). 
91 See Miller SK ‘Accountability for the Conduct of UN-Mandated Forces under International Human Rights 
Law: A Case Study Concerning Sexual Abuse of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(MONUC)’ Arnold R and Knoops GJA (eds) Practice and Policies of Modern Peace Support Operations under 
International Law (Transnational Publishers Ardsley 2006) 261-286, 269; Miller AJ op cit (n 7) 83. 
92 Whitworth S ‘Militarized Masculinities and the Politics of Peacekeeping: The Canadian Case’ in Booth K (ed) 
Critical Security Studies in World Politics (Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder 2005) 89-106. See also supra 
2.2.1. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
96
 Gaeta P ‘War Crimes Trials before Italian Courts: New Trends’ in Fischer H, Kreß C & Lüder SR (eds), 
International and National Prosecution of Crimes Under International Law: Current Developments (BWV 
Berlin 2004) 751-768. 
97 Amnesty International ‘Italy: A briefing for the UN Committee against Torture: Findings of the Italian 
Government Commission of Inquiry into events in Somalia’ (Amnesty International May 1999 AI Index: EUR 
30/02/99) 9-10. 
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the military prosecutor’s office in Rome had opened judicial investigations into specific 
alleged human rights violations, cases were actually transferred to civilian prosecutors.
98
 The 
Gallo Commission set up to investigate, accompanied by members of the magistracy, 
gathered information in Italy, Ethiopia, and Kenya, but never visited Somalia and it 
interviewed 141 people, of whom a small number were Somalis.
99
  Its report concluded that 
the overall conduct of the Italian troops in Somalia had been good. This conclusion shielded 
Italian troops from accountability for their acts of torturing, killing, and raping while on a UN 
mission in Somalia.
100
 The only commendable recommendations of the Commission that one 
may record are that troops be accompanied by magistrates and persons who are experts on 
international and national human rights standards,
101
 and that the military authorities upgrade 
human rights training for conscripts.
102
 The commission concluded its inquiry without any 
pronouncement with respect to criminal responsibility. This leads one to draw the conclusion 
that there is a lack of objectivity on the part of the Commission of Inquiry. It is therefore 
important to investigate the position of Canada, Belgium, and South Africa with respect to 
investigating crimes committed by their military personnel while on UN missions of peace in 
Africa. 
5.2.2.1. Canada 
Though reference may be made to other sources, the developments under this heading are 
gleaned from the report of the Canadian commission of inquiry regarding the events that 
happened in Somalia.
103
 The purpose of establishing the commission was to correct mistakes 
and systemic problems that appeared to have plagued the Canadian Forces long before their 
deployment to Somalia.
104
 The other aim of the inquiry was to put in writing information 
regarding Canada's soldiers deployed on a mission of peace to Somalia. The first addressees 
                                                             
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Gaeta P ‘War Crimes Trials before Italian Courts: New Trends’ in Fischer H, Kreß C & Lüder SR (eds), 
International and National Prosecution of Crimes Under International Law: Current Developments (BWV 
Berlin 2004) 751-768. 
101 Amnesty International ‘Italy: A briefing for the UN Committee against Torture: Findings of the Italian 
Government Commission of Inquiry into events in Somalia’ (Amnesty International May 1999 AI Index: EUR 
30/02/99) 10. 
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 Ibid.  
103 Commission of Inquiry ‘Reports’ available at http://www.forces.gc.ca/somalia/somaliae.htm [accessed 23 
June 2011] (hereinafter CCI Somalia op cit). 
104 Siver C ‘The Dark Side of Canadian Peacekeeping: The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia’ (Paper 
presented at Politics, Philosophy and Economics Seminar Series University of Washington -Tacoma 23 
November 2009) 2. 
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of the inquiry are the Canadian public and future soldiers of Canada;
105
 hence the aim was not 
essentially to see perpetrators prosecuted.
106
 Although many other questions might be raised 
about the conduct of the troops deployed to Somalia and about the over 100 incidents of 
varying seriousness that occurred on the mission, the terms of reference directed the 
Commission of Inquiry to address specific issues, and its investigation was confined to 
significant matters that would enable it to answer the specific questions posed.
107
 
The Commission had to find the motive for the torture and killing of Shidane Arone,
108
 the 
attitude of the Canadian military and its leadership vis-à-vis this atrocity, and other atrocities 
which occurred, especially the attempts to cover up these events.
109
 The other issues the 
Commission had to solve related to the ethics and compassionate sensibilities of the Canadian 
troops and their commanders; to discipline and cohesiveness in some parts of the Canadian 
Forces which became dysfunctional to the point that accountability was shunned, and little 
value, if any, was perceived in admitting and confronting grave errors and deficiencies. The 
Commission had to find so many in the junior ranks have been held to account or have been 
punished, while the higher ranking officers have escaped accountability.
110
 These are the 
questions which formed the basis of the Canadian inquiry into the conduct of Canadian forces 
deployed in Somalia, especially the Canada Airborne Regiment, subsequently disbanded.
111
 
                                                             
105 CCI Somalia op cit (n 103) 1331. 
106 Prosecutions were conducted before the work of the Commission of Inquiry. The latter referred frequently to 
the decision of the court in cases that had been prosecuted.  
107 CCI Somalia op cit (n 103) 1330. 
108 Supra 2.2.1. See Addy v. Canada (Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces in 
Somalia - Létourneau Commission) [1997] F.C.J. No. 796 para [4]. On March 16, 1993, a young Somali boy 
named Shidane Arone was tortured and killed by members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR). This was 
not the first and only profoundly disturbing incident during the deployment of the CAR to Somalia. On March 4, 
1993, slightly more than a week before the death of Mr. Arone, two Somali nationals had been shot as they tried 
to enter the Canadian compound. One of the Somalis was killed, and there were some allegations that he had 
been shot "execution-style". 
109 The commission did not hear testimony regarding the death of Arone. See Siver C ‘The Dark Side of 
Canadian Peacekeeping: The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia’ (Paper presented at Politics, Philosophy 
and Economics Seminar Series University of Washington -Tacoma November 23, 2009) 3. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Beruto GL (ed) International Humanitarian Law Human Rights and Peace Operations, 31st Round Table on 
Current Problems of International Humanitarian Law Sanremo, 4-6 September 2008 (The International Institute 
of Humanitarian Law In collaboration with the International Committee of the Red Cross 2008) 66; Siver C ‘The 
Dark Side of Canadian Peacekeeping: The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia’ (Paper presented at Politics, 
Philosophy and Economics Seminar Series University of Washington -Tacoma November 23, 2009) 2, 15 et 
passim; Abbott R ‘Military Peacemaking: Mission Impossible?’ 2002 (41) Military Law & Law of War Review 
13-38, 17. 
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In striving to understand what happened, the Commission faced stern difficulties. Among the 
difficulties encountered, one may mention the obstacle presented by the reluctant compliance 
of the Department of National Defence with the Commission’s orders in terms of the Inquiries 
Act to produce the necessary documents, and the delays and difficulties it experienced when 
dealing with the Somalia Inquiry Liaison Team.
112
 In the conduct of the investigation, the 
commission pointed to unanticipated obstacles relating to the lack of co-operation exhibited 
by the Department of National Defence in its dealings with the Inquiry.
113
 The Department did 
not manifest openness and transparency. Its actions hampered the progress and effectiveness 
of the Inquiry.
114
 The attitude of the Canadian Department of National Defence did not 
facilitate the work of the commission to the point of hampering connection between members 
of the commission and the onsite team liaison.
115
 The second obstacle, related to the first, 
concerned the manner in which the Directorate General of Public Affairs of the Department of 
National Defence failed to comply with an order from the Commission to disclose the 
documents related to Somalia and, indeed, attempted to have them destroyed.
116
 Evidence 
reveals, for example, that on 5 September 1995, Ms. Nancy Fournier was placing Somalia-
related documents, including Responses to Queries, into a ‘bum bag’ for destruction when she 
was interrupted by Lieutenant Wong who ordered her to cease her activities immediately. 
Fortunately Lieutenant Wong was able to secure the material.
117
 Before the commission, Ms. 
Fournier testified that she had been instructed by Colonel Haswell to get rid of the documents 
pertaining to Somalia.
118
 
With respect to the incident of 4 March 1993, the Commission of Inquiry found that the 
official explanation of the incident was not supported by the evidence adduced at the 
hearings.
119
 The shooting in the back of two unarmed Somali civilians in flight was a use of 
force clearly in excess of what was permitted under the Rules of Engagement, and the 
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response to this incident by the chain of command in Somalia was wholly inappropriate.
120
 
Rather than providing in-depth training in cultural awareness and the Rules of Engagement in 
order to ease tensions between the troops and Somali civilians and to stress the need for 
restraint, the chain of command issued an even less restrictive interpretation of the Rules of 
Engagement that significantly increased the likelihood of the use of deadly force.
121
 The 
Commanding Officer did give, on 28 January 1993, some rules to the Canadian forces. These 
rules were interpreted as authorizing Canadian soldiers to shoot at fleeing thieves or 
infiltrators under certain circumstances.
122
 The interpretation went on to include entrapment 
tactics.
123
 The Commission further found that the force used highly questionable tactics such 
as the putting out of food and water to entice Somalis to approach the Canadian installations. 
In the light of such actions, the reason given for the troops’ fear of sabotage, that is, the theft 
of a fuel pump
124
 is not credible and seems little more than a pretext.
125
 The treatment of the 
captured Somalis was not consistent with how a captured saboteur would be handled. The two 
Somali men, Mr Abdi Hunde Bei Sabrie and Mr Ahmed Afraraho Aruush, did not approach 
the Canadian installations in a military fashion. They, therefore, posed no threat whatsoever to 
the Canadian troops or the installations apart from possible thievery.
126
 Mr Abdi and Mr 
Aruush did not breach the wire at the helicopter compound, nor did they approach any closer 
than 100 metres from the boundary of the compound.
127
 The two Somalis were unarmed, 
except for one ritual knife, which was not produced by either man during the entire incident. 
No hostile act was committed and no hostile intent was demonstrated that could have justified 
the use of force, let alone deadly force.
128
 The shootings, therefore, of Mr Aruush and Mr 
Abdi were not consecutive to any perceived threat, but stemmed rather from the will to 
                                                             
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid. 
122 It seems that a commander even shouted,  “Get him”, following which shout two soldiers ‘dropped to their 
knees, and each fired an aimed shot at Mr Aruush’ who died on the spot. See Rowe P ‘Military Misconduct 
during International Armed Operations: “Bad Apples” or Systemic Failure?’ 2008 (13) Journal of Conflict & 
Security Law 165-189, 176; Heide RL ‘Obligation of the Home Front: The Necessity of Cultural Awareness 
Training for Interventions in the New World Order’ - After the Fall: Theory and Practice of Post-Intervention 
Security (Paper presented at the Centre for Security and Defence Studies Conference Ottawa 10 March 2006) 11. 
123 CCI Somalia op cit (n 103) 1057. 
124
 A fuel pump was stolen from the CAR camp. The theft was interpreted as an act of sabotage. See CCI 
Somalia op cit (n 103) 297. 
125 See finding 1.14 of the Commission. CCI Somalia op cit  (n 103) 1055. 
126 CCI Somalia op cit (n 103) 1055. 
127 Finding 1.16. See CCI Somalia op cit (n 103) 1056. 
128 Finding 1.19. 
 181 
 
accomplish capture as instructed. The use of such force was inappropriate and not permitted 
under the Rules of Engagement.
129
  
The Commission realised that the investigation of the military justice system into the 
incidents which occurred ‘in theatre’ and post deployment to Somalia were merely examples 
of the many cases where the decision to investigate, the investigation itself, and the reporting 
of the investigation, deviated from the required procedure or from what would normally be 
expected in a fair justice system.
130
 According to the Canadian military code, commanding 
officers have primary responsibility for the decision to investigate
131
 and to decide upon the 
mode of investigation.
132
 In cases where a charge is laid, they are required to arrest the 
suspect regardless of the person’s rank or status.133 In other instances, commanding officers 
are required to take into account the specificity of the matter investigated. Thus, if a Canadian 
Force member dies for any reason other than from injuries received in action, a summary 
investigation or board of inquiry must be held.
134
 Moreover, the Military Police have powers 
to initiate their own investigations, although when they do so they must brief the appropriate 
commander, commanding officer, or other person in charge at the earliest practical moment 
regarding the circumstances surrounding their investigation.
135
 In most cases, however, the 
commanding officer decides whether to investigate and what kind of investigation to 
conduct.
136
 
It is important to note that it was the death of Shidane Arone that occasioned the investigation 
of prior incidents by military police.
137
 This means that many incidents that should have been 
investigated before were not investigated in time or were not investigated at all.
138
 For 
instance, 62 incidents which required investigation occurred between the beginning of the 
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deployment of the Canadian contingent and the incident of 16 March 1993.
139
 These incidents 
included allegations of serious criminal or disciplinary misconduct: mistreatment of detainees; 
killing of Somalis; theft of public property; and self-inflicted gunshot wounds.
140
 The 
commission reported that none of the 62 recorded incidents was investigated by the Military 
Police at the time they occurred, not even the serious ones that are required to be investigated 
by the Military Police.
141
 Although not appropriately and adequately performed, however, 
summary investigations were promptly called in eight of the 62 cases, and informal or other 
investigations were held in an additional 27 cases.
142
 Indeed, prior to the change brought by 
the 1997 establishment of the National Investigation Service,
143
 the battle commanders had 
much influence on Military police who actually could not decide by themselves whether to 
initiate an investigation or not.
144 
 
The explanation of why investigations were not conducted is said to lie in the insufficiency of 
military police in the theatre field, i.e. in Somalia itself.
145
 To resolve this, two investigators 
were sent from Canada to investigate the circumstances of the death of Shidane Arone.
146
 
Because of the torture to death of Arone, two other military police teams were called from 
Canada and tasked with the investigation into the incidents of March 4
th
, i.e. the shooting of 
two Somali nationals which occurred 12 days before the incident that brought awareness.
147
 
The first team investigated the incident itself; the second investigated a possible cover-up of 
the incident by Canadian Force members in Somalia.
148 
Many summary investigations that 
had been undertaken were incomplete or flawed, and, in some, the Canadian Force guidelines 
were not followed.
149
 In other summary investigations, witness statements which should have 
been taken into account were not considered, and, in still other cases, those conducting or 
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ordering the investigations had a conflict of interest.
150
 According to the Commission of 
Inquiry, the investigation of the March 4th incident missed important witness statements, and 
several other investigations were also incomplete.
151
 Only four statements were taken in 
respect of the shooting incident that killed one Somali and injured two others at the Bailey 
bridge on 17 February 1993. None of the Somalis and few of the soldiers who were present 
were interviewed.
152
  
In at least four of the summary investigations ordered, conflicts of interest arose since 
commanding officers responsible for carrying out or supervising the investigations were 
potentially implicated in the problematic conduct.
153
 These conflicts are inherent in the formal 
role and responsibilities of a commanding officer.
154
 The conflict of interest can taint the 
appearance of fairness of the investigations and may certainly affect their impartial 
outcome.
155
 The Military Police attempted to carry out their investigations professionally and 
adequately. Most of the individuals involved in the two most serious incidents - the shootings 
on March 4th and the death of Mr. Arone on March 16th - were identified by the Military 
Police.
156
  
Although most of the evidence collected by the Military Police appears to have met the 
standards of admissibility in the military justice system, the investigative shortcomings which 
exist stemmed largely from the systemic challenges faced by the Military Police, especially 
the fact that the few appropriately-trained Military Police could not carry out the 
investigations adequately
 
as many investigations were conducted long after the event and 
under tight deadlines, when the scene could not remain intact.
157
 Furthermore, in any instance 
of a criminal charge, commanding officers were reluctant to call in the Military Police to 
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investigate.
158
 Military Police also encountered problems when conducting individual 
investigations, including a lack of cooperation from soldiers and officers. Investigators were 
in all circumstances in difficulty as regards investigating their superiors.
159
 Commanding 
officers imposed limits on investigations. Indeed, the investigations were frustrated owing to 
the fact that military police investigating had been subjected to disciplinary measures for 
having conducted investigations prior to the incidents.
160
 Moreover, some of the 
investigations conducted by the military police were incomplete in part, the choice of 
investigative tactics was sometimes governed by irrelevant considerations, and some 
individuals were inappropriately cautioned, thereby restricting the information that could be 
gathered.
161
 In general, few attempts were made to obtain statements from Somali witnesses. 
As examples, there are the incident involving the alleged injury to a child by a Canadian 
Airborne Regiment vehicle and the investigation of the shooting at the Bailey bridge.
162 
It is 
clear that a systemic problem exists as the military is reluctant to investigate its own potential 
misconduct by approaching external witnesses.
163
 
Later investigations, conducted in 1994, exhibited several deficiencies; they were initiated 
long after the incidents occurred; and the time limits to the investigators did not allow 
efficiency.
164
 The investigation into the alleged mistreatment of detainees could not obtain 
written statements from Colonel Labbé
165
 or from other individuals who could recall having 
seen the detainees.
166
 Similarly, no written statements were obtained from the key witnesses 
with respect to alleged orders to destroy photographs of detainees.
167
 With regard to the 
investigation of taking of money from a Somali vehicle during a 'house clearing' operation, 
the incident was not well documented, since investigators could not secure written statements 
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from military members who had accompanied Colonel Labbé and witnessed his actions.
168
  In 
other cases, the conclusions of investigators were reached prematurely, without answering 
important questions of obvious contradictions between different statements. For instance, the 
Military Police investigation into the shooting at the Bailey bridge concluded that the soldiers 
acted properly,
169
 whereas the investigation could not clarify contradictions between the 
statements of the soldiers involved and the statements contained in briefings.
170  
A key issue to consider is whether any prosecution followed. Charges were laid as a result of 
the torture and death of Shidane Arone. The soldiers and officers were charged with passing 
on orders that prisoners could be abused.
171
 They were also charged with failing to issue 
instructions to subordinates to prevent the mistreatment of prisoners, for not ensuring that a 
Somali prisoner was safeguarded, for failing to exercise command over their subordinates 
following the capture of Mr Arone, and for not intervening to put a stop to the mistreatment of 
the prisoner.
172
 There was also evidence in the courts martial that other soldiers knew that the 
prisoner was being tortured but they were not punished. Despite the existence of some 
convictions, several officers who were in a position of promoting discipline and respect for 
the lawful of armed conflicts escaped accountability.
173
 The Commission of Inquiry itself 
queried why superior officers were not called to account for failing to intervene in these 
events.
174
 Upon the basis of the Code of Service Discipline and the Queen's Regulations and 
Orders, officers would have been held accountable for neglecting to intervene to prevent 
misconduct by those under their command.
175
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5.2.2.2. Belgium  
The allegations that Belgian troops committed rights abuses against Somali citizens have been 
recounted with others in chapter two of this thesis.
176
 The said allegations were supported by 
evidence, especially photographs taken by the Belgian soldiers themselves.
177
 The issue here 
is, therefore, to know whether such allegations were investigated and, if so, what may have 
been the difficulties encountered by investigators.  
Indeed, judicial investigations promptly opened into the allegations by the military authorities 
(auditorat militaire) resulted in two former paratroopers being tried before a military court in 
June in connection with the treatment of the Somali boy held over an open fire.
178
 On 30 June 
1997, the court acquitted both men of the charges of assault and battery and of using threats 
(coups et blessures volontaires avec menaces).
179
 The military prosecutor, who had requested 
a sentence of one month’s imprisonment and a fine of 10,000 Belgian francs for each of the 
defendants, reportedly lodged an appeal.
180
 A sergeant was due to stand trial before a military 
court on 8 September 1997 in connection with the alleged forcible feeding of a Somali 
child.
181
 A sergeant major will also stand trial in September, apparently on suspicion of 
having killed the Somali on whose body he was photographed urinating.
182
  
Following the publication of the allegations and photographs, the Minister of Defence ordered 
a broader administrative investigation carried.
183
 In its letter, Amnesty International asked for 
details of the terms of reference of the investigation to be given to it and to be informed of its 
outcome.
184
 To ensure that the investigation commission worked with impartiality, Amnesty 
International asked whether consideration had been given to a comprehensive inquiry, 
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independently of the military.
185
 It is unlikely that this was the case, since the commission 
was headed by an army member, General Jozef Schoups.
186
  
Even though the acts of torture and killing by Belgian troops in Somalia, publicised by 
African Rights, were supported by photographic evidence, the Belgian army and government 
denied them outright.
187
 Commander Van de Weghe said the facts had been exaggerated, 
taken out of context, or simply invented.
188
 The UN has recognised that instances of sexual 
exploitation and abuse may constitute violations of International Humanitarian Law, Human 
Rights Law, or both.
189
 There is no explanation about the position of a Troop-Contributing 
Country considering the allegations of sexual offences perpetrated by their troops to be 
negligible.
190
 
After presenting highlights of certain findings emerging from the administrative inquiry to 
Parliament on 8 July 1997, the Minister of Defence wished to set up an independent inquiry 
on racism within the army.
191
 The report by General Schoups recommended a better selection 
of army candidates, improvement in training, and the inclusion of more information on 
humanitarian law in the training programmes provisions to soldiers.
192
 It also indicated that 
excessive delays in disciplinary proceedings and problems of alcohol abuse in the army were 
to be addressed.
193
 Despite the existence of incidents involving unacceptable conduct,
194
 the 
investigation commission concluded that there was no serious problem in respect of the 
                                                             
185 Ibid. 
186 Zymberaj S ‘Les troupes belges en Somalie (1993)’ available at www.grip.org/bdg/g1551.html [last accessed 
1 July 2011]. 
187 De Waal A ‘US War crimes in Somalia’ 1998(30) New Left Review 131-144, 136. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Zeid Report UN DOC. A/59/710 of 24 March 2005 para 10. 
190 The judgment of the Belgian military court at Brussels, rendered in 1997, regarding the UN peace operation 
in Somalia highlighted the fact that UN forces can be a party to a conflict and be constrained by the rules of 
international humanitarian law, although the leniency of the sentences would seem to prove otherwise, even 
though infringements of humanitarian law are serious offences. See Knoops GJ Defenses in Contemporary 
International Criminal Law (Transnational Publishers Ardsley 2001) 134. 
191 Amnesty International ‘Belgium-Alleged Human Rights Violations by Members of the Armed Forces in 
Somalia’ op cit (n 179) 16. 
192 Knoops GJ op cit (n 190) 134. 
193
 Amnesty International ‘Belgium-Alleged Human Rights Violations by Members of the Armed Forces in 
Somalia’ op cit (n 179) 16.  
194 Belgium did not pay compensation to the victims of the incidents involving Belgian soldiers in UNOSOM. 
Claims by third parties were processed and paid by the UN. See Zwanenburg M Accountability of Peace Support 
Operations (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Leiden 2005) 229, footnote 93. After consultation with the Belgian 
Ministry of Defence, the sum of US$ 2,800,000.00 was paid. 
 188 
 
application of the law of armed conflict.
195
 How did South Africa fare regarding allegations of 
crimes committed by members of its contingents in Burundi and DRC? 
5.2.2.3. South Africa 
As indicated earlier
196
, South African peacekeepers have been members of the UN missions to 
Burundi and are still serving with the peace operation to the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo.
197
 Allegations of misconduct made against the peacekeeping personnel of ONUB and 
MONUC were also directed against South African soldiers.
198
 It is, therefore, interesting to 
investigate whether South Africa has chosen to investigate or has ignored the complaints 
made against a certain number of its soldiers.  
It is important to recall that military personnel constitute the majority of offenders in 
allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse.
199
 This section, therefore, focuses on the issue of 
whether the allegations against SANDF personnel serving with the two UN missions of peace 
have been investigated or not. Before discussing this, it is prudent first to discuss whether 
there is any enacted legislation in South Africa which would allow any possible investigations 
to be conducted outside the country. Such a discussion relates to the issue of extra-territorial 
matters in criminal law. 
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5.2.2.4.1 Recall of extra-territoriality issues 
In principle, the application of the laws of South Africa is limited solely to domestic cases.
200
 
However, subsection 1 of section 3 of the MDSMA states that the Act applies to any person 
subject to the Code, irrespective of whether such person is within or outside the Republic.
201
 
The Act, therefore, has provided for the extra-territorial application of the measures 
applicable to members of the South African National Defence Force. Section 5 also indicates 
that the Act may be enforced outside the RSA.
202
 Since most crimes committed by SANDF 
members deployed as peacekeepers are of a sexual nature, the issue of extra-territorial 
jurisdiction needs also to be addressed by the Sexual Offences Act 32 of  2007, especially 
with respect to conduct which is not specifically related to military service.
203
 With respect to 
extra-territoriality, section 61 of the Act expressly grants extra-territorial jurisdiction over 
SANDF personnel for any sexual crime committed outside South Africa, even when such act 
is not a crime where it was perpetrated.
204
 All allegations of sexual misconduct committed by 
SANDF personnel, therefore, whether classified as violations of the code of Military 
Discipline (that is, strictly service-related offences), as violations of the ordinary criminal law 
(especially of the Sexual Offences Act), or as violations of international law, may be 
prosecuted by the South African military. Allegations of rape will typically be brought before 
the courts of competent senior military judges
205
 and the bench is composed of three 
judges.
206
 The supplementary measures to the code of Military Discipline do not indicate 
which court is competent if a war crime has been committed. As a general rule, however, 
while South Africa does not have to prosecute war crimes committed outside the RSA, the 
Rome Statute indicates that South African courts have jurisdiction over war crimes whoever 
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may have committed them.
207
 This would include SANDF personnel serving with the UN 
forces if their alleged crimes are substantiated and qualify as war crimes. 
Prostitution per se is not an offence in Congolese or Burundian law. It is also not an offence 
to visit a prostitute. A South African soldier, therefore, who has paid for sex in the Host State, 
incurs no criminal proceedings. As a South African citizen, however, he can still be 
prosecuted for such an act committed outside the RSA.
208
 Since South African peacekeepers 
have been deployed in DRC and Burundi, where frequenting a prostitute is not an offence, 
their conduct may remain un-reported. Indeed, no one in the Host State would actually 
complain to any authority about prostitution.
209
 In the absence of investigations conducted by 
the South African authorities, it is exceedingly unlikely that instances of prosecution would 
exist in this regard. Murder, rape, or culpable homicide would, therefore, be the only instances 
warranting prosecution as these crimes certainly possess complainants and can seldom be 
committed unnoticed. 
5.2.2.4.2 Investigation
210
 of the allegations against members of SANDF
211
 
South African soldiers deployed on a UN Peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo have been accused of involvement in a massive sex abuse scandal.
212
 Although not 
perpetrated by the contingent from South Africa alone, the allegations include a staggering 50 
cases of sex attacks on minors in Bunia throughout 2003.
213
 Involved peacekeepers were 
mainly South African and Indian soldiers.
214
 A South African Colonel was sent home from 
the Congolese province of North Kivu after investigations substantiated that he had been 
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molesting his young male interpreter.
215
 Other allegations relate to the behaviour of South 
African MONUC troops stationed in Kindu.
216
  
The question of whether the allegations levelled against SANDF members in the DRC have 
been investigated was also orally posed in Parliament to the South African Minister of 
Foreign Affairs in 2004.
217
 The Legislative body wanted answers and to have details from the 
department regarding allegations against members of the South African contingent serving 
with MONUC, especially regarding the abuse of children. The second question relates to the 
interaction between the department and the UN, if any, and the findings with respect to that. 
The third and fourth questions sought to establish whether there had been any investigation 
including a South African official, and the findings or evidence as to whether the allegations 
had been substantiated or not.
218
 
In answering the questions, the Minister indicated that the department was aware of the 
allegations made in the media against SANDF members serving in the United Nations 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).
219
 The UNDPKO team sent in 
Bunia to conduct investigations included no South African official.
220
 The Minister reminded 
the honourable Members of Parliament that, at the time when all the allegations pertaining to 
sexual exploitation and abuse in Bunia were reported in the media, there were only ten South 
African National Defence Force (SANDF) members stationed in that town.
221
  
The above answer regarding the small number of South African soldiers present in Bunia does 
not mean that they were not involved in any misconduct. It, however, makes it clear that 
                                                             
215 UNGA ‘Investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services into Allegations of Sexual exploitation and 
Abuse in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (UN. Doc. 
A/59/661); Du Plessis M & Pete S ‘Who Guards the Guards?: The ICC and serious crimes committed by United 
Nations Peacekeepers in Africa’2004 (13) African Security Review 5-17, 8. 
216 Du Plessis M & Pete S Who Guards the Guards? The International Criminal Court and Serious Crimes 
Committed by Peacekeepers in Africa (ISS Monograph Series No 121Pretoria February 2006) 6. 
217 National Assembly Allegations of Abuse by Members of SANDF in DRC: Question No.14 For Oral Reply,  
Question time: 08 September 2004 - Written question No. 390 Transferred for Oral Reply, Published in The 
Internal Question Paper No 8 of 6 August 2004 available at http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2004pq/pq14.htm [last 
accessed 21 December 2012]. 
218 National Assembly Allegations of Abuse by Members of SANDF in DRC: Question No.14 For Oral Reply,  
Question time: 08 September 2004 - Written question No. 390 Transferred for Oral Reply, Published in The 
Internal Question Paper No 8 of 6 August 2004 available at http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2004pq/pq14.htm [last 
accessed 21 December 2012]. 
219 Ibid.  
220 Ibid. 
221 Ibid. 
 192 
 
South Africa did not initiate an investigation into the matter. It is also obvious that the few 
SANDF personnel present in Bunia were not associated with the UN investigating team. The 
other investigation launched by MONUC in Kinshasa in 2003 was dropped because of a lack 
of evidence and support for the investigation from the military contingent commanders.
222
 
The fact that MONUC soldiers are on a six-month posting renders the investigation more 
complex. A rotated soldier is, therefore, unlikely to face a military investigation.
223
  
It is important for South Africa to investigate in order to prove wrong the assertion that 
SANDF members have a cultural problem with respect to abiding by the disciplinary code, 
that they have exhibited an extremely poor disciplinary record, and manifested a cultural 
problem.
224
 The behaviour of South African troops, Mandrup notes, especially when off-duty 
in both Burundi and the DRC, has been a problem for South Africa and has given the force a 
bad reputation.
225
 This cannot be remedied if a thorough investigation is not conducted. South 
Africa may, by doing so, manage to create the impression of a professional and capable force, 
which can properly and proudly function as a representative of South Africa.
226
  
Applying domestic law, the Military Discipline Supplementary Measures Act underlines the 
importance of gathering evidence.
227
 The Act underscores the manner in which a preliminary 
investigation has to be conducted.
228
 Except for illness or exigencies of service or other 
cogent reasons that the investigator judges fit, evidence by witnesses must be given viva 
voce.
229
 With respect to investigating crimes committed outside the RSA, it stresses that:  
(8) When a preliminary investigation is held in respect of treason, murder, rape or culpable 
homicide, committed outside the Republic, or a contravention of section 4 or 5 of the Code230 or 
any offence punishable by imprisonment exceeding a period of 10 years, the prosecution counsel 
shall, subject to subsection (10), lead the evidence of every witness called by him or her and any 
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witness may be cross-examined by the accused and may thereafter be re-examined by the 
prosecution counsel in relation to any evidence given by that witness under cross-examination 
and may at any stage of the proceedings be recalled by the presiding judge, commanding officer 
or recording officer for the purpose of being further examined or cross-examined, as the case 
may be. 
(9)…  
 (10) When any witness cannot by reason of illness or the exigencies of the service or for any 
other reason which the presiding judge, commanding officer or recording officer deems fit, 
attend a preliminary investigation to give evidence, a sworn statement purporting to have been 
signed by such person may be read over to the accused and shall thereupon form part of the 
record of the proceedings of the preliminary investigation: Provided that the inability of the 
accused to exercise the rights in terms of subsection (8) which would have accrued to the 
accused if such person had been called to give evidence shall not be taken or construed in any 
subsequent proceedings to the prejudice of the accused. 
From an analysis of the above-mentioned provisions, it would appear that it is an international 
obligation for States, pursuant to customary international law, to investigate war crimes 
allegedly committed by their nationals, especially members of armed forces, and, where 
appropriate, prosecute them.
231
 South Africa is, therefore, expected to observe such customary 
rules regarding its armed forces deployed in Africa with UN missions of peace. Despite the 
fact that it is well established that South African troops have committed crimes while 
performing peacekeeping duties in Africa,
232
 despite the existence of allegations of sexual 
offences by South African troops in Kindu and in Burundi,
233
 it does not seem that the 
SANDF or any other South African authority has sent any mission to the scene to investigate 
these allegations. South Africa should, prior to any prosecution, conduct a genuine 
                                                             
231 Henckaerts JM ‘The Development of International Humanitarian Law and the Continued Relevance of 
Custom’ in Hensel HM (ed) The Legitimate Use of Military Force: The Just War Tradition and Customary Law 
of Armed Conflict (Ashgate Hampshire 2008) 117-133, 126. 
232
 Du Plessis M & Pete S ‘Who Guards the Guards?: The ICC and serious crimes committed by United Nations 
Peacekeepers in Africa’ 2004 (13) African Security Review 1-17, 8 referring to Holt K and  Hughes S ‘SA troops 
“raped kids in DRC”’ Pretoria News 12 July 2004. 
233 Hoffmeister T ‘Policing those who Police the Peace’ International Herald Tribune 31 December 2004;  
Bridges D and Horsfall D ‘Increasing Operational Effectiveness in UN Peacekeeping: Toward a Gender-
Balanced Force’ 2009 (36)  Armed Forces & Society 120-130, 122. 
 194 
 
investigation to identify the suspects and to collect evidence.
234
 No prosecution is possible 
without the prior and proper establishment of facts and the identification of offenders.  
With respect to the allegations of crimes in Goma, Kindu, and Burundi, there is a dearth of 
information regarding specific instances where peacekeepers have been investigated.
235
 It may 
be noted, however, that a South African Portfolio Committee on Defence conducted an 
oversight visit to the DRC in October 2005, and its report, dated 14 March 2006, shows that 
some instances of sexual misconduct did occur, though nothing further indicates that, at the 
national level, proceedings have been initiated.
236
 The committee noted that incidences of 
sexual exploitation and sexual abuse by SANDF members are not widespread, but can impact 
negatively on the overall performance of the SANDF.
237
 With respect to discipline, it recalled 
that the contingent is under the discipline of the administrative command of the SANDF, but 
under the operational control of the UN, and, therefore, the force must observe and make sure 
it implements the UN non-fraternisation and ‘sexual exploitation and abuse’ policy.238 In 
certain quarters, however, remarked the committee, there are some grey areas with regard to 
the understanding of fraternisation with the local community.
239
  
As to the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse, and its proper investigation, the committee 
pointed out that MONUC had an Investigative Office to this end.
240
 Known as the ‘Office for 
Addressing Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse’, the Office addresses violations of a 
sexual nature that plagued the peace support mission.
241
 From December 2004 to October 
2005, this office investigated 110 cases of alleged sexual exploitation and abuse, involving 
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soldiers, police, and civilians. Ninety-five cases involved soldiers; thirty-two per cent of them 
were South Africans.
242
 The Office substantiated the allegations in respect of 8 SANDF 
members.
243
 At the time of the committee’s report (March 2006), two cases were in the 
process of being finalised by the board of inquiry.
244
 Eight SANDF members (1 officer, 1 
warrant officer and 6 NCOs) were repatriated to South Africa on disciplinary grounds for 
sexual exploitation and abuse.
245
 Eight allegations involving possibly 15 soldiers have been 
forwarded to the Office of Internal Oversight Services, which took over the investigative 
function from the Office for addressing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.
246
 It is, therefore, 
evident that many cases remained unsubstantiated because of, (i) a lack of evidence or 
witnesses and (ii) the long time between the alleged event and the completion of the judicial 
process. Four new cases, involving seven SANDF soldiers, were received, but they have been 
referred to the OIOS.
247
 It was stated that the Office for Addressing Sexual Exploitation and 
Sexual Abuse and the OIOS received the fullest support and cooperation from the SANDF 
leadership.
248
 The case of a South African colonel in Goma, DRC, whose conduct was 
substantiated during a UN investigation, and another incident of rape of a 12-year-old girl 
identified as Anna, involved South African troops in Goma.
249
 
When the process of investigation is completed the documentation is forwarded to the 
Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) at the UN headquarters in New York.
250
 
After it has been mentioned and which of the allegations have been substantiated highlighted, 
the DPKO forwards the record of proceedings of the instances investigated to the Permanent 
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Mission of the relevant country for appropriate action.
251
 The committee recommended that 
discipline should be strengthened, so that SANDF members adhere to the code of conduct of 
the UN and the military code of the SANDF.
252
 
South Africa should not rely only on a report of investigation by the UN because, as a senior 
member of MONUC has told Holt of the London Independent, the OIOS enquiry does not 
follow the whole process relating to the sending of the report to the Troop-Contributing 
Country concerned.
253
 The head of MONUC child protection in Bunia (DRC) has also given 
the opinion that the solution to the plague of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse lies in a 
mechanism giving to the UN OIOS the power to prosecute and act as a substitute for national 
justice.
254
 The opinion constitutes the evidence of unwillingness on the part of states to 
investigate the conduct of their troops deployed on missions of peace. The absence of 
investigations signals the absence of prosecution. This allows peacekeepers to get away with 
criminal conduct. Such a situation might compromise the efforts of the UN to restore or keep 
peace, and it also paves the way for the continuation of grave misconduct.
255
 South Africa has 
not conducted its own investigations regarding repatriated SANDF members. Should this 
reinvest the Host State with criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by peacekeepers? 
5.2.3 Investigation by Organs of the Host State 
The foundation of the right to investigate of the Host State lies in its obligation to protect its 
nationals against any crimes.
256
 As a MONUC briefing paper puts it, a peacekeeping mission: 
cannot replace the national army and the Government’s responsibility to protect its people, its 
borders and the natural wealth within them. These are sovereign responsibilities. This is why 
MONUC and other partners such as the United States are working to help the Government 
improve the performance and conduct of the security forces so that they can meet these 
responsibilities.257 
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There must, however, be a distinction between functioning state judicial systems and 
unreliable state judicial systems. The former may be allowed to conduct investigations 
regarding allegations of crimes by peacekeepers, whereas the latter should not be given this 
duty. Two reasons can be advanced in respect of not allowing a Host State to investigate 
conduct of peacekeepers; the first relates to State-related barriers which include the failure of  
criminal justice systems of States to meet standards of international human rights law and the 
second relates to the difficulties of gathering valid evidence in a timely fashion.
258
 This type 
of criminal system prevents a waiver of immunity, even where waiver would be possible, for 
example regarding peacekeeping civilian personnel. The second reason relates to the absence 
of ‘dual criminality’ (activities considered to be criminal both in the mission area and in the 
alleged perpetrator's state of nationality).
259
 
Although it must be ascertained that the criminal system in the host country functions, local 
investigative authorities can more easily collect evidence than any investigator from outside 
the country in which the incident occurred. The advantage of the former authorities over the 
latter can be explained by the fact that the medium of communication is important to both 
investigators and person supplying information. Victims and witnesses are likely to be 
acquainted with the procedural rules usually applied by domestic authorities. These are 
available assets which help to uncover the facts accurately. Where the criminal system of the 
Host State is dysfunctional, it is advisable that the international community brings support to 
the Host State to lead investigations. This would also enable the damaged system to perform 
adequately, even after the end of the UN operation.
260
  
Bourguet’s incident is the perfect example to illustrate the usefulness of implicating local 
police authorities in some tasks relating to investigating allegations of crimes committed by 
peace operations personnel.
261
 The incident did not involve crimes committed by a military 
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member of a national contingent but by a civilian employee of MONUC.
262
 The intervention 
of the Host State investigator proved helpful in gathering the evidence.
263
 Bourguet was 
accused of having committed 23 rapes against young minor girls between the ages of 12 and 
17 in two different African nations, the Central African Republic and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo.
264
 He was arrested by the Congolese police and handed to the French 
authorities. Paedophilic pornography material was seized and utilised as evidence in his 
prosecution.
265
 It is reported that he has been prosecuted back in France and sentenced to nine 
years in prison and a fine.
266
 It appears that the judge found that he had a psychiatric disorder 
and he instructed that the convicted Bourguet underwent eight years of treatment.
267
 In 
France, the obligation of treatment is executed while the imprisonment term is running.
268
  
It has been confirmed, in one of the Human Rights reports on sexual violence committed by 
international peacekeeping forces, that it is difficult to expect the same force or the sending 
State of the accused force objectively, and without bias, to investigate the conduct of its own 
troops.
269
 It has been pointed out how the conduct of the investigations revealed a lack of 
appreciation for the seriousness of the problem of sexual violence.
270
 Where the Host State 
judicial system encounters functional difficulties, therefore, the UN should intervene and help 
                                                             
262 On 10 September 2008, an ex-UN logistician, Didier Bourguet appeared in court in Paris for rape and other 
sexual abuses perpetrated against children aged between of 12 and 17 years. He had abused twenty-three 
victims between 1998 and 2004, when he was working with a UN mission of peace in Central African Republic 
and in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Pornographic pictures of his sexual activities with the minors were 
found stored on his computer. Bourguet was recognized to have been involved with the girls but he argued that 
it was prostitution as he did remunerate the girls. He contested the charge that he had raped them. He was 
sentenced to nine years of imprisonment, eight years of undergoing counselling, and a fine. Only two of the 
twenty-three counts were considered as rapes, and one case as sexual aggression. For the twenty other 
instances, the jury considered the evidence to be insufficient. (This is the author’s own translation from French). 
See Hodan F ‘Procès Bourguet: un vrai déni du crime de prostitution de mineur-e-s’ 2008(160) Prostitution et 
Société available at www.prostitutionetsociete.fr/societe/enfants/proces-bourguet-un-vrai-deni-du [last accessed 
20 December 20012].  
263 Vista A ‘Un Français, ancien de l'ONU, jugé à Paris pour viols sur mineures en Afrique’ available at 
www.avmaroc.com/actualite/francais-ancien-onu-a140179.html [last accessed 20 September 2012]. 
264 Miller SK op cit (n 91) 268. 
265 Vista A ‘Un Français, ancien de l'ONU, jugé à Paris pour viols sur mineures en Afrique’ available at 
www.avmaroc.com/actualite/francais-ancien-onu-a140179.html [last accessed 20 September 2012]. 
266 Ibid. 
267 Hodan F ‘Procès Bourguet: un vrai déni du crime de prostitution de mineur-e-s’ 2008(160) Prostitution et 
Société available at www.prostitutionetsociete.fr/societe/enfants/proces-bourguet-un-vrai-deni-du [last accessed 
20 December 2012]. 
268 Thieuleux I ‘Fin de l’impunité pour un ancien employé de l’ONU violeur d’enfants’ 2008(10) La lettre de la 
commission enfants Amnesty International Sept. /Octobre 2008 Public SF 08 – ENF 29. 
269 Levin SA ‘Sexual Exploitation of Refugee Children by UN Peacekeepers’ 2003 (19) New York Law School 
Journal of Human Rights 833-842, 840. 
270 Ibid. 
 199 
 
its police to investigate each and every allegation of misconduct levelled against members of 
the UN forces.  
For serious crimes of international concern, that is all misconduct that qualifies as war crime, 
a third competent State should be given the power to investigate in order to carry out 
prosecution and trial. The UN Secretary-General Bulletin of 1999 bestows exclusive criminal 
jurisdiction upon contributing countries with respect to war crimes committed by 
peacekeepers.
271
 If, therefore, war crimes have been committed by their military personnel but 
have not been investigated and prosecuted, the efficiency of such a UN policy is seen to be 
inadequate.
272
  
The above Secretary General Bulletin is in conformity with agreements between the 
organization and the Host State, the organization and the Troop-Contributing Country, the 
Status-of-Forces Agreement and the Memorandum of Understanding concluded with respect 
to peacekeeping missions. These agreements, however, like any other international 
convention or treaty, are res inter alios acta with respect to states non-party thereto.
273
 They 
are binding only on the parties
274
 to these agreements, i.e. on the UN, the Host State, and the 
contributing States.
275
 A third State would not be bound by such agreements.
276
 These 
agreements do not eliminate the criminal jurisdiction of other States not party to the Status-of-
Forces Agreement or Memorandum of Understanding that may have jurisdiction over a case 
on other grounds, for example where the victim is a citizen of their state and the alleged 
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perpetrator is currently on the territory of the third State claiming jurisdiction.
277
 Such a third 
State is, however, likely to face impediments similar to those encountered by any Troop-
Contributing Country regarding the investigation of crimes committed in a foreign country. 
5.2.4 Investigation by a State other than the Host State 
International crimes fall under the jurisdiction of the state where the perpetrator is currently 
found.
278
 A State other than the Host State, therefore, may claim jurisdiction over crimes 
committed by peacekeepers. A third State, however, will encounter the same difficulties as 
the Troop-Contributing Country while conducting an investigation in a foreign country.
279
 
The reason for this is that costs, language barriers, access to witnesses, or transporting persons 
capable of contributing to the revelation of the truth into the country of the investigating 
authorities may present a burden.
280
 For a State to encumber national resources for such ends, 
it would be eager to do so only if it has some relationship with the conduct being prosecuted. 
This relationship exists where the victim of the conduct happens to be a national of the 
interested third State.
281
 Whenever a perpetrator is currently found within the territory of a 
third State, it may prosecute him for the crimes committed abroad if it has enacted a law in 
this regard.
282
 One would, otherwise, advocate joint cooperation between the investigating 
authorities and those of the Host State. The latter mechanism would help to ensure that no 
crime goes unpunished and that justice is done and can be seen to be done.
283
  
Indeed, any critical analysis of the current regime embodied in the Status-of-Forces 
Agreements and the Memorandum of Understanding would reveal that countries with 
criminal jurisdiction over peacekeepers meet with practical problems during investigations. 
The only possible solution to such problems is to reform the regime, for example by 
integrating collaboration between stakeholders. An internal organ of the UN may investigate 
the crimes, but the shortcoming of such an organ is that it has no criminal jurisdiction over 
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peacekeepers. The Troop-Contributing Country has an obligation to investigate crimes by its 
respective contingents but may lack the political will to do so. The Host State is obliged to 
investigate any offence committed within the boundaries of its territory, but does not have 
criminal jurisdiction over the conduct of peacekeepers, especially military personnel. 
Collaboration, therefore, among the UN, the Troop-Contributing Country and the Host State 
is needed to bring an end to the impunity peacekeepers seem to enjoy when they commit 
crimes.
284
  
5.2.5 Cooperation between the investigative authority and the Host State
285
 
In respect of crimes against humanity and war crimes, bearing in mind that conduct by 
peacekeepers may fall under the latter category, the General Assembly of the United Nations 
has taken a resolution on the necessity for cooperation in matters regarding such crimes.
286
 An 
analysis of this resolution reveals that the United Nations, in pursuance of the principles and 
purposes set forth in the Charter concerning the promotion of cooperation between peoples 
and the maintenance of international peace and security, proclaims a number of principles of 
international cooperation relating to the detection, arrest, extradition, and punishment of 
persons guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
287
 The above principles show the 
necessity of cooperation between States to ensure that war crimes and crimes against 
humanity are punished.
288
  
The first principle insists on investigating the crime, tracing, arresting, trying, and punishing 
the perpetrator if found guilty.
289
 The second principle recognises the right of each and every 
State to try nationals for war crimes or crimes against humanity.
290
 The general rule is that the 
trial must be conducted in the countries in which the crimes were committed.
291
 The other 
                                                             
284 The aim of each and any criminal investigation must be prosecution in a court of law after the investigation. 
See Bensouda F ‘Challenges Related to Investigation and Prosecution at the International Criminal Court’ in 
Bellelli R (ed) International Criminal Justice: Law and Practice From the Rome Statute to Its Review (Ashgate 
Farnham 2010) 131-142.  
285 A joint investigation team composed of UN OIOS personnel, the TCC, and Host State representatives may 
thwart any cloud of suspicion of covering up crimes by UN peacekeepers. 
286 UNGA Principles of International Cooperation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of 
Persons Guilty of War Crimes against Humanity (UN. Doc. A/RES/3020/ (XXVII) 3 December 1973) 
(Herinafter UN. Doc. A/RES/3020/(XXVII)) 
287 Ibid. 
288  Ibid. 
289 UN. Doc. A/RES/3020/ (XXVII) of 3 December 1973 principle 1. 
290 UN. Doc. A/RES/3020/ (XXVII) of 3 December 1973 principle 2. 
291 UN. Doc. A/RES/3020/ (XXVII) of 3 December 1973 principle 5. 
 202 
 
principles relate to bilateral and multilateral cooperation.
292
 Emphasis is put not only on 
preventing war crimes and crimes against humanity, detecting, arresting, and bringing to trial 
persons suspected of having committed such crimes, but also on collecting information and 
evidence.
293
 It is the latter on which a successful prosecution rests. Cooperation may also be 
given by refusing to grant asylum to any person about whom there are serious reasons for 
considering that such person has committed such crimes.
294
 
It appears useful and important, therefore, to attempt to ensure that States shall act at the 
national and regional levels and in cooperation with the United Nations to contribute by all 
means to the prevention of all kind of crimes by peacekeepers.
295
 The Memorandums of 
Understanding and Status-of-Forces Agreements should provide for such a rule. Cooperation 
to investigate is crucial to the gathering of reliable proof. It helps a foreign sovereign State to 
exercise its jurisdiction over acts committed outside its territory.
296
 This prompted Aubert to 
write that helping one another on the judicial level in penal matters implies putting in motion 
all procedures related to international cooperation in criminal prosecution.
297
 Doing so helps 
and allows foreign criminal judicial authorities to acquire, from the requested national 
authorities, the needed cooperation to collect all means of proof available within the limits of 
the territory of the requested State.
298
 Cooperation should also be resorted to in order to make 
known the decision arrived at in the competent jurisdiction. Transparency with regard to 
crimes committed by peacekeepers is necessary so that the general public and the victims are 
aware of the outcomes of such proceedings. 
To assure each and every intervening party or any entity wishing justice to be done and to 
appear to be done, the Host State police or investigators, and members of investigating team 
from the OIOS, and from the Troop-Contributing Country concerned must cooperate. Then, 
whoever afterwards obtains criminal jurisdiction over the substantiated facts and findings can 
                                                             
292 UN. Doc. A/RES/3020/ (XXVII) of 3 December 1973 principles 3 to 9. 
293 UN. Doc. A/RES/3020/ (XXVII) of 3 December 1973 principle 6 
294 UN. Doc. A/RES/3020/ (XXVII) of 3 December 1973 principle 7. 
295 UNGA Drawing on the formulation in the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance (UN. Doc. A/RES/47/133 (18 December 1992)). 
296 Reeb B «La raison d’Etat dans l’entraide internationale en matière pénale » in Zen-Ruffinen P (ed) Du monde 
pénal: Droit pénal- criminologie et politique criminelle- police et exécution des sanctions-procédure pénale : 
Mélanges en l’honneur de Pierre-Henri Bolle (Helding Bâle 2006) 235-246. 
297 Aubert M «Relation bancaire et entraide internationale en matière pénale: Nouvelles pratiques suisses et 
étrangères» in Paolo Bernasconi (dir) Les nouveaux défis au secret bancaire suisse: Enquêtes fiscales, 
commissions rogatoires, fusions d’entreprises (Méta-Éditions Lausanne-Bellinzona 1996) 109-126. 
298 Ibid. 
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prosecute easily. Thus, it may still be suggested that the Troop-Contributing Countries 
continue to hold jurisdiction over their troops in order to show to other members of the force 
that discipline is vital, even far away from home. It may, however, remain more important to 
conduct prosecution in the Host State for the sake of ensuring that the right to justice of the 
victims or survivors and their right to know that the wrong done to them was punished, as 
well as their rights to compensation and reparation, are respected.
299
 Prosecuting perpetrators 
who are far removed from the place where their crimes occurred, without the participation of 
the victims, survivors, and witnesses is to ignore the rights of the host population to know and 
see that justice has been done.  
5.3 The purpose and period of a criminal investigation
300
  
The aim of any criminal investigation must be to prosecute in a court of law after the 
investigation.
301
 Indeed prosecuting a person has no purpose other than the function of 
contributing to the restoration of confidence in the rule of law.
302
 If crimes are not 
punished, confidence in the validity of the values of the community is undermined.
303
 
Victims and witnesses have a role to play in an investigation. 
                                                             
299 Beigbeder Y Judging War Criminals: The Politics of International Justice (MacMillan London 1999) 203-
204. 
300 With reference to the opinion of Vestberg, time is an important factor when it comes to investigating and 
prosecuting. Belated intervention leads to lost files, files devoured by insects, and faded memories that 
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investigations have to be conducted timeously to avoid collecting information after memories have faded or after 
files have disappeared. Visits to crime scenes may be important. See Vestberg B ‘Prosecuting and Investigating 
International Crimes in Denmark’ (Guest Lecture Series of the Office of the Prosecutor ICC-CPI and individual 
authors 2006) available at www2.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/9C4449DE-B59B-40E-BF2 [last accessed 30 May 
2012]. This may be illustrated by the failure of Germany to prosecute the nationals left to it by the allies. An 
example of reluctance of States to try its own troops for serious offences committed abroad can be seen in the 
Leipzig trial after the World War I. The Allies submitted to the German government a list of 900 persons 
accused of atrocities committed outside Germany during the conflict. After a protracted argument with the 
Germans, a test list of only 45 people was submitted. Only 12 persons were tried, and only six of them 
convicted. Two of those convicted received the severest sentences but escaped from the German jails, it is 
thought with official connivance. Where an onsite court existed, the difficulty linked to collecting evidence can 
be avoided. Glueck S ‘By What Tribunal Shall War Offender be Tried?’ 1943 (56) Harvard Law Review 1059-
1089. 
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International Humanitarian Law’ 1998 (9) European Journal of International Law 2-17, 9 referring to B. V. A. 
Röling ‘Criminal Responsibility for Violations of the Law of War’ 1976 (12) Revue Belge de Droit International  
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5.3.1 Victims’ involvement in investigation 
Such a purpose cannot be fulfilled if victims have no role to play in the proceedings, and if the 
infringements of their rights are not remedied.
304
 In fact, regarding war crimes and other 
international core crimes, if justice intervenes later and there is no material proof to 
substantiate the facts, and no written proof is available, the crimes may all too easily go 
unpunished.
305
 Regardless of who committed the crime, the involvement of victims in the 
process remains crucial to the ends of justice. Victims, whose human rights have been 
violated, may have a strong need to understand what happened and to identify the wrongdoers 
in the process of seeking to see justice done.
306
 For victims, it does matter whether the 
perpetrator is a rebel, an armed militia member, or a member of the UN force. They need to 
see that their rights have been vindicated. 
As discussed earlier, the majority of victims of crimes committed by peacekeepers, especially 
sexual crimes, have been women and children.
307
 During the conflict they have been raped, or 
raped by peacekeepers and afterwards provided with money or food to give the appearance of 
a consensual transaction.
308
 Since the prosecution process may commence after the victims, 
who were minors at the time of the crime, have come of age and can fully cooperate with the 
judicial authority, the role they can play is crucial to the success of the proceedings.
309
 They 
are the witnesses who can help to establish the proof required, even though it has to be noted 
that testimonial proof will often be imperfect, especially where the crime alleged has to be 
investigated a long time after its commission.
310
 
                                                             
304 The basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of violations of 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law, adopted in 2000, based on the observations of 
governments, provide that the appropriate remedy includes the victim’s right to access justice, to reparation for 
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406-427, 424. 
305 Weber R and Ott B « Enquêtes militaires suisses pour crimes de guerre commis au Rwanda » in Ziegler AR, 
Wehrenberg S & Weber R (éds) Procès de criminels de guerre en Suisse (Nomos Zürich 2009) 99-107,101. 
306 Van Dyke JM ‘Reconciliation between Korea and Japan’ 2006 (5) Chinese Journal of International Law 215-
239, 230. 
307 Miller SK op cit (n 91) 267. 
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Cornell International Law Journal 97-107, 102. 
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310 Ziegler AR, Wehrenberg S & Weber R (éds) op cit (n 305) 303. 
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The role of victims of sexual violence and crimes has been stressed, but the practical problem 
is that of gathering undisputed proof.
311
 To this end, it is required that victims be questioned 
in order to identify the perpetrator.
312
 As Miller puts it, however, the trauma of the victims’ 
lives after rape may render the taking of evidence a delicate process for a number of reasons: 
firstly, the victim may not have seen the face of perpetrator; secondly, the victim might not be 
able to differentiate between foreign individuals; and, thirdly, the victim might not be able to 
identify the perpetrator because the act took place in the dark.
313
 These reasons often lead to 
uncorroborated identification of perpetrators.
314
 It must be assumed that the 296 cases 
investigated in the DRC during 2005, which led to 17 civilian UN personnel, 16 police, and 
137 military personnel being dismissed or repatriated
315
 were substantiated owing to some 
involvement of victims.
316
 Involving victims in court proceeding may also be helpful. Nicola 
Henry has identified four reasons which may motivate victims to choose to stand as witnesses 
in war criminal proceedings,
 ‘
to speak for the dead, to tell the world the truth about what 
happened, to look for justice in the present, and to help prevent future war crimes from 
occurring’.317 Such motivations or reasons actually meet the purposes and objectives of any 
criminal trial, namely, punishment, prevention, deterrence, and rehabilitation.
318
 No individual 
can reform himself or herself where justice did not intervene and show how the crime 
committed shocked the values which the international community upholds. When it comes to 
sexual offences, judges have to accept that the difficulties of recollecting precise details of 
                                                             
311 The system for participation by a victim in criminal proceedings has already tested, even before the ICC. See 
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traumatic events years after the commission of the crimes explain why witness testimony 
might contain inconsistencies.
319
 In trials for international crimes, victims have to take part in 
the proceedings both as witnesses and as victims.
320
 Their right to such involvement should 
not be ignored.
321
  
No one actually, however, wishes to see peacekeepers prosecuted because it signals the failure 
of the peacekeepers to fulfil their protective role,
322
 but again no one should ignore the rights 
of their victims to justice.
323
 To advocate the non-prosecution of peacekeepers would violate 
the 2006 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law.
324
 Apart from reparation, victims also have the right not only 
to speak for the dead, as has been mentioned, but also to tell the world of their traumatic 
ordeal in order to prevent future crimes by the peacekeepers.
325
 
It will be difficult to halt sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers if justice is not done 
on behalf of the victims. It may be difficult for victims to report crimes committed against 
them if they know that nothing will follow their allegations, and encouraging individuals in 
the Host State to take such a stance does not honour the UN organisation as such. Prosecution 
means the allegations have been investigated. Yet, practical problems do exist regarding 
investigating crimes committed by peacekeepers. Investigating and gathering evidence of war 
crimes, for the purpose of prosecution, inevitably amounts to constructing a case after the fact. 
It does not appear judicious to conduct investigation in places far from the crime scenes. To 
build a good case, firsthand evidence is needed.
326
 Moreover, investigation aimed at collecting 
evidence to be used in proceedings conducted at home may be of some value. Such an 
                                                             
319 Malcontent P ‘Human Rights and Peace: Two Sides of the Same Coin’ in Thakur R and Malcontent P (eds) 
From Sovereign Impunity to International Accountability: The Search for Justice in a World of States (UN 
University Press Tokyo 2004) 1-12, 6. 
320 That is the difference brought about by the Rome Statute of the ICC. See Malcontent P op cit  6-7. 
321 Lemasson AT La victime devant la justice pénale internationale (Thèse de doctorat en droit Université de 
Limoges avril 2010 [unpublished doctoral thesis]). 
322 If there should be any liability based on the failure to protect, the body to be arraigned before would be the 
UN Organisation itself. 
323
 Du Plessis M & Peté S Who Guards the Guards? The ICC and Serious Crimes Committed by Peacekeepers in 
Africa (ISS Monograph Series No. 121 2006) 36. 
324 Bassiouni MC ‘International Recognition of Victims’ Rights’2006 (6) Human Rights Law Review 203-279. 
325 Henry N op cit (n 317) 119. 
326 Del Ponte C ‘Reflections Based on the ICTY’s Experience’ in Bellelli R (ed) International Criminal Justice: 
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investigation must, therefore, be conducted by the investigators from the Troop-Contributing 
Country that has jurisdiction over the alleged perpetrator. 
5.3.2. TCC investigation for court proceedings in home country 
Because Troop-Contributing Countries are often loath to admit as publicly as possible that 
their troops may have perpetrated some acts of wrongdoing, they are, therefore, not prepared 
to court-martial alleged offenders.
327
 Indeed, they are not interested in prompting an 
investigation into allegations against their troops. Such an attitude violates the rights of 
victims.
328
 The human rights of the victims are violated if they are further deprived of any 
possibility of presenting their version of what happened and of confronting, if possible, and 
identifying the wrongdoer.
329
  Their right to justice is violated where the proceedings have to 
take place far from the scene, without allowing victims to access the adjudicating court. 
Article 7 quinquiens of the revised Memorandum of Understanding relative to the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the Government of the TCC does not provide for the presence of the victims at 
the trial. It provides only for the obligation to prosecute of the Troop-Contributing Country. It 
reads as follows:  
1. Military members and any civilian members subject to national military law of the national 
contingent provided by the Government are subject to the Government’s exclusive jurisdiction 
in respect of any crimes or offences that might be committed by them while they are assigned 
to the military component of [United Nations peacekeeping missions]. The Government 
assures the United Nations that it shall exercise such jurisdiction with respect to such crimes or 
offences. 
2. The Government further assures the United Nations that it shall exercise such disciplinary 
jurisdiction as might be necessary with respect to all other acts of misconduct committed by 
any members of the Government’s national contingent while they are assigned to the military 
component of [United Nations peacekeeping missions] that do not amount to crimes or 
offences. 
                                                             
327 Zeid Report UN Doc A/59/710 of 24 March 2005 para 67. 
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It is obvious that the responsibility to prosecute peacekeepers who have been accused of 
committing criminal acts lies with the state of nationality of the perpetrator.
330
 The first step 
to be taken by the country that exercises criminal jurisdiction over an offender is to 
investigate the allegations. This must be done in the Host State where the alleged offences 
occurred.
331
 The preceding discussions have revealed a number of difficulties with respect to 
sending investigating authorities abroad as well as the obstacles posed by transporting 
witnesses and victims to the perpetrator’s home country to participate in the proceedings, 
especially the expenses involved.
332
 It is, therefore, submitted that on-site prosecution should 
be the aim of investigation and could be a solution to the problem.  
5.3.3. Investigation by the TCC towards court proceedings onsite 
It is important to recall the suggestion of the Zeid Report that Troop-Contributing Countries 
think of making provision for on-site courts martial accompanying their deployments.
333
 An 
on-site court martial has the advantage of the immediate collection of evidence, and the 
demonstration to the local population that contingent members remain criminally 
accountable.
334
 An on-site court martial can also put an end to the frequent complaint of 
Troop-Contributing Countries that evidence gathered in previous preliminary investigations 
by a UN organ is insufficient or that it does not meet requirements of direct use in court 
martial proceedings.
335
 This would also enable all the intervening parties to the trial to 
participate and allow the public to see justice being done.
336
 This recommendation is justified 
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by the legal inability of the UN to follow prosecutions against UN force members accused of 
some crimes during a mission of peace. A secondary jurisdiction over crimes committed by 
peacekeepers should, therefore, exist in the Host State.
337
  
As was stated in a report by the UN Secretary-General when UNEF was deployed, the fact 
that a Host State waives its jurisdiction over peacekeepers should not result in a vacuum in 
which a given offence might be subject to prosecution by neither the Host State nor the 
participating State.
338
 It is, therefore, submitted that, where possible, an on-site court-martial 
could perhaps be useful in helping to investigate the facts, and, if no on-site jurisdiction is 
established by the Troop-Contributing Country, to settle the matter via the host country’s 
courts.
339
 The Host State may also be tasked with conducting investigations.
340
 This may 
facilitate the process as the victims and witnesses will be familiar with the domestic criminal 
system. Currently, Troop-Contributing Countries are under no legal obligation to investigate 
or try offenders.
341
 This may be the reason why Prince Zeid recommended that the model 
Memorandum of Understanding should adopt a clause indicating that, where an investigation 
has concluded that the allegations are founded, and an official of the Troop-Contributing 
Country has participated in the investigation, the perpetrator must be prosecuted, and the state 
concerned be obliged to do so.
342
 Indeed, as prosecution is an act of sovereignty, countries of 
origin of alleged perpetrators are not obliged to prosecute. Where the Troop-Contributing 
Country has participated in the investigation and the allegations of crimes were held to be 
founded, but that country decides not to prosecute, it has to inform the UN Secretary-General 
within a certain time, for instance 120 days as the Zeid Report recommended, and explain 
                                                             
337 Though not ideal, a SOFA or a MOU should provide that a Host State recovers jurisdiction over a 
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340 Vista A ‘Un Français, ancien de l'ONU, jugé à Paris pour viols sur mineures en Afrique’ available at 
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why it cannot prosecute.
343
 Whatever the position taken by the Troop-Contributing Country, it 
remains in the interests of the Host State to conduct an investigation, to know the truth about 
what happened, and to let the victims know the measures taken against the perpetrator. 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has revealed that hurdles do exist with respect to investigating crimes committed 
by peacekeepers. Investigating authorities of states other than the Host State may finally 
report that there is a lack of conclusive evidence for prosecution to be initiated. It transpired, 
from the cases of Italy, Canada, Belgium, and South Africa, that even investigations by the 
Troop-Contributing Country may reach biased conclusions aimed at safeguarding the image 
of the country and its reputation.
344
 The investigation team or a commission of inquiry may 
act in good faith, but its conclusions might not reveal the truth, owing to the fact that such 
conclusions rests on, for instance, false documentation, the relevant material or documents 
having been kept secret or destroyed.
345
 The Courts Martial in Canada did not even have the 
chance of adjudicating the case of Colonel Haswell for ordering the destruction of documents 
related to the Somalia event.
346
 He has furthermore never been charged with any wrongdoing. 
Regarding Canada, it must be noted that the commission of inquiry was not meant to collect 
evidence for use in court proceedings. The military judicial system in Belgium did not 
consider the events in Somalia to be serious.
347
 With regard to South Africa, no official 
investigation was initiated. South Africa seems to have been content that the UN and its 
investigation division had dealt with the allegations of misconduct by members of the South 
African military contingent in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Yet it was 
shown that the OIOS has no prosecutorial powers and some of its reports may not even have 
gone through the process of reaching the Troop-Contributing Country concerned. 
To remedy such difficulties, it has been suggested that expert investigators be included in 
each contingent or an on-site tribunal be established for each contingent.
348
 The suggestion 
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does not seem to be satisfactory in that the prosecution of alleged perpetrators will still be 
dependent upon the willingness of the Troop-Contributing County concerned.
349
 That is why 
the present thesis suggests not only the inclusion of a provision aiming at State responsibility 
for omission to prosecute but also a tripartite on-site court-martial to close the lacunae which 
exist in this regard.
350
 This suggestion has the merits of circumventing all the obstacles 
relating to the investigation of crimes outside one’s jurisdiction. The Host State, therefore, 
should be left with the task of investigation. The most adequate solution may be that of 
combining state liability for failure to prosecute with that of putting in place a mechanism that 
involve tripartite cooperation among the UN, the Host State, and the Troop-Contributing 
Country.
351
 
If the UN is to take serious steps to end sexual exploitation, abuse, and other misconduct by 
peacekeepers, it must do more than merely repatriate abusers. In order to create incentives for 
enforcement and deterrents against crimes by peacekeepers, there must be real consequences 
for individuals and for governments. The possible mechanism might not necessarily involve 
yielding jurisdiction over personnel to the UN or to a foreign judicial authority, but it must 
entail commitments by member States to investigate, try, and punish their personnel in cases 
of misconduct. A clear principle should be included in agreements between UN State 
members and the organisation so that investigators are granted full cooperation and access to 
witnesses, records, and the sites where crimes had allegedly occurred so that trials could 
proceed. Equally importantly, the UN must hold member countries strictly to these standards. 
States that fail to fulfil their commitments to discipline their troops should be barred from 
providing troops for peace operations.
352
 This measure should not be avoided because the 
failure to prosecute peacekeepers accused of sexual abuses, in spite of the command 
structures being well aware of the plight of civilians in Host States, stems from the fact that 
the States are often unwilling to haul their soldiers before court. According to the Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary-General in the DRC [MONUC], William Lacy Swing, 
                                                             
349 An international accountability mechanism is crucial; otherwise national processes are not effective. See 
Sheeran SP Contemporary Issues in UN Peacekeeping and International Law: Briefing Paper IDCR-BP-02/11 
(Institute for Democracy and Conflict Resolution (IDCR) University of Essex 2011) 7. 
350 See infra 7.5. 
351 Ibid. 
352 Gardiner N and Groves S ‘The United States Must Act to End Abuses by U.N. Peacekeepers’ January 16 
2007 available at www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/01/ [last accessed 20 December 2012]. See also See 
Durch WJ et al. op cit (n 37) 14 et passim. 
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Emphasis needs to be placed on the accountability of the officers of contingents to which the 
perpetrators belong, from contingent to company and platoon commanders... It is apparent that the 
feeling of impunity is such that not only have the policies not been enforced, but the command 
structures have not always given investigators their full cooperation.353 
The UN should make public all internal reports relating to the abuse scandals in Africa and 
outline the specific steps it plans to take to prevent the sexual exploitation of refugees in both 
existing and future UN peacekeeping operations.
354
 In lieu and place of obtaining assurances 
that the Troop-Contributing Countries will prosecute their soldiers once they are repatriated, 
the Status-of-Forces Agreement should provide that an on-site court be operational in the 
field, and that the troop- contributing countries and Host State enter into agreement as to the 
levels of cooperation necessary for the trial of perpetrators who are members of a UN force. 
The organisation can also help rebuild the judicial system in the Host State so that there will 
be no fear that justice might not be properly rendered.
355
 It has, in fact, been indicated how 
reluctant States are to prosecute their own contingent military members. Indeed, the only 
serious and concrete example of action being taken against a military peacekeeper related to 
the rape and murder of an 11-year old Albanian girl by a US army staff sergeant Ronghi in 
2000.
356
 The accused soldier Ronghi was sentenced to life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole.
357
 The case does not relate to peacekeepers deployed to Africa. Since 
there is no status of limitation regarding international crimes, especially war crimes, it is 
possible to be hopeful that one day there will be prosecution of those allegations of crime by 
peacekeepers. Effective punishment of war crimes and crimes against humanity is important 
for ending such crimes and for promoting peace and international security.
358
 There is, 
therefore, clearly a need for legislation on an international level to address the accountability 
of the peacekeepers adequately. 
                                                             
353 See Miller SK op cit (n 91) 269.  
354 Gardiner N and Groves S ‘The United States Must Act to End Abuses by U.N. Peacekeepers’ January 16 
2007 available at www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/01/ [last accessed 20 December 2012]. 
355 Compare Durch WJ et al. op cit (n 37) 19-20. 
356
 United States v. Ronghi 60 M.J. 83 (2004).  
357 The sentence was upheld at appeal. see United States v. Ronghi, 84; O’Brien M ‘Prosecuting Peacekeepers in 
the International Criminal Court for Human Trafficking’ 2006 (1) Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 281-
328, 301;  Brookhart DG Criminal Law Deskbook Volume II - Crimes and Defenses (the Judge Advocate 
General’s School US Army Charlottesville 2010) 4-36. 
358 Beigbeder Y Judging War Criminals: The Politics of International Justice (Houndmills London1999) 76. 
 213 
 
The next chapter examines the issue relating to criminal jurisdiction over peacekeepers and 
investigates the prosecutions conducted by Canada and Belgium. Whilst these two countries 
are not African States, their attempts to prosecute will be discussed because they are the only 
Troop-Contributing Countries, amongst those who deployed peacekeepers to Somalia, which 
initiated proceedings against their troops once back home. There exists no further data 
regarding prosecutions of soldiers who were alleged to have committed crimes while serving 
with a UN mission of peace in Africa.  
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CHAPTER VI  
JURISDICTION OVER CRIMES COMMITTED BY PEACEKEEPERS 
6.1 Introduction 
The most important legal documents pertaining to peacekeepers deployed afield determine 
which States have jurisdiction over crimes committed by peacekeepers. Thus, the Status-of-
Forces Agreement and the Memorandum of Understanding provide for which State is actually 
under obligation to take action regarding any misdeed by a given member of UN peace 
mission personnel.
1
 
This chapter explores all the avenues available regarding jurisdiction over crimes allegedly 
committed by peacekeepers. It first discusses the exclusive jurisdiction of a Troop-
Contributing Country over its military personnel. It then investigates whether the Host State 
retains any residual jurisdiction and whether a third State remains judicially competent over 
crimes committed by peacekeepers since it is not party to the Status-of-Forces Agreement or 
Memorandum of Understanding. The chapter also examines whether the international 
criminal court should have criminal jurisdiction where the alleged conduct falls under its 
jurisdiction. A discussion of prosecutions of instances of crimes committed by peacekeepers 
is undertaken in order to draw some lessons regarding States that ought to exercise 
jurisdiction bestowed upon them by the aforementioned agreements. The discussion extends 
to the issue of how far Troop-Contributing Countries have discharged their obligation under a 
Status-of-Forces Agreement or a Memorandum of Understanding. To this end, prosecutions 
by Canada, Belgium, and South Africa are investigated with respect to allegations of crimes 
by peacekeepers in Somalia, Burundi, and the DRC. 
The principle of territoriality is the founding principle of jurisdiction in international law.
2
 
Bystander States, however, may assume their responsibility of bringing to justice the 
perpetrators of violations of international values where they have been authorized to do so by 
                                                             
1 Model SOFA, UN. Doc. A/45/594 of 9 October 1990; Revised MOU, UN. Doc. A/61/19 (Part III) of 12 June 
2007. 
2 Cassese A International Criminal Law 2 ed. (OUP New York 2008) 336; Ryngaert C Jurisdiction in 
International Law (Oxford Monographs in International Law Oxford University Press Oxford 2009) 42. 
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the State on whose territory the violations were perpetrated or pursuant to an agreement.
3
 This 
is the case regarding peacekeepers on UN mission and with respect to crimes they may 
commit. Regarding peacekeepers, the existing agreements stipulate that the Troop-
Contributing Country, whose contingent member is alleged to have committed a crime, has 
the duty to prosecute such crime.
4
 By being party to an agreement with the UN, the Host State 
surrenders its jurisdiction over criminal acts by UN peacekeepers to the country of the 
nationality of the offender. 
6.2. Exclusive jurisdiction of the TCC 
States are entitled under international law to legislate with respect to the conduct of their 
nationals abroad through extra-territorial jurisdiction which enables a State to deal with an 
action that occurred in a foreign country.
5
 The technique of extra-territorial jurisdiction makes 
it possible to prosecute nationals at home, under national laws, for offences committed 
abroad. The usefulness of such a mechanism is obvious: (1) it provides a basis for arresting 
and prosecuting an offender who could not account for his/her acts since he or she has 
returned to her/his country of origin in order to avoid prosecution; and (2) it sends a clear 
message that countries will not let their citizens commit criminal acts with impunity.
6
 In other 
words, even though a law is enacted to deal with conduct that might occur within the 
boundaries of a given state, the limits of criminal law are no longer restricted to the domestic 
law where an act is perpetrated.
7
 The extension of criminal laws to citizens abroad means that 
nationality is an important basis of jurisdiction under international criminal law.
8
 This is 
particularly so in relation to armed forces stationed overseas who are compelled by the 
legislation of most States to carry their flag abroad with them.
9
 Thus article 7 quinquiens of 
the revised Memorandum of Understanding still reserves the exercise of criminal and 
disciplinary jurisdiction over the conduct of a military contingent member to the Government 
                                                             
3 Ryngaert C op cit (n 2) 152. 
4 Oswald B, Durham H and Bates A Documents on the Law of UN Peace Operations (Oxford University Press 
New York 2010) 56; Article 7.10 of the Revised Draft Model Memorandum of Understanding as set out in 
A/61/19 (Part III). 
5 Beaulieu C Extraterritorial Laws: Why they are not really working and how they can be strengthened (ECPAT 
International Bangkok September 2008) 5. 
6
 Ibid. 
7 Podgor ES ‘Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction: Replacing “Objective Territoriality” With “Defensive 
Territoriality”’ 2003 (28) Studies in Law Politics and Society 117-135, 118. 
8 Cryer R et al. An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure 2 ed. (Cambridge University Press 
Cambridge (UK) 2010) 47. 
9 Ibid. 
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of the State that contributed the troops alleged to have committed the criminal acts or acts of 
indiscipline.
10
 
The recognition of the exclusive jurisdiction over acts committed by peacekeepers to the 
sending State is in conformity with the provision of the model Status-of-Forces Agreement.
11
 
The government of the State that contributes troops and exercises criminal jurisdiction over 
the contingent undertakes to prosecute any soldier that commits a crime on mission and to 
that end it gives assurances to the UN.
12
 Giving assurances does not necessarily obligate the 
Troop-Contributing Country actually to prosecute.
13
 A decision whether or not to prosecute is 
an act of sovereignty. By giving assurances that it will prosecute any crimes that its troops 
might commit, the government does not divest itself of such sovereignty.
14
 The problem 
remains that the assurances expected from the Troop-Contributing Countries are not always 
given to the UN Secretary-General, and, if they are, this authority omits to inform the victims 
as to how the case was resolved. For instance, it is reported that Moroccan authorities decided 
on 14 February 2005 to prosecute six of its contingent members, who were then serving with 
MONUC, for having engaged in sexual exploitation and abuse of Congolese girls and 
women.
15
 Nothing is known of the outcome of the prosecution. In effect, as Hampson and 
Kihara-Hunt put it, one of the principal rationales for prosecution is to deter the commission 
                                                             
10 Revised Memorandum of Understanding UN. Doc. A/61/19 (Part III) of 12 June 2007. The provision reads as 
follows: 1. Military members and any civilian members subject to national military law of the national 
contingent provided by the Government are subject to the Government’s exclusive jurisdiction in respect of any 
crimes or offences that might be committed by them while they are assigned to the military component of 
[United Nations peacekeeping missions]. The Government assures the United Nations that it shall exercise such 
jurisdiction with respect to such crimes or offences. 
2. The Government further assures the United Nations that it shall exercise such disciplinary jurisdiction as 
might be necessary with respect to all other acts of misconduct committed by any members of the Government’s 
national contingent while they are assigned to the military component of [United Nations peacekeeping 
missions] that do not amount to crimes or offences. 
11 Model SOFA para 47 (b) UN. Doc. A/45/594 of 9 October 1990. The relegation of exclusive criminal 
jurisdiction to the sending state may be criticized on the basis that, in these shameful circumstances, the sending 
state is not in a position to be impartial or to prosecute objectively. This is so because ‘men armed by a sovereign 
government’ are belligerents whose violent or warlike acts are not individual crimes or offences. See article 57 
of the Lieber Code of 1863 quoted by Dehn JC ‘The Hamdan Case and the Application of a Municipal Offence: 
The Common Law Origin of “Murder in Violation of the Law of War”’ 2009 (7) Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 63-82, footnote 74. 
12 Article 7 quinquiens of the Revised MOU UN. Doc. A/61/19 (Part III) of 12 June 2007. 
13 A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations UN. Doc. A/59/710 of 24 March 2005 (hereinafter Zeid Report UN. Doc A/59/710), 
para 80. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Abus sexuels par les éléments de la MONUC: Après la France le Maroc engage des poursuites contre ses 
ressortissants available at www.Sfdi.org/actualites/Sentinelle7.html#maroc [last accessed 20 May 2012]; 
Gardiner N ‘The U.N. Peacekeeping Scandal in the Congo: How Congress Should Respond’ 2005 (868) 
Heritage Lectures (delivered 1 March 2005) 1-8, 1-2.  
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of crime.
16
 Conducting the proceedings in the sending State in place of conducting them 
where the suspect committed the crime has less, if not, impact in the Host State.
17
 The risk, 
however, of this negative or absent impact could be reduced if the Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General was required to be informed of such proceedings so that they could be 
made public in the Host State.
18
 For its efficiency, the publication mechanism must be 
sufficiently institutionalised and its violation should entail State responsibility.
19
 There is, 
however, no such requirement that a host population be informed regarding the outcome of a 
prosecution back home. Indeed, the enforcement of violations of international humanitarian 
law and the punishment of individuals hinge on and depend upon the goodwill of States, and 
legislation varies from one country to another.
20
 All instruments related to the conduct of UN 
forces do not inform whether, in the case of non-prosecution, despite the investigation 
concluding the truth of the occurrence of the crimes, the Host State recovers its criminal 
jurisdiction over crimes committed within the boundaries of its territory.
21
 In other words, is 
there any residual jurisdiction by the Host State over crimes committed by peacekeepers? The 
issue will be discussed in the following section. 
6.3. Residual criminal jurisdiction of the Territorial State (Host State) 
According to the recommendations of the Zeid Report, the Host State should not be deprived 
of criminal jurisdiction.
22
 It still retains the ability to gather evidence and to arrest offenders, 
                                                             
16 Hampson FJ and Kihara-Hunt Ai ‘The Accountability of Personnel Associated with Peace Support 
Operations’ in Aoi, de Coning & Thakur (eds) Unintended Consequences of Peace Support Operations (United 
Nations University Press Tokyo 2007) 209.  
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 The undertakings to report to the Secretariat of the UN are not fulfilled when it comes to the outcomes of 
prosecution of peacekeepers back home. See for example Report of the Secretary-General Criminal 
accountability of United Nations officials and experts on mission (UN. Doc. A/63/260 of 11 August 2008) para 
70. 
20 Cassese A ‘On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of International 
Humanitarian Law’1998 (9) European Journal of International Law 2-17, 4. 
21 The territoriality principle is the most basic principle of jurisdiction in international law. See Ryngaert C 
Jurisdiction in International Law (Oxford Monographs in International Law OUP Oxford 2009) 42. For 
instance, Italian military laws do not subject personnel on peacekeeping missions to face criminal prosecution 
for crimes committed abroad. Pallen D ‘Sexual Slavery in Bosnia: The Negative Externality of the Market of 
Peace’available at www.american.edu./sis/students/sword/Back_Issues/3.pdf [last accessed 19 December 2012]. 
How then can the Italian courts intervene if an Italian peacekeeper commits a crime while serving with a UN 
mission of peace and is repatriated? In case of conflicts of law, for instance where a peacekeeper committed an 
offence to his national law abroad but where the act was not a crime in the Host State such an act should not be 
prosecuted. If the act relates to military discipline, it can still be prosecuted to restore discipline within the ranks. 
22 Zeid Report UN. Doc A/59/710 paras 89, 93. 
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and, since criminal jurisdiction is not an indivisible concept
23
 and from the point of view that 
it is not easy for investigators of a foreign state to visit the place where the crimes were 
committed to collect all the evidence needed, some jurisdiction must be left to the Host State 
in order to surmount the challenges of evidence gathering.
24
 Cooperation, therefore, is crucial 
since the victims of crimes committed by peacekeepers are essentially nationals of the Host 
State.
25
  
The Report of the Group of Legal Experts recommended that the UN should facilitate the 
exertion of criminal jurisdiction over peacekeepers by the Host State since the organisation is 
still unable to rely on other states to gather evidence or ensure that peacekeepers are 
effectively prosecuted on their home territory.
26
 Furthermore, serious crimes against the 
person committed by peacekeepers, which do not amount to war crimes or crimes against 
humanity, are prosecutable by any state, even a third state if a treaty provides for this as an 
option.
27
 Under the current law, crimes committed by peacekeeping personnel may go 
unpunished because the Host State has no criminal jurisdiction over peacekeepers.
28
 It must 
be noted that the Host State is the first or the only state on whose territory the effects of the 
crime are felt.
29
 The need to provide for extra-territorial jurisdiction by states other than the 
Host State, based on the objectives of territoriality principle, is of very limited consequence. 
6.4. Residual criminal jurisdiction of a third State 
According to Engdahl, the principle of exclusive criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed 
by peacekeepers is relevant only with respect to the Host State.
30
 This means that military 
personnel suspected of war crimes cannot rely on the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of their 
                                                             
23 Report of the Group of Legal Experts on Ensuring the Accountability of United Nations Staff and Experts on 
Mission with Respect to Criminal Acts Committed in Peacekeeping Operations (UN. Doc. A/60/980 of 16 
August 2006) (hereinafter GLE Report UN. Doc. A/60/980) para 40. 
24 If this is added, the existence of on-site courts martial for troops together with the aid of the UN investigators 
and the use of DNA and fingerprinting technology, the victims and witnesses will regain confidence in the rule 
of law. See Defeis EF ‘UN Peacekeepers and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: An End to Impunity’ 2008 (7) 
Washington University Global Studies Law Review 185-214, 197. 
25 Victims of crimes by peacekeepers may also be foreigners, but most of time they are members of the host 
population. See GLE Report UN. Doc A/60/980 para 51. 
26
 para 27. 
27 para 51. 
28 GLE Report UN. Doc A/60/980 para 54. 
29 para 50. 
30 Engdahl O Protection of Personnel in Peace Operations: The Role of the ‘Safety Convention’ Against the 
Background of General International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Leiden 2007) 191. 
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state.
31
 The Status-of-Forces Agreement and Memorandum of Understanding are the 
agreements that preclude the Host State from exercising criminal jurisdiction over criminal 
acts committed by peacekeepers. These two agreements have no bearing on the jurisdiction of 
third states which are not parties thereto.
32
  Third states, therefore, may still wish to exercise 
their criminal jurisdiction over a case based on a ground such as the passive principle.
33
 
According to this principle, a third state, i.e. a state which is not the state on whose territory 
the crime was committed or of origin of the perpetrator, would have the right to try a 
peacekeeper if the victim were a citizen of that state.
34
 A third state would, therefore, 
naturally be within its right to exercise jurisdiction. Most of the time, a third state cannot 
exercise jurisdiction over war crimes if the perpetrator is not currently found in its territory, 
unless it can have the suspect extradited from where he is currently residing to the country 
seeking to have him or her punished. The problem remains therefore of determining when 
peacekeepers’ conduct amounts to war crimes.35 This falls away if an investigation has been 
conducted by the UN OIOS or by a TCC and the identified perpetrator is a fugitive in order to 
avoid prosecution. In fact, agreements bestowing exclusive criminal jurisdiction over acts of 
peacekeepers to TCCs do not bind states which are not party to such agreements.
36
  
From the aforementioned principle, a third state has jurisdiction over peacekeepers where 
their conduct amounts to war crimes.
37
 This raises another key issue which is whether an 
international criminal court or tribunal can also be competent to exercise jurisdiction over 
crimes by peacekeepers? 
                                                             
31 Ibid. War crimes are amongst international crimes for which any state can exercise universal jurisdiction. 
32 Bedont B International Criminal Justice: Implications for Peacekeeping (report for the Canadian Department 
of Foreign Affairs and International Trade December 2001) available at www.peacewomen.org/un/pkwatch-
/DFAIT_rport.doc [last accessed 29 September 2011]. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 According to Amnesty International, two-thirds of all states permit their courts to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over conduct amounting to war crimes. Much of the legislation, however, remains inadequate in that 
it does not determine the scope of the said war crimes, their definition, the principles of criminal responsibility, 
defences, and other obstacles to effective prosecution. See Amnesty International Universal Jurisdiction: The 
Duty of States to Enact and Implement Legislation, Chapter Four - Part A: War Crimes: State Practice at the 
National Level (AI Index: IOR 53/006/2001 September 2001) 14. 
36
 See the res inter alios acta: It is a universal agreement that in principle a treaty creates neither obligations nor 
rights for third States without their consent. Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. 
Entry into force - 27 January 1980. See United Nations Treaty Series vol. 1155, p. 331. 
37 There can be no limitations on the rights of a State, except with its consent. With respect to treaties which 
promote the highest internal interests, any State can aspire to protect such rights by prosecuting whoever 
infringes them. 
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6.5. The International Criminal Court and Tribunals’ jurisdiction 
If the crimes alleged to have been committed fall, for instance, under the jurisdiction of the 
ICC, the principle of exclusive criminal jurisdiction set up in the Status-of-Forces Agreement 
should cease to apply because, as Miller puts it, ‘the only exception to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the TCC in the Host State with respect to criminal offences over their 
contingent members would be if the International Criminal Court asserted jurisdiction over 
crimes falling within its Statute.’38 There is, however, still no case where the ICC has asserted 
such jurisdiction in relation to crimes by peacekeepers, and it is unlikely that it will actually 
do so.
39
  
The issue of peacekeepers falling under the jurisdiction of the ICC reoccurs frequently.
40
 It is 
sometimes said that interpretation by States of the current language in the model Status-of-
Forces Agreement points to excluding the jurisdiction of international tribunals.
41
 Section 
46(b) of the Model Status-of-Forces Agreement that refers to the ‘exclusive’ jurisdiction of 
contingent States must be understood as not relating to international tribunals, but solely to 
Host States.
42
 Furthermore, immunities from the jurisdiction of Host States cannot apply in 
the International Criminal Court.
43
 The ICC is not a party to the agreements between the UN 
and Host States, or between the UN and the TCC and cannot be bound by such instruments. 
For peacekeepers to be prosecuted before the ICC, however, their acts must have reached the 
level of widespread or systematic crimes.
44
 There is no doubt that peacekeepers are 
prosecutable before the ICC, despite its limited capacity to adjudicate each and every case 
                                                             
38 Miller AJ ‘Legal Aspects of Stopping Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations’ 2006 
(39) Cornell International Law Journal 71-96, 80. 
39 It is prudent to refrain from expecting the ICC to be the panacea to the ills of the world. See Bergsmo M (ed) 
Thematic Prosecution of International Sex Crimes (TOAELP Beijing 2012) 407. 
40 Sheeran S et al. United Nations Peacekeeping and the Model Status of Forces Agreement: Experts’ Workshop: 
United Nations Peacekeeping Law Reform Project (School of Law University of Essex February 2011) 18. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Compare Bedont B International Criminal Justice: Implications for Peacekeeping (report for the Canadian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade December 2001) available at www.peacewomen.org-
/un/pkwatch/DFAIT_rport.doc [last accessed 29 September 2011]. 
43 See UN-ICC Agreement: Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and 
the United Nations. Its Article 19 on the Rules concerning United Nations privileges and immunities excludes 
the invocation of such immunities to make the ICC unable to exercise its jurisdiction. In the case the UN is 
required to waive the said immunities. See also Cassese A International Criminal Law 2 ed. (OUP New York 
2008) 312. 
44 Article 8(1) of the Rome Statute: ‘The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when 
committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.’ 
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within its jurisdiction.
45
 One can infer from the fact that the UN organisation had to take a 
resolution to exempt peacekeepers drawn from States not party to the Rome Statute from 
criminal prosecution before the court actually means that the ICC does have jurisdiction over 
crimes committed by peacekeepers.
46
 Indeed, there is no principle that in effect says an 
international tribunal or court has no jurisdiction over peacekeepers. Such a principle would 
jeopardise the raison d’être of any international jurisdiction. In fact, the purpose behind the 
setting up of an international tribunal is to put an end to partiality similar to that which 
happened in Leipzig.
47
 As Gaeta rightly puts it, ‘the perception of impartiality is crucial to the 
legitimacy of the court or tribunal. A choice not to prosecute certain crimes can lead to the 
appearance of partiality [such was the case when the ICTY chose not to prosecute the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) bombings against Serbia]’.48 
The establishment of the ICC was a necessity resulting from the fact that, in some exceptional 
instances, national courts are unwilling or unable to act. It has been shown that prosecuting 
members of the army when back from abroad where they served under the UN flag may well 
fall within exceptional circumstances of state unwillingness to prosecute.
49
 The ICC statute is 
applicable to all individuals without distinction based on official capacity.
50
 The ICC does 
have jurisdiction over war crimes committed by peacekeepers while on UN missions of peace, 
                                                             
45 The ICC has limited capacity to prosecute perpetrators of serious international crimes. See Bergsmo op cit (n 
39) 398 et passim. 
46 Engdahl O op cit (n 30) 191. 
47 Glueck S ‘By What Tribunal Shall War Offender be Tried?’1943 (56) Harvard Law Review 1059-1089, 1059 
et seq. 
48 Gaeta P ‘International and Mixed Jurisdictions: Means and Achievements of Mechanisms established by 
States and United Nations’ (Communication at the ICC-Assembly of States Parties New York 30 November to 
14 December 2007 ICC_ASP/6/INF.2A) 8-9. 
49 Since under the Statute, situations can be triggered in one of following three ways:  referrals to the Court by a 
State [Article 13(a)] or by the Security Council [Article 13(b)]; and investigations proprio motu of the 
Prosecutor consecutively to communications received by his Office and emanating from individuals, groups, 
States, intergovernmental, or non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and related to potential situations 
necessitating investigations. For the exertion of this power, the pre-trial chamber must first give authorization 
(Article 15). It is unlikely that a State, whose army members have been accused of committing crimes while 
serving with a UN peace operation, will refer the case to the ICC itself, nor will the UNSC refer such a case to 
the ICC. No one can actually convince that the proprio motu mechanism can bring the ICC to prosecute 
peacekeepers. The Prosecutor may not be authorized to proceed with such case. With respect to the existing 
workload of the ICC, see Wouters J and Chan K ‘'Policies, Not Politics: The Pursuit of Justice in Prosecutorial 
Strategy at the International Criminal Court’ in Muller S and Zouridis S (eds) Law and Justice: A Strategy 
Perspective: Law of the Future Series No.2 (TOAEP The Hague 2012) 143-168, 148 et seq.  
50 Blattmann R ‘The Establishment of a Permanent International Criminal Court: Consequences and Role of the 
ICC’ (Communication at the ICC-Assembly of States Parties New York 30 November to 14 December 2007 
ICC_ASP/6/INF.2A) 14-15. 
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but the ICC observes the principle of complementarity that is found in the Rome Statute,
51
 i.e. 
the ICC intervenes whenever States are not willing to prosecute those who commit heinous 
crimes such as war crimes.
52
  
6.6. Some prosecutions of crimes by peacekeepers: TCCs 
6.6.1 Canada  
Despite the fact that amongst the six prosecutions before the Canadian courts-martial five 
relate to the same incident, it is important to give facts for each case in order to show the 
degree of involvement of each accused.
53
 Indeed not all the five accused directly participated 
in the torturing to death of the Somali boy.
54
 Moreover, any assessment of the participation in 
criminal conduct seeks to establish personal criminal liability of each participant.
55
 In fact, 
despite the fact that the five prosecutions stemmed from the same incident, what is important 
to take cognisance of is the fact that the proceedings were separate and held in different 
courts. The different individuals accused were not prosecuted jointly. It must be noted, 
however, that the main perpetrator was not prosecuted owing to the fact that he could not 
stand trial.
56
 
                                                             
51 Paragraph 10 of the preamble of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
52 El Zeidy MM The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal Law: Origin, Development and 
Practice (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Leiden 2008) 157-158, 163-170. 
53 For most of the individuals involved, see Rouillard LPF ‘Canada’s Prevention and Repression of War Crimes’ 
2005 (2) Miskolc Journal of International Law 43-58, 50. 
54 For instance Brocklebank did not actually participate in acts of torture which brought about Arone’s death. See 
Boustany K ‘Brocklebank: A Questionable Decision of the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada’ 1998 (1) 
Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 371-374, 371. 
55 Some of the accused in the torturing to death of Arone should be considered as accessories after the fact to 
some degree or other or as having committed specific crimes such as omitting to report to superiors or to punish 
the actual perpetrators if the aim was actually to let the perpetrator escapes accountability. See S 23 of the 
Canadian Criminal Code. 
56 Elvin Kyle Brown (Private, Canadian Forces) v. Her Majesty the Queen, Respondent. [1995] C.M.A.J. No. 1 
File No.: CMAC 372, Judgment: January 6, 1995, para [5]. Also MCpl Matchee still has to stand trial for the 
murder and torture of Shidane Arone. Although he has been declared unfit to stand trial, reviews of that decision 
take place every two years to determine whether he is fit to stand trial pursuant to section 202.12 of the National 
Defence Act, to determine whether sufficient evidence can be adduced to put the accused person on trial. See 
UN Committee against Torture Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 19 of the 
Convention - Fifth periodic reports of States parties due in 2004 Addendum: Canada (CAT/C/81/Add.3 of 4 
November 2004) para 84. Master Corporal Matchee was first charged with second-degree murder and torture in 
relation to the death of Arone in Ottawa. At his trial in April 1994, on a preliminary motion, he was found unfit 
to stand trial by reason of a mental disorder, namely permanent organic brain damage. See UN Committee 
against Torture Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 19 of the Convention - Third 
periodic reports of States parties due in 1996 Addendum: Canada (CAT/C/34/Add.13 of 31 May 2000) para 28. 
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6.6.1.1 R. v. Brocklebank (Appeal) [1996] C.M.A.J. No. 4 
6.6.1.1.1 The facts of the case
57
  
Private Brocklebank was serving with the Canadian Forces on a peacekeeping mission in 
Belet Uen, Somalia.
58
 On the evening of 16 March 1993, a military patrol captured an 
unarmed sixteen-year-old Somali boy named Shidane Arone.
59
 Without resisting, Arone was 
taken into custody, bound, and placed in a bunker.
60
 At the time of the capture, Brocklebank 
was in bed suffering from dysentery; he did not leave his tent until he was awakened by 
Master Corporal Matchee at approximately 2300 hours.
61
 Brocklebank did not have any 
knowledge of the captured boy and the torture he was undergoing at the hands of both 
Matchee and Private Brown. Brocklebank did not even have an idea why he was being 
awakened. He, however, understood afterwards that he was being ordered to be on duty at the 
front gate to the camp. As Brocklebank was heading to the front gate, Matchee called him 
over to the bunker. Once close to the bunker, Matchee pointed a flashlight at Arone and said, 
‘Look what we got here’. Brocklebank had no idea who Arone was, nor did he have any idea 
as to why Arone was in the state in which he saw him.
62
  
After Matchee turned off the flashlight, he ordered Brocklebank to hand over his pistol. 
Matchee then held Brocklebank's pistol to Arone's head and told Brown to take pictures of 
him. Brocklebank did not enter the bunker where Arone was being held; he remained outside 
the bunker watching the gate. He never went down into the bunker while Matchee was 
present. Brocklebank asked Matchee if anyone else had seen what had happened, and 
Matchee told him that Warrant Officer Murphy had kicked or hit Arone and that Captain Sox 
had instructed Matchee to ‘give him a good beating, just don't kill him’. At no time did 
Brocklebank abuse the prisoner or encourage Matchee in what he was doing. Even though he 
knew Arone was being beaten, he assumed it was as a result of an order given to Matchee, 
                                                             
57 Her Majesty the Queen, appellant v. D.J. Brocklebank, (Private Canadian Forces), respondent - File No.: 
CMAC-383 - Judgment: Ottawa, April 2, 1996 (hereinafter R v Brocklebank (appeal)). The case concerned the 
alleged torture of a Somali youth by Canadian Forces engaged in a peacekeeping mission in Somalia in 1993. 
See also Adaka F ‘The Enforcement of Military Justice and Discipline in External Military Operations: 
Exploring the Fault Lines’ 2008 (47) Military Law & Law of War Review 253-265, 255. 
58 The peace operation was established pursuant to the UN Security Council Resolution 794 (1992). 
59 Supra 5.2.2.1. 
60 R v Brocklebank (appeal) para [5]. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
 224 
 
and he did not realize the severity of the beating. Arone subsequently died. Brocklebank 
testified that at no point had he been ordered to guard Arone and that he believed Arone was 
in the custody of Matchee.
63
  
Brocklebank was charged, under section 269 of the Criminal Code of 1985, with the offence 
of aiding and abetting in the commission of torture, and in the alternative with negligent 
performance of a military duty.
64
 Brocklebank was acquitted on both charges at his Court 
Martial, and the Crown appealed.
65
 The legal question discussed on appeal was whether 
Private Brocklebank should be acquitted on both charges of aiding and abetting in torture and 
of negligent performance of military duty since the accused did not take steps to protect the 
prisoner. 
6.6.1.1.2 The Court-martial of Appeal decision 
Regarding the conduct of Brocklebank, the court, in acquitting the accused, estimated that his 
attitude did not constitute a punishable offence. The prosecution disagreed and appealed 
against such an acquittal. The appellate jurisdiction in its majority decision dismissed the 
appeal on the following grounds with respect to each count of offence.  
 Aiding and abetting torture  
In order to be found guilty of the offence of aiding and abetting
66
 in the commission of 
torture,
67
 the panel should have been convinced beyond reasonable doubt that Brocklebank (a) 
                                                             
63 R v Brocklebank (appeal) para [5]. 
64 R v Brocklebank (appeal) para [8]. See also Committee Against ‘Torture Consideration of Reports Submitted 
by States Parties under Article 19 of the Convention Third Periodic Report of States Parties Due in 1996 
Addendum – Canada [19 October 1999]’ Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (UN. Doc. CAT/C/34/Add.13 of 31 May 2000) para 31. 
65 UN. Doc. CAT/C/34/Add.13 of 31 May 2000 31. 
66 72. (1) Every person is a party to and guilty of an offence who 
(a) actually commits it; 
(b) does or omits to do anything for the purpose of aiding any person to commit it; 
(c) abets any person in committing it; or 
(d) counsels or procures any person to commit it. 
67 See S. 269.1 (1) of the Canadian Criminal Code: Every official, or every person acting at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of an official, who inflicts torture on any other person is guilty of an indictable 
offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years. The remainder of the article explains 
what is meant by the terms “official” and “acts of torture.” 
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did or omitted to having done something and (b) for the purpose of aiding Matchee (the 
soldier who actually tortured Arone) in the commission of the offence of torture.
68
 
Considering the assumption that the accused failed to take the necessary steps to prevent the 
torture or omitted to do something, therefore, the opinion that Brocklebank’s omission to 
intervene aimed at aiding or abetting the torturous acts perpetrated by Matchee reposes upon a 
non-existing basis. Indeed the evidence that could establish that the respondent had formed 
the intention required to commit the offence he was charged with was not presented. No 
prima facie case was established by the prosecution with respect to this first charge.
69
 The 
accused was, therefore, acquitted regarding the charge of aiding and abetting torture. 
 Negligent performance of military duty 
The prosecution appealed against the acquittal of the accused with respect to the charge of 
negligent performance of military duty on the ground that the Judge Advocate erred in 
instructing the panel regarding the standard care and the de facto duty of care.
70
 Section 124 
of the Canadian National Defence Act forms the basis of the charge. It provides that ‘Every 
person who negligently performs a military duty imposed on that person is guilty of an 
offence and on conviction is liable to dismissal with disgrace from Her Majesty’s service or to 
less punishment.’71  
The appellate jurisdiction noted that the correct definition of ‘negligently’ is that the word 
signifies that the accused either did something or omitted to do something in a manner which 
would not have been adopted by a reasonably capable and careful person in his position in the 
service under similar circumstances.
72
 With respect to exercising military service, the 
standard of care applicable to the charge of negligent performance of a military duty is that of 
the conduct expected of the reasonable person of the rank and in all the circumstances of the 
accused at the time and place the alleged offence occurred.
73
 In the context of a military 
operation, the standard of care will vary considerably in relation to the degree of 
responsibility exercised by the accused, the nature and purpose of the operation, and the 
                                                             
68
 R v Brocklebank (appeal) para [9]. 
69 R v Brocklebank (appeal) para [10]. 
70 para [12]-[13]. 
71 S. 124 Canadian National Defence Act. 
72 R v Brocklebank (appeal) para [14]. 
73 R v Brocklebank (appeal) para [18]. 
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exigencies of a particular situation.
74
 The reason for this is that, in the military context, where 
discipline is the linchpin of the hierarchical command structure and insubordination attracts 
the harshest censure, a soldier cannot be held to be exacting the same standard of care as a 
senior officer when faced with a situation where the discharge of his duty might bring him 
into direct conflict with the authority of a senior officer.
75
 
To reach the conclusion that the prosecution's argument with respect to the standard of care 
fails,
76
 the appellate jurisdiction indicated that the Judge Advocate's comments show that he 
informed the panel that in deciding whether the respondent had met the appropriate standard 
of care in the performance of the duty imposed upon him, the panel could consider the rank, 
status and training of the respondent as these were characteristics which the panel would 
otherwise ascribe to the reasonable person in the circumstances of the respondent.
77
 A 
question put to the Judge Advocate by the panel points to the correctness of the understanding 
of the instruction,
78
 and it aimed to ascertain whether, in determining the standard of care, 
ought one to determine the standard within the strict context of the circumstances in Somalia, 
or ought one to determine the standard within the context of the average Canadian soldier 
within the Canadian Forces as a whole. In other words, the different members of the panel 
wanted to know whether the standard of care to which they  would subsequently compare 
Private Brocklebank's conduct would be determined within the circumstances and  context of 
the situation in Somalia at the time of the alleged offence according to the evidence presented, 
or if the standard of care to which they would subsequently compare Private Brocklebank's 
conduct would be determined within the broader context of the average Canadian soldier 
within the Canadian Forces.  
The Judge Advocate’s response to the question put to him unequivocally clarified that the test 
to be adopted was an objective one, viz referred to the conduct of a ‘reasonably capable and 
careful private in Private Brocklebank's position in the Service under circumstances similar to 
those in evidence’ would have adopted to discharge the duty.79 
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 R v. BrockleBank (Appeal) para [22]. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Para [20]. 
78 Para [21]. 
79 Ibid. 
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As to the question of whether the trial panel could find Brocklebank guilty of negligent 
performance of a de facto military duty to protect civilians from foreseeable danger and 
whether or not the soldier considered was aware of such de facto duty, the appellate 
jurisdiction concluded that the Judge Advocate had erred in instructing the panel in this 
regard, i.e. from the Unit Guide to Geneva Conventions such a duty existed.
80
 The error, 
however, was of no significance in ordering the trial of the Brocklebank anew since the panel 
found that the deceased Arone was not under the custodial responsibility of the respondent.
81
 
6.6.1.1.3 Criticism of the decision in R v. Brocklebank 
The criticism regarding the case must concern the whole issue of whether Brocklebank should 
have been found guilty of any crime. As one may infer from the facts as presented above, the 
acquittal of the accused is sustained by a number of reasons that Brocklebank performed 
personally no act of torture against Arone. The only act he witnessed was that of Brown 
taking a picture of Matchee holding Brocklebank’s pistol to the head of the victim.82 After 
recovering his pistol, however, Brocklebank remained outside the entrance to the bunker 
while Matchee continued to torture Arone.
83
 It was the above reason that justified the 
acquittal of Brocklebank regarding aiding and abetting torture. 
With respect to the charge of a negligent performance of duty, it is important to note the 
dissenting opinion of Justice of Appeal Weiler according to which opinion the appeal against 
the count of negligent performance of military duty should be allowed. This Judge based his 
argument on the ground that Brocklebank had guarded the bunker in which Arone was 
detained, he knew the victim was in bad state, and he took no steps to alert the hierarchy 
regarding the state of the detained person.
84
 Perhaps Brocklebank failed to take such steps 
because his direct superior was the torturer, because of his assumption that Arone was under 
the custody of Matchee, and that his interpretation that mounting the guard at the gate and 
                                                             
80 R v. BrockleBank (Appeal) paras [23]-[55]. 
81 Para 59. 
82 Paras [5],[ 67]. 
83
 R v. BrockleBank (Appeal) para [67]. 
84 The Crown discharged its burden of proving that the Judge Advocate's instructions concerning the charge of 
neglect of duty affected the finding of the panel. The errors made were fundamental ones which would have 
affected the very basis on which the panel approached the second charge. See R v. BrockleBank (Appeal), para 
96. It is effectively true that Brocklebank failed even to attempt to put an end to the ordeal by, for instance, 
reporting it to a superior of Matchee.  
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having the custody of the detained were two different duties.
85
 But Brocklebank could have 
tried to stop Arone's ordeal by reporting the matter to any of Matchee's superiors.
86
 Indeed, if 
this case is considered in the context of liability for omissions highlighted in chapter three, it 
is submitted that a peacekeeper would not escape liability if there was such a clause in the 
Memorandum of Understanding or in the Status-of-Forces Agreement.
87
 
The most serious criticism against the judgment of appeal is that of considering that the 
Geneva Conventions were not applicable to the case.
88
 The minority judgment also pointed at 
that misinterpretation of the law by stating that ‘a peacekeeping mission is a military 
operation carried out by armed forces with the aim of preventing hostilities and, therefore, 
within the Geneva Convention as enlarged by the 1977 protocols.’89 Indeed, as Oswald, 
Durham, and Bates put it, Geneva Conventions are relevant to peacekeepers where they are 
engaged in an armed conflict, i.e. when they can be considered as combatants in the spirit of 
the 1999 Secretary-General Bulletin.
90
 In situations where peacekeepers cannot be viewed as 
engaged in an armed conflict, the Fourth Geneva Convention, also called the Civilian 
Convention, must continue to be considered to be the bench-mark standard to be applied.
91
  
6.6.1.2 R. v. Brown (Appeal)
92
 
6.6.1.2.1 The facts of the case  
On the night of 16 March 1993, the day of the incident, the appellant's section was assigned to 
guard and sentry duty in the compound of number 2 Commando under the commandment of 
Sergeant Boland. The immediate superior of the appellant was Master Corporal Matchee.
93
 A 
                                                             
85 R v. BrockleBank (Appeal) para [67]. 
86 R v. BrockleBank (Appeal) para [67]. See also Doria J ‘Attacks on UN and Regional Organizations 
Peacekeepers: Potential Legal Issues before the International Criminal Court’ 2009 (5) International Studies 
Journal 35-89, 43; Boustany K op cit  (n 54) 371. 
87 Compare the South African case of Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and another [2000] 4 All SA 
537 (A); 2001 (1) SA 489 (SCA). 
88 Boustany noted that since the incident occurred during UNITAF, an enforcement operation, humanitarian law 
was more relevant; it could not be said that Geneva law was foreign to the incident. See Boustany K op cit  (n 
54) 372-374. 
89 R v. BrockleBank (Appeal) para [82]. 
90
 Oswald B, Durham H and Bates A Documents on the Law of UN Peace Operations (Oxford University Press 
New York 2010) 206, 221. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Elvin Kyle Brown (Private, Canadian Forces) v. Her Majesty the Queen, Respondent. [1995] C.M.A.J. No. 1 
File No.: CMAC 372, Judgment: January 6, 1995. 
93 R. v. Brown (Appeal) para [3]. 
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16-year-old Somali male was captured and was placed in the custody of the appellant's 
section. The detainee was severely and brutally beaten to death by Matchee,
94
 who was also 
charged but found unfit to stand trial.
95
  
The appellant was present during a great part of the beating, took photos of the person 
perpetrating the beating, and himself posed with the victim. He even admitted to have 
punched him once in the jaw and to have kicked him twice on the leg.
96
 Other soldiers were 
also present from time to time while the beating was taking place. Evidence from soldiers 
who visited the bunker where the beating took place tends to point to the fact that the 
appellant was scared of Matchee not only as his immediate superior but also because he was a 
violent person with a quick temper and had apparently been drinking that night.
97
 The death 
of the boy was probably caused by brain swelling resulting from the cumulative effect of 
blows to the head. Lacerations on the deceased's face were probably caused by blows with a 
fist, and such blows may have had a concussive effect contributing to the victim's death.
98
 
The General Court-martial found the appellant not guilty of the charge of murder but guilty of 
the included offence of manslaughter. It also found him guilty of torture.
99
 Brown appealed 
against the decision and the Crown cross-appealed regarding the sentence. The appellant's 
grounds of appeal from conviction were: that the denial of a trial by jury infringed his rights 
under paragraph 11(f) of the Charter; that the guaranteed presumption of innocence contained 
in paragraph 11(d) of the Charter was infringed by the absence of a requirement of unanimity 
to support a court martial's finding; that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias on the 
part of the Commanding Officer in signing the charge sheet; and that the Judge Advocate at 
trial erred in refusing to admit certain alleged hearsay statements.
100
 The Crown's proposed 
appeal with respect to the severity of sentence alleged that a sentence of five years' 
imprisonment was not sufficient, given the objective gravity of both the offence of 
manslaughter and the offence of torture.
101
  
                                                             
94 R. v. Brown (Appeal) para [4].  
95 Para [5]. 
96
 Ibid.  
97 Ibid. 
98 Para [6]. 
99 Para [7]. 
100 R v. Brown (Appeal) para [8]. 
101 Paras [33]-[34]. 
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The legal questions dealt with by the Court Martial of Appeals was as follows: (1) Whether 
the appellant’s right to be tried by a jury and his right to be presumed innocent were 
infringed
102
; (2) whether the alleged reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the 
commanding officer who signed the charge sheet and an alleged error on the part of the Judge 
Advocate in refusing evidence of a hearsay statement made by Matchee should have 
contributed in favour of the accused;
103
 and (3) The Crown’s Appeal upon the ground that the 
sentence of five years of imprisonment is not sufficient vis-à-vis the gravity of the offences of 
manslaughter and torture.
104
 
6.6.1.2.2 The Court-martial of Appeal decision  
The appellate court dismissed both the Appeal from conviction and the Appeal with respect to 
severity of sentence.
105
 The Court Martial of Appeal held that the appeal upon the ground 
based on the right to a jury failed because the existence of a military nexus with the crime 
charged constituted an exception to the right to a jury.
106
 With respect to the guaranteed 
presumption of innocence, such guarantee is not infringed by the absence of unanimity to 
support court martial’s findings,107 because the requirement of unanimity exists only with 
respect to trial by a jury. A panel of a court martial is not a jury; its role and function are 
different from those of a jury.
108
 
With respect to the ground of appeal vis-à-vis the attitude of the appellant’s commanding 
officer signing the charge sheet to take legal advice from officers in the Judge Advocate 
General’s department, the Appellate Court held that the appellant’s consideration that such 
commanding officer’s attitude amounts to a bias is without merit since the commanding 
officer role is an administrative one, not judicial.
109
 Concerning the other ground of appeal by 
Brown with respect to the refusal of admission of hearsay evidence, the appellate jurisdiction 
rejected this ground on the basis that it implicated no substantial miscarriage of justice.
110
 
                                                             
102 R v. Brown (Appeal) para [9]. 
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The sentence appeal by the Crown was also dismissed on the ground that no error on the part 
of the Trial Court Martial could be identified from the reading of that court’s decision.111 
With respect to the other ground of dismissal of the Crown’s appeal regarding the low 
severity of the sentence compared to the offences charged, the appellate jurisdiction held that, 
in the light of many factors in favour of the accused, the sentence was not inadequate in 
respect of both the charge of manslaughter and that of torture.
112
 
6.6.1.2.3 Criticism of the decision in R v Brown 
At Private Brown’s court martial, the prosecution argued that Private Brown had violated his 
duty to protect the victim from Matchee, or at least to report the incident to someone who 
could stop it.
113
 This seems not to have been taken into account since no sentence was 
imposed in this regard, perhaps because the trial general court martial  accepted the argument 
by the defence counsel that Brown could not report to any superior since his superiors were 
involved in the torture, or at least condoned it.
114
 It was correctly upheld that Private Brown's 
own acts of assault constituted torture. There seems, however, to be no justification for the 
position of the court to leave out the assistance that Brown gave to Matchee.
115
 The argument 
by the defence that Private Brown was guilty of assault, but that the evidence failed to 
establish that the assault perpetrated by Private Brown actually contributed to the death of Mr. 
Arone, or that Private Brown's acts or omissions were intended to assist  Matchee in torturing 
the victim or in causing injuries was not accepted.
116
 Since the minimum sentence for 
manslaughter is four years of imprisonment,
117
 and considering that for the offence of torture 
no minimum is set but only the maximum of fourteen years of imprisonment,
118
 one is not 
wrong to argue that the sentence of five years is not completely inadequate as indeed the 
appellate jurisdiction held.
119
 
                                                             
111 R v. Brown (Appeal) para [38]. 
112 para [39]. 
113 Commission of Inquiry Reports available at www.forces.gc.ca/somalia/somaliae.htm [accessed 23 June 2011] 
329 (hereinafter CCI Somalia op cit). 
114 Ibid. 
115
 R v. Boland (Appeal), para [7]. 
116 If such an argument were accepted by the panel, it could not find Brown guilty of torture. See CCI Somalia 
op cit (n 113) 329. 
117 S. 236(a) of the Canadian Criminal Code. 
118 S. 269.1 of the Canadian Criminal Code. 
119 R v. Brown (Appeal) para [39]. 
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It is still, however, not explained why Kyle Brown was eligible for parole as soon as 
November 1995. He was convicted on 16 March 1994, exactly one year after the death of 
Shidane Arone; his appeal and that of the Crown were dismissed by the Court Martial Appeal 
Court on 6 January 1995, and leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was denied on 
1 June 1995.
120
 It is not indicated that during these proceedings Brown was in custody, and 
was, therefore, considered to have already served one half of the sentence already to be 
eligible for parole.
121
 
6.6.1.3 R. v. Boland (Appeal)
122
 
6.6.1.3.1 The facts of the case 
Boland arrived shortly before 9:00 pm to relieve Matchee who had at that time already 
tortured the prisoner.
123
 The appellant found the prisoner bound by his ankles and wrists and 
had a baton stuck through his elbows behind his back. He ordered the prisoner's ankles to be 
released and arranged for a looser wrist binding. Matchee retied the prisoner's ankles and 
subjected the prisoner to further abuse in Boland's presence. Before the appellant, Boland, 
went off duty at midnight, he said to Brown and Matchee: ‘I don't care what you do, just don't 
kill the guy.’124 
Boland subsequently met Matchee at a beer tent where Matchee told him that Private Brown 
had been hitting the prisoner, and that he, Matchee, intended to burn the soles of the prisoner's 
feet with a cigarette. Boland reportedly said, ‘Don’t do that, it would leave too many marks. 
Use a phone book on him.’125 In the same conversation, Boland told Matchee of the 
instructions from senior officers that it was alright to abuse prisoners, on which Matchee 
commented, ‘Oh yeah!’ Again, in parting, Boland said to Matchee, ‘I don't care what you do, 
just don't kill him’.126 Boland then went to bed without returning to the bunker where the 
prisoner was being held.  
                                                             
120 He was released from the Canadian Forces on 24 May 1995. See CCI Somalia op cit 329. 
121 S 743.6 of the Canadian Criminal Code. 
122
 Her Majesty the Queen v. Mark Adam Boland, (Sergeant, Canadian Forces), [1995] C.M.A.J. No. 7 - File 
No.: CMAC-374 - Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada. 
123 R v. Boland (Appeal) para [12]. 
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Boland was charged with two offences. The first charge was for the torture of the prisoner. 
The second charge was that of negligently performing a military duty. Boland pleaded guilty 
to the charge of negligence and not guilty to the charge of torture.
127
 The charge of torture 
was not proceeded with. Boland was sentenced to 90 days' detention. The Crown appealed the 
severity of the sentence. The appeal raised two issues: (1) should the General Court Martial 
have taken into account evidence presented by Boland as to the events involved in the offence 
itself? (2) Was the sentence of 90 days' incarceration adequate?
128
 The second issue is 
pertinent to this thesis. 
6.6.1.3.2 The Court-martial of Appeal decision 
The court held that the sentence of 90 days' imprisonment imposed by the trial panel was 
effectively inadequate. The sentence was increased to one year.
129
 The reasons for upholding 
the crown’s appeal was that the ‘public policy demands firm deterrence of those who abuse or 
neglect helpless persons in their charge.’130 The primary sentencing principles are repudiation 
and general deterrence. The prosecution requested that the Judge Advocate instruct the court 
that a significant period of incarceration was required. The term of imprisonment should be a 
term that takes into account the stark horror of the death of Shidane Arone and the 
responsibility for that death that Sergeant Boland shared with others.
131
 If the panel of officers 
imposed a sentence which is so light, this must have stemmed from the inadequate 
instructions given by the Judge Advocate. As a minimum it must be recognized that the 
respondent never disputed the particulars of his offence, namely that he failed to ensure that 
Arone was safeguarded, as it was his duty to do.
132
 In his own examination-in-chief he 
confirmed on several occasions that he had been negligent. The sad but unalterable fact is that 
negligence led to the death of the prisoner. Even if the panel believed that Boland did not see 
Brown strike the prisoner on the first occasion, and even if it concluded that Boland did not 
believe Matchee's statement that Brown had struck the prisoner after he, Boland, had left, 
Boland had admitted that he considered Brown to be a ‘weak’ soldier who could surely not be 
counted on to resist the initiatives of Matchee. He admitted to having seen Matchee do life-
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132 The appellant was, therefore, negligent but also criminally liable for omission. 
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threatening acts to the prisoner by covering his nose and pouring water on him. He had 
subsequently heard Matchee speak of intending to burn the prisoner with cigarettes. He, thus, 
had good grounds for apprehension with respect to Matchee's conduct. There was also 
evidence from even some defence witnesses that Matchee's reputation was well known. Yet, it 
was clear that Boland had said at least once, and probably twice, in the presence of Matchee, 
‘I don't care what you do, just don't kill the guy’. He gave no proper order to Matchee as to 
safeguarding the prisoner and left the prisoner unsupervised. Nor was it in dispute that it was 
Boland's responsibility to take all reasonable steps to see that the prisoner was held in a 
proper manner. Boland failed in that duty, with grave consequences.
133
 There were no 
mitigating circumstances, such as the presence of an armed or dangerous prisoner, or even 
one who was physically uncontrollable. These events did not happen in the heat of battle. 
There was nothing to suggest that this prisoner had caused any harm to any Canadian or to 
any Canadian military property; indeed he was captured, not in the Canadian compound, but 
in an abandoned adjacent compound.
134
 
6.6.1.3.3 Criticism of the decision in R v. Boland 
It must be recalled that the sentence of imprisonment was increased from 90 days’ 
imprisonment to one year.
135
 The Geneva Conventions prescribe humane treatment of 
protected persons such as civilians and prisoners and also proscribe coercion that causes 
physical suffering that might lead to death as in the case of Arone in the hands of the 
Canadian forces.
136
 The parties to these treaties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to 
provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of 
the grave breaches defined by the said Conventions.
137
 Torture is one of such grave 
breaches.
138
 Failure to prosecute Boland for torture, or for at least abetting torture or 
condoning it, has no obvious explanation. He saw that Arone was being mistreated but took 
no action to stop it.
139
 Boland, in fact, encouraged the inhumane treatment by telling Matchee 
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that instructions from senior officers were that it was all right to abuse prisoners.
140
 Boland 
repeated to Matchee, ‘I don't care what you do, just don't kill him.’141 One, therefore, can 
draw the conclusion that to have omitted to prosecute Boland for torture shows the reluctance 
on the part of national prosecutors and courts to punish the perpetrators of torture, especially 
when such acts were committed abroad against foreigners.
142
 Boland was superior in rank to 
those who materially committed the torture. Boland had as his immediate superior Lieutenant 
Michael Sox with whom he attended the ‘Orders Group’ in the morning of the incidents that 
claimed the death of Shidane Arone. 
6.6.1.4 R. v. Sox (Appeal)143 
6.6.1.4.1 The facts of the case 
Sox was the commander who passed on information that any prisoners captured as a result of 
a forthcoming patrol could be "abused".
144
  He may, therefore, be considered to be the person 
at the basis of the torturing to death the Arone.
145
 Tried at a General Court Martial on three 
charges, Sox was found not guilty with respect to the first charge of unlawfully causing bodily 
harm to Arone. He was convicted on the second charge, which was an alternate to charge 1, of 
failing to exercise properly command over his subordinates.
146
 Expert testimony at the trial 
indicated that a platoon commander in Sox's situation ought to have given clear orders to 
ensure his troops did not abuse a prisoner and ought to have exercised such personal 
supervision as may have been required in the circumstances to make sure that those orders 
were obeyed.
147
 He was sentenced to reduction in rank and a severe reprimand.
148
 The Crown 
appealed the stay of proceedings with respect to Charge 3, and sought the substitution of a 
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conviction. The Crown also appealed the sentence, seeking one of more severe punishment. 
Sox also appealed against his conviction on Charge 2.
149
 
Some four issues had to be decided by the appellate jurisdiction: (1) whether a Court Martial 
Appeal Court has jurisdiction to substitute a conviction on a charge where the Court Martial 
has entered a stay of proceedings; (2) the issue of section 124 of the Canadian Defence Act, 
which relates to negligent performance of a military duty; (3) as regards evidence, whether 
evidence related to a charge can be considered in relation to a different charge; and (4) 
whether the Crown may seek a more severe sentence from that imposed by the trial panel. 
6.6.1.4.2 The Court-martial of Appeal decision  
With respect to the first issue, the court held that there is no jurisdiction conferred on a Court 
Martial Appeal Court to substitute a conviction on a charge where the Court Martial has 
entered a stay of proceedings.
150
 With respect to the second issue regarding negligent 
performance of military duty, the appellate court held that military duty arises from tasking 
given by a superior officer.
151
 It further added that the duty to exercise command over 
subordinates includes the duty to safeguard prisoners from physical abuse. Regarding the 
third issue, it was held that the hearsay evidence which related to Charge 1, and was irrelevant 
to Charge 2, should not have been considered in relation to Charge 2, but that, although such 
double hearsay had been admitted, it had resulted in no substantial miscarriage of justice.
152
 
With respect to the issue of increasing sentences on appeal, the court held that it was not 
necessary to change the sentence to a more severe one, because the sentence the court a quo 
had inflicted was not unreasonable.
153
   
A number of reasons can be cited for the dismissal of the appeals and cross-appeal. In its 
conclusion that it was illegal to substitute a verdict of not guilty by a verdict of guilty, the 
Court Martial Appeal Court founded its decision upon the interpretation of section 239(1) 
invoked by the Crown.
154
 This section deals with a situation where the trial court found the 
                                                             
149 R. v. Sox (Appeal) para [4]. 
150 Para [21]. 
151
 Para [38]. 
152 Para [41]. 
153  Para [45]. 
154 Canadian National Defence Act, S. 239(1): Where an appellant has been found guilty of an offence and the 
court martial could, on the charge, have found the appellant guilty under section 133, 134 or 136 of some other 
offence, or could have found the appellant guilty of some other offence on any alternative charge that was laid, 
 237 
 
accused guilty on one of alternative charges.
155
 For instance, if the trial panel had found Sox 
guilty on charge 1 but made no pronouncement on charge 3, the appellate jurisdiction could 
substitute such a finding on charge 1 with the alternative charge 3. The Crown misinterpreted 
section 239(1) of the National Defence Act.  
Regarding the finding on the military duty imposed on Captain Sox, the fact that he attended 
the ‘Orders group’156 implied that such duty had been imposed on Sox at that session. Such a 
duty includes the duty to safeguard prisoners against abuse.
157
 And, with respect to the 
conclusion that the admission of hearsay evidence led to no substantial miscarriage of justice, 
the appellate jurisdiction estimated that such admission of evidence ‘had little if any 
prejudicial effect on the panel, having regard to the admissions of fact and other evidence to 
which reference has been made concerning Sox's comments on this subject at his orders 
group.’158 
With respect to restraint in the increase of sentences on appeal, the decision of the court is 
based on the principles governing appeals from the sentence of a General Court Martial, 
which was reviewed by the same court of Appeals in R. v. Seward.
159
 In that case, the Court 
Martial Appeal Court noted the need for restraint on the part of an appellate court in 
considering whether to vary a sentence on the basis of lack of fitness. It cited formulations of 
the test set out in a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Shropshire.
160
 
6.6.1.4.3 Criticism of the decision in R v. Sox 
As for the criticism regarding the preceding Boland case, it is important to note that 
international humanitarian law proscribed the inhumane treatment that Shidane Arone 
suffered at the hands of the Canadian Forces.
161
 Indeed he died repeating ‘Canada, Canada!’ 
in his painful screams.
162
 Arone was apprehended
163
 by the patrol headed by Captain Sox
164
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who, during his orders group for the section commanders in his platoon, is alleged to have 
said something to the effect that it would be appropriate or acceptable to abuse or ‘rough up’ 
anyone captured while attempting to penetrate the compound.
165
 He, by such allusion to the 
appropriateness of abusing prisoners, gave a sort of carte blanche to those who effectively put 
the instruction into execution, i.e. Matchee and Brown. 
By giving such an instruction to section commanders, Sox could not forget that, if someone 
were captured, that person could be abused, contrary to the requirements of international 
humanitarian law. He took no measures to prevent such abuse but said it was not bad to abuse 
prisoners. The fact that he did not himself torture Shidane Arone does not absolve Sox from 
his responsibility to protect prisoners in the custody of the Canadian forces.
166
 
One could not expect Sox to have prevented a breach of international humanitarian law when 
he himself had said that such a breach could be committed. Thus, in addition to his command 
responsibility, Sox could also be held as an accomplice since Sox conducted an orders group 
for the section commanders in his platoon and said persons captured could be abused.
167
 As 
the expert testimony at the trial indicated, the failure to give clear orders to ensure that his 
troops did not abuse a prisoner, and to exercise such personal supervision as may be required 
in the circumstances to assure orders are obeyed, demonstrated the part played by Sox in the 
tragic incident against Arone.
168
 One sees no reason why proceedings related to charge 3 had 
to be stayed. What was effectively grave for Sox was having stated that prisoners could be 
abused. 
As to the appropriateness of the sentence of reduction in rank and a severe reprimand, it must 
be noted that such a sentence is one of the options provided for by the National Defence 
Act.
169
 It denotes, however, that the offence of negligent performance of military duty is not 
grave when committed by commanders. Yet, any sentence meted out should reflect the 
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purpose of the punishment and deterrence should increase with the rank of the officer.
170
 But, 
as it has already been noted, since the parties to the Geneva Conventions undertake to enact 
any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or 
ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches defined by the said Conventions,
171
 such 
sanctions vary from one country to another.
172
 Captain Sox was not the very first officer to 
instruct the abuse of any person captured. It was Major Seward who had wilfully ordered the 
violation of the Geneva Convention in the circumstance. It is, therefore, interesting to know 
how the court dealt with his case. 
6.6.1.5 R. v. Seward (Appeal)
173
 
6.6.1.5.1 The facts of the case 
In command of 2 Commando, Canadian Airborne Regiment deployed to Somalia,
174
 the 
respondent is the officer who issued orders that infiltrators into their camp were to be 
captured and abused, and he wanted them captured.
175
 He was charged with having 
unlawfully caused bodily harm to Arone contrary to section 130 of the National Defence Act 
and section 269 of the Criminal Code of Canada; and with having negligently performed a 
military duty imposed upon him contrary to section 124 of the National Defence Act, in that 
he allegedly issued an instruction to his subordinates that prisoners could be abused and failed 
to exercise command over his subordinates properly.
176
  
The respondent was found guilty on the second charge and sentenced to a severe 
reprimand.
177
 The Crown sought to appeal the above sentence. In its factum on the appeal, the 
Crown asked that the respondent's sentence be increased to dismissal from Her Majesty's 
service. During argument before the Appeal Court, however, the Crown suggested that an 
appropriate sentence would be dismissal with disgrace, the maximum sentence permitted.
178
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The Crown appealed against the sentence. The Crown considered the sentence imposed by the 
General Court Martial to be low, and asked the Court Martial Appeal Court to increase it.
179
 
6.6.1.5.2 The Court-martial of Appeal decision 
 
After cautioning that the Appeal Court must show restraint in increasing sentences imposed 
by the trial court,
180
 it held that the sentence of severe reprimand was unfit, and clearly 
unreasonable.
181
 The court increased the sentence to three months’ imprisonment together 
with dismissal from Her Majesty's service.
182
  
 
If the trial panel of officers imposed a derisory sentence in the form of a severe reprimand, it 
was because the Judge Advocate did not instruct the panel properly. He also failed to take into 
account factors that could cast light on the issue. It is said on behalf of the respondent, that 
since he was acquitted on count 1 (the charge of causing bodily harm to Shidane Abukar 
Arone) the death of Arone through abuse at the hands of the respondent's subordinates could 
not be a circumstance to be taken into account with respect to sentence. It should have been 
instructed as the prosecutor forcefully argued that, in the matter of sentence, the consequences 
which followed upon the giving of the respondent's order were relevant, particularly because 
they reflected a breakdown in discipline to which the order must be taken to have contributed. 
Part of that breakdown in discipline involved the beating to death of Arone. The Judge 
Advocate did not accept the argument by the prosecutor that instructions by Seward 
contributed to the breakdown in discipline and that such circumstance had to be taken into 
account in sentencing. The only reference the Judge Advocate made to the prosecutor's 
position was the lengthy enumeration of some 18 factors the panel should consider in 
sentencing, including ‘consequences of his negligence’. This was neither explained nor 
elaborated upon.
183
  
 
The Judge Advocate did not have adequate regard to the stated particulars of the offence upon 
which the respondent had just been convicted, namely, that he had negligently performed a 
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military duty in that, by issuing an instruction to his subordinates that prisoners could be 
abused, he failed to exercise command over his subordinates properly, as it was his duty to 
do. Even interpreted reasonably and in a way most favourable to the respondent, the evidence 
amply demonstrated that this failure resulted in, at best, confusion in 2 Commando and must 
be taken to have led ultimately to excesses by some of the respondent's subordinates. This 
contributed not only to the death, of which the respondent was acquitted of being a party, but 
also contributed to several members of the Canadian Armed Forces committing serious lapses 
of discipline and ultimately facing serious charges. The Judge Advocate also failed to give 
any direction to the panel with respect to another relevant matter, namely the sentences of 
other service personnel already convicted in respect of the same chain of events, for example 
Boland's sentence. If the Judge Advocate had properly directed the panel to compare the 
sentence imposed with respect to other court-martial decisions related to the incident, this 
panel should not have imposed so derisory a sentence of severe reprimand against the person 
who actually was at the base of the incident itself.
184
  
6.6.1.5.3 Criticism of the decision in R v. Seward  
As stated in the comment on the preceding cases, international humanitarian law is violated 
whenever a protected person is not afforded humane treatment.
185
 Arone, as a civilian, was 
such a protected person. By torturing and inflicting death on that Somali teenager, the 
Canadian forces violated international humanitarian rules. The material perpetrators of the 
torture were elements belonging to the 2 Commando of the Canadian Airborne Regiment. 
Seward was of a much superior rank, as an officer and commander of the whole of 2 
Commando, to his subordinates.
186
 The duty to ensure that subordinates do not perpetrate acts 
of indiscipline, contrary to the law of armed conflicts, belonged to him. 
The question one may ask is whether Seward knew, or had information which would have 
enabled him to conclude, that his subordinates were going to commit a breach of International 
Humanitarian Law. One fails to understand why Seward could be considered as not having 
intended what happened. He was in a position to foresee that his subordinates would mistreat 
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any Somali, and, as in the case of Arone, to cause the death of a Somali.
187
 Thus he had 
foresight that the interpretation of the orders given might lead to the violation of the rule 
required to be observed in the circumstances. Unfortunately, the decision does not provide 
particulars as to when Seward was informed regarding the torture and death of Arone and 
what steps he took to punish the perpetrators.
188
 In any case, Seward did not have command 
responsibility for the breach only, and it should have been considered that he should be 
prosecuted for actually ordering his subordinates to commit the breach by abusing prisoners. 
That was, however, never the case before the trial panel. 
Regarding the sentence which was increased on appeal, i.e. to three months imprisonment and 
dismissal from Canadian forces, it must be considered as appropriate to the charge on which 
Seward was found guilty, the negligent performance of military duty in violation of section 
124 of the Canadian National Defence Act. Had Seward been prosecuted for ordering abuse, a 
sentence of three months imprisonment would have be inadequate when one takes into 
consideration the circumstances in which a senior officer deliberately pronounced an 
ambiguous order and the fact that the sentence must provide a deterrent to careless conduct by 
commanding officers.
189
 
6.6.1.6 R. v. Mathieu (Appeal)
190
 
6.6.1.6.1 The facts of the case 
Lieutenant-Colonel Mathieu was the commanding officer of the Canadian Airborne regiment 
Battle Group deployed to Somalia at the end of 1992.
191
 All the Canadian forces were placed 
under the command of Colonel Labbé. The Airborne regiment, as well as the other Canadian 
forces, were stationed in Belet Huen, five kilometres from the town. Although the camp was 
fenced with rolls of barbed wire, unarmed Somali teenagers slipped under the wire to access 
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the camp. There were several instances of thefts of the personal belongings of soldiers such as 
cans of diesel fuel, binoculars, and a barrack box. No theft of any firearm was ever reported 
nor was the Canadian camp ever been attacked by armed forces or militia.
192
  
Lieutenant-Colonel Mathieu met with his ‘group orders’ every morning at eight o’clock to be 
informed of the events of the previous day and to issue directives to his officers. On 28 
January 1993, Mathieu was very concerned about infiltrations and break-ins. He feared 
weapons and ammunitions could be stolen. At the meeting of the orders group, he spoke to his 
subordinates about the use of force against thieves and looters fleeing the camp. They could 
fire at a thief fleeing between the feet and the knees. The accused informed the local tribal 
kings and elders in the Belet Huen region that the Canadian Forces intended to fire on looters 
and thieves.
193
   
On 4 March 1993, a Somali man was killed by a patrol outside the camp.
194
 Shortly after the 
incident, Lieutenant-Colonel Mathieu prohibited his troops from using deadly force against 
looters except where it could be positively ascertained that a thief was fleeing with a firearm 
in his hands.
195
 With regard to the above incident, Lieutenant-Colonel Mathieu was charged 
with negligently performing military duty contrary to section 124 of the National Defence 
Act. The accused was acquitted by a General Court Martial. The Crown appealed against the 
acquittal.
196
 On appeal the verdict was set aside and a new trial ordered.
197
 During the second 
trial, Mathieu was once again acquitted.
198
 
6.6.1.6.2 Criticism of the decision in R v. Mathieu 
The appellate court was right in pointing to the misdirection of the panel by the Judge 
Advocate. Had the panel been correctly directed as to the test to be used, it could have found 
Mathieu guilty of having been negligent in the performance of military duty. The rules of 
engagement are addressed to the commanders and precisely instruct when force can be used. 
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Deadly force was to be used with great care, and only minimum force could be used to repel 
attacks or threat by unarmed elements.
199
 The charge related effectively to the negligent 
performance of military duty in that Mathieu failed to observe the rules of engagement  
correctly, thus breaching the duty of care expected of him as a commander.
200
 
It was because of the misdirection that the panel acquitted Mathieu at his first and subsequent 
trials.
201
 The Judge Advocate gave incompatible definitions of negligence.
202
 The first 
definition was surely one applicable in civil matters where he instructed the panel that they 
could find Mathieu guilty as charged if he had failed to act in good faith.
203
 H Repeating such 
a direction in his closing address constituted a fundamental error. In fact, contrary to the 
explanation the Judge Advocate made available to the panel, the test relevant to negligence in 
criminal law and proceedings is that based on objective standard. A court has to assess what a 
reasonable person would have done in the circumstances.
204
 
With regard to the second acquittal, the decision is not published. It is, therefore, difficult to 
tell on which grounds the acquittal rests.
205
 It is possible to assume that the fact that Lt Col 
Mathieu’s orders had some limits, e.g. as to the spot on the body at which to fire, between the 
feet and the knees, the fact that he took the precaution of informing local kings and elders 
regarding looters and thieves, and the recall of the January 28 orders after the March 4 
incident might have played an important role, or created doubt as to whether the performance 
of his military duty was actually negligent. To have ordered his soldiers to fire at unarmed 
fleeing civilians outside of the camp was, however, already an order in violation of the rules 
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of engagement.
206
 His interpretation of the rules of engagement actually demonstrated his 
negligence in performing his military duty as commander.
207
 
6.6.1.7 Final comment on the prosecution of peacekeepers by Canada 
From the above different decisions of the Canadian military courts with respect to the 
prosecution of the incidents in Somalia that led to death of unarmed civilians, the most 
obvious lesson is that some commanding officers bore no criminal liability or were never 
found guilty. Thus, regarding the torture to death of Shidane Arone, the platoon commanding 
officer on duty on 16 March 1993, Sergeant Gresty, was acquitted on the count of negligent 
performance of duty on the day the death of Shidane Arone occurred. It is reported that Gresty 
‘was the duty officer in the Command Post, just over 80 feet from the bunker where the 
beating and torture took place, but had not responded when told of the treatment of the 
prisoner.’208 With respect to the killing and wounding of 4 March 1993, Captain Rainville was 
the officer leading the Canadian Airborne Reconnaissance Platoon when the incident 
occurred.
209
 He was charged with unlawfully causing bodily harm and negligent performance 
of military duty in that, by telling his subordinates that they could use deadly force to capture 
fleeing Somalis, he was counselling them to commit an illegal armed assault.
210
 He was found 
not guilty with regard to both charges, and no appeal was launched.
211
 
To have prosecuted peacekeepers for crimes committed while on mission is laudable with 
respect to Canada. The most obvious criticism of these decisions is the general denial of 
applicability of the international humanitarian law to national contingent members deployed 
with a UN mission of peace.
212
 It must also be noted that officers in command are rarely 
blamed when something goes wrong and only low-ranking soldiers are actually prosecuted.
213
 
As it was been cogently argued, ‘The conduct of a State organ does not lose that quality 
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because that conduct is, for example, coordinated by an international organization, or is even 
authorized by it’.214 Indeed, States must not retreat behind the fact that their military members 
were actually at the disposal of an international organization like the UN to deem the law of 
armed conflict not to be applicable.
215
 The State organ was lent to the organization only in 
order to fulfil its objectives, and the State retains control over such organ.
216
 
Despite the above criticism, it must be noted that, even though some Canadian peacekeepers 
involved in criminal conduct in Somalia were acquitted or some charges and allegations were 
not prosecuted, Canada fared better than other countries against which allegations existed, 
who did not prosecute or where prosecutions existed but no punishment was imposed.
217
 An   
example of prosecutions without a single conviction is Belgium. 
6.6.2 Belgium
218
 
After the report of the commission of inquiry into the acts of Belgian soldiers in Somalia, 
very few prosecutions followed before the Belgian courts-martial. Three paratroopers were 
acquitted of manslaughter, one case of aggravated assault was brought against a troop but 
thrown out of the court martial,
219
 and the case of a Somali boy who was held over the 
burning brazier was prosecuted in 1997.
220
 The two soldiers accused of the conduct in the 
latter case were acquitted on the ground that the victim launched no complaint.
221
 In one case, 
relating to a forced strip-show, a sentence of three months was imposed at the trial stage, but 
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increased to one year on appeal.
222
 This sentence was the only conviction of all the cases and 
allegations. There has been not a single conviction for rape, torture/assault or murder.
223
 Most 
of these egregious acts were treated as ill-treatment or unintentional killing of Somalis.
224
 
One case of assault in which the accused was acquitted and one other case of murder merit 
further scrutiny and will now be discussed.  
6.6.2.1 Case A
225
: Korad Kalid v. Paracommando Soldier
226
 
6.6.2.1.1 Facts 
The charges against the accused find their basis within the context of the duties the said 
accused was performing on 21 August 1993 as a member of UNOSOM, the UN humanitarian 
operation in Somalia. In the performance of these duties, the accused, who was a night guard, 
fired an aimed rifle shot at the legs of a child, the claimant in the civil action, and in so doing 
wounded the victim, aged twelve at the time of the incident.  
The accused was an unnamed soldier member of the 3rd Para Battalion in Tielen who was 
accused of having deliberately wounded Ayan Ahmed Farah in Kismayo, Somalia, on 21 
August 1993. As a soldier, the accused formed part of a Belgian contingent which was 
dispatched to protect a humanitarian operation. The deployment of military forces 
presupposes that the humanitarian operation could be threatened by force and that the 
international community considered that legitimate force could be used to curb or neutralize 
unlawful force. Despite the peaceable intentions of the Belgian and other troops, peacekeepers 
had to deal, both in Somalia and elsewhere, with hostile armed elements. In those 
                                                             
222 De Waal A op cit (n 221) 136. The prosecution of this case included assault and battery, threat and racial 
discrimination as well as incitement to immorality in the camp. The sentence, even having been increased to one 
year, is still a very light one. See Dubois O ‘Implementation of international humanitarian law: Biannual update 
of national legislation and jurisprudence January to June 1998’ 1998 (325) International Review of the Red 
Cross 730-733, 732. 
223 De Waal A op cit (n 221) 136. 
224 Knoops GJ Defenses in Contemporary International Criminal Law (Transnational Publishers Ardsley 2001) 
134. 
225 This unpublished case being in Dutch, the discussion refers to the translation by Sassòli M, Bouvier AA et al. 
A How Does Law protect in War? Cases, Documents and Teaching Materials on Contemporary Practice in 
International Humanitarian Law, Volume II - Cases and Documents, 2 ed. (ICRC-Geneva 2006, case A No. 168 
Belgium, Belgian soldiers in Somalia available under No. 7 A.R. 1995 at the Auditorat Général près la Cour 
Militaire, Brussels; not published, original in Dutch, unofficial) 1696-1701.  
226 The Public Prosecutor’s Department and 104 Korad Kalid Omar, resident in Kismayo, Somalia, v. VJFJ, 3rd 
Para Battalion in Tielen, standing accused (hereinafter Prosecutor v 3rd Para Battalion case No. 168 Belgium op 
cit (n 225)).  
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circumstances the Belgian officers were compelled to take security measures in order to 
perform their mission and to ensure their own safety and that of their men. 
The incident took place at a check-point before the beach of Kismayo, where the Belgian 
contingent was established. Its base was protected by a wall. The guard posts were set up in 
front of the wall, and a barbed wire fence was put up in front of those guard posts. On the 
night of 20 to 21 August 1993, the accused was on guard duty between two and three o’clock 
in Post 3 with orders to prevent anyone from penetrating into the safety area through the 
barbed wire fencing. He suddenly spotted a shadow which he identified as a child. The 
intruder was indeed a child. Ayan Ahmed Farah (then aged twelve). He carried out his 
instructions. It was subsequently found that Liebrand, who was manning Post 4 and had a 
night-glass, reacted in exactly the same manner, i.e. he fired a warning shot followed by a 
shot aimed at the legs. 
The legal issue the court had to decide was whether the accused was justified in invoking the 
provisions of Article 70 of the Belgian penal code, according to which ‘no offence is 
committed if the act is prescribed by law and ordered by the competent authority’.227 
6.6.2.1.2 The Court Martial decision  
The court acquitted the accused. The following grounds are reported to have supported the 
decision of the court. To be able to claim a superior’s order as a ground of justification:  
(a) The invoked order must have been given beforehand, and its implementation must 
correspond to the purpose of that order;  
(b) The invoked order must be issued by a legitimate superior acting within the limits of his 
authority; and 
(c) The order issued must be legitimate, i.e., in conformity with the law and regulations.228 
In connection with the last point, it may generally be assumed that a soldier of the lowest rank 
may base his actions on the assumption that the order was legitimate.
229
 A careful 
                                                             
227 Article 70 of the code pénal belge : Sauf en ce qui concerne les infractions définies dans le livre II, titre I bis, 
il n'y a pas d'infraction, lorsque le fait était ordonné par la loi et commandé par l'autorité. Therefore, unless the 
crime is in violation of International Humanitarian Law, obedience to superior order constitutes a defence. 
228 See articles 152 and 260 of the code penal belge. For instances of non invocation of the defence of superior 
orders, see articles 136 octies with respect to violations of Humanitarian Law, and 417 ter with respect to the 
crime of torture. See also Prosecutor v 3rd Para Battalion case A No. 168 Belgium op cit (n 225) 1698. 
229 For instance if he or she did not know that the order would violate Humanitarian Law or amount to torture.  
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investigation, therefore, must be made to establish whether the force dictated by the senior 
officer did not exceed the necessary force to bring about the intended action. The order given 
to the accused during his duties as a night guard at the time of the facts was ‘to defend and 
prevent anyone from penetrating into’ the cantonment of various Belgian military units.230 
The order invoked by the accused in the context of Article 70 of the penal code must also be 
viewed in conjunction with other, more general and earlier, permanent instructions given to 
such a soldier in the form of the rules of engagement. The rules of engagement are to be 
understood as meaning the general directives issued by the competent authority in the matter 
(in this instance, the UN as the international political authority). They were intended to give 
precise instructions to the armed forces under the direct or indirect command of the 
aforementioned competent (political or military) authority regarding the circumstances in 
which they may use all forms of force in the performance of their duties in an existing or 
possibly impending armed conflict. 
The Member States, on the other hand, also ‘translate’ the rules of engagement into the form 
of an order, relating to the use of armed force, for the troops they deploy.
231
 Such oral or 
written order to Belgian military personnel is translated into an obligation of obedience and 
would, therefore, be admissible in a prosecution for insubordination under the terms of 
Articles 28 et seq. of the military penal code. The order must be issued by a hierarchical or 
operational superior of the same nationality, within the meaning of said Article 28 of the 
military penal code. On the other hand, an order may be disobeyed if its implementation can 
clearly involve the commission of a crime or offence.
232
  
According to the court, the accused acted with the necessary care and in accordance with the 
law in the circumstances.
233
 After observing that the child crept through the concertina and 
thus arrive in the immediate vicinity of the bunker, he first gave the necessary verbal 
warnings in both Somali and English.
234
 He then fired two warning shots into the ground 
                                                             
230 Gossiaux C ‘Les règles d'engagement : norme juridique nouvelle?’ 2001 (40) Military Law and Law of War 
Review 159-179, 172. 
231
 See Article 11, para 2, subpara 2, of the Tuchtwet (Code of Military Discipline [Law of 14 January 1975] 
available in French on http://www.just.fgov.be]). See Prosecutor v 3rd Para Battalion case A No. 168 Belgium 
op cit (n 225) 1699. 
232 Ibid. 
233 Prosecutor v 3rd Para Battalion case A No. 168 Belgium op cit (n 225) 1700-01. 
234 Ibid. 
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about 50 cm away from the child, who still showed no reaction. He finally decided to fire an 
aimed shot at non-vital organs, viz the legs. The infiltration detected terminated only with this 
aimed shot. The procedure followed by the accused was the only possible one to fulfil his 
defensive duty.
235
 
There was no other action suitable in the circumstances which could be taken to prevent 
further penetration. He acted in accordance with legitimate orders given beforehand by a 
legitimate superior acting within his authority. The force used was proportional to the nature 
and extent of the threat. Another guard acted in almost the same manner as the accused. 
6.6.2.1.3 Criticism of the decision 
The court did not actually consider the issue of whether or not an unarmed child constituted a 
threat for the accused soldier to use such force. The court limited itself to considering the 
validity of superior orders but not the issue whether such orders could be carried out against 
an unarmed civilian, especially a child. The position of the court may lead to the reproduction 
of similar conduct by members of the army.
236
 As one senator has observed, leniency in 
prosecuting acts which would amount to grave breaches of international humanitarian law 
entails that members of the same contingent will not be intimidated and will, therefore, 
willingly repeat similar conduct.
237
 The senator underlined that, with regard to the instruction 
of the case, the court proceeded too quickly, without a thorough examination of the facts and 
relevant law and that it reached a superficial decision.
238
 The Military Court of Appeal upheld 
the verdict of acquittal in the case. This position of the court is observed in another similar 
case. 
  
                                                             
235
 Prosecutor v 3
rd
 Para Battalion case A No. 168 Belgium op cit (n 225) 1700-01. 
236 Sénat de Belgique, Question orale de M. Desmedt au ministre de la justice sur «les conséquences à tirer du 
jugement rendu le 30 juin par le conseil de guerre de Bruxelles à l’égard de faits commis par des militaires 
belges en somalie» Annales parlementaires - Séances du jeudi 10 juillet 1997, 3369-3370. 
237 Ibid. 
238 Sénat de Belgique op cit (n 236) 3370. 
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6.6.2.2 Case B
239
: Osman Somow v. Paracommando Soldier
240
 
6.6.2.2.1 Facts 
Belgium, along with many other countries, dispatched soldiers to protect humanitarian 
operations. The dispatch of military troops is justifiable only insofar as humanitarian 
operations are threatened by force and the international community considers that it has the 
right to neutralize or curb such force by means of another legitimate force. As a soldier on 
active service in Kismayo, Somalia, the accused caused the death of Hassan Osman Soomon 
through a lack of foresight or care on 14 April 1993.
241
 
The accused was assigned, on 14 July 1993, between 7.00 and 9.00 a.m., to an observation 
post on the Kismayo beach with orders to guard a shooting sector between barbed wire fences 
on his left and an imaginary line on his right within which were at least two wrecked ships, 
with the instruction that no-one was to enter that sector and that no-one should have the 
opportunity to ‘install’ himself in the wrecks. It happened that there was a person to the right 
of the largest ship. The accused, after issuing all the specified warnings, aimed at the port side 
of the hull as a warning and in order not to hit the person on the starboard side of the hull,  but 
the bullet (probably, for nothing is certain) ricocheted and struck the victim in the forbidden 
area.
242
 
The legal issue was whether the use of a weapon which caused the death of Hassan Osman 
Soomon was justified and whether, in the use of this weapon, an error was made which would 
not have been committed by a regular, cautious, highly-trained soldier. The legal question to 
be answered is, in other words, whether the accused failed to exercise foresight and care when 
firing his warning shot. 
  
                                                             
239 Sassòli M, Bouvier AA et al. A How Does Law protect in War? Cases, Documents and Teaching Materials 
on Contemporary Practice in International Humanitarian Law, Volume II - Cases and Documents, 2ed. (ICRC 
Geneva 2006 case B No. 168 Belgium, Belgian soldiers in Somalia available at the Auditorat Général près la 
Cour Militaire, Brussels; not published, original in Dutch, unofficial translation) 1701-1705. 
240 The Public Prosecutor’s Department and 102 Osman Somow Mohamed, resident in Jilib-Gombay-Village, 
Somalia, [...] v. 103 D A Maria Pierre (Paracommando Battery in Braaschaat) standing accused (hereinafter 
Osman Somow v Paracommando Soldier case B No. 168 op cit (n 239)). 
241 Osman Somow v Paracommando Soldier case B No. 168 op cit (n 239) 1702-03. 
242 Osman Somow v Paracommando Soldier case B No. 168 op cit (n 239) 1702. 
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6.6.2.2.2 The Court Martial decision 
The court declared the accused not guilty of the charges brought against him on the chief 
ground that, after examining the documents on file and the case presented in court, the 
conclusion was that the accused correctly carried out the order given to him. In the given 
circumstances, he behaved with the care required of a regular, cautious, highly-trained soldier 
in accordance with the law. It was not established from the overall investigation that the 
accused formally exceeded the rules of engagement. No fault, therefore, not even 
carelessness, was proven to meet the requirements of the law. Indeed, the accused was being 
prosecuted for having killed the victim. This conduct took place in the course of the 
performance of his duties in observance of the rules of engagement and the orders received 
from his superiors. No offence can be said to have been committed if the act is prescribed by 
law or ordered by the competent authority.
243
 Furthermore, article 260 of the Belgian Penal 
Code constitutes a defence in favour of an official who has carried out an unlawful order 
issued to him by a superior in matters falling under the latter’s authority.244 
The accused’s statement that his instructions were to drive out any person found in a certain 
area of the beach at Kismayo, Somalia, using all possible means of intimidation is not 
contradicted by any other information in the file. In fact, an undated report by the deputy 
prosecutor, Franskin, emphasizes the military importance of the order, to wit that the 
shipwreck lying in the forbidden area could be used by a sniper. The Public Prosecutor’s 
Department rightfully did not dispute the fact that the accused was authorized, in the given 
circumstances, to fire a warning shot.
245
 The ‘force’ inherent in the firing of that warning shot 
was found to be proportional to the extent of the established threat, and it can be recalled that 
it was never the accused’s intention to harm anyone’s bodily integrity. The warning shot was 
necessary to intimidate the person who was entering the forbidden area.
246
 
                                                             
243 Article 70 (code pénal belge).  
244 Article 260 du Code pénal belge : Lorsqu'un fonctionnaire ou officier public, un dépositaire ou agent de la 
force publique, aura ordonné ou fait quelque acte contraire à une loi ou à un arrêté royal, s'il justifie qu'il a agi 
par ordre de ses supérieurs, pour des objets du ressort de ceux-ci et sur lesquels il leur était dû une obéissance 
hiérarchique, il sera exempt de la peine, qui ne sera, dans ce cas, appliquée qu'aux supérieurs qui auront donné 
l'ordre.  
245 Osman Somow v Paracommando Soldier case B No. 168 op cit (n 239) 1704. 
246 Ibid. 
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At the time of firing the warning shot, the accused did not notice the presence of the victim. 
Unfortunately the shot ricochet against the curved steel bow of the wreck boat and fatally 
wounded the victim. In view of the curvature of the steel bow of the wreck, the bullet could 
have ricocheted only towards the area which no-one was allowed to enter. It may be assumed 
that the accused selected this aiming point precisely in order that the person with regard to 
whom he was required to take intimidation measures should not be injured or killed by a 
ricocheting bullet. It was very clear from the report of the investigation conducted by deputy 
prosecutor Franskin on the spot that the victim was fatally wounded at only some five metres 
from the port side of the wreck. This relatively short distance supports the accused’s claim 
that he had never seen the victim and could not, therefore, take account of his presence. The 
accident, therefore, may be ascribed solely to a set of unfortunate circumstances which could 
not be foreseen by the accused. 
6.6.2.2.3 Criticism of the decision 
The arguments were purposely selected to reach an acquittal. For instance the assumption that 
to select the target was calculated to avoid any injury to the person being intimidated does not 
hold water. A regular, well-trained shooter would have foreseen the possibility of the bullet’s 
ricocheting on contact with curved hard surfaces. It is not also demonstrated that some other 
warning shots were directed into the ground or into the air to achieve a similar result, namely, 
intimidating the person who had crept into the forbidden area. 
6.6.2.3 Final comment on the prosecution of peacekeepers by Belgium 
 
The above Belgian court-martial decisions reflect unwillingness in actually prosecuting 
soldiers who have violated humanitarian law.
247
 Not all incidents were actually dealt with. 
Thus in the case of the prosecution of the incident of holding a Somali youth over a burning 
                                                             
247 Belgium, like Canada, considered the Geneva conventions as not being applicable to soldiers placed under 
UN command, although military personnel remain under the criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction of their state 
of origin, and thus an organ of the contributing state. See Zwanenburg M ‘The Secretary-General's Bulletin on 
Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law: A Pyrrhic Victory?’ 2000 (39) 
Military Law & Law of War Review 13-43, 27. 
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brazier, the court acquitted the alleged perpetrator upon the overly-odd ground that there was 
not an armed conflict in Somalia to which Geneva law could be applicable.
248
 
This is the reason why Mr Desmedt, the Belgian senator, in referring to the words of the 
prosecutor during the prosecutions of some of the cases related to the incidents in Somalia, 
remarked that, if soldiers could behave as they did in peacekeeping missions, in situations of 
actual war they could behave more badly.
249
 After observing that military troops suspected of 
having committed crimes are seldom, or leniently punished, by their peers, military personnel, 
even though they may be judges, coupled with the esprit corporatiste, the senator suggested 
the suppression of military jurisdictions in times of peace.
250
 Indeed, although the materiality 
of facts have on every occasion been established, the military jurisdiction pronounced 
shocking judgments, acquitting the accused individuals, granting them suspended sentences, 
or condemning them to derisory punishment execution of which was generally suspended. 
The military court, on no occasion, took into account the gravity of the facts.
251
 
The two abovementioned cases and the opinion of the Belgian senator confirm that national 
courts, especially military courts, are not eager to punish troops who have committed crimes 
outside their country. One has, however, to be cautious before jumping to any final 
conclusions. Did countries other than Belgium and Canada prosecute peacekeeping personnel 
who have allegedly committed crimes on mission?  
  
                                                             
248 Lattimer M & Sands P (eds) Justice for Crimes against Humanity (Hart Publishing Oxford 2003) 138; 
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1998, 5240. 
 255 
 
6.6.3 South Africa  
With respect to alleged crimes committed during peace missions in the DRC
252
 and Burundi 
by peacekeepers from South Africa, it appears that only one case triggered prosecution. 
Similarly to the prosecutions in Canada, which involved incidents that led to the death of 
civilians, the instance being adjudicated by South African courts involves an incident relating 
to the murder of a 14-year-old girl.
253
   
At the time of the incidents, the Air Force Sergeant, Philippus Jacobus Venter, was deployed 
as a peacekeeper in Burundi. It is reported that, on 20 September 2004, the accused raped and 
killed the 14-year-old girl; he is also accused of assaulting a guesthouse guard who refused to 
rent him a room.
254
 He was charged, and, for the first time, a South African military court 
conducted prosecution outside South Africa, in Burundi.
255
 In August 2007, the accused, 
Philippus Jacobus Venter, was found guilty on all the charges and given a sentence of 24 
years’ imprisonment.256 On 8 October 2007, the accused filed an appeal against the ruling of 
military court on the grounds that he had not had a fair trial.
257
 Meanwhile, on 26 April 2006, 
while on bail in connection with the Burundi incident, he murdered his two children and 
attempted to kill his wife.
258
 Tried for these new charges, he was sentenced to ten years’ 
imprisonment. Upon appeal by the prosecution this sentence was almost doubled. It was 
raised to 18 years imprisonment. This sentence was still light considering the facts, but, as the 
Supreme Court of Appeals stated, the Burundi episode and its aftermath rendered the accused 
                                                             
252 Not a single case is known to have been prosecuted with respect to the allegations of rape and other sexual 
offences by South African soldiers deployed in DRC. See also Report of the Portfolio Committee on Defence on 
an Oversight visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo 14 March 2006 available at www.pmg.org.za-
/docs/2006drc.pdf [last accessed 21 December 2012] 8. South African peacekeepers have been involved in 
humanitarian rights abuses. See SA Soldier Monthly Magazine, Department of Defence, 2005, 11. 
253 United States Department of State 2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - South Africa (25 
February 2009) available at www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/119025.htm [last accessed 21 December 2012]; 
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irrational and availed him a diminished responsibility.
259
 Unless the decision in the matter has 
been withheld from publication for military secrecy, the appeal against the finding of the 
military court is still pending. 
Regarding the prosecution by the South African military court, it must be mentioned that this 
is the only case prosecuted or with respect to which snippets of information do exist. The 
other incidents of rape are not reported to have been investigated or prosecuted. Even where 
they might not amount to violations of the law of war, they should have been investigated and 
prosecuted in conformity with South African obligations under the Status-of-Forces 
Agreement and Memorandum of Understanding, whereby Troop-Contributing Countries 
undertake to exercise criminal jurisdiction over their contingent members. 
6.7. Conclusion 
During an armed conflict, many crimes are perpetrated. Most of those crimes are mainly of a 
sexual character, committed against women and children by military forces, police and 
security officials. Other acts of sexual violence are perpetrated by international peacekeeping 
forces or humanitarian aid workers.
260
 Although all acts against civilians during an armed 
conflict or thereafter, do not necessarily qualify as war crimes, especially where the link to the 
conflict may not be sufficient, the perpetrators should be brought to justice.
261
 With respect to 
acts which may qualify as war crimes, these are no longer simply of local interest.
262
 They 
infringe sacred principles and trample on the rights and the dignity of the human being. 
Where national leaders, therefore, do not have the will to prosecute the individuals 
responsible for these acts in court, or where the courts lack the courage to prosecute, the 
international justice system constitutes the unique alternative to impunity.
263
 In fact, ‘sexual 
violence happens in conflict because it is allowed to happen. Until perpetrators are held 
accountable for their crimes, violence will continue’.264 This also applies to peacekeepers in 
                                                             
259 DPP Transvaal v Venter (430/2007) [2008] ZASCA 76 (30 May 2008) paras [34] [46] [70]. 
260 Dahrendorf N and Shifman P ‘Sexual Violence in Conflict and Post Conflict: A Need for More Focused 
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that, if peacekeepers do not account for their acts, future operations may be fraught with 
similar misconduct. 
The fact that each and every State is entitled to legislate with respect to the conduct of 
nationals abroad has no other meaning than the recognition that a state has criminal 
jurisdiction over the criminal conduct its nationals might be guilty of outside the boundaries 
of such a State territory. The nationals of a State that has asserted such a jurisdiction are on 
notice that none of their illegal conduct or acts will go unpunished.
265
 Whereas States are not 
obligated to legislate regarding each and every act considered as criminal in the law of 
another country, since criminal legislation varies from country to country, most of the States 
have enacted laws with respect to crimes outside their jurisdictions especially regarding their 
military forces since their actions entail State international responsibility.
266
 One of the 
rationales for considering the conduct of military personnel abroad is that agreements with the 
Host State where the crime might have occurred might have provided for immunities for such 
personnel before the jurisdictions of the Host State. Without either Host State or sending State 
ensuring jurisdiction over conduct by foreign forces, crimes could be committed with total 
impunity. To fill the gap, the Status-of-Forces Agreement and the Memorandum 
Understanding provide for immunity from the jurisdiction of the Host State and recognise 
criminal jurisdiction over military peacekeepers as the prerogative only of the Troop-
Contributing Country. 
From the above exclusive criminal jurisdiction over peacekeepers, the question that arises is 
whether there is any residual jurisdiction left to the Host State. It has been noted that, with 
respect to members of the UN mission personnel other than those of national military 
contingents, the Host State has jurisdiction over their conduct on the condition that it obtains 
the waiver of their immunities from the UN Secretary-General. Furthermore, it has been noted 
that jurisdiction should not be considered to be indivisible and, therefore, the responsibility of 
either the Host State or the Troop-Contributing Country to ensure offenders are prosecuted 
and if found guilty punished. This means that even with respect to conduct by military 
personnel subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Troop-Contributing Countries, it remains 
                                                             
265 Beaulieu C op cit (n 5) 5. 
266 See Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries 2001, 
Text adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session, in 2001, and submitted to the 
General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session (UN. Doc A/56/10) 
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judicious to recognise some jurisdiction over their conduct to the Host State. It can still be 
helpful, for instance to recognise that the authorities of the Host State might be the most 
suitable to gather evidence relative to the alleged crime. 
With respect to any jurisdiction by a State other than the Host State and the troop-contributing 
State, it was noted that since a third State is not bound by agreements between the UN and the 
Host State or the UN and the Troop-Contributing Countries, its prosecutorial powers 
pertaining to its sovereignty remain untouched by such agreements. Indeed, a third State can 
still claim jurisdiction over a peacekeeper where, for instance, the victim of such 
peacekeeper’s conduct is its national, or on the basis of universal jurisdiction vis-à-vis a crime 
of international interest.
267
 
The discussion of the issue of whether the international criminal court (ICC) has jurisdiction 
over peacekeepers concluded that. Indeed, it does have jurisdiction if their conduct amount to 
acts that fall under its jurisdiction. In such a case, peacekeepers can be prosecuted before the 
ICC. The other argument was that it was upon such fear of being arraigned before the ICC 
that a number of members of the UN prompted the Security Council to vote into force two 
resolutions prohibiting the prosecution before the ICC of peacekeepers from States who are 
not parties to the Rome Statute. Up to 2012, however, not a single case exists where a 
peacekeeper has been indicted before the permanent criminal court. The court is, furthermore, 
a court of last resort since the primary duty to prosecute individuals alleged to have 
committed crimes rests with national or domestic jurisdiction. 
With respect to effective prosecution of peacekeepers before their national courts for alleged 
crimes committed while serving on a mission of peace, especially missions deployed on the 
African continent, the chapter discussed instances of prosecution in Canada, Belgium, and 
South Africa. In the prosecutions conducted, the offence stemmed from an incident that led to 
death of the victim or to grievous bodily harm. Many other incidents were not adjudicated. In 
cases where superiors were aware of the perpetration of the act, they took no action to halt it 
or to punish it. The lesson was that commanding officers are seldom blamed for crimes 
committed by peacekeepers. Considering the weight of sentences meted out against those 
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found guilty as charged, it must be said that they manifest unwillingness on the part of Troop-
Contributing Countries to prosecute their troops seriously for crimes committed while on 
peace missions abroad. 
For the special situation of prosecution by South African courts of the allegations of crimes 
committed by peacekeepers from this country in the DRC and in Burundi, only one case of 
rape, murder, and assault that occurred in Burundi has reached the courts. It appears to be still 
pending. If it has been disposed of, then the secrecy surrounding military matters and the 
judiciary has precluded its publication. If it is so, this is a violation of the right to access to 
information held by the State that the public is entitled to.
268
  
According to Glueck, to employ existing criminal courts is inadvisable, but to send the 
perpetrators and any witnesses to district courts distant from the scene of the crime remains an 
impractical and expensive alternative.
269
 A new mechanism is still needed. The failure to 
provide for the criminal accountability of peacekeepers and the absence of a systematic 
mechanism to inform the victims of any outcome of proceedings lodged against peacekeepers 
remains an unsolved problem. The focus on gender mainstreaming and the strengthening of 
guidelines and standards for peacekeepers does not per se curb the plight of victims.
270
 A 
policy to remedy the situation should be that countries that have failed to prosecute 
peacekeepers for crimes allegedly committed during UN missions of peace should be barred 
from recruitment for future operations.
271
 Such a mechanism might prompt States to prosecute 
acts that amount to war crimes since they are not subject to any statute of limitation. Crimes 
committed by peacekeeping personnel are of a grave nature and they should not be minimised 
as the random, isolated conduct of individual peacekeepers. 
The next chapter critically analyses the Draft Convention on the Criminal Accountability of 
UN Officials and Experts on Mission
272
 and proposes an alternative mechanism to solve the 
issue of information to victims and witnesses, as well as the hurdles to investigating and 
                                                             
268 Constitution of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996.  Section 32 (1) (a) reads: 32. Access to information.  
- (1) Everyone has the right of access to - 
(a) any information held by the state. 
269
 Glueck S ‘By What Tribunal Shall War Offender be Tried?’ 1943 (56) Harvard Law Review1059-1089, 1060. 
270 Sweetser CE ‘Providing Effective Remedies to Victims of Abuse by Peacekeeping Personnel’ 2008 (83) New 
York University Law Review 1643-1678, 1648. 
271 The solution to the lack of prosecution may lie in engaging liability for omission against the state that failed 
to prosecute. 
272 UN Doc. A/60/980 of 16 August 2006. 
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prosecuting crimes committed outside one’s territory. The aim of the analysis is to investigate 
whether the proposed convention also includes military personnel of various national 
contingents. If this is not the case, areas of amelioration to the extant draft convention on the 
accountability of peacekeepers will be provided. 
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CHAPTER VII  
THE DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE CRIMINAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF UN 
OFFICIALS AND EXPERTS ON MISSION
1
 AND ON-SITE COURTS FOR PEACE 
MISSION PERSONNEL 
 
7.1. Introduction 
The preceding chapters have shown that some of the allegations of crimes committed by 
peacekeepers have been substantiated by UN investigative teams. Save for the rare instances 
of prosecution in Canada, however, and some reluctant prosecutions in Belgium,
2
 the existing 
measures to hold peacekeepers criminally accountable are seldom applied and are, in practice, 
ineffective.
3
 Whereas their official capacity, based on international law, should not avail 
peacekeepers exemption from punishment for crimes that all too often fall within the 
definition of war crimes, it must be noted that, despite the exclusion of official capacity as a 
ground for exemption or mitigation, the prosecution of peacekeepers is a rare event.
4
 At the 
international level, no single case exists where a peacekeeper has been prosecuted by an 
international court. At the national level, it is apparent that no political will exists.
5
 As Prince 
Zeid recalls with respect to the US readiness to condemn the conduct of MONUC 
peacekeepers, ‘we condemn publicly the abuses committed by international peacekeeping 
personnel, abuses that include the crimes of rape, the trafficking of human beings and illicit 
narcotics, but we remain tight-lipped when it is our own peacekeepers who commit them.’6 
This is an expression of the position of so many States. In fact States are readily prepared to 
prosecute war crimes committed by individuals other than their nationals or members of their 
                                                             
1 Hereinafter Draft Convention. This document is an annex III to the Report of the Group of Legal Experts on 
ensuring the accountability of United Nations staff and experts on mission with respect to criminal acts 
committed in peacekeeping operations. UN Doc. A/60/980 of 16 August 2006 [GLE report A/60/980] 
2 Supra chapter 2 and cases discussed there. 
3 See GLE report A/60/980, para 84.  Also Sweetser CE Ensuring Accountability of Peacekeeping Personnel for 
Human Rights Violations (Centre for Human Rights and Global Justice Working Paper No.16 2007) 18. 
4 Article 27 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (RS ICC). 
5 If there were a political will to hold peacekeepers accountable, cases on prosecution for crimes committed 
abroad should not be so scant. 
6
 Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein ‘For Love of Country and International Criminal Law’ 2009 (24) American 
University International Law Review  647-664, 650 and note 9 where he refers to comparing U.S. Department of 
State, Trafficking in Persons Report 230 (2007) condemning the acts of sexual exploitation and abuse 
perpetrated by UN peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo with Notar SA ‘Peacekeepers as 
Perpetrators: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse of Women and Children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ 
2006 (14) American University Journal of Gender Social Policy and Law 413-429, 425-27. 
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armed forces. For instance, Belgium is known to be good at exercising universal jurisdiction.
7
 
But, as it was shown in the preceding chapter six, it imposed no serious sentence on soldiers 
who committed crimes in Somalia while serving with a UN peace operation.
8
 
According to the Model Status-of-Forces Agreement,
9
 only Troop-Contributing Countries 
hold criminal jurisdiction over peacekeepers, especially the military component of the force.
10
 
Most of the countries contributing troops to the UN have shown that they are reluctant to 
prosecute their military personnel for crimes committed abroad while serving with UN 
missions of peace.
11
 It must be recalled, at the same time, that the UN does not have criminal 
jurisdiction with respect to the military members of its missions.
12
 The provisions of the 
Model Status-of-Forces Agreement which provide for exclusive jurisdiction over 
peacekeepers have reached the status of customary international law
13
  in that those provisions 
recognise universal restraint in that a State on whose territory a foreign force is present with 
its consent abandon its sovereign powers to exercise criminal jurisdiction over such a force, 
because it is almost a universal praxis that visiting forces exercise exclusive disciplinary 
                                                             
7 Amnesty International Universal Jurisdiction: UN General Assembly should support this essential 
international justice tool (Amnesty International Publications-Index: IOR 53/015/2010 2010) 29,45; Baker RB 
‘Universal Jurisdiction and the Case of Belgium: A Critical Assessment’ 2009 (16) ILSA Journal of 
International & Comparative Law 141-167; Amnesty International Universal Jurisdiction: Belgian prosecutors 
can investigate crimes under international law committed abroad (AI Index: IOR 53/001/2003). 
8 Supra chapter 6: 6.6.2.1; 6.6.2.2. 
9 A SOFA is an international agreement to be respected and fulfilled in good faith, according to the universally 
recognised principle of pacta sunt servanda. See Article 2(2) of the UN Charter; preamble to and Article 26 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (into force 27 January 1980) 1155 U.N.T.S.; Article 23 of 
the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with commentaries 1966 Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 1966; Lee YA ‘Criminal Jurisdiction under the U.S. - Korea Status of Forces Agreement: Problems 
to Proposals’ 2003 (13) Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 213-249, 245; Talmon S ‘Responsibility of 
International Organizations: Does the European Community Require Special Treatment?’ in Maurizio Ragazzi 
(ed) International Responsibility Today (Koninklijke Brill NV 2005) 405–421, 410. A State cannot invoke its 
constitution or internal law to avoid applying international conventions it voluntarily entered to. See Uzoukwu 
LI Constitutionalism, Human Rights and the Judiciary in Nigeria (LLD thesis UNISA 2010) 231.  
10 Model Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) UN. Doc. A/45/594, paras 46-48 regarding jurisdiction of 
peacekeepers; UNGA ‘Note by the Secretariat: Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials and Experts 
on mission’ UN. Doc. A/62/329 of 11 September 2007, para 16; Allais C ‘Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN 
Peacekeepers: The Psychosocial Context of Behaviour Change’ 2011 (39) Scientia Militaria- South African 
Journal of Military Studies 1-15, 8.  
11 Burke R ‘Status of Forces Deployed on UN Peacekeeping Operations: Jurisdictional Immunity’ 2011 (16) 
Journal of Conflict & Security Law 63–104, 67; van Baarda TA ‘Military Ethics in Peacekeeping and in War: 
Maintaining Moral Integrity in a World of Contrast and Confusion’ available at http://jha.ac/articles/a129.htm 
[last accessed 1 July 2011]. 
12 UNGA Model Status of Forces Agreement between the United Nations and Host Countries (UN Doc A/45/594 
of 9 October 1990). 
13 Burke R op cit  (n11) 94 et seq. 
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jurisdiction over its members while they are in the foreign country.
14
 Applied to a UN force, 
without such a customary rule, Troop-Contributing Countries would be reluctant to deploy 
their military contingents in the absence of expansive immunities consented to by the Host 
State.
15
 
In principle, the TCCs must give assurances to the UN
16
 that, if military personnel commit 
crimes during their deployment, the TCC concerned will exercise its criminal jurisdiction to 
investigate reports or allegations of such crimes, and, if substantiated, to repatriate the suspect 
for proper action to be taken against him or her.
17
 Another obligation of the TCC, for which it 
gives assurances to the UN, concerns the undertaking to inform the UN with regard to the 
outcome of the proceedings in the home country.
18
 Even when such assurances are given, the 
information required is seldom forthcoming.
19
 The UN seems to have no power, or seems to 
lack the political will, to compel the TCC to do so.
20
 Furthermore, no rule or norm exists 
whereby the UN must inform the Host State of the outcome of these cases so that the victims 
might in turn be informed of the outcome.
21
  
This chapter offers an analysis of the Draft Convention on accountability of UN officials and 
experts on mission
22
 not only to highlight its flaws, but the chapter also proposes a tripartite 
on-site jurisdiction to close the lacunae that exists as far as court matters relating to 
peacekeepers are concerned. Taking into consideration the available mechanisms devised by 
                                                             
14 Koo JH ‘The Uncomfortable SOFA: Anti-American Sentiments in South Korea and The U.S.-South Korea 
Status of Forces Agreement’ 2011 (1) National Security Law Brief 102-115,106; Ladley A ‘Peacekeeper Abuse, 
Immunity and Impunity: The Need for Effective Criminal and Civil Accountability on International Peace 
Operations’ 2005 (1) Politics and Ethics Review 81-90, 84; Fleck D ‘Are Foreign Military Personnel exempt 
from International Criminal Jurisdiction under Status of Forces Agreements?’ 2003 (1) JICJ 651-670, 656. 
15 Burke R op cit (n 11) 95.  
16 Defeis EF ‘U.N. Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse and Exploitation: An End to Impunity’ 2008 (7) Washington 
University Global Studies Law Review 185-214, 207 et passim. 
17 Up to July 2009, the United Nations had not received any information from the relevant States on action being 
taken. UN. Doc. A/64/183 para 63. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Jennings KM Protecting Whom? Approaches to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping 
Operations (Fafo Policy Report Oslo 2008) 22. 
21 Prosecutions of peacekeepers are rare. If the UN is informed about outcome of action taken, it does not, in 
turn, inform the victims or witnesses of the authorities of where such acts occurred. For charges reported to the 
39 Troop-Contributing Countries in 2010, 13 governments responded to the U.N. regarding their progress in 
investigating the charges and taking action. In 2009, the U.N. sent 82 requests for information on actions taken 
by national authorities concerning misconduct related to sexual exploitation and abuse, and received 14 
responses.  In 2008, the U.N. sent 69 such requests and received eight responses on action taken, while in 2007, 
67 requests were made and 23 responses were received. See Ilg GM Few Governments Answer U.N. Queries on 
Peacekeeper (United Nations Inter Press Service Thursday 5 August 2010); Defeis EF op cit (n 16) 207. 
22 Annex III to UN Doc. A/60/980 of 16 August 2006. 
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the UN to deal with the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse, the most common allegation 
made against peacekeepers, and one which may be regarded as a war crime or ordinary 
crimes, this chapter will show that the Draft is not likely to solve the problem since it does not 
include all the components of a UN mission of peace. Whereas statistics show that the 
majority of crimes are perpetrated by military personnel, military contingent members are not 
included in the proposed convention.
23
 Jurisdiction over such personnel is still exclusively 
dependent upon the willingness of the contributing State to prosecute. The chapter, therefore, 
argues that the convention should oblige States to prosecute effectively, especially through a 
system of courts-martial applicable to military forces outside the borders of each state. This 
may help to circumvent the hurdles identified in chapter five of this thesis by the mechanism 
of an on-site tripartite court-martial
24
 for all members of a peacekeeping operation. 
7.2. Current status of the Draft Convention  
Before drafting the proposed convention pertaining to the accountability of UN officials and 
experts on mission, the working group, known as the Special Committee, pointed out the need 
to ensure that all military, civilian police, and civilian personnel in United Nations 
peacekeeping missions managed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations function in a 
manner that preserves the image, credibility, impartiality, and integrity of the United 
Nations.
25
 The Special Committee emphasized that any misconduct, real or supposed, as well 
as perceptions of impropriety from the local population, are unacceptable and have a 
detrimental effect on the relations of national contingents with the local population and could 
cause difficulties in fulfilling mandates.
26
 The Committee voiced its outrage with respect to 
the large number of allegations of sexual misconduct by military and civilian personnel in the 
United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
27
 The 
committeemen and committeewomen were also concerned about the impact which such acts 
                                                             
23 For instance, in 2003 the investigation indicated 19 cases against the military contingent and 5 against staff. In 
2004, out of 72 allegations, 68 were against military personnel and 4 against civilian personnel. See Zeid report 
UN. Doc. A/59/710 paras 7-8. 
24 This is the solution proposed by this dissertation the advantage of which is ensuring that justice is fairly done 
and can be seen to be done. The solution circumvents the barriers of language during investigations and 
proceedings before the court itself and during any process of obtaining evidence. In chapter 8 a brief convention 
in this regard is drafted. 
25 Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group, GA Official Records, 
Fifty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 19 (UN. Doc.A/59/19/Rev.1) 4-8 April 2005 para 48. 
26 Ibid. 
27 UN. Doc.A/59/19/Rev.1 op cit (n 25) para 49. 
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of gross misconduct have had on the good name of military, civilian police, and civilian 
personnel in United Nations peacekeeping missions.
28
 The issue of such conduct by personnel 
on peacekeeping mission, the seriousness of the allegations, and the implications for the 
future of United Nations peacekeeping, call for the need to address the problem more broadly, 
comprehensively, and systematically.
29
 It was upon the basis of such blatant reality that the 
Committee emphasized that all stockholders in a peace operation be aware of their 
‘responsibility not to allow those responsible for acts of gross misconduct to go 
unpunished’.30 
Whether Troop-Contributing Countries actually prosecute those responsible for gross 
misconduct in UN operations of peace is not clearly reported.
31
 Because of the unwillingness 
of TCCs to prosecute according to their obligations under the Memorandum of 
Understanding, the Group of Legal Experts
32
 proposed the Draft Convention.
33
 UN officials 
and experts on mission are obliged to respect the law of the Host State and, where applicable, 
the Host State has criminal jurisdiction over such UN personnel.
34
 
After expressing its deep concern regarding the criminal conduct of peacekeepers, and noting 
that ‘such conduct, if not investigated and, as appropriate, prosecuted, would create the 
negative impression that United Nations officials and experts on mission operate with 
impunity’.35 The General Assembly formulated some recommendations in order to curb the 
situation and to avoid reproductions of similar conduct in the future. The General Assembly
36
: 
 Strongly urges States to take all appropriate measures to ensure that crimes by United Nations 
officials and experts on mission do not go unpunished and that the perpetrators of such crimes 
are brought to justice, without prejudice to the privileges and immunities of such persons and the 
                                                             
28 UN. Doc.A/59/19/Rev.1 op cit (n 25) para 49. 
29 Ibid. 
30 UN. Doc.A/59/19/Rev.1 op cit (n 25) para 50. 
31 TCCs consider matters relative to military personnel to be secretive and not available to the public. Moreover, 
the UN does not name the individuals involved or their nationality. See Notar SA ‘Peacekeepers as Perpetrators: 
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse of Women and Children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo ’2006 (14) 
American University Journal of Gender Social Policy & the Law 413-430, 418. 
32 Established by General Assembly Resolution 59/300 of 22 June 2005 upon the recommendation of the Special 
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. 
33
 See A/RES/62/63. Criminal accountability of United Nations officials and experts on mission. Resolution 
adopted at 62nd Plenary Meeting 6 December 2007. 
34 UN Model SOFA UN. Doc. A/45/594 paras 46-49.  
35 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on the Criminal accountability of United Nations officials and 
experts on mission, A/RES/62/63 of 8 January 2008. 
36 A/RES/62/63 paras 2-5. 
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United Nations under international law, and in accordance with international human rights 
standards, including due process;  
 Strongly urges all States to consider establishing to the extent that they have not yet done so 
jurisdiction, particularly over crimes of a serious nature, as known in their existing domestic 
criminal laws, committed by their nationals while serving as United Nations officials or experts 
on mission, at least where the conduct as defined in the law of the State establishing jurisdiction 
also constitutes a crime under the laws of the Host State;  
 Encourages all States to cooperate with each other and with the United Nations in the exchange 
of information and in facilitating the conduct of investigations and, as appropriate, prosecution of 
United Nations officials and experts on mission who are alleged to have committed crimes of a 
serious nature, in accordance with their domestic laws and applicable United Nations rules and 
regulations, fully respecting due process rights, as well as to consider strengthening the 
capacities of their national authorities to investigate and prosecute such crimes;  
 Requests the Secretariat to ensure that requests to Member States seeking personnel to serve as 
experts on mission make States aware of the expectation that persons who serve in that capacity 
should meet high standards in their conduct and behaviour and are aware that certain conduct 
may amount to a crime for which they may be held accountable. 
The above recommendations are analysed below in order to ascertain whether or not they are 
actually enforceable or remain mere recommendations.  
7.2.1 Dealing with crimes of UN experts on mission at State level 
All States have been strongly urged to take all appropriate measures to ensure that crimes by 
United Nations officials and experts on mission do not go unpunished and that the 
perpetrators of such crimes are brought to justice.
37
 Among the measures to be taken by State 
members, the enacting of appropriate laws is crucial.
38
 By urging all States to consider 
establishing jurisdiction over crimes committed by their nationals while serving as United 
Nations officials or experts on mission, the UN General Assembly seems to have considered 
that UN officials or experts on mission remain under the jurisdiction of the State which 
contributed them.
39
 By recommending that jurisdiction be established over acts which are 
crimes in their existing domestic criminal laws,
40
 the General Assembly seems to have 
                                                             
37 A/RES/62/63 para 2. 
38 Para 3. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
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overlooked the obligation by peacekeepers and UN officials and experts on mission to 
observe the laws and customs of the country where such personnel are deployed. Countries of 
nationality of UN officials and experts should be urged to enact laws that permit prosecution 
of any individual that commits a crime while serving on a UN mission, without subjecting the 
enactment to double criminalisation.
41
 The jurisdiction of the country of nationality of a 
perpetrator should attach only if the official or expert has returned home before the criminal 
act he is alleged to have committed is revealed, investigated, and prosecuted. This would 
seem important, especially with regard to the obligation to respect local legislation.
42
 As far as 
immunity applicable to UN officials and experts on mission is concerned, the mechanism of 
waiver must also be highlighted.
43
 The waiver permits the Host State to prosecute the member 
of UN personnel for crimes committed within its territory.
44
 Indeed, since the UN has no 
criminal jurisdiction over members working with the organisation, the lack of a forum to 
which civilian personnel can answer for any criminal charge may constitute a gap in the sense 
that if the immunity is not waived, the perpetrator of the crime would go unpunished. This is, 
in fact, the case regarding UN officials and experts on mission who are repatriated since the 
country of nationality is not under an obligation to prosecute.
45
 The country of nationality of a 
UN official or an expert on mission is under no obligation to give assurances to the UN that, 
if such a member of the personnel commits a crime, the State of nationality will prosecute. 
UN officials and experts on mission are not considered to be representatives of the State of 
their nationality.
46
 Instead of urging States to enact laws regarding the prosecution of UN 
officials and experts on mission, it should be judicious to emphasize the necessity for States to 
include within their forces deployed abroad a special staff member for an on-site court 
                                                             
41 The countries of origin of UN officials and experts on mission are under no international obligation to 
prosecute such persons because they are not representative of a State member (experts on mission other than 
civil police also considered as experts on mission). The country of origin of civilian personnel of a UN peace 
operation has no obligation under international law to prosecute the repatriated civilian for an offence he 
committed while serving with the UN. See Oswald B, Durham H and Bates A Documents on the Law of UN 
Peace Operations (Oxford University Press New York 2010) 36, 366. 
42 A UN publication entitled ‘We Are United Nations Peacekeepers’ sets out what UN peacekeepers have to 
observe. They undertake to respect local laws and customs. To ignore the engagement constitutes a lack of 
observance of UN standards. 
43 If the Host State wished to bring a charge against a UN official or expert on mission, all it needs is to observe 
the procedure set out in the SOFA. See para 47(a) of the UN Model SOFA, UN. Doc. A/45/594 of 9 October 
1990. See also Oswald B, Durham H and Bates A op cit  (n 41) 36. 
44 Report of the Secretary-General on Criminal accountability of United Nations officials and experts on mission, 
UN Doc. A/63/260 of 11 August 2008 para 60. (hereinafter SG Report on Criminal Accountability, UN. Doc. 
A/63/260).  
45 Oswald B, Durham H and Bates A op cit (n 41) 36. 
46 Ibid. 
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martial.
47
 Such a court martial has the advantage not only of reducing the cost of investigation 
but also of ensuring that the prosecution of any offence is not subject to the principle of 
double criminalisation
48
 since any violation is prosecuted where it took place. 
The specific recommendation to State members is that jurisdiction over crimes committed by 
their nationals sent to serve as UN officials or experts on mission should be established.
49
 The 
legislation to be enacted must take into account the fact that criminal legislation varies from 
one country to another. Every form of conduct criminalised by the laws of each state must, 
therefore, be prosecuted if they also constitute crimes under the laws of the Host State.
50
 One 
would suggest that the prosecution envisaged be conducted where the crime was committed 
by the officials of the TCC to make it possible for victims and witnesses to be involved. 
7.2.2 Role of UN regarding the curbing of crimes by UN officials and experts on mission 
It is the UN that asks Member States to contribute personnel to serve as UN officials and 
experts on mission.
51
 Its Secretariat must, therefore, ensure that requests to such an end are 
sent with an explanation to make not only the State member, but also the individuals 
themselves, aware that persons intending to serve in that capacity are required to observe high 
standards.
52
 These standards should be clearly mentioned. It should be expressly mentioned 
that to prosecute any conduct it must amount to a crime whether in the Host State or in the 
state of origin of the perpetrator.
53
 
Since experts on mission act in the name of the UN, the Secretary-General is tasked with the 
obligation of bringing all credible allegations that reveal that a crime may have been 
committed by United Nations officials and experts on mission to the attention of the States 
                                                             
47 For a tripartite onsite court see infra 7.3.3.6. 
48 Double criminality imposes a condition on prosecution in some legal systems by requiring that the allegations 
constitute an offence both under that country’s extraterritorial jurisdiction and also in the foreign country. See 
Ireland-Piper D ‘Extraterritoriality and the Sexual Conduct of Australians Overseas’ 2010 (22) Bond Law 
Review16-40. 
49 The establishment of criminal jurisdiction by states over UN officials and experts on mission is warranted only 
regarding civilian police personnel. In fact UN officials and experts may be engaged by the UN directly to 
accomplish a specific task for the organization. They might have no status as State member representatives. UN 
officials and experts on mission are not recruited by asking State members to contribute personnel. See Oswald 
B, Durham H and Bates A op cit (n 41) 366.   
50 UNGA Criminal accountability of United Nations officials and experts on mission (A/RES/62/63 of 8 January 
2008) para 3. 
51 Para 5. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
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against whose nationals such allegations are made. He must be asked also to request from 
those States an indication of the status of their efforts to investigate and, when appropriate, 
prosecute crimes of a serious nature, as well as the types of appropriate assistance States may 
wish to receive from the Secretariat for the purposes of such investigations and 
prosecutions.
54
  
For the whole system to work efficiently, States should cooperate. This is why the General 
Assembly encourages: 
all States to cooperate with each other and with the United Nations in the exchange of 
information and in facilitating the conduct of investigations and, as appropriate, prosecution of 
United Nations officials and experts on mission who are alleged to have committed crimes of a 
serious nature, in accordance with their domestic laws and applicable United Nations rules and 
regulations, fully respecting due process rights, as well as to consider strengthening the capacities 
of their national authorities to investigate and prosecute such crimes.55  
It is evident from an interpretation of the above quotation that an accused person can be given 
a fair trial if the allegations of crimes are properly investigated. This can be possible only if 
the TCC which is prosecuting has sufficient evidence to shed light on the case. Indeed, 
therefore, it cannot be ‘due process’ where the prosecuting authority did not actually 
investigate the incident or has doubts with respect to the findings of a foreign authority or the 
UNOIOS. This explains the insistence of the UN on cooperation with regard to the 
exchanging of information.  
In its meeting of October 2008, a representative of France suggested that the zero-tolerance 
policy with respect to serious crimes committed by United Nations officials on mission must 
be enforced, and States should, first and foremost, be encouraged to establish and exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over their nationals in a Host State.
56
 They also needed to cooperate with 
other States and the United Nations to advance criminal proceedings.
57
 As it appears, 
however, the Draft is not yet an international Convention signed by States and ratified to be a 
                                                             
54 para 9 shows the responsibility of the UN to follow up. 
55
 UNGA Criminal accountability of United Nations officials and experts on mission (A/RES/62/63 of 8 January 
2008) para 4. 
56 UNGA Legal Committee Told ‘Jurisdictional Gaps’ Among Elements Impeding Efforts on Accountability of 
Personnel on United Nations Missions (GA/L/3342 of 10 October 2008 (hereinafter GA/L/3342 of 10 October 
2008)). 
57 Ibid. 
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binding instrument. It can, therefore, still be amended and ameliorated. There are a number of 
lacunae that exist in the draft that will be examined. 
7.3. Content and scope of the Draft Convention  
Under this section an analysis will be undertaken which focuses on personnel covered by the 
draft convention, jurisdiction over conduct of such personnel, and the practical exercise of 
such jurisdiction. With respect to the latter issue, the discussion furthermore explores 
international jurisdiction, Host State jurisdiction, TCC jurisdiction, third State jurisdiction, 
universal jurisdiction, and hybrid jurisdiction. A form of jurisdiction is also proposed which 
consists of an on-site tripartite court composed of individuals from the United Nations, the 
Host State, and the Troop-Contributing Country concerned. 
7.3.1 Personnel covered by the Draft Convention 
As the persons covered are not elsewhere defined under international law, the criterion given 
by the Draft Convention itself may help to determine the category of individuals covered, viz. 
UN officials and experts on mission. The Draft does not clearly define the group comprising 
this category of personnel. The Draft convention explains that the ambiguity should be left as 
such in order to avoid omitting individuals who may also be considered as ‘officials and 
experts on mission.’58 This category of persons includes members of a United Nations 
peacekeeping operation who are considered UN officials pursuant to article V and UN experts 
on mission pursuant to article VI of the General Convention on the privileges and immunities 
of the UN.
59
 It also includes individuals who are considered to be experts on mission pursuant 
to either the provisions of the Status-of-Forces Agreement entered into by the United Nations 
and the Host State for the peacekeeping operation, or, pending the conclusion of such an 
agreement, the provisional application of the Model Status-of-Forces Agreement of 9 October 
1990.
60
 Apart from the above categories of UN officials and experts on mission, this status is 
also bestowed upon other agents of the United Nations ‘who are present in an official capacity 
in the area where a United Nations peacekeeping operation is being conducted and who enjoy 
                                                             
58 See footnote 11 to article 1 of the Draft Convention. 
59 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Adopted by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations on 13 February 1946. 
60 Article 1(d) (i) of the Draft Convention. 
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privileges and immunities of the United Nations pursuant to either articles V or VI of the 
General Convention, if applicable, or Article 105 of the Charter of the United Nations’.61 
The above definition is wide enough and its interpretation must indicate that the list is not 
exhaustive. Indeed, the Secretary General’s Report of 2008 indicates that ‘experts on mission’ 
may include consultants or contractors, even rapporteurs of the Human Rights Council or 
members of the International Law Commission.
62
 With respect to missions of peace, ‘experts 
on mission’ include military observers, military liaison officers, military advisers, and arms 
monitors, members of formed police units, and corrections officers. The status-of-forces or 
status-of-mission agreements indicate which individuals are actually considered as ‘experts on 
mission’.63 
In order to determine whether a given agent must be considered as an expert on mission or a 
UN official, the answer must be found in the wording of the agreement signed to that end 
between the UN and the Host State. This is why even UN volunteers and agents of specialized 
agencies may be considered as falling within the category of ‘experts on mission’ if the 
agreement so provides.
64
  It must be noted, however, that the Draft Convention covers only 
UN officials and experts on mission. This means that any categories of UN personnel or 
agents that do not fit the above definition are excluded.
65
 Such excluded groups of 
peacekeeping personnel are military personnel of national contingents and other individuals 
who, pursuant to the Status-of-Forces Agreement, are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of 
Troop-Contributing Countries.
66
 UN officials and experts on mission cease to be subjected to 
the draft convention if the UN operation to which they are assigned to calls for the observance 
of International Humanitarian Law. This means that United Nations officials or experts on 
mission are considered as combatants whenever they are serving with a United Nations 
operation authorized by the Security Council as an enforcement action under Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations. In such a situation the law of international armed conflict 
                                                             
61 Article 1(d) (ii) of the Draft Convention. 
62
 SG Report on Criminal Accountability UN. Doc. A/63/260 para 65. 
63 Ibid. 
64 UN GA Criminal accountability of United Nations officials and experts on mission, Note by the Secretariat 
(UN Doc.  A/62/329  of 11 September 2007) see explanatory note and para14. 
65 Article 2 of the Draft Convention. 
66 Article 2(2) of the Draft Convention. 
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applies.
67
 Crimes committed by UN forces during such engagements should be considered to 
be war crimes.
68
 There is an opposite view that peacekeepers cannot commit war crimes.
69
 
Indeed, it is also argued that no peacekeeping operation has ever been deployed where there is 
no armed conflict, and a UN force is, therefore, by nature an international one.
70
 Even when 
actual circumstances on the ground do not amount to hostilities, the situation of conflict is 
troubled enough to prompt the UN to deploy troops
71
 and, in such circumstances, crimes 
committed by peacekeepers do not escape the domain of war crimes on the ground that they 
are, or were not, committed in the heat of a battle, which is not a requirement for establishing 
war crimes.
72
 As will be shown later, among the criticisms levelled at this text is the need for 
the convention to cover all situations where criminal responsibility of individuals may be 
engaged.
73
 A differentiation should be made, however, between peacekeepers engaged as 
combatants, especially uniformed personnel, and other UN agents. UN officials and experts 
on mission should still continue to benefit from the status of ‘protected persons’ even during 
enforcement action by a UN force. The Draft Convention considers them as combatants 
whenever they are deployed within a Chapter VII mission, and, therefore, their acts cease to 
                                                             
67 Article 2(3) Draft Convention. This will be the case where peacekeepers are considered as combatants and so 
party to a conflict. What is not easy to determine, however, is whether every Chapter VII operation UN force 
should be deemed party to the conflict whether it be in hostilities with armed groups (rebels) or with regular 
armed forces of a state.  
68 See Zwanenburg MC Accountability under International Humanitarian Law for United Nations and North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization Peace Support Operations (Doctoral thesis Leiden 2004) 195-196. 
69 See Odello M ‘Tackling Criminal Acts in Peacekeeping Operations: The Accountability of Peacekeepers’ 
2010 (15) Journal of Conflict & Security Law 347–391. 
70 Kolb R ‘Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to Forces Under the Command of an International 
Organization’ Report of the Expert Meeting on Multinational Peace Operations: Applicability of International 
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law to UN Mandated Forces (ICRC-UCIHL Geneva on 11-
12 December 2003) 61-69, 67. 
71 The question of whether an international organisation is a party to the treaty that provides for the ius in bello is 
resolved by the fact that States providing contingents to peace operations remain bound by the treaties to which 
they are parties. The provisions of Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, which requires State parties 
‘to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances’ and Article 1(1) of Additional 
Protocol I, which is in the same terms, are cogent proof that UN forces are bound by international humanitarian 
law. See Swindon S The Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict: Joint Service Publication 383 
(Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre Wiltshire 2004) 378. 
72 O’Brien M ‘Prosecuting Peacekeepers in the International Criminal Court for Human Trafficking’ 2006 (1) 
Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 281-328, 325.  
73 See also O’Brien M National and International Criminal Jurisdiction over United Nations Peacekeeping 
Personnel for Gender-Based Crimes against Women (Doctoral thesis University of Nottingham July 2010) 122-
125. Personnel members recruited locally are excepted though it seems that immunity is extended to such 
personnel especially in relation to conduct perpetrated in pursuance to the UN duty of the agent. See General 
Assembly [Sixty-third General Assembly, Sixth Committee, 5th Meeting (AM)], Legal Committee Told 
‘Jurisdictional Gaps’ Among Elements Impeding Efforts on Accountability of Personnel on United Nations 
Missions, GA/L/3342 of 10 October 2008. 
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be covered by the Draft Convention.
74
 From this last exclusion, it appears that the jurisdiction 
of the envisaged convention does not cover war crimes. It is important to try to discuss which 
possible misconduct by peacekeepers is covered with regard to jurisdiction and with regard to 
the practical exercise of such jurisdiction. 
7.3.2. Jurisdiction over conduct 
The Draft Convention envisions jurisdiction over crimes committed by officials and experts 
on mission as being in the domain of the national law systems.
75
 Once it is signed and ratified, 
the State parties are required to domesticate the Convention and to enact the law 
accordingly.
76
 In this way, parties to the Convention will establish jurisdiction, taking into 
account the territorial principle
77
 of the commission of the crime and the active personality.
78
 
A State party may also establish jurisdiction based on passive personality, which means 
jurisdiction based on the law of the nationality of the victims
79
 or on the stateless status of the 
victim residing within the State establishing such jurisdiction.
80
 When the State on whose 
territory the perpetrator is currently found is not in a position to prosecute such a perpetrator, 
it is under an obligation to extradite him or her to any State that has established jurisdiction 
over the crimes listed in the Convention.
81
 It should be noted that extradition must be 
consequential to a request from the competent State.
82
 It would have been more judicious if 
the Draft Convention had indicated that the extradition procedure is not subject to the 
                                                             
74 Article 2(3) of the Draft Convention considers UN officials and experts on mission with a UN enforcement 
action as combatants. This author thinks that UN civilian personnel should still retain their status of protected 
persons even in chapter VII operation. 
75 Article 4 of the Draft Convention. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Article 4(1)(a) of the Draft Convention. 
78 Article 4(1)(b) of the Draft Convention. 
79 Article 4(2)(a) of the Draft Convention. 
80 Article 4(2)(b) of the Draft Convention. 
81 Article 4(4) of the Draft Convention. 
82 Articles 49/50/129/146 of the four Geneva Conventions respectively use the expression ‘hand over’ rather than 
‘extradite’ to provide for cooperation in the enforcement of international humanitarian law. It is, therefore, an 
international obligation to extradite when a state finds itself not prepared to prosecute. International crimes are 
serious crimes. States are always required to enact laws that make them extraditable offences under domestic 
law. See Cryer R et al. An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure 2nd ed. (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge (UK) 2010) 96-97; Öberg MD ‘The Absorption of Grave Breaches into War 
Crimes Law’ 2009 (91) International Review of the Red Cross 163-183; Swindon S op cit 417. 
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prerequisite of an extradition treaty between the two states, and to decree that the principle of 
non-extradition of nationals does not apply.
83
 
The crimes covered by this jurisdiction are set out in article 3 of the Draft Convention which 
reads: 
Article 3 - Crimes committed during United Nations peacekeeping operations 
1. A United Nations official or an expert on mission commits crime within the meaning of this 
Convention if that person intentionally engages in conduct which constitutes one of the serious 
crimes set out in paragraph 2 of the present article while serving on a United Nations 
peacekeeping operation in a Host State. 
2. The serious crimes referred to in paragraph 1 of the present article are, for each State party 
establishing and exercising jurisdiction pursuant to this Convention, those which, under the 
national law of that State party, correspond to:84 
(a) Murder; 
(b) Wilfully causing serious injury to body or health; 
(c) Rape and acts of sexual violence; 
(d) Sexual offences involving children; 
(e) An attempt to commit any crime set out in subparagraphs (a) to (d); and 
(f) Participation in any capacity such as an accomplice, assistant or instigator in any crime set out 
in subparagraphs (a) to (e).  
As a first ground of criticism, the Draft Convention errs in listing the crimes that 
peacekeepers, as UN officials or experts on mission, may possibly commit. Such an 
exhaustive list has the effect of leaving out some of the types of serious misconduct with 
which the MONUC personnel were reproached, such as pillaging and weapons trafficking
85
 as 
well as the horrendous crime of torture which was reported in Somalia,
86
 unless one interprets 
the crime of torture as covered under subparagraph (b) of the section. The UN has itself 
underlined the difficulty of establishing a finite list of crimes that should be covered by a 
                                                             
83 Some states do not extradite nationals, but they provide for jurisdiction for crimes committed abroad. Cryer R 
et al. An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press 
Cambridge (UK) 2010) 97. To prohibit recourse to the principle would avoid areas of impunity, for example 
where the state does not extradite and is not prepared to prosecute. 
84 Torture, pillaging, arms trafficking, and other serious crimes are not listed in this article of the Draft 
Convention. 
85 See UN GA Criminal accountability of United Nations officials and experts on mission (UN. Doc. A/62/329 
of 11 September 2007). 
86 See Chapter II of this thesis. 
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convention.
87
 The provided list above limits criminal acts by peacekeepers to crimes against 
the person.
88
 Yet investigations regarding conduct of UN peacekeepers deployed in Africa, 
especially in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, have proved that peacekeepers can 
commit other crimes than those listed in the Convention.
89
 The investigation into gold 
smuggling and trafficking in weapons in MONUC highlights the need for a convention to 
apply to all serious crimes to ensure there is no jurisdictional gap.
90
 This explains the 
suggestion that any attempt to list the crimes to be covered, or to specify how crimes by UN 
officials and experts on mission should be defined, is an error of interpretation.
91
 To avoid 
such limitation and error, it has been suggested that the scope ratione materiae be left to the 
discretion of the state asserting jurisdiction.
92
 The convention, therefore, should cover crimes 
which are specified under the national law of the State that has established jurisdiction but 
punishable under that nation’s law by at least two/three years’ imprisonment.93  
In addition, the Convention should, to appear as a complete treaty, include all core 
international crimes
94
 and general principles referring to any violation of national law of the 
Host State as well as of each UN Troop-Contributing Country.
95
 It is not judicious to assume 
that peacekeepers cannot commit international crimes simply because their conduct 
sometimes may not rise to the level of violations of jus cogens to entail universal 
jurisdiction.
96
 The criminal conduct of peacekeepers goes beyond ordinary crimes and 
                                                             
87 UN Doc. A/62/329 para 37. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Criminal acts alleged to have been committed by MONUC personnel range from sexual offences to smuggling 
gold, ivory, and other natural resources, drug dealing, and even trading weapons with armed groups who were 
supposed to be disarmed by the same peacekeepers. See van Rooyen F Blue Helmets for Africa: India’s 
Peacekeeping in Africa-Occasional Paper (South African Institute of International Affairs (SAII) May 2010)17; 
Schaefer BD ‘Keep the Cap on U.S. Contributions to U.N. Peacekeeping’ 2007 (2067) Backgrounder 1-20, 6-7. 
90 UN Doc. A/62/329 para 37. 
91 Ibid para 39. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. Any conduct that may be considered to be petty crime is left out. Thus an offence such as adultery in 
Burundian law, as well as in Congolese law, cannot as such be prosecuted since it is only punished by a fine 
(Articles 26-29 of the Burundian Penal Code ) or by an imprisonment of a maximum term of twelve months 
(Article 467 of the Congolese Family Code. ‘Loi no. 87-010 portant Code de la Famille’ Journal Officiel du 
Zaïre, numéro spécial 1er aout 1987). In the Somali penal code, adultery is punishable by a term in jail of up to 
two years (Article 426 of the Somali Penal Code). 
94 For purposes of recall, international core crimes include the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and 
war crimes. See supra 4.2.1 and Cryer R et al. op cit (n 82) 4. 
95 UN Doc. A/62/329 para 39. 
96 Sweetser CE ‘Providing Effective Remedies to Victims of Abuse by Peacekeeping Personnel’ 2008 (83) New 
York University Law Review 1643-1678, 1656-58. 
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constitutes human rights violations.
97
 Indeed, if peacekeepers could not commit international 
crimes, namely the core international crimes within the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), there should not have been any opposition to such this permanent and 
vocationally universal criminal court. Furthermore, if crimes by peacekeepers could not 
amount to international crimes, the UN Security Council Resolutions 1422 (2002), 1487 
(2003) and 1497 (2003) excluding the jurisdiction of the ICC over some peacekeepers would 
not have been passed.
98
 Peacekeepers sent to Liberia at the time when these resolutions were 
passed were, therefore, prosecutable before the ICC, and this is still the situation today.
99
 
7.3.3. Practical exercise of jurisdiction 
There are a number of available forums competent to adjudicate criminal acts by 
peacekeepers. These include inter alia the national courts of the Host State on whose territory 
the act is performed; the national courts of the Troop-Contributing Country; an international 
                                                             
97 Ibid.  As an example trafficking in human beings is an international crime and peacekeepers in Kosovo and 
elsewhere have been accused of committing such acts. See Jennings KM & Nikolić-Ristanović V UN 
Peacekeeping Economies and Local Sex Industries: Connections and Implications (MICROCON Research 
Working Paper 2009); Chun S ‘Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Peacekeepers’ Policy Brief 10/2009; 
Skjelsbæk I‘The NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Military Intervention Facing New 
Civilian Challenges’ in Olsson L et al. Gender Aspects of Conflict Interventions: Intended and Unintended 
Consequences - Case Studies on the United Nations Mission in Eritrea/Ethiopia (UNMEE), the NATO 
Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) and the Temporary International Presence in Hebron 
(TIPH) (Final Report to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Oslo March 2004) 25-38; Kent V ‘Protecting 
Civilians From UN Peacekeepers and Humanitarian Workers: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse’ in Aoi C, de 
Coning C & Thakur R (eds) Unintended Consequences of Peace Support Operations (United Nations University 
Press Tokyo 2007) 44-66. 
98 Oswald B, Durham H and Bates A Documents on the Law of UN Peace Operations (Oxford University Press 
New York 2010); Zwanenburg MC Accountability under International Humanitarian Law for United Nations 
and North Atlantic Treaty Organization Peace Support Operations (Doctoral thesis Leiden 2004); Jain N ‘A 
Separate Law for Peacekeepers: The Clash between the Security Council and the International Criminal Court’ 
2005 (16) EJIL 239-254; Zappala S ‘Are Some Peacekeepers Better than Others? UN Security Council 
Resolution 1497 (2003) and the ICC’ 2003 (1) Journal of International Criminal Justice 671-678; Zappala S 
‘The Reaction of the US to the Entry into force of the ICC Statute: Comments on UN SC Resolution 1422 
(2002) and Article 98 Agreements’ 2003 (1) Journal of International Criminal Justice  114-134; Zwanenburg M 
‘Compromise or Commitment: Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Obligations for UN Peace 
Forces’ 1998 (11) Leiden Journal of International Law 229-245; Zwanenburg M ‘Editorial: Double Standards in 
Peacekeeping? Subcontracting Peacekeeping and International Humanitarian Law’ 1999 (12) Leiden Journal of 
International Law 753-757; Zwanenburg M ‘The Statute for an International Criminal Court and the United 
States: Peacekeepers under Fire?’ 1999 (10) EJIL 124-143. 
99 Engdahl O Protection of Personnel in Peace Operations: The Role of the ‘Safety Convention’ Against the 
Background of General International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Leiden 2007) 191. 
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court or tribunal and the courts of a third state.
100
 Some of these forums are more effective 
than others in ensuring criminal accountability.
101
  
In the preceding chapters of this thesis the possible impediments to the exertion of jurisdiction 
have been discussed. This section, therefore, examines the possible mechanisms to overcome 
the identified hindrances. The relevance of the analysis resides in the fact that, with respect to 
UN officials and experts on mission who are not members of the military component of the 
force, the Host State is not precluded from exercising criminal jurisdiction over their criminal 
conduct, except where their immunity is not waived.
102
 The Troop-Contributing Country 
remains concurrently competent with the Host State regarding its nationals serving with the 
UN as UN officials and experts on mission.
103
 Coupled with such relevance to the analysis is 
the variation in national laws as to what constitutes criminal conduct and the definitions for 
each crime.
104
 For example, there are national differences in the definition of rape and other 
violent sexual crimes and the age at which an individual is capable of giving valid consent to 
a sexual act.
105
 The issue, therefore, of what conduct has to trigger the intervention of the 
prosecuting authority of one or the other competent jurisdictions referred to above lies in 
identifying a common understanding of what is needed to be done. To overcome such 
variation, an international jurisdiction would be more suitable regarding the adjudication of 
criminal conduct of international personnel.
106
 
                                                             
100 The hurdles to the effective exertion of such jurisdiction, especially with regard to military members of a 
peace operation, have been shown in chapter III of this thesis. 
101 Effectiveness stems from the existence of an agreement to such an end, but for prosecution actually to to take 
place willingness is needed. 
102 According to the model SOFA, the Host State has only to manifest its desire to bring to justice a UN official 
or expert on mission. It has, therefore, to obtain the permission of the Secretary-General’s Special Representative 
in order to obtain the waiver of the immunity enjoyed by the official or expert alleged to have committed an 
offence. See paras 42 and 47 of the UN Model SOFA, UN. Doc. A/45/594 of 1990. 
103 To avoid the suggestion that immunity leads to impunity, the Draft Convention of the accountability of UN 
officials and experts on mission has propounded that jurisdiction be established in each and every state party to 
the convention. See Article 4. Host State, sending State and State of the nationality of victims all are concerned. 
104 Regarding the crimes considered in the Draft Convention, see Article 3. 
105 Report of the Group of Legal Experts on ensuring the accountability of United Nations staff and experts on 
mission with respect to criminal acts committed in peacekeeping operations. UN Doc. A/60/980 of 16 August 
2006, para 19. 
106 UN operations are, by their very nature, of an international character. UN personnel are, therefore, 
international personnel or agents. See Kolb R ‘Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to Forces Under 
the Command of an International Organization’ Report of the Expert Meeting on Multinational Peace 
Operations: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law to UN 
Mandated Forces (ICRC-UCIHL Geneva on 11-12 December 2003) 61-69, 62. 
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7.3.3.1. International jurisdiction 
It is important that all categories of peacekeeping personnel be subject to the same norms of 
conduct, including national contingent members, particularly in relation to sexual exploitation 
and abuse.
107
 The Zeid report identified that different components of peacekeeping operations 
are governed by different rules and disciplinary procedures because they each have a distinct 
legal status and said that a uniform code of conduct may be the solution.
108
  
Although the Secretariat can decree that experts on mission, contractors, consultants, and 
United Nations volunteers have to observe the standards established by the 2003 Secretary-
General bulletin
109
 which have been incorporated into the draft conditions of service of 
international United Nations volunteers, and, although violations of those standards will result 
in appropriate action within the authority of the Secretary-General, criminal and disciplinary 
responsibility in respect of members of national contingents depends on the national law of 
the Member State.
110
 Moreover, with respect to those personnel over whom the national law 
of the sending State has not exclusive criminal jurisdiction, the Secretariat has no power to 
hold them criminally accountable.
111
 It has been realised that the UN Secretariat cannot 
conduct a criminal investigation regarding UN officials or experts on mission where it is 
alleged that the conduct engaged in by the persons participating on a United Nations operation 
may amount to a crime.
112
 Nor can the Secretariat prosecute an alleged offender.
113
 But where 
the operation is comparable to those deployed in Kosovo
114
 or East Timor,
115
 the exercise of 
                                                             
107 For instance engaging the services of a prostitute is not a crime in Congolese law whereas it is an offence 
under South African criminal law. See chapter III, paragraph 3.2.2 of this thesis. 
108 UN. Doc. A/59/710 para 14. 
109 Report of the Group of Legal Experts on making the standards contained in the Secretary-General’s bulletin 
binding on contingent members and standardizing the norms of conduct so that they are applicable to all 
categories of peacekeeping personnel UN Doc. A/61/645 of 18 December 2006 para 40.  
110 Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group at the 2006 substantive 
session, New York, 27 February-17 March 2006, UN Doc. A/60/19 of 22 March 2006 para 65. 
111 The UN, being not a State and having no own military force, has no criminal jurisdiction over any category of 
its personnel. There is a need for clear legislation regarding criminal offences that may be committed by 
members of UN personnel, especially with respect to peacekeeping missions. 
112 UN GA Criminal accountability of United Nations officials and experts on mission, Note by the Secretariat 
(UN Doc. A/62/329  of 11 September 2007) para 16. 
113 Ibid. 
114 See Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). 
115 See Security Council resolution 1704 (2006). 
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criminal jurisdiction by the authorities of the operation is not only possible but also falls 
within the duties of the operation.
116
 
It should be noted that ‘international jurisdiction’ does not necessarily mean jurisdiction by a 
UN tribunal.
117
 Hence, where those crimes may be qualified as war crimes, an international 
criminal adjudicating forum such as the ICC
118
 should be considered competent.
119
 One 
scholar has even stated that the ICC is the sole exception to the principle of exclusive 
jurisdiction over peacekeepers by the sending State.
120
 It must be remembered that the ICC 
Statute does not expressly refer to the applicability of International Humanitarian Law to UN 
forces.
121
 Article 8 of the Statute, which deals with war crimes, however, considers attacking 
personnel involved in a peacekeeping mission as a war crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court.
122
 But this is subject to the condition that such personnel must have been entitled to the 
protected status of civilians.
123
 In other words, when a peacekeeper cannot avail himself or 
herself of civilian protected status, he or she is considered as a combatant party to the conflict 
and subject to the international law of armed conflict.
124
 Actions of peacekeepers during UN 
missions of peace, depending upon the specific circumstances, therefore, may fall within the 
                                                             
116 In enforcement operations, such of Kosovo and Timor-Leste, the UN mandate comprises executive and 
prosecutorial powers. See UN Doc. A/62/329 of 11 September 2007 para 16. 
117 Where there is a gap in law because of lack of jurisdiction over crimes committed by UN officials and experts 
on mission, the UN Secretariat, which does not possess criminal and prosecutorial powers, cannot fill such a gap. 
See UN Doc. A/62/329 of 11 September 2007 para 18. 
118 See discussion in Chapter III of this thesis regarding the question of whether conduct by peacekeepers 
qualifies as international crime. The reason why the USA opposes the ICC and threatens to cut, and has indeed 
cut, military aid to dozens of ICC signatories, including South Africa, who refuse to enter into bilateral 
agreements with the US government, is effectively that UN peacekeepers who commit war crimes fall with the 
jurisdiction of the Court. In 2002, President Bush signed into law the American Service Members Protection Act, 
which was intended to intimidate countries that ratify the ICC treaty. This US law authorizes the use of military 
force to liberate any American or citizen of a US ally being held by the Court in The Hague. This provision, 
dubbed the ‘Hague invasion clause’, has caused a strong reaction from US allies around the world. The law also 
provides for the withdrawal of US military assistance from countries ratifying the ICC treaty, and it restricts US 
participation in UN peacekeeping unless the USA obtains immunity from prosecution. See Oxfam International 
OI Policy Compendium Note on the International Criminal Court May 2007. 
119 Murder, even a single murder of a protected person, amounts to a violation of article 8(2)(c)(i) of the Rome 
Statute. See Zimmermann A ‘Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the ICC: Preliminary Remarks on Paragraph 2 (c)-
(f) and Paragraph 3: War Crimes committed in an Armed Conflict not of International Character’ in Triffterer O 
(ed) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, 
(Nomos Baden-Baden 1999) 262-288. 
120 Miller AJ ‘Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Operations’ 2005 (39) Cornell International Law 
Journal 71-96, 80. 
121
 Zwanenburg MC Accountability under International Humanitarian Law for United Nations and North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization Peace Support Operations (Doctoral thesis Leiden 2004) 220. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Shraga D ‘The United Nations as an Actor Bound by International Humanitarian Law’ 1998 (5) International 
Peacekeeping 64-81. 
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category of war crimes.
125
 It was for fear that American troops engaged in the Balkans would 
be prosecuted by the ICC ‘that the United States chose to veto the extension of the mandate of 
the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina as one of the steps in its efforts to 
exempt United States military personnel from the jurisdiction of the Court.’126 In fact the 
personnel of peace operations are capable of committing war crimes which consist of 
violations of international humanitarian law. As stated in a letter of the then UN Secretary-
General, Kofi Annan, to Colin Powell, then US Secretary of State, peacekeepers are capable 
of committing crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC, though the occurrence of such crimes 
is highly improbable.
127
 
Other scholars have indicated that peacekeepers cannot commit war crimes within the 
purview of the ICC, because Article 8 of the Rome Statute implies that the conduct of a UN 
force is incapable of fulfilling the requirement that ‘[t]he Court shall have jurisdiction in 
respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a 
large-scale commission of such crimes,’128 or that a UN force cannot commit great breaches 
of the Geneva Conventions because the UN is not a party to such treaties.
129
 Such arguments, 
especially when related to the sexual violence perpetrated by the peacekeepers, reveal that 
they originate from the traditional consideration of sexual crimes as isolated acts, as private 
crimes perpetrated discreetly.
130
 This is so because, when a soldier (or an international aid 
                                                             
125 A war crime is any serious violation of international humanitarian law. The violation of this body of law 
applicable in armed conflict entails individual criminal liability under international law. See Cryer et al. op cit (n 
82) 267. 
126 Zwanenburg MC Accountability under International Humanitarian Law for United Nations and North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization Peace Support Operations (Doctoral thesis Leiden 2004) 220-221. See 
Zwanenburg M Accountability of Peace Support Operations (Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers Leiden 2005) 158 
where the author gives the opinion that ‘the UN exercise exclusive command and control over all troops 
comprising its forces, which are recruited and organized as national contingents. As a consequence of its 
command and control, the UN is deemed a party to armed conflict and thereby subject to the obligations of 
international humanitarian law’ citing Glick R ‘Lip Service to the Laws of War: Humanitarian Law and UN 
Armed Forces’ 1995 (17) Michigan Journal of International Law 97-98. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Harrington AR Victims of Peace: Current Abuse Allegations against U.N. Peacekeepers and the Role of Law 
in Preventing them in the Future (Paper 630 Bepress Legal Series 2005) 20-25. 
129 Odello M op cit (n 69) 370 et passim. Contra, see Zwanenburg M Accountability of Peace Support 
Operations (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Leiden 2005) 158; Spencer SW ‘Making Peace: Preventing and 
Responding to Sexual Exploitation by United Nations Peacekeepers’ 2005 (16) Journal of Public and 
International Affairs 167-181, 171.  
130 Compare Haffajee RL ‘Prosecuting Crimes of Rape and Sexual Violence at the ICTR: The Application of 
Joint Criminal Enterprise Theory’ 2006 (29) Harvard Journal of Law and Gender 201-221, 204; Sexual 
exploitation and abuse constitute violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions; they constitute 
war crimes. See Spencer SW ‘Making Peace: Preventing and Responding to Sexual Exploitation by United 
Nations Peacekeepers’ 2005 (16) Journal of Public and International Affairs 167-181,171. 
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worker) is accused of rape, it is most often very difficult to get evidence.
131
 If it is proven that 
a peacekeeper committed a war crime, and it consisted of murder, torture or rape, and the 
crime was perpetrated as part of a large-scale commission of similar crimes, that peacekeeper 
can be prosecuted and found guilty of a war crime by the International Criminal Court.
132
 But 
the formulation of Article 8 of the Rome Statute, although requiring the indicated chapeau 
element, does not exclude the possibility of the Court’s exercising jurisdiction over isolated 
war crimes.
133
 
 It has already been indicated that, effectively, the chapeau element of war crimes seems to 
require that war crimes, as well as genocide and crimes against humanity, be committed 
collectively or on a large-scale.
134
 Yet war crimes are not necessarily collective in nature, 
even though wars are fought by groups, and are thus collective in nature.
135
 Although random 
or isolated criminal occurrences do not have sufficient nexus to the armed conflict, it is 
possible that a single act against individual values may still amount to war a crime
136
 as the 
status of the soldier as combatant or uniformed military is sufficient to show the required 
nexus.
137
 The UN OIOS has shown that sexual exploitation and abuse has been widespread, 
i.e. committed on a large-scale, though not necessarily in fulfilment of any preconceived 
policy or plan.
138
 Bonafè correctly observes that war crimes need not be planned or executed 
on a large-scale at the State or organisational level to give rise to individual criminal 
                                                             
131 The Nordic Africa Institute Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeeping Operations in Contemporary 
Africa (Policy Notes 2009/2 March 2009) 3. 
132 Du Plessis M & Peté S Who Guards the Guards? The International Criminal Court and Serious Crimes 
Committed by Peacekeepers in Africa (ISS Monograph Series No 121 Pretoria February 2006) 27. 
133 See Lee RS et al. (eds) The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedures and 
Evidence (Transnational Publisher Ardsley 2001) 109-110. 
134 The Rome Statute seems to equate ‘attack against civilian’ with State or organizational policy in provisions 
relating to widespread requirement. See Haskell JD ‘The Complicity and Limits of International Law in Armed 
Conflict Rape’ 2009 (29) B.C. Third World Law Journal 35-84, 57. 
135 Anderson K ‘The Rise of International Criminal Law: Intended and Unintended Consequences’ 2009 (20) 
European Journal of International Law – EJIL 331- 358, 346. 
136 See Schomburg W & Peterson I ‘Genuine Consent to Sexual Violence under International Criminal Law’ 
2007(101) ASIL 121-140, 130. 
137 Within a Chapter VII mandate, a peacekeeper will always be considered a combatant. See Breau SC ‘The 
Impact of the Responsibility to Protect on Peacekeeping’ 2006 (11) Journal of Conflict & Security Law 429-464, 
446-7; and, even when operating as part of a UN force, military forces remain in their capacity as State agents, 
which means they have to observe the law applicable to armed conflict where State forces are engaged. See 
McLaughlin R ‘The Legal Regime Applicable to Use of Lethal Force When Operating Under a United Nations 
Security Council Chapter VII Mandate Authorizing “All Necessary Means”’ 2008 (12) Journal of Conflict and 
Security Law 389-417, 395. 
138 Supra Chapter 2. 
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responsibility.
139
 Therefore, since Troop-Contributing Countries may not be, or are not, 
willing to prosecute crimes by peacekeepers owing to their special status, it should be 
suggested that their conduct be referred to an impartial forum.  
As the present discussion deals with jurisdiction over UN officials and experts on mission, it 
may be noted that the ICC does not possess the proper jurisdiction for the prosecution of those 
peacekeepers charged with abuses of any type, and particularly sexual abuses, for ‘the ICC 
statute was created to codify the tradition of prosecuting those accused of political and 
military-political atrocities which started with the prosecutions at Nuremberg … or complicity 
in a larger plan to harm or destroy a population.’140 This simply does not describe the type of 
possible misconduct by UN officials and experts on mission whose crimes, most of the time, 
are akin to domestic law violations.
141
 Host States, as well as the country of origin of the 
individual alleged to have committed an offence while serving as UN official or expert on 
mission, remain competent to prosecute such an individual.  
7.3.3.2. Host State jurisdiction
142
 
For several reasons enumerated by the Group of Legal Experts the Host State should exercise 
jurisdiction over crimes committed by peacekeeping personnel in its territory.
143
 Not only it is 
the duty of the State to do so, but it offers better access to witnesses, and the fact is that the 
local laws were infringed contrary to the pledge that peacekeepers will observe those laws.
144
 
Trial or prosecution in the Host State gives a good impression and justice is seen to be 
done.
145
 This is not so new since, according to the Group: 
                                                             
139 Bonafè BI The Relationship Between State and Individual Responsibility for International Crimes (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers Leiden 2009) 91. 
140 Harrington AR op cit (n 128) 24-25. 
141 Most of the criminal conduct of UN officials and experts on mission can hardly fall into categories within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC. 
142 The courts of the territory within which the offender committed his offence have jurisdiction over that 
offence. See Levitt A ‘Jurisdiction over Crimes II’ 1926 (16) Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law 
and Criminology 495-518. This is clearly affirmed in the Draft Convention Article 4(b) (a). 
143 GLE report A/60/980 para 27. 
144 Ibid. 
145
 (a) When a crime is committed in the territory of the Host State, there is little doubt that it may establish 
jurisdiction over conduct within its territory. This is regardless of the identity of the alleged offender or of the 
victim, or whether another State can exercise jurisdiction over the same conduct; (b) the Host State is likely to be 
the place where most of the witnesses and evidence are located. Holding criminal trials in the Host State averts 
the expense, delays, and inconvenience of witnesses having to travel overseas or of evidence having to be 
transmitted abroad; (c) holding an alleged offender criminally accountable in the Host State flows from the 
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There have been instances where United Nations personnel have been subject to the exercise of 
criminal jurisdiction by the Host State of a peacekeeping operation and have had their immunities 
waived for this purpose. This has occurred even in Host States whose legal systems are perceived as 
dysfunctional. In these cases, the waiver of immunity may be subject to ad hoc arrangements being 
made by the United Nations to ensure that the interests of the alleged offender are protected.146 
In Host States where the judicial system is dysfunctional, it has been suggested that, regarding 
the adjudication of crimes committed by peacekeeping personnel, the Host State agrees to and 
receives assistance from the United Nations in order to ensure that criminal proceedings 
against international personnel satisfy international human rights standards.
147
 Although the 
group pointed to the fear of instituting double standards in the domestic judicial system in 
order to ensure peacekeepers are dealt with in observance of international standards of the 
human rights, this does not constitute a prejudice to the judicial system. The experience by the 
judges may help in improving their approach of the handling cases even regarding nationals 
of the said Host State. This would be a tremendous contribution to the host country. It is, 
therefore, not so difficult to overcome the reluctance to waive the immunity of peacekeepers 
and allow the Host State to prosecute them. It is also possible for the mission to train Host 
State judges or to establish hybrid courts where national judges, and those designated by the 
mission, together handle all the matters regarding peacekeepers, especially their criminal 
offences. Regarding criminal accountability of the special personnel called ‘UN officials and 
experts on mission,’ the jurisdiction of the country of origin should not be ruled out as a 
practical and potentially effective option.
148
 In fact, the Secretary-General Bulletin on 
protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse provides that cases of sexual 
exploitation and abuse ‘may’, upon consultation with the Office of Legal Affairs, be referred 
to national authorities for criminal prosecution.
149
 The use of ‘may’ means that the UN 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
obligation of United Nations peacekeeping personnel to respect all local laws and regulations as a corollary to 
their enjoyment of privileges and immunities in the Host State; and (d) holding trials in the Host State will give 
the local population a greater sense of justice being done and being seen to be done. This would be an important 
demonstration of the UN commitment to the rule of law. GLE report A/60/980 para 27. 
146 However, not one case is cited. GLE report A/60/980 para 29. Considering the inadequate state of the judicial 
systems of most hosting countries, the SRSG will always be reluctant with respect to waiving immunity of 
civilian staff of a UN operation. See Jennings KM Protecting Whom? Approaches to Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Operations (Fafo-Report 36 Allkopi AS (Norway) 2008) 21. 
147
 GLE report A/60/980 para 30. 
148 See UN Doc.  A/62/329 of 11 September 2007 para 21. 
149 Miller SK ‘Accountability for the Conduct of UN-Mandated Forces under International Human Rights Law: 
A Case Study Concerning Sexual Abuse of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)’ in 
Arnold R and Knoops GJA (eds) Practice and Policies of Modern Peace Support Operations under 
International Law (Transnational Publishers Ardsley 2006) 261-286, 282. 
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investigative team is not obliged to do so, but may use this as a means to supplement the 
absence of a UN criminal jurisdiction over its personnel or to prosecute crimes committed by 
peacekeepers.
150
 
7.3.3.3. Jurisdiction of the Troop-Contributing Country 
If the Host State’s judicial system is not functioning, or is unable to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction to a satisfactory level in the short-term with or without international assistance, 
the intervention of other States is inevitable.
151
 One of these States is the State of nationality 
of the perpetrator.
152
 Under the Model Status-of-Forces Agreement,
153
 individuals upon whom 
the status of experts on mission is conferred, enjoy, as provided for by the Convention on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, the same privileges and immunities as UN 
Staff.
154
 United Nations staff members are required to follow the directions and instructions 
properly issued by the Secretary-General and their supervisors.
155
 They are required to 
comply with local laws and honour their private legal obligations, including the obligation to 
honour orders of competent courts.
156
 UN officials and experts on mission, therefore, 
undertake to observe local laws.
157
 But a jurisdictional gap is still possible since, contrary to 
the deployment of military personnel,
158
 the countries contributing civilian personnel are not 
asked to give assurances to the UN that if UN officials and experts on mission do not live up 
to their obligation to respect local laws and customs they will prosecute them.
159
 United 
Nations officials and experts on mission enjoy privileges and immunities. With the exception 
of the members of UN peacekeeping personnel recruited locally and assigned an hourly 
                                                             
150 Zwanenburg M ‘The Statute for an International Criminal Court and the United States: Peacekeepers under 
Fire?’ 1991 (10) EJIL 124-143, 127-129; Zwanenburg M Accountability of Peace Support Operations (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers Leiden 2005) 238. 
151 GLE report A/60/980 para 40. 
152 Para 41. 
153 Model SOFA UN Doc. A/45/594. 
154 Paras 25-26. 
155 Annex II - Standards of conduct for United Nations peacekeeping personnel UN. Doc. A/61/645 of 18 
December 2006 paras 4, 6. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Rule 2 of the Ten Rules - Code of Conduct for Blue Helmets available at www.un.org/en/peacekeeping-
/documents/ten_in.pdf  [last accessed 19 December 2012]; We Are United Nations Peacekeepers [Obligations] 
available at www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/un_in.pdf [last accessed 19 December 2012]. 
158 Para 48 of the model SOFA, UN. Doc. A/45/594. 
159 There is no requirement in international law for the civilian-contributing State to prosecute the repatriated 
civilian member for offences committed during peace operations. It must also be indicated that experts on 
mission are not representatives of their states of origin. See Oswald B, Durham H and Bates A Documents o the 
Law of UN Peace Operations (Oxford University Press New York 2010) 36, 366. 
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rate,
160
 no automatic action against UN officials and experts on mission can be taken.
161
 This 
would make it difficult for any State to assert jurisdiction over their acts. However, the 
Secretary-General has the authority and duty to waive them in order to avoid the impeding of 
the course of justice.
162
 It is after such a waiver that a State can assert jurisdiction and 
prosecute crimes alleged to have been committed by UN officials and experts on mission. 
Criminal jurisdiction of Troop-Contributing Countries over peacekeepers, other than those 
provided for in the different agreements regarding the deployment of the operation, finds legal 
basis not upon the territoriality principle but in the well-established active nationality 
principle.
163
 Where it may be ascertained that the Host State is not able to exercise its 
jurisdiction, the sending State should be asked to intervene because the UN has no criminal 
jurisdiction.
164
 It has even been suggested that this may be especially so with respect to 
custodial issues after investigation and prosecution have been conducted and the perpetrator 
sentenced.
165
 The intervention of the State of nationality of the perpetrator in a later stage may 
be recommended in that it avoids the difficulties relating to gathering evidence in a foreign 
country. But what if the State of nationality construes custodial powers as available only over 
persons convicted and sentenced according to national law? To answer this question, the UN 
has listed views regarding crimes committed outside the boundaries of States, especially by 
individuals serving with a UN mission of peace.
166
 It appears, from the views of different 
countries, that there are many variations. For instance, Canadian law applies to crimes 
committed within Canada, including cases where only part of an offence has taken place in 
Canada, or where there is some other real and substantial connection.
167
 The general rule, in 
line with its common law tradition, is to limit the application of the criminal law of Canada to 
events occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of Canada.
168
 Exceptions to this principle 
are found in section 7 of the Criminal Code and the Crimes against Humanity and the War 
                                                             
160 GA/L/3342 of 10 October 2008.  
161 Bastick M, Grimm K & Kunz R Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict Global Overview and Implications for the 
Security Sector (DCAF Geneva 2007) 173. 
162 Ibid. 
163 According to the active nationality principle, the state of origin of the perpetrator has jurisdiction over the 
offence committed by its national. Some states require that the act be criminal in both the State of commission as 
well as in their State. Other assert jurisdiction regardless of the double incrimination principle. See Cassese A 
International Criminal Law 2
nd
 ed. (Oxford University Press New York 2008) 337.   
164 UN. Doc. A/62/329 paras 17-19. 
165 GLE report A/60/980 para 41. 
166 SG Report on Criminal Accountability UN. Doc. A/63/260. 
167 Para 11. 
168 Ibid. 
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Crimes Act.
169
 Several such exceptions fulfil international legal obligations to prosecute such 
acts committed by Canadians outside Canada or to prosecute others accused of extraterritorial 
offences who are found in Canada.
170
 The other exceptions relate to the protection of the 
essential interests of Canada, particularly with respect to offences in areas such as 
immigration law, the integrity of the Canadian passport, and similar matters, as well as 
maintaining control over Canadian officials and military personnel working abroad.
171
 
Accordingly, Canada would extend jurisdiction over crimes committed by Canadian nationals 
while serving as United Nations officials or experts on mission only when they fall within one 
of those exceptions.
172
  
According to a UN report, South Africa, like other common law countries, does not exercise 
extra-territorial jurisdiction on grounds of nationality.
173
 Exceptions to this stance are, for 
example, the Defence Act, 1957 that provides for criminal jurisdiction over military and 
civilian elements of its defence force deployed beyond South Africa.
174
 Furthermore, an 
amendment to the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977 was introduced in Parliament in 2008 with 
a view to enabling prosecution against South African nationals who committed serious 
offences while serving abroad.
175
 Indeed, most States have enacted laws to ensure that serious 
crimes committed outside by one of their nationals are punishable within the country, 
provided that the perpetrator is currently found in his or her home country and the principle of 
double criminality is satisfied,
176
 i.e. the conduct is an offence according to the law of the 
State exercising jurisdiction, or independently to whether or not the conduct is criminalized 
where it was perpetrated.
177
 It is upon this provision that the countries of origin can prosecute 
                                                             
169 S 7 of the Canadian Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act 2000 relates to breach of responsibility by 
military commander or other superior. 
170 Ss 6 and 8 of the Canadian Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act 2000 with respect to crimes of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed outside Canada. 
171 SG Report on Criminal Accountability UN. Doc. A/63/260 para 12. 
172 Ibid. 
173 UNGA Legal Committee Told ‘Jurisdictional Gaps’ Among Elements Impeding Efforts on Accountability of 
Personnel on United Nations Missions (GA/L/3342 of 10 October 2008) (hereinafter GA/L/3342 of 10 October 
2008). 
174 SG Report on Criminal Accountability, UN. Doc. A/63/260 para 32. 
175 The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 establishes 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over citizens and those who ordinarily reside in the Republic who are alleged to have 
committed a sexual offence or other offences in terms of the Act outside its borders. 
176 Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Liechtenstein, Norway, Qatar, Tunisia to cite a few. See SG Report on Criminal 
Accountability UN. Doc. A/63/260 paras 13, 16, 18, 25, 28, 30, 34. 
177 Brazil, Czech Republic, Germany.  See SG Report on Criminal Accountability UN. Doc. A/63/260, paras 10, 
14, 17. 
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peacekeepers for crimes committed abroad. Furthermore, a UN Secretary-General Report 
indicates that  
‘efforts to hold violators to legal account for past abuses have not been limited to the courts of 
countries in which violations take place or international tribunals alone. Recent years have seen 
an un-precedented number of cases brought in the national courts of third-party States, under the 
universality principle...’178  
Although this statement applies to crimes committed by parties to an armed conflict other 
than peacekeeping personnel, nothing precludes its application to peacekeepers if their 
conduct amounts to war crimes. 
7.3.3.4 Third State jurisdiction: universal jurisdiction
179
 
As Engdahl has pointed out, the principle of exclusive criminal jurisdiction is only relevant 
vis-à-vis the Host State, and not with respect to a third State within which peacekeepers 
cannot rely on the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of their State of nationality.
180
 To operate 
effectively, such a principle should be clearly mentioned in the Convention envisaged or, in 
the meantime, in the revised model Memorandum of Understanding.
181
 It means, in other 
words, that third States have jurisdiction over peacekeepers under the principle of universal 
jurisdiction regarding any conduct which amounts to a war crime.
182
 Universal jurisdiction 
entails that a national court is competent to try a person suspected of a serious international 
crime such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, or torture, even if neither the 
suspect nor the victim are nationals of the country where the court is located (‘the forum 
                                                             
178 The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies. Report of the Secretary-General, 
UN. Doc. S/2004/616 of 23 August 2004 para 48. 
179 It is a duty and right of each and every State to prosecute alleged perpetrators of gross violations of human 
rights and humanitarian law. See ‘The Chicago Principles on Post-Conflict Justice’ in Bassiouni MC (ed ) The 
Pursuit of International Criminal Justice: A World Study on Conflicts, Victimization, and Post-Conflict Justice 
(Intersentia Antwerp 2010) 43-65, Principle 1. 
180 Engdahl O op cit (n 99) 191. 
181 The revised draft model MOU [UN. Doc. A/61/19 (Part III) of 12 June 2007] does not allude to criminal 
jurisdiction over civilian members of UN peace operations other than those subject to the military laws of their 
country. 
182 Human Rights Watch Universal Jurisdiction in Europe: The State of the Art (Human Rights Watch vol. 18 
No. 5(D) 2006) 1-2. War crimes, therefore, which do not qualify as grave breaches of the Geneva Convention 
cannot usually trigger universal jurisdiction. This may be the case of crimes by peacekeepers. The law contains 
gaps. See Sweetser CE Ensuring Accountability Of Peacekeeping Personnel For Human Rights Violations 
(Center for Human Rights and Global Justice Working Paper Number 16 (2007)) 15.  
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state’), and the crime took place outside that country.183 The exercise of universal jurisdiction 
is commonly authorized, or even required, by an international convention to which the State is 
a party. For example, the Convention against Torture and the Grave Breaches provisions of 
the Geneva Conventions both mandate the exercise of universal jurisdiction.
184
 
It may be recalled that, although universal jurisdiction is not disputed regarding international 
core crimes, especially grave breaches,
185
 acts constituting non-grave breaches but which are 
violations of the laws or customs of war can fall within universal jurisdiction.
186
 Other crimes, 
such as those constituting violations of the UN Torture Convention on forced disappearance, 
have come within the scope of the required exertion of universal jurisdiction.
187
 This means 
that States should create legislation and otherwise enable their courts to exercise universal 
jurisdiction for gross violations of human rights and humanitarian law in accordance with 
principles of treaty law and customary international law.
188
 This is so because the nullum 
crimen sine lege principle has to be respected in all circumstances.
189
 Many countries have 
enacted laws to enable the judicial system to prosecute crimes requiring universal 
jurisdiction.
190
  
Despite the fact that international crimes as such are not frequently committed by ‘UN 
officials and experts on mission’, the discussion of universal jurisdiction by third States 
remains relevant when analysing the Draft Convention because the aim of the analysis is to 
                                                             
183 Under customary law, States have the right to vest universal jurisdiction in their national courts over war 
crimes whoever is alleged to have perpetrated them. See Ryngaert C ‘Universal Jurisdiction over Genocide and 
Wartime Torture in Dutch Courts: An Appraisal of the Afghan and Rwandan cases’ 2007 (2) Hague Justice 
Journal /Journal judiciaire de la Haye 13-36, 16. 
184 Article 5 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 39/46 
of 10 December 1984, entry into force 26 June 1987, in accordance with article 27 (1); Article 1 common to the 
Geneva Conventions. 
185 Van der Wilt H ‘Equal Standards? On the Dialectics between National Jurisdictions and the International 
Criminal Court’ 2008 (8) International Criminal Law Review 229–272, 240 et passim; Mohammed J ‘Individual 
Criminal Responsibility in International Human Rights Law: The Contribution of the International Criminal 
Court’ in Worone A and Vey A (eds) Carleton Review of International Affairs (United Nations Society Ottawa 
2009)1-14. 
186 Aksar Y Implementing International Humanitarian Law: From the Ad Hoc Tribunal to a Permanent 
International Criminal Court (Routledge London 2004) 137-139. 
187 Human Rights Watch Universal Jurisdiction in Europe: The State of the Art (Human Rights Watch vol. 18 
No. 5(D) 2006) 1-2. 
188 Ryngaert C op cit (n 183)16. 
189 Van der Wilt H ‘Equal Standards? On the Dialectics between National Jurisdictions and the International 
Criminal Court’ 2008(8) International Criminal Law Review 229–272. 
190 FIDH-International Federation for Human Rights Universal Jurisdiction Developments: January 2006- May 
2009. 
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extend the provisions of the Draft to military peacekeepers.
191
 Unfortunately there are no 
cases where a third State has conducted proceedings against a UN peacekeeper for crimes 
committed on mission, and for which the country of origin of the alleged perpetrator failed to 
take action. One may consider that it has been because of such a lack of prosecution by a third 
State that the UN General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to bring credible 
allegations which reveal that a crime may have been committed by United Nations officials 
and experts on mission to the attention of the States against whose nationals such allegations 
are made.
192
  The Secretary-General is also tasked with the duty of requesting from those 
States of nationality indications showing their efforts to investigate and, where appropriate, 
prosecute crimes of a serious nature by their nationals.
193
 The UN Secretariat is disposed to 
assist States for the purposes of such investigations and prosecutions.
194
 It would also be 
judicious to request the UN Secretariat to urge the Host State and the relevant TCCs to 
collaborate in order to ensure that justice is done.
195
 Such collaboration should lead to a 
hybrid jurisdiction by the two states involved. 
7.3.3.5. Hybrid jurisdiction 
To circumvent all difficulties related to the territorial jurisdiction of the Host State, as well as 
the reluctance of TCCs effectively to exercise criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed 
abroad, and to make sure that justice is done and is seen to be done according to international 
standards with respect to human rights, the GLE suggested the establishment of hybrid 
tribunals.
196
  
                                                             
191 Torture was committed by peacekeepers during UNISOM.  
192 Report of the Sixth Committee, Sixty-second session, Criminal accountability of United Nations officials and 
experts on mission, UN Doc. A/62/448 of 21 November 2007, para 9 of the part on recommendations.  
193 UN Doc. A/62/448 of 21 November 2007 para 9. 
194 Ibid. 
195 By a note verbale dated 31 December 2008, the Secretary-General drew the attention of all States to 
resolution 63/119 and requested them to submit, by 1 July 2009, information on the extent to which their 
national laws establishes jurisdiction, in particular over crimes of a serious nature committed by their 
nationals while serving as United Nations officials or experts on mission, as well as information on 
cooperation among States and with the United Nations in the exchange of information and the facilitation 
of investigations and prosecutions of such individuals. See Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Criminal 
accountability of United Nations officials and experts on mission’ UN Doc. A/64/183 of 28 July 2009, 
para2. 
196 GLE report A/60/980 para 33. 
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Hybrid jurisdiction means that a court can be composed of judges and prosecution personnel 
from inside the Host State as well as from other countries.
197
 Such jurisdiction should not 
depend upon the executive mandate of the UN, but focus upon facilitating the action of the 
Host State to handle questions relating to crimes committed by peacekeepers.
198
 Indeed, 
examples of such hybrid tribunals existed only to prosecute international crimes,
199
 but 
nothing precludes that tribunals be established to dealing ‘exclusively with domestic crimes, 
including those committed by peacekeeping personnel, which do not rise to the level of 
international crimes.’200 One should bear in mind that even where the conduct of a 
peacekeeper may rise to the level of an international crime, considering the circumstances of 
its perpetration, it is still, at the same time, a crime under domestic law.
201
 
The following section presents some criticism of the Draft Convention. It argues that it needs 
reformation to include all peacekeeping personnel and their crimes committed where they are 
deployed, whether these crimes fall within international or domestic law. These need not 
exclusively be sex-related crimes. 
7.4. Other considerations on the Draft Convention 
The main reproach to the Draft Convention is that it does not take into account the need for 
standardisation.
202
 It leaves out the bulk of perpetrators, especially with regard to sexually-
related crimes, whereas the idea behind the creation of the Convention stems from the large-
scale perpetration of such crimes by peacekeepers. Why then are the military contingent 
members not taken into consideration?
203
 As a student website puts it, there are glaring gaps 
                                                             
197 Ibid. 
198 GLE report A/60/980 para 33. The UN Transitional Administration in East Timor established Special Panels 
for serious crimes to try serious criminal offences in Timor-Leste. 
199 GLE report A/60/980, para33 - Examples of such hybrid tribunals are the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the 
Extraordinary Chambers established in Cambodia to try senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea [and one 
should add the Lebanese Special Chambers] (square brackets added). 
200 GLE report A/60/980 para 34. 
201 The territorial criminal jurisdiction does not apply owing to the observation of the pacta sunt servanda rule 
with regard to agreements entered into, and the TCC may still not prosecute because of unwillingness. 
202 The fact that different categories of peacekeeping personnel are subject to different standards has lead to the 
differing consequences for any breach of those norms of conduct. See Report of the Group of Legal Experts on 
making the standards contained in the Secretary-General’s bulletin binding on contingent members and 
standardizing the norms of conduct so that they are applicable to all categories of peacekeeping personnel, UN 
Doc. A/61/645 of 18 December 2006 para 40. 
203 The Convention would apply only to a certain category and not to military contingent members. See also 
Quénivet N ‘The Dissonance between the UN Zero-Tolerance Policy and the Criminalisation of Sexual Offences 
on the International Level’ 2007 (7) International Criminal Law Review 657-676. 
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in legal standards and the normative acceptance of internal organisational corruption to the 
point that peacekeepers are undeterred when committing sexual crimes.
204
 Such lack of 
deterrence vis-à-vis peacekeepers compromises the ability of the UN to try to advise host 
countries on human rights standards and the rule of law legitimately.
205
 
This reveals how incomplete the attempt is and why no action will be taken against 
peacekeepers alleged to have been involved in misconduct against the local population. This 
strengthens the perceived lack of accountability on the part of soldiers. But one may respond 
that members of national military contingents are already under the disciplinary and criminal 
jurisdiction of their contributing countries. Merely inserting provisions in different 
agreements to the effect that States contributing military personnel to a UN mission will retain 
criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction over such personnel, does not cause the Troop-
Contributing Country whose contingent member is accused of having committed an offence 
actually to enforce the said jurisdiction. The Draft Convention should, therefore, not deal only 
with UN officials and experts on mission. It needs improvement to take all scenarios of 
possible crimes into account and to include all categories of peace operations personnel. It 
may contain propositions such as those suggested by Rowe, viz that all participating states be 
encouraged to enact domestic law that provides investigation procedures, and especially to 
allow courts-martial to be established where troops are deployed.
206
 According to Rowe, it is 
still necessary for legal proceedings concerning serious crimes to take place within the home 
State, and the Secretary-General can be informed through the normal monitoring process.
207
 
This means that each and every crime that involves peacekeepers has to be referred to the 
national courts, which have demonstrated their unwillingness to prosecute nationals for 
crimes committed outside the borders of their jurisdiction.
208
 International crimes should not 
                                                             
204 Pallen D ‘Sexual Slavery in Bosnia: The Negative Externality of the Market for Peace’ available at 
www.american.edu./sis/students/sword/Back_Issues/3.pdf [last accessed 19 December 2012]. 
205 Kent VL ‘Peacekeepers as Perpetrators of Abuse: Examining the UN’s Plan to Eliminate and Address Cases 
of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Operations’ 2005 (14) African Security Review 85-92, 86. 
206 Rowe P ‘United Nations Peacekeepers and Human Rights Violations: The Role of Military Discipline: 
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208 Odello M op cit (n 69) 365; Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working 
Group at the 2006 substantive session New York 27 February-17 March 2006 (UN Doc. A/60/19 of 22 March 
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be left out of the scope of the crimes covered by the Convention either.
209
 Another suggestion 
by Rowe is that the Secretary-General should encourage States to improve disciplinary 
procedures and that States that do not act upon allegations of crimes by their troops be barred 
from participation in future operations.
210
 Thus, when a State with a poor record of 
prosecuting its soldiers for crimes committed during past missions of peace offers troops, the 
Secretary-General should refuse the offer on the ground of previous and unpunished 
misconduct by its contingent members.
211
 This may cause Troop-Contributing Countries to 
take all the necessary measures to ensure discipline in the forces and to make sure that 
prosecution is conducted for misconduct.
212
 This recommendation should, therefore, also be 
included in the Draft, though it might render it unacceptable to a number of States if not all.
213
  
Another reproach relative to the Draft Convention lies in the attempt to limit possible offences 
that a peacekeeper may commit to murder, wilfully causing serious injury to body or health, 
and to sex-related offences.
214
 Sexual behaviour and conduct has not been the only issue 
plaguing United Nations officials. The UN Secretariat has also expressed the same criticism 
with respect to the temptation of establishing a finite list of crimes that may be committed by 
UN officials and experts on mission included in the draft convention.
215
 A convention should 
not be limited to crimes against the person, or sexual crimes, since the occurrence of instances 
of gold smuggling and trafficking in weapons in MONUC should prompt the drafters of the 
convention to devise an instrument applicable to all serious crimes. A complete convention 
                                                             
209 UN Doc. A/62/329 of 11 September 2007 para 39. 
210 Rowe P op cit (n 206) 80. 
211 To date, the action by the UN has consisted in reforms largely limited to the administrative sphere: UN 
conduct and discipline units now serve in all UN operations; the investigative abilities of the Office of Internal 
Oversight Services (OIOS) have improved somewhat; the UN's internal system of administrative justice has been 
rebuilt; the UN has developed the ability to blacklist persons with records of serious misconduct; and States have 
been encouraged to develop the laws needed to prosecute nationals who serve in UN missions. While these are 
necessary and useful tools, the lack of criminal accountability remains, accompanied by the realization that these 
improvements are not enough, either as a punishment or a deterrent. See Durch WJ et al. Improving Criminal 
Accountability in United Nations Peace Operations (Stimson Center Report No. 65 Rev. 1 Washington 2009) xi. 
The UN Security Council should consider excluding from future operations not only individuals who have 
committed crimes while serving on peace mission but also countries whose peacekeepers have a history of 
human rights violations unless they demonstrate a commitment to try to punish their nationals accused of 
criminal behaviour. See Gardiner N and  Groves S ‘The United States Must Act to End Abuses by U.N. 
Peacekeepers’ available at www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/01/The-United-States-Must-Act-to-End-
Abuses-by-UN-Peacekeepers [last accessed 20 December 2012]. 
212 It is important to note that there is a Code of Conduct for UN peacekeeping missions, but no procedure to 
hold peacekeepers accountable. The gaps in law have to be filled in by a multilateral convention. 
213 Rowe P op cit (n 206) 80. 
214 Supra 7.3.2. 
215 UN Doc.  A/62/329 of 11 September 2007 para 37. 
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must avoid jurisdictional gaps.
216
 As the UN Secretariat indicates, therefore, the convention 
should avoid any listing of the crimes to be covered. It should also avoid suggesting how 
crimes should be defined. The Convention should state only that it covers crimes as they are 
known and defined under the national law of the State asserting jurisdiction punishable by a 
term of at least two/three years of imprisonment.
217
 If these concerns are adequately dealt with 
in the drafting process, the envisaged Convention will be worthy to be presented to UN State 
members for signature and ratification. This Convention is long overdue. 
After considering that these mechanisms should not be limited to peacekeeping personnel 
who are not military contingent members, the present researcher recommends a more special 
on-site tripartite mechanism to deal with all matters regarding the accountability of 
peacekeeping personnel. The proposed mechanism has the merits of avoiding the hurdles 
related to bestowing jurisdiction upon one or the other of the countries immediately 
involved.
218
 The tripartite mechanism needs the participation of the UN, as sponsor of the 
mission or operation during which the crime was committed, the Host State as the country on 
whose territory the crime was committed and whose nationals are the victims, and the TCC as 
the State of nationality of the perpetrator. 
7.5. Proposed form of jurisdiction: Onsite Special Tripartite Court 
Since TCCs have shown unwillingness to prosecute personnel involved in alleged criminal 
acts effectively, which reluctance should not be underestimated,
219
 and considering the fact 
that the holding of the prosecution far away from the sources of evidence and witnesses may 
prove inefficient, it seems judicious to approach the matter in a way that satisfies the parties 
involved.
220
 From this perspective, owing to the practical difficulties of gathering evidence 
and the summoning of witnesses, which national authorities face when prosecuting 
                                                             
216 Ibid. 
217 UN Doc.  A/62/329 of 11 September 2007 para 3739. 
218 A tripartite on-site criminal court is needed to remedy the problems of the rotation of alleged perpetrators, the 
non-recourse to DNA samples as evidence, and the fact that Troop Contributing Countries are not ready to use 
their own resources to investigate allegations. For the non-requirement of DNA and limitation of investigations 
of sexual offences and abuses, see Bailliet MC ‘Examining Sexual Violence in the Military within the Context of 
Eritrean Asylum Claims Presented in Norway’ 2007 IJRL 471-510, 494-5. 
219 Odello M op cit (n 69) 365. 
220 There is a need to bring an end to the exclusion of rape and other forms of sexual violence from investigation 
and from prosecution as war crimes. The investigation and presentation of the evidence relating to this kind of 
sexual violence is in the interests of justice and of the victims. See Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu Case No. 
ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para 417.  
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peacekeepers for acts that may transgress International Criminal Law or the domestic 
Criminal Law of the Host State, the present author suggests the creation of an on-site special 
tripartite Court which will be explored in this thesis.  
There has been a recommendation that Troop-Contributing Countries should establish on-site 
courts in the country where the alleged offences were committed
221
 but this is not a tripartite 
court and may be criticised as being insufficient mechanism to deal with the problem. Such a 
mechanism would afford immediate access to witnesses and evidence in the mission area, and 
would also demonstrate (to both the peacekeeping mission and the local community) a strong 
commitment to the fact that perpetrators will be accountable for their acts.
222
 On-site courts 
martial are envisaged as an enforcement of the Status-of-Forces Agreement that leaves legal 
and disciplinary action against the peacekeepers, as members of national military contingents, 
to the Troop-Contributing Countries.
223
 This means that each TCC is required to set up a court 
in the country where criminal acts were committed by military peacekeepers.
224
 The 
difficulties of collecting evidence and summonsing witnesses will be overcome, but it is 
foreseeable that the difficulties of language translation will not be resolved as easily.
225
 How 
does this open access to the witness protected confidentiality? It should not be overlooked that 
holding peacekeepers accountable for sexual violence is important for the credibility of the 
mission, which, in turn, is essential to the mission's effectiveness, but the mission has to make 
sure confidentiality remains.
226
 What happens if a state is not ready to set up or provide 
personnel for an on-site court martial since no national legislation provides for this? The 
drawbacks of not being able to conduct an on-site court martial dates back half a century as 
alluded to by the Secretary-General almost 50 years ago in his report entitled ‘United Nations 
                                                             
221 UNGA A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations (UN Doc. A/59/710) para 35 (hereinafter Zeid Report). 
222 Zeid Report para 35. See also Defeis EF ‘U.N. Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse and Exploitation: An End to 
Impunity’ 2008 (7) Washington University Global Studies Law Review 185-214, 197. 
223 Model SOFA UN Doc. A/45/594 of 9 October 1990 para 47 (b). 
224 In August 2007, a South African military court found Air Force Sergeant Philippus Jacobus Venter guilty of 
raping and murdering a 14-year-old girl and assaulting a Burundian security guard while serving as a 
peacekeeper in Burundi in 2004. He was sentenced to 24 years' imprisonment. See US Bureau of Democracy 
Human Rights and Labor 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-South Africa 11 March 2010 
available at www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/af/135977.htm [last accessed 7July 2011]. Also Department of 
State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2007 volume I Report submitted to the Committee of 
Foreign Affairs U.S. House of Representatives and the Committee of Foreign Relations U.S. Senate (August 
2008) 513. 
225 See Otto H ‘SA soldier facing murder charge in Burundi’ available at http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/sa-
soldier-facing-murder-charge-in-burundi-1.267660 [last accessed 21 December 2012].  
226 Bastick M, Grimm K & Kunz R op cit (n 161) 173. 
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Emergency Force: Summary study of the experience derived from the establishment and 
operation of the Force’227 which stated, ‘Those countries which remain committed to 
participating in peacekeeping operations but whose legislation does not permit on-site courts 
martial should consider reform of the relevant legislation.’228  
Why not make it possible and provide that even the non-military personnel of a country that 
has established an on-site criminal court will be arraigned before such a court, i.e. that the 
latter on-site court be enabled to adjudicate matters relating to the conduct of non-military 
personnel? Indeed, regarding non-military personnel, such as peacekeeping staff, repatriation 
is the most commonly used disciplinary measure in the case of misconduct.
229
 Since this 
process and its implications are not properly explained in the Host State, it is very often 
perceived as a simple ‘removal’ of the perpetrator without any repercussions and as a means 
of securing impunity for him or her.
230
 This is why Bastick, Grimm and Kunz are of the 
opinion that:  
Whilst protecting the confidentiality of victims and witnesses, missions should provide information to 
the host community on how allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse are being handled, and 
explain the outcomes of investigations to the victim and other involved persons, whether local or other 
international staff. It may be appropriate for a mission's Special Representative of the Secretary-
General, a Force Commander, a Police Commissioner or another person in authority to make a public 
announcement to the effect that the party/parties concerned has/have been removed from the mission 
and are being punished, so that the community can see that appropriate action is being taken.231  
It is clear from the abovementioned quotation that if the Secretary-General waives a 
peacekeeper’s immunity to allow the host country to prosecute such accused peacekeeper, an 
important barrier may still exist in the viability of the judicial system of the country in which 
the relevant peacekeeping mission is deployed.
232
 The Host State could be in such a situation 
that its legal system is not able to exercise criminal jurisdiction to a satisfactory level, with or 
without international assistance.
233
 So, as the report of the group of legal experts rightly 
states, jurisdiction is not an indivisible concept to be pinned to a specific country. It 
                                                             
227 Zeid Report para 35 footnote 5. 
228
 Ibid. 
229 Ibid. 
230 Ibid. 
231 Bastick M, Grimm K & Kunz R op cit (n 161) 173 -174. 
232 GLE report A/60/980 para 40 
233 Ibid. 
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encompasses various activities: investigations, adjudication, and detention of persons which 
can be shared.
234
 Two or more States can, therefore, share the exertion of the different but 
mutually supportive aspects of criminal jurisdiction.
235
 For example, the authorities of the 
Host State may be able to carry out the investigation and prosecution of offenders 
satisfactorily but its custodial institutions may be inadequate for imprisonment.
236
 In such 
cases, the Host State investigates and prosecutes the person, but on conviction, he or she is 
returned to the State of nationality to serve the sentence of imprisonment under appropriate 
arrangements for the transfer of prisoners.
237
 If, on the other hand, the judicial system of the 
Host State is not functioning to a satisfactory level and another State has to conduct the trial, 
it may still be possible for the investigatory authorities of the Host State to investigate the 
alleged crime, with or without assistance.
238
 
That is why, for more efficacy and neutrality, the present study considers that it is possible to 
set up credible criminal courts in the Host State but a proper multilateral convention is needed 
in this regard. The present researcher therefore suggests that the composition of such courts 
must be tripartite, i.e. involving the United Nations, the Host State, and the Troop-
Contributing Countries. This can ensure witnesses, perpetrators, and the population that the 
UN is committed to upholding the rule of law. The three parties involved have to cooperate in 
the investigation, adjudication, and detention. This concept which is believed to be a valuable 
solution will now be addressed in the sections below and will conclude, in the last chapter of 
the thesis, with possible draft legislation by the present researcher which could be utilised to 
close the current lacunae existing in International Criminal Law. 
7.5.1 Investigation of crimes committed by peacekeepers.
239
  
It is firstly submitted that the chief investigator who will interact with witnesses may be a 
person chosen by the Host State. He or she must be assisted by investigators from the UN and 
the Troop-Contributing Countries. The findings of the investigation will need to be discussed 
                                                             
234 Ibid. 
235 Ibid. 
236 GLE report A/60/980 para 41 
237
 Ibid. 
238 GLE report A/60/980 para 42. 
239 The recommendation that the investigative body be staffed by experts who have had experience in sex crime 
investigations, particularly those involving children (Zeid Report para 36) is commendable but, as the Secretary-
General has remarked, the experience of MONUC proved that other criminal allegations of a different nature do 
exist. Investigators must work correctly and need skills in investigating crimes or any kind. 
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collegially, and the action to be taken decided thereafter. The benefits of such a mechanism of 
cooperation may be, as conceived by the UN investigative service, deterrence and 
commitment to accountability.
240
 The UN OIOS investigations manual begins by giving the 
function of any investigation and, thereafter, the tools for collecting facts. In executing 
investigating function properly, investigators can achieve purposes beyond simply collecting 
facts. In particular: 
 Deterrence against possible impropriety. Individuals who may be inclined to act improperly are 
deterred by the fact that such conduct will be subject to effective investigation. 
 Commitment to accountability. The process of investigating matters of possible employee 
misconduct is a function of the internal accountability system in the United Nations. Also, as 
investigations are conducted into other categories of personnel engaged in United Nations 
activities, it is important for individuals, beneficiaries and Member States to see that there are 
consequences for misconduct. This requires a robust capacity to establish facts so that there will 
be consequences for this misconduct which is critical for achieving accountability.241 
It is clearly evident from the above quotation that a further advantage of involving the 
investigative authorities of different States is the benefit to the criminal justice practitioners of 
the host country, as well as of the other States involved, of conducting investigations 
properly. In fact, it seems unrealistic today to confine all criminal investigations or 
prosecutions related to peacekeeping personnel to one country, be it the one of nationality of 
the individuals alleged to have committed an offence or of the Host State. Mutual legal 
assistance in investigations, prosecutions, and judicial proceedings is, therefore, crucial, and 
the Convention that will be signed and ratified to this effect should formalize this necessity. 
As for joint investigations in matters regarding terrorism,
242
 parties or states involved are 
immediately informed and this could prevent any double expense in trying to verify the 
findings of the investigating authority.
243
 The possibility of anonymous testimony by a 
witness, if there are grounds to believe that the person concerned would otherwise be exposed 
to a serious danger to his or her life, health, well-being, or freedom, must be granted, and the 
                                                             
240 UN OIOS Investigations Manual (Investigative Division March 2009) 1. 
241 Ibid.  
242 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Vienna Manual on International Cooperation in 
Criminal Matters related to Terrorism (United Nations New York) 2009, 142. 
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Convention must provide for such an eventuality.
244
 If the UN, the Host State, and the Troop-
Contributing Country conduct investigations jointly, there is no need to ask assurances from 
the TCC that it will prosecute the perpetrator or inform the host country as to the outcome of 
proceeding since the subsequent steps of action are decided together. Referrals would no 
longer exist. In the extant system, when the UN requests information as to the action taken or 
makes a request for assistance, the states concerned may not respond.
245
 
7.5.2 Prosecution relating to crimes committed by peacekeepers.  
The second aspect which needs to be considered relates to the prosecution. Collegiality must 
be the norm in the decision to charge and in the conduct of proceedings before the tripartite 
on-site court. Here the chief president authority may come from the UN, and, preferably, he or 
she must not be a member of the mission so as to avoid possible bias. The other judges may 
come from the States concerned. With respect to the person being prosecuted, however, if 
such a person is a member of a military contingent, it should be possible to include high-
ranking military members trained in legal matters. They may sit as assessors. The majority 
judgment must be taken as the decision of the court.
246
 
7.5.3 Detention of suspected perpetrators.  
Thirdly, according to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which provides 
for the right for anyone deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention to approach a court, in 
order that the approached court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention 
and order his release if the detention is found to be unlawful.
247
 The same principle applies if 
                                                             
244 Compare section 162 of the Austrian Criminal Code, cited in Report of the Secretary-General ‘Criminal 
accountability of United Nations officials and experts on mission’ (UN Doc. A/64/183 of 28 July 2009) para 32. 
245 See SG Report on Criminal Accountability UN. Doc. A/63/260, paras 69-70 and UN Doc. A/64/183 of 28 
July 2009 para 63. It seems noteworthy to point to the prosecution by US military courts of Sergeant Frank J. 
Ronghi for having raped and murdered an 11-year old Albanian girl called Merita Shabin in Kosovo. See U.S. v. 
Ronghi  60 M.J. 83 (A.A.F. 2004). The case is similar to that of the raping and murdering of a Burundian 14-year 
girl, except that the outcome of the prosecution of the latter has never been published. 
246 Since this purported tripartite model is nowhere provided for, an improved convention relating to criminal 
accountability of peacekeepers must not leave the question unresolved. 
247 Article 9(4) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entered into 
force 23 March 1976, in accordance with Article 49. 
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the person (a peacekeeper) is detained awaiting trial. He or she must be assured of the 
lawfulness of his or her detention. The detention referred to here is ‘preventive detention’.248  
As far as preventive detention is concerned, UN officials and experts on mission are generally 
immune from such an action. Indeed experts on mission are accorded the necessary privileges 
and immunities for the discharge of their functions, including immunity from personal arrest 
and detention.
249
 They are also immune from legal process of every kind in respect of words 
spoken or written and acts perpetrated by them in the course of the performance of their 
mission.
250
 But the privileges and immunities are not for individual personal benefit.
251
 This is 
why the UN Secretary-General is vested with authority to waive them in order for the bearer 
to be prosecuted.
252
  
Even when the criminal conduct of a peacekeeper is not duty related, it is still in violation of 
the mandate of the peacekeeper as it is still performed in the course of the mission.
253
 Even 
where acts are committed when off duty, the peacekeeper’s acts cannot lead to the detention 
of the alleged perpetrator pending the investigation by Host State authorities.
254
 But, if the 
envisaged Convention deems it necessary, one might suggest that such detention be one of the 
powers bestowed upon the Troop-Contributing Country concerned. In any case, where the 
circumstances so warrant, the nationality of the offender or alleged offender will determine 
                                                             
248 A law of preventive detention sanctions the confinement of individuals in order to prevent them from 
engaging in activities considered injurious to the community. Preventive detention is also used to ensure that a 
person against whom an investigation is being conducted does not suppress elements of evidence or escape from 
investigation and prosecution. See Kakule Kalwahali C De l’indemnisation des victimes d’une détention 
préventive injustifiée en droit congolais (Mémoire de licence (unpublished LLB thesis ULPGL-Goma 2000) 1 et 
seq. The International Committee of the Red Cross favours the term ‘internment,’ which it defines as 
‘deprivation of liberty ordered by the executive authorities when no specific criminal charge is made against the 
individual concerned’. See Pilloud C et al. International Commission of the Red Cross: Commentary on the 
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,  875 cited by Elias SB 
‘Rethinking ‘Preventive Detention’ From a Comparative Perspective: Three Frameworks for Detaining Terrorist 
Suspects’ 2009 (41) Columbia Human Rights Law Review 99-210, 111. 
249 S 22 of Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. 
250 Ibid. 
251S 23 of Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.  
252 Ibid. 
253 UN officials and experts on mission are required to conduct themselves at all times (both on and off duty) in a 
manner befitting their status as members of the mission and they ought to carry out their duties and regulate their 
conduct solely with the interest of the United Nations in view. See UNGA Making the standards contained in the 
Secretary-General’s bulletin binding on contingent members and standardizing the norms of conduct so that 
they are applicable to all categories of peacekeeping personnel: Note by the Secretary-General (UN. Doc. 
A/61/645 of 18 December 2006) para 19 (a). 
254 It is only when substantiation of criminal conduct can be given to the Special Representative of the UN 
Secretary-General that arrest can be made and the arrested person handed over to his/her contingent for 
appropriate disciplinary action. See Model SOFA para 41. 
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the troop contributing-country expected to take the offender into custody or apply other 
measures to ensure that person’s presence at trial. Custody and other possible measures may 
be provided for in the law of that State must be implemented in a manner respectful of the 
rights of the person, and must, therefore, not entail treatment that could be judged to be 
inhumane or torturous.
255
  
Detention consequent to the finding of the tripartite court that the accused is guilty as charged 
(i.e. the sentence of imprisonment) must be executed in the home country. Pecuniary 
sanctions against the perpetrator may be executed by the UN, especially when these sanctions 
consist of reparation and damages to the victims. The settlement of such obligations can be 
done after negotiations with the host country that assumed the victims’ rights, but an 
independent NGO may be most suited to the handling of victims’ rights.   
7.6 Conclusion 
The lack of sanctions relating to peacekeepers accused of misconduct is, by implication, 
directly related to the absence of a deterrent whereby fear is signalled with regard to the 
possibility for other peacekeepers of being caught.
256
  Because they are deployed under a UN 
flag means that peacekeepers represent the United Nations itself, which means in turn that 
they serve a greater and higher cause than their own selves.
257
 They should, therefore, not 
conduct themselves as simple citizens on a tour.
258
 United Nations peacekeepers on mission 
need to become aware of their special status and the effects of their actions. Being officials 
who serve the host country citizens, they are precluded from taking advantage of their 
position.
259
  
The allegations of crimes by peacekeepers discussed in this thesis are predominantly 
committed in under-developed countries, war-torn societies without functioning judicial 
systems. Victims of actions by peacekeepers have not been acquainted with challenging big 
organizations such as the United Nations. A clear set of policies, therefore, which are capable 
of being enforced for all personnel would help to clarify how victims within these populations 
                                                             
255
 Articles 7 and 10 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
256 UN Criminal Accountability of United Nations and Experts on Mission: Current Situation available at 
www.gtmun.org/documents/2008/GA6Topic3currentSituation.pdf [last accessed 30 July 2011]. 
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ought to behave when seeking to assert their violated rights.
260
 The Draft Convention should, 
therefore, provide some clauses stating that whenever the UN sets up a peace mission, a 
tripartite court will also be set up in the host country to deal with any criminal act alleged 
against any member of the peace mission personnel. To such an end, Troop-Contributing 
Countries have to be required to select among personnel involved in peace missions, persons 
with legal training in case a national of that country may be said to have committed a criminal 
act where they are deployed. 
UN officials and experts on mission are obliged to respect Host State laws and, where 
applicable, the Host State has criminal jurisdiction over such UN personnel. Thus, the current 
Draft Convention covers only UN officials and experts on mission. It also limits the exercise 
of jurisdiction over crimes by these UN personnel to national courts. This is why it requires 
State parties to legislate accordingly. Legislation should include establishing jurisdiction 
based on passive personality
261
 and the stateless status of the victim residing within the State 
establishing such jurisdiction.
262
 It has been argued in the discussion that where it may be 
ascertained that the Host State is not able to exercise its jurisdiction, the sending State should 
be asked to intervene because the UN has no criminal jurisdiction.
263
 Upon such 
understanding, the Troop-Contributing Country can prosecute peacekeepers for crimes 
committed abroad, and a third State, which is not a Host State or Troop-Contributing Country 
will also have jurisdiction. If military personnel suspected of war crimes, therefore, have to 
travel to a third State, they would no longer be able to rely on the exclusive criminal 
jurisdiction of the State of their nationality. Since sexual offences, especially rape, are 
notoriously hard to prosecute successfully even on a domestic level despite the frequency of 
their occurrences, when drafting a convention to address crimes of the kind, all measures need 
to be taken to ensure that the difficulties regarding proof of the crimes and the question of the 
rotation of the alleged perpetrators are dealt with in a practical manner.
264
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the nationality of the victim. 
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Ensuring accountability for actions by the personnel international missions is crucial to the 
success of such UN operations of peace and to the re-building of the judicial system of the 
affected country. All personnel of the mission, military or civilian, need legal lights to guide 
them for any conduct that entails either accountability at the international or domestic level. 
The analysis of the Draft Convention has underlined the inadequacies of the provisions related 
to jurisdiction of courts which are physically remote from the evidence at the scene and from 
local witnesses. If these issues are not addressed, the Convention will be another missed 
opportunity for safeguarding the integrity of justice and for establishing a deterrent for future 
misconduct. An effective system of accountability for peacekeepers is possible by means of 
adequate legislation. The current Draft does not provide for effective accountability because it 
is restricted to sexual crimes committed by certain categories of UN personnel, leaving aside 
the military contingents that constitute the highest percentage of perpetrators. There is no 
other means to guarantee adherence to humanitarian law by peacekeepers than ensuring that, 
when they commit crimes, investigation, and prosecution will follow. Fear of criminal and 
disciplinary punishment, in addition to the record of past convictions, can be an effective 
deterrent for soldiers.
265
  
It has been shown that states are reluctant not only to prosecute their troops accused of 
misconduct during peace operations, but also that they may actively prevent such prosecution. 
The example is that of the Italian authorities with respect to crimes committed in Somalia and 
elsewhere by Italian soldiers.
266
 Although accounts of abuses can reach the media and NGOs, 
follow ups by the UN do not exist, and investigations by the investigating division of the UN 
Office of Internal Oversight Services can only recommend repatriation and this only where 
evidence suggests that a case exists. Knowing that investigations and action by Troop-
Contributing Countries are glaringly lacking, the drafting of a convention to remedy the 
situation must explore all options and retain the most efficient and binding of those options. 
Thus, the proposed on-site tripartite
267
 formula can successfully end the impunity of 
                                                             
265 Wolfrum R and Fleck D ‘Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law’ in Fleck D (ed) The Handbook of 
International Humanitarian Law 2 ed. (Oxford University Press Oxford 2008) 675-722, 687. 
266 Gaeta P ‘War Crimes Trials before Italian Courts: New Trends’ in Fischer H, Kreß C & Lüder SR (eds) 
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peacekeepers guilty of misconduct. This does not exclude the possibility of using DNA and 
fingerprinting technology in order to gather irrefutable evidence to render indisputable 
decisions.
268
 The advantage of prosecuting in the Host State has been indicated. It not only 
plays a deterrent role that exists in every prosecution, but also avoids or overcomes the 
unwillingness manifested by Troop-Contributing Countries and the lack of follow up on the 
part of the Secretary-General, as well as the importance of making the outcome of the 
proceedings public so that victims and witnesses are informed and are able to see justice done 
on their behalf.
269
 This cannot be achieved by applying the extant framework within which the 
Troop-Contributing Countries pledge to prosecute perpetrators back home and give 
assurances to the UN Secretary-General that they will keep him informed regarding the 
outcome of any prosecution of peacekeepers, and yet, in practice, do not fulfil this 
undertaking. It has been shown that such information is not being sent to the Secretariat, and 
the assurances made are not binding.
270
 The analysis of the Draft has demonstrated the 
pressing need for coherent, cogent, and practical legislation. The next chapter will suggest 
solutions in the form of draft legislation by the present researcher to close the lacunae which 
currently exist with regard to peacekeepers who manage to escape accountability for their 
crimes.  
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269
 Compare Hampson FJ & Kihara-Hunt A ‘The Accountability of Personnel Associated with Peace Support 
Operations’ in Aoi C, de Coning C & Thakur R (eds) Unintended Consequences of Peace Support Operations 
(UN University Press Tokyo 2007) 195-220, 209. 
270 Hunter L ‘Should We Prosecute the Protectors? Holding Peacekeepers Accountable in Cases of Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse’ in Worone A & Vey A (eds) 2009 (1) Carleton Review of International Affairs 15-34, 
24-25. 
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CHAPTER VIII  
GENERAL CONCLUSION 
8.1 Synthesis   
The study undertaken in this thesis has demonstrated that conduct by the UN personnel 
deployed in Africa amounted to criminal law violations of not only the domestic law of the 
countries where these peacekeepers were on mission and the domestic law of the States of 
nationality, but also International Criminal Law. It has focused on three of the UN peace 
missions deployed in Africa. It has been shown that the substantive domestic Criminal Law of 
these different systems is applicable to the conduct of peacekeepers. The study addresses the 
issues of jurisdiction over peacekeepers and their accountability for the crimes committed 
during UN missions of peace.  
Chapter one set forth the contextual background in which the deployment of peacekeepers 
takes place, especially in Africa. It stated that the deployment of a UN mission of peace is 
generally consecutive to the existence of armed conflicts and political instability during which 
horrendous crimes and barbaric acts are usually committed against civilians. The most 
paradoxical thing is that UN personnel have been accused of committing crimes, especially 
sexual crimes, murder, torture, and assault against the already victimized civilians. Although 
the seriousness of those crimes has been established, the crimes of peacekeepers have been 
kept quiet.
1
 It has been noted that in most post-conflict peace operations, serious human rights 
abuses by peacekeepers, such as sexual exploitation and abuse have, been committed by 
almost all categories of UN peacekeeping personnel, members of the military, the civilian 
police, and civilian servants.
2
  
It has been shown that, under the current international law and the UN Model Status-of-
Forces Agreement, criminal jurisdiction over peacekeepers rests with their sending States.
3
 
Most of the allegations of crimes by UN personnel have been investigated by the United 
                                                             
1 UNDPKO Public Information Guidelines for Allegations of Misconduct Committed by Personnel of UN 
Peacekeeping and Other Field Missions (DPKO/MD/03/00996 DPKO/CPD/DPIG/2003/001). 
2
 Jennings KM and Nikolić-Ristanović V UN Peacekeeping Economies and Local Sex Industries: Connections 
and Implications (MICROCON Research Working Paper 17 Brighton 2009) 20. Not all places are considered as 
‘off-limits’ so that peacekeepers find ways of continual fraternization. See Dahrendorf N Sexual Exploitation 
and Abuse -Lessons Learned Study: Addressing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in MONUC (Discussion Paper - 
United Nations Peacekeeping 2006) paras 53-58.  
3 Para 47(b) of the Model Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) (UN. Doc. A/45/594 of 9 October 1990). 
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Nations itself, through its Office of Internal Oversight Services.
4
 Future UN missions of peace 
run the risk of being riddled with similar problems if peacekeepers continue to commit crimes 
with impunity.
5
 The lack of UN jurisdiction over troops underlines the difficulty of 
maintaining discipline among military and civil UN personnel.
6
 Even though UN 
peacekeepers alleged to have committed crimes are nationals of a variety of Troop-
Contributing Countries, the discussion in this study has concerned only three of these Troop- 
Contributing Countries, namely Canada, Belgium, and South Africa, in respect of prosecution 
of peacekeepers alleged to have committed crimes during UN missions of peace in Africa. It 
has been argued that all the agreements signed relative to the deployment of any UN mission 
of peace should include a clause that Troop-Contributing Countries are under an obligation to 
prosecute and the UN to follow up, and this should be the reason for the Host State consenting 
to the operation. 
From the aforementioned, one realises clearly that chapter one sets out the background of 
crimes alleged to have been committed by peacekeepers in Africa.
7
 The UN mission in 
Somalia was the very first peace operation on the African continent that not only failed, but 
also where criminal conduct by peacekeepers was exposed.
8
 During other operations of peace, 
however, peacekeeping personnel from a great number of countries are alleged to have 
perpetrated criminal acts.
9
 Among all the countries whose soldiers were involved in 
committing criminal acts, Canada and Belgium alone have actually brought their soldiers to 
justice with respect to the events that happened in Somalia.  
Chapter one further sought to elucidate the different concepts used throughout the thesis.
10
 Its 
last part introduced the different topics constituting the headings of the following chapters. 
These topics ranged from revisiting the three case-study missions, the allegations of crimes 
and their discussion under the domestic law of the Host State as well as the domestic law of 
South Africa as a Troop-Contributing Country. Other areas and issue which were investigated 
                                                             
4 Supra 2.2.2; 2.2.3 and 5.2.1. 
5 Ntoubandi FZ Amnesty for Crimes against Humanity under International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
Leiden 2007) 1 quoting Justice Robert H. Jackson, UN Chief Prosecutor during the Nuremberg Trials in his 
opening statement before the Nuremberg Tribunal, 1945. 
6 Fleshman M ‘Tough UN line on peacekeeper abuses: Action initiated to end sexual misdeeds in peacekeeping 
missions,’ available at www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/april-2005/tough-un-line-peacekeeper-abuses [last 
accessed 15 December 2012]. 
7 Supra 1.1. 
8 Supra 1.2. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Supra 1.3. 
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relate to whether international criminal law deals with the matter of crimes by peacekeepers, 
the analysis of the practical problems relating to investigating crimes outside its own 
jurisdiction, the determination of criminal jurisdiction over peacekeepers, and the exploration 
of all available avenues which may make it possible for the proceedings to be held within the 
territory of the Host State.
11
 The Draft Convention on the accountability of UN officials and 
experts on mission was discussed before concluding, synthesising the findings, giving 
recommendations, and proposing some issues for further study.
12
 
Since peacekeepers, military and civilian personnel, do commit crimes against the civilian 
population of the Host State, it has been shown that every Status-of-Forces Agreement and 
every Memorandum of Understanding should contain specific clauses obligating Troop-
Contributing Countries to prosecute and the UN to follow-up in such cases.
13
 Current rules 
relating to crimes by peacekeepers reflect the traditional position of many States who do not 
allow other authorities to exercise criminal jurisdiction over their troops.
14
 It has been argued 
that the exclusive jurisdiction over peacekeepers should not let allegations of crimes such as 
rape, murder, torture, and assault go unpunished. The message sent to the victims in such a 
case is that there is no avenue to which they may turn and that peacekeepers are above the 
law, if those who commit crimes are not prosecuted. Contrary to the scenario of peacekeepers 
not being held accountable for their conduct, members of armed groups must know that, 
sooner or later, they will be hauled before a national or an international court to account for 
their criminal acts. The absence of accountability on the part UN peacekeepers suggests that 
future UN peace operations may be riddled with crimes against the civilian population whose 
protection was, or should be, one of the reasons for the establishment a peace operation.
15
 
Chapter two investigated the crimes alleged to have been committed by peacekeepers. It gave 
an account of those allegations. In this chapter it was shown that rape and other sexual acts of 
violence, murder, and assault constitute offences under Somali, Burundian, and the Congolese 
domestic criminal law, but, owing to agreements recognising exclusive jurisdiction over 
                                                             
11 Supra 1.7. 
12
 Ibid. 
13 This is so in light of the existing mechanism that grants criminal jurisdiction over peacekeepers to the sending 
State. 
14 Patterson M ‘A Corporate Alternative to United Nations ad hoc Military Deployments’ 2008 Journal of 
Conflict and Security Law 1-18. 
15 Instances of rape, murder and torture, when committed by peacekeepers, may be considered as war crimes. 
 307 
peacekeepers to Troop-Contributing Countries, these offences cannot be prosecuted under the 
domestic law of these Host States.  
Under Somali law, the discussion revealed that instances of rape and killings constituted the 
majority of the reported human rights violations in Somalia by peacekeepers and that most of 
the incidents remaining unreported.
16
 Instances of torture and assault were reported regarding 
members of the UN operation in Somalia and remain specific to that operation.
17
 With respect 
to the UN operation in Burundi, it was shown that reported allegations of crimes by 
peacekeepers relate to sexual offences, an instance of assault, and one case of murder. It was 
also highlighted that most of the allegations of crimes committed by members of the peace 
operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo were sexually related crimes, and that there 
had also been instances of the pillaging of natural resources and of weapons-minerals 
trafficking.
18
 This chapter highlighted that sexual offences are similar under the legal systems 
of all the three countries of reference.
19
 The main defence to rape that is often raised relates to 
the key issue of consent. The accused always seeks to establish that sexual penetration was 
consensual. This is so because, where it can be proved that the parties to a sexual act were 
consenting adults the crime of rape cannot be established.
20
 Indeed, consent is a definitional 
element when it comes to rape, not a ground of justification. Penetrative sex with children, 
however, is considered to be rape, because a person who has not attained the age of consent is 
considered not to have understood the nature and scope of the sexual activity he or she is 
engaging in.
21
 Allegations of rape committed by peacekeepers also involved children 
incapable of validly consenting to sexual penetration. It was also explained that grounds of 
justification, such as necessity, superior orders, and self-defence, are not valid defences when 
it comes to rape. 
The crime of murder is a punishable crime under domestic laws of all three Host States. Yet 
only a few instances of murder have been reported regarding the peace operations in Somalia 
and in Burundi. No single instance of murder has been reported with respect to the 
                                                             
16 Supra 2.3.1.1. 
17
 Supra 2.2.1. 
18 Supra 2.1; 2.2.4 and 2.3. This conduct was not further discussed because it is specific the sole case of the DRC 
and has not occurred in Somalia or in Burundi. 
19 Supra 2.3. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Supra 2.3.3.2. 
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Democratic Republic of Congo.
22
 It was also noted that prostitution is not a crime in Burundi 
or in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Save in instances of forced prostitution, therefore, a 
peacekeeper cannot be prosecuted under the domestic law of those two countries for having 
engaged the services of a prostitute.
23
 Where the prostitute has not reached the age of consent, 
the person engaging the services of such a prostitute is committing rape. With respect to the 
Congolese (DRC) domestic law, therefore, a distinction was pointed at regarding the age of 
consent prior to 2006 and thereafter.
24
 
Chapter two concluded that the domestic law of all three countries would be the applicable 
law with respect to crimes committed within their territorial jurisdictions. It was shown, 
however, that peacekeepers could not be prosecuted there, because of the agreements which 
existed between the Host States and the United Nations, which agreements specifically 
recognise exclusive criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction to belong solely to the State of 
origin of the alleged perpetrator.
25
  
Chapter three further discussed sexual crimes and other crimes alleged to have been 
committed by peacekeepers from the perspective of South Africa as a Troop-Contributing 
Country. It was shown that the South African legal system distinguishes between rape and 
compelled rape. This distinction is not encountered in the domestic law of Somalia, Burundi, 
or the Democratic Republic of Congo. The elements of rape are still, however, similar in all 
the four domestic legal systems.
26
 With respect to other sexual offences, it was indicated that, 
by criminalising the ‘engaging the services of a person 18 years or older’, a person visiting a 
prostitute commits an offence under the South African law.
27
 Where it can be proved, 
therefore, that a peacekeeper from the Republic of South Africa paid for sexual services, he 
can still be prosecuted before South African courts, although the services were provided by 
prostitutes in the Host State.
28
 
                                                             
22 Supra 2.3.1.3; 2.3.2.3; 2.3.3.3. 
23 Supra 2.3.2.2. 
24
 Supra 2.3.3.2. 
25 Supra 2.4. 
26 Supra 3.2.1. 
27 Supra 3.2.2. 
28 In Burundi and the DRC where South African peacekeepers were deployed, prostitution per se and visiting 
prostitutes are not criminal acts.  
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After noting, during the discussion of the crime of murder in South African law, that no single 
country exists which does not consider murder as a crime,
29
 the other notable discussion of 
chapter three relates to the issue of state liability for failure to prosecute and to prevent.
30
 
Pursuant to that issue, it was indicated that state liability is envisioned only as civil liability
31
 
and not criminal liability.
32
 It was shown that state liability is engaged with respect to actions 
and conduct of individuals acting in their official capacity as organs of the state.
33
 In this 
regard, some cases were discussed where South African state liability has been invoked, viz 
Carmichele,
34
 Duivenboden,
35
 Ewels
36
 and K versus Minister of Safety and Security.
37
 Of 
great importance, it was shown that, within the realm of domestic law of South Africa, there 
exists an avenue for a victim to sue for damages where the State has failed to prevent harm 
against him or her. It may, therefore, be considered to be the duty of the State of nationality of 
victims to exercise any action on behalf of victims.
38
 With respect to the suing of another state 
for damages on behalf of its citizens, such an action can be brought only before the 
International Court of Justice
39
 which remains the most competent forum to settle disputes 
between two sovereign States.
40
 
Chapter four investigated the issue of identifying crimes alleged to have been committed by 
peacekeepers in the light of international law. The chapter mentioned the fact that the 
discussion of those crimes under domestic law did not preclude such crimes being discussed 
under international law. Indeed, it was highlighted that the criminalization of certain conduct 
                                                             
29 Supra 3.2.3. 
30 Supra 3.3. 
31 If state liability could be considered as criminal, then there would be a myriad action, for the commission of 
any crime would amount to failure on the part of state actually to safeguard the victim against the acts of other 
individuals. The state has always a legal duty to protect citizens and their properties. It would also become a 
collective criminal liability which does not exist in criminal law. When a statute provides that a legal duty to 
intervene exists, this means that a citizen has a duty to intervene, not the state itself. For more details on the 
scope of public duties involved, see Ashworth A ‘Public Duties and Criminal Omissions: Some Unresolved 
Questions’ 2011 Journal of Commonwealth Criminal Law 1-21, 12-15. 
32 In common law systems criminal liability for omissions is exceptional and entails individual criminal liability. 
See R v West Coroner, ex p Gray [1988] QB 467. The existence of the legal duty to act may contrast with the 
principle of legality. See Ashworth A ‘Public Duties and Criminal Omissions: Some Unresolved Questions’ 
2011 Journal of Commonwealth Criminal Law 1-21, 12-15. 
33 Supra 3.3. 
34 Surpa 3.3.2.3. 
35 Supra 3.3.2.2. 
36 Supra 3.3.2.1. 
37
 Supra 3.3.2.4. 
38 Victims may also ask the UN itself to pay damages, an action that can be fruitful if their State of nationality 
intervenes. For comparison, see Salmon JJA ‘Les accords Spaak -U Thant du 20 février 1965’ 1965(11) 
Annuaire français de droit international 468 - 497, 478.   
39 On the condition that the State being sued accepts the jurisdiction of the ICJ. 
40 See articles 34(1) and 36 of the International Court of Justice (San Francisco 1945). 
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at a domestic level may be dictated to a State in terms of its obligations under International 
Law. In that case the State incorporates a treaty it has ratified in order for the said treaty to 
become part of the domestic law. One of a State’s obligations under international law includes 
its obligation to prosecute the perpetrators of international crimes.
41
 A state will not fulfil 
such an obligation if it has not enacted adequate law which gives domestic judicial institutions 
the competence to apply international criminal law as incorporated into their legal system.
42
 
This enables the competent authority to bring persons who commit international crimes to 
justice before a national court of law and in terms of its enacted domestic laws.
43
 The 
domestication of international norms seeks to make sure that the principle of legality is 
satisfied.
44
  
In this same chapter an analysis of the allegations of crimes committed by peacekeepers was 
undertaken from an International Criminal Law perspective. This analysis demonstrated that 
the crimes alleged to have been committed by peacekeepers could not amount to genocide or 
to crimes against humanity on the ground that the State element, which is characteristic to 
these two categories on international crimes, is lacking. The chapter argued, however, that 
crimes by peacekeepers can amount to the third category of international crimes, i.e. war 
crimes.
45
 From there, the following discussion related to the definition and presentation of the 
core international crimes, viz genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. It further 
pointed out that crimes by peacekeepers may amount to war crimes, which are international 
crimes, i.e. crimes over which an international tribunal or court has jurisdiction. Upon the 
basis of universal jurisdiction, a third state, which is not party to the agreements recognising 
exclusive criminal jurisdiction over peacekeepers to a Troop-Contributing Country, can assert 
its jurisdiction over crimes by peacekeepers. It was pointed out, however, that not a single 
case of prosecution of a peacekeeper for a crime committed while on UN mission had ensued 
whether by an international criminal tribunal or by a third state criminal court. The possibility 
of such prosecution does, however, exist as was elucidated in this chapter.  
                                                             
41 Cassese A International Criminal Law 2ed. (Oxford University Press New York 2008) 3. 
42 Cryer R et al. An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure 2nd ed. (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge (UK) 2010) 63.  
43 Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act No. 27, 2002 of 18 July 2002; see 
also Article 3(d) of the Act.  
44 The principle of legality means, in domestic law as in international law, that no conduct can be subject to 
criminal sanction unless it is prohibited by law. see Boas G, Bischoff JL & Reid NL Elements of Crimes under 
International Law: International Law Practitioner Library Series Volume II (Cambridge University Press 
Cambridge (UK) 2008) 8. 
45 Supra 4.2. 
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In chapter five, the issue of the investigation of the crimes by peacekeepers and the problems 
related thereto were addressed. In the presentation of the problems, obstacles, or barriers 
relating to investigating crimes by peacekeepers, this chapter of the thesis noted firstly the fact 
that the law pertaining to the issue of conduct by peacekeepers recognises jurisdiction over 
peacekeepers as belonging to the Troop-Contributing Country. This is absolutely the case 
with respect to members of the military contingents of a UN force.
46
 The exercise of such 
jurisdiction is not possible without a prior investigation. Thus, it is required that the Troop-
Contributing Country concerned conducts an investigation outside its boundaries, in the Host 
State.
47
 The chapter indicated that conducting an investigation in a foreign country may meet 
with hurdles amongst which are the fact that the investigating authorities may be reluctant to 
use state money for issues arising outside the boundaries of the said state, and also the fact 
that such an action may actually be costly.
48
 This very often explains the reluctance of the 
State whose soldiers are alleged to have committed crimes to initiate investigation likely to 
lead to prosecution. The only existing investigative reports are those of the UN Office of 
Internal Oversight Services with respect to allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by 
peacekeepers. It was noted that, while the UN may conduct the investigation, it still, however, 
has no criminal jurisdiction over the investigated individuals because, as an international 
organisation, the UN does not have a tribunal to judge its peacekeeping personnel. Indeed, it 
was highlighted that the UN has no criminal tribunal to prosecute those against whom there is 
substantiated proof that they have committed crimes. The UN may only repatriate the suspect 
to the country of origin.
49
 It is nowhere provided that the Troop-Contributing Country will 
inform the OIOS regarding the outcome of any prosecution or with respect to the decision of 
non prosecution of the troop concerned. It was suggested, therefore, that the country that has 
criminal jurisdiction over the crime should deploy its investigating authority. The Troop-
Contributing Country, its courts and laws, must be used to conduct investigations and 
prosecutions against each and all of its nationals when they commit a criminal offence. With 
respect to South Africa, no investigating team has been set up to consider the allegations 
against members of the SANDF deployed with MONUC and ONUB.
50
 
                                                             
46 Supra 5.1. 
47 Supra 5.2. 
48 Supra 5.2.2. 
49 Supra 5.2.1.3. 
50 Supra 5.2.2.4 
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To overcome the barriers relating to investigating crimes outside the jurisdiction of a State, 
cooperation between States and the involvement of the Host State was reiterated as being an 
absolute necessity.
51
 It was shown that no matter which State has criminal jurisdiction over 
peacekeepers the investigation may be conducted by the Host State, the prosecution by an 
impartial on-site tripartite tribunal, and the serving of the sentence undertaken in and by the 
State of origin of the person prosecuted.
52
 Such a system has the merit of making sure that the 
interests of the victims are served, especially the right to know that justice is done and is seen 
to be done with their involvement in the process of establishing the truth.
53
 To conduct 
prosecution far from the place where the crime occurred, without the involvement of the 
victims, amounts to a denial of the rights of victims
54
, and the legal and other forms of 
assistance to victims seem not to be available in such circumstances,
55
 although the assistance 
and support as such does not take the place of the individual responsibility of the alleged 
perpetrator.
56
  
Chapter six analysed the existing agreements with respect to jurisdiction over peacekeepers.
57
 
Since handling crimes by peacekeepers is regulated by agreements between the UN and the 
Host States as well as with the States contributing troops,
58
 the Status-of-Forces Agreement 
and the Memorandum of Understanding indicate which State has primary responsibility.
59
 
Both agreements exempt the members of the UN force, to a certain extent, from the criminal 
                                                             
51 Supra 5.2.3; 5.2.4. 
52 An impartial onsite tripartite court is advocated  because ‘[w]hile contributing States have a legal obligation to 
carry out national investigations and prosecutions, the lack of an international accountability mechanism means 
such national processes are often not fully effective’. See Sheeran SP Contemporary Issues in UN Peacekeeping 
and International Law: Briefing Paper IDCR-BP-02/11(Institute for Democracy and Conflict Resolution (IDCR) 
University of Essex 2011) 7. 
53 Supra 5.3. 
54 Supra 5.3.2. 
55 UNGA United Nations Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance and Support to Victims of Sexual Exploitation 
and Abuse by United Nations Staff and Related Personnel (UN Doc A/RES/62/214 of 7 March 2008) para 6 et 
seq. 
56 Para 14. 
57 Supra  6.1. 
58 By entering these agreements, the Host State renounces its criminal jurisdiction over criminal acts committed 
within its boundaries, pacta sunt servanda. See article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties 1969; 
Yoon-Ho AL ‘Criminal Jurisdiction under the U.S.-Korea Status of Forces Agreement: Problems to Proposals’ 
2003 (13) Journal Transnational Law & Policy 213-249, 245. 
59 According to the UN Model Status-of-Forces Agreement for Peacekeeping Operations (UN-Doc. A/45/594 of 
9 October 1990), Troop-Contributing Countries have exclusive criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by 
soldier peacekeepers. TCC apply their national law which must have integrated international humanitarian law. 
See also Engdahl O Protection of Personnel in Peace Operations: The Role of the ‘Safety Convention’ Against 
the Background of General International law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Leiden 2007). 
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jurisdiction of the Host State.
60
 Under some circumstances,
61
 however, or on the condition 
that the Secretary General waives the immunity of non-military peacekeepers, the Host State 
retains some jurisdiction over civilian UN personnel  and jurisdiction with respect to civil 
proceedings.
62
 The jurisdiction of the Host State, its courts and law, over crimes committed 
by peacekeepers is, in principle, obvious since ‘when a criminal offence has been committed 
within the territory of a State, that State shall establish its jurisdiction.’63 The existence of this 
residual criminal jurisdiction should not distract from the obligation of the Host State to 
observe the Status-of-Forces Agreements regarding criminal jurisdiction over peacekeepers 
and the limitation
64
 that such Status-of-Forces Agreements impose on the national law and 
courts.
65
 The difficulty of distinguishing acts amounting to violations of domestic law per se 
and those constituting violations of laws and customs of war was underlined, as well as the 
fact that it is not indicated whether the declaration of observance of local laws extends to all 
members of UN Force and whether the violations of such local laws constitute criminal 
offences under exclusive jurisdiction of the sending State.
66
 The conclusion was that 
violations of local laws not amounting to international crimes or crimes against their code of 
military discipline might remain unpunished when perpetrated by soldiers.
67
 In such 
instances, if the decision is that the person involved should be prosecuted, the Host State 
should have jurisdiction over that peacekeeper on the basis of the territoriality principle.
68
  
                                                             
60 Zwanenburg M ‘The Statute for an International Criminal Court and the United States: Peacekeepers under 
Fire?’ 1999 (10) European Journal of International Law 124-143, 127.  
61 The Host State can take into custody any person who has committed a criminal act. See para 43 of the Model 
SOFA (UN Doc A/45/594 of 9 October 1990). 
62 The reference is to non-military personnel of a peace operation but it can also conduct civil proceeding relating 
to any member of the peace operation, provided that the SRSG be informed to assure the said proceedings are 
not duty-related acts. See paras 47(a) and 49 of the Model SOFA (UN Doc A/45/594 of 9 October 1990). 
63 Frieberger J ‘Search for Criteria Determining the Competent Jurisdiction to Carry out Investigations and 
Prosecutions in the European Union in the Context of Mutual Recognition of Decisions in Criminal Matters’ in 
De Kerchove G and Weyembergh A (eds) L’espace pénal européen : enjeux et perspectives (Institut d’Etudes 
Européennes Bruxelles 2002)119-124, 122. 
64 Respect of the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda. See article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties 
1969; Yoon-Ho AL ‘Criminal Jurisdiction under the U.S.-Korea Status of Forces Agreement: Problems to 
Proposals’ 2003 (13) Journal Transnational Law & Policy 213-249, 245; van Wyk JA et al. ‘The International 
Politics of Nuclear Weapons: A Constructivist Analysis’ 2007 (35) Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of 
Military Studies 23-45, 26. 
65 Para 47 (a) UN Model SOFA (UN. Doc. A/45/594). 
66 Supra 6.2. 
67 Supra 6.4. 
68 Supra 6.3. 
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To the question of jurisdiction where the conduct falls within the jurisdiction of the ICC
69
, i.e. 
an international crime such as war crimes, it was argued that the law of peacekeeping should 
be developed to include regulations, such as universal jurisdiction and the intervention of an 
international court, to ensure that no crime goes unpunished.
70
 It was considered that, if a 
crime falls under the jurisdiction of the ICC, this should mean it can also be prosecuted by 
other States, including the Host State. Where the criminal extant system of the Host State is 
dysfunctional, the State can refer the case to the ICC, especially if the alleged crimes amount 
to war crimes
71
 under the jurisdiction of the ICC.
72
 
Returning to the issue of jurisdiction over peacekeepers, the chapter discussed the decisions of 
some cases prosecuted in Canada and Belgium,
73
 and it explored the prosecution pending in 
South Africa relative to the case of murder perpetrated by an Air force Sergeant from South 
Africa.
74
 Amongst the incidents actually prosecuted, it must be noted that only the most 
publicised incidents by the media received the attention of the above Troop-Contributing 
Countries. Indeed, only instances of crime that led to the death of the victim have been 
prosecuted. The only case of grievous bodily harm that came before courts, and the 
perpetrator received the required sentence, is that of Gunnery Sergeant Harry Conde.
75
 Other 
allegations of rape and instances of looting have never been prosecuted.
76
 Where Canada and 
                                                             
69 Miller AJ ‘Legal Aspects of Stopping Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations’ 2006 
(39) Cornell International Law Journal 71-96, 80. Indeed, even for crimes under the ICC jurisdictions are crimes 
under the jurisdiction of domestic courts. 
70 Supra 6.5. 
71 The international law recognizes the existence of some offences in respect of which every country in the world 
is recognised as possessing the right, and, perhaps, even the duty, of exercising criminal jurisdiction regardless 
of the nationality of the offender, or of the victim, or of the locus of the offence. See Green LC ‘International 
Crimes and the Legal Process’ 1980 (29) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 567- 584, 568. States 
have a duty to prosecute international crimes under international law and such a duty explains the principle of 
complementarity found in the Rome Statute of the ICC. See Murungu C & Biegon J (eds) Prosecuting 
International Crimes in Africa (Pretoria University Law Press Pretoria 2011) 14-15. For jurisdiction over war 
crimes, see Henckaerts J-M and Doswald-Beck L (eds) Customary International Humanitarian Law Volume II: 
Practice (Cambridge University Press for ICRC-Geneva Cambridge 2005) 3883-38940. 
72 The Rome Statute is based on two principles, complementarity and cooperation. State Parties to the Rome 
Statute are committed to investigate, prosecute, and prevent massive crimes when perpetrated within their own 
jurisdiction. They accepted that, should they fail genuinely to investigate and prosecute; the International 
Criminal Court can independently decide to step in. State Parties also committed to cooperate with the Court 
whenever and wherever the Court decided to act. See Moreno-Ocampo L ‘The International Criminal Court – 
Some Reflections’ 2009 (12) Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3-12, 5. 
73 Supra 6.6. 
74 Supra 6.6.4. 
75 Adams TK ‘SOF in Peace-Support Operations,’ 1993 (6) Special Warfare 2-7, 2. 
76 Supra 6.6.3. 
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Belgium did conduct prosecution, the sentences imposed were very light compared to the 
gravity of the alleged crimes.
77
 
Chapter six also recommended that Troop-Contributing Countries which do not prosecute 
their soldiers for crimes committed while on mission of peace be barred from participating in 
future similar operations. The fear that, if that were the case, few countries would be available 
to contribute troops to UN operations should not distract from the fact and necessity of setting 
an example and contributing to bringing peace and security in war-torn societies.
78
 The 
analysis of the draft convention on the accountability of UN officials and experts on mission 
can suggest more practical avenues to ensure that no crime by peacekeepers goes unpunished. 
Chapter seven analysed the Draft Convention on the accountability of UN personnel and 
experts on mission
79
 and the present researcher proposed an on-site tripartite court 
mechanism. It commenced by pointing out that prosecution of peacekeepers is rather a rare 
occurrence.
80
 This may be the same regarding the prosecution of UN officials and experts on 
mission who are expected to observe the laws of the Host State. Where it is not expressly 
precluded, therefore, the Host State should have jurisdiction over violations of its laws, 
regardless of the perpetrator of the act. 
The above possibility of prosecuting UN officials and experts on mission in the State where 
they are alleged to have committed crimes seems to be contradictory by comparison with the 
statement of the UN General Assembly requiring States to establish jurisdiction over UN 
officials and experts on mission.
81
 This means that the Host State, as well as the UN, has no 
jurisdiction over the conduct of such personnel. It was noted that, unlike members of a 
national contingent of a UN mission of peace, UN officials and experts on mission are not 
representatives of their States of nationality. Hence, the criminal conduct they may commit in 
the place where they are deployed falls under the jurisdiction of domestic law of the country 
where such act is committed.
82
 
                                                             
77 See criticism of each case, supra 6.6. 
78 Supra 6.7. 
79
 Annex III to the Report of the Group of Legal Experts on ensuring the accountability of United Nations staff 
and experts on mission with respect to criminal acts committed in peacekeeping operations. UN Doc. A/60/980 
of 16 August 2006 [GLE report A/60/980]. 
80 Supra 7.1. 
81 Supra chapter 7. 
82 Supra 7.2. 
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It was shown that the Draft Convention, taken holistically, can be criticized on a number of 
grounds. First of all, it lists crimes that peacekeepers, whether UN officials or experts on 
mission, commit on mission. Secondly, the Host State seems to have no jurisdiction over 
crimes committed within its boundaries even where the perpetrators are not members of the 
military component subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the TCC. The third ground on 
which the Draft Convention can be criticised is that it did not refer to the Rome Statute, 
although peacekeepers can commit crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC.
83
 
It was important, however, to mention the doctrine of non indivisibility of jurisdiction, a 
doctrine which allows the recognition of some residual jurisdiction over peacekeepers or UN 
officials and experts on mission to the Host State. It was also mentioned that where Host State 
jurisdiction does not function properly, the possibility of helping such a state should not be 
ignored. In either instance, investigative tasks should be made the responsibility of the Host 
State, and other authorities should exercise other acts regarding proceedings against 
peacekeepers. It was suggested that the Host State and sending State cooperate for optimal 
justice.
84
 
The proposition from the present researcher was that of setting up a tripartite jurisdiction 
involving the UN, the Troop-Contributing Country, and the Host State. Such a jurisdiction 
should be recognised as being competent to adjudicate any matter related to peacekeeping 
personnel, whether civil or criminal, or whether constituting the enforcement of Host State 
laws or relating to international crimes. It was highlighted that a tripartite mechanism has the 
merit of ensuring accountability for crimes committed by peacekeepers because it allows the 
participation of the victims and witnesses throughout the proceedings. Indeed, the draft 
convention which tries to provide a solution to the crimes committed by peacekeepers did not 
include military contingent members, though statistics have shown that the large proportion of 
sexual crimes perpetrated by peace support operations personnel are perpetrated by military 
members. At the end of the analysis, a tripartite mechanism that involves the UN, as the 
sponsor of the mission or operation during which the crimes are committed, the Host State, as 
the country on whose territory the crimes are committed and whose nationals are the victims, 
and the Troop-Contributing Country as the State of nationality of the perpetrator(s) was 
suggested. To set up such a mechanism, the convention has to be reviewed to include all 
                                                             
83 Supra 7.4. 
84 Supra 7.3. 
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peacekeeping personnel and their possible crimes, whether such crimes fall within 
international law or are limited to domestic law. They need not be exclusively sex-related 
crimes.
85
 There is no other means to guarantee adherence to humanitarian law and 
international human rights law by peacekeepers than making sure that when their commit 
crimes, investigation and prosecution follow.
86
  
Before the suggested mechanism can be agreed upon, considering the legal inability of the 
UN to follow-up the prosecutions conducted against UN force members in their home country 
pursuant to the law applicable to peacekeepers as it stands today, it was suggested that a court 
with jurisdiction over crimes committed by peacekeepers in the Host State will assist with the 
investigation the facts. Where an on-site court is not established by the Troop-Contributing 
Country, the jurisdiction of the courts of the Host State must be recognised.
87
 Collaboration 
between the UN, the Troop-Contributing Countries, and the Host State is needed to ensure 
accountability for crimes committed by peacekeepers.  
The reality of peace operations today is that there exists a complex regime that comprises 
peacetime rules of international law, international humanitarian law, and national law
88
, and 
internal rules of the UN which determine how the UN force will function, despite the fact that 
national contingents remain subjected, in respect to disciplinary and criminal jurisdiction, to 
the law of the respective contributing countries.
89
 Despite the fact that criminal jurisdiction 
over peacekeepers rests with the countries of origin of the personnel concerned, the discussion 
demonstrated that it was difficult actually to discharge this responsibility which entails that 
the prosecuting authority deploys an investigating team in a foreign country to collect 
evidence
90
 or has the victims and witnesses flown to the country where the trial is held.
91
  
                                                             
85 UN Doc.  A/62/329 of 11 September 2007, para 39. 
86 Supra 7.3.3.6. 
87 Du Plessis M & Peté S Who Guards the Guards? The ICC and Serious Crimes Committed by Peacekeepers in 
Africa (ISS Monograph series No. 121 2006) 3. 
88 Klappe BF ‘International Peace Operations’ in Fleck D(ed) The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law 
2 ed. (Oxford University Press oxford 2008) 635-673, 642-43. 
89 Disciplinary jurisdiction means competence to control the conduct of soldiers during military operations, and, 
where possible, to sanction acts contrary to the discipline of the army. Acts of indiscipline include the misuse of 
alcohol, sexual misconduct, and insubordination, violence, and black market activities. See Rowe P ‘Military 
Misconduct during International Armed Operations: “Bad Apples” or Systemic Failure?’ 2008 (13) Journal of 
Conflict & Security Law 165-189; Winslow D ‘Misplaced Loyalties: The Role of Military Culture in the 
Breakdown of Discipline in Two Peace Operations 21 January 1999’ 2004 (6) Journal of Military and Strategic 
Studies 1-19. 
90 To surmount the issue of investigation by State of nationality of an alleged perpetrator, the UN urges the 
Troop-Contributing Countries to include personnel investigating units in peace operations. See para 57 of the 
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It was pointed out importantly that crimes committed in Somalia were widespread and that 
prosecution in sending states, namely in Canada and in Belgium, was inadequate in that 
punishment meted out did not reflect the gravity of the incidents. It was shown, however, that 
Canada had attempted to keep up with the law of armed conflict for it disbanded the Canadian 
airborne regiment accused of having violated humanitarian law in Somalia. 
With respect to crimes by peacekeepers in Burundi, the mechanism of the ONUB Code of 
Conduct Unit and the appointment of a gender adviser who was placed there to minimise 
misconduct by the UN personnel can be considered to have worked quite well. Instances of 
crimes by peacekeepers were not widespread. It was indicated, however, that war crimes do 
not require a widespread character for prosecution, especially in domestic law. This explains 
why the case of rape and murder of Therese Nkeshimana is being prosecuted. 
With respect to the Democratic Republic of Congo, several UN reports showed that sexual 
crimes by peacekeepers were widespread. They also revealed that the UN Organisation was 
well aware of the pillaging and weapons-for-minerals trafficking with rebels.
92
 UN reports 
have indicated that the organisation had not received any request from the troop- contributing 
countries to use evidence available to the UN in prosecuting repatriated alleged perpetrators. 
On the other hand, Troop-Contributing Countries do not send information to the UN 
Secretariat regarding the action they have taken against repatriated troops. This attitude 
constitutes the proof that States are not prosecuting their soldiers for crimes committed while 
on UN missions of peace. Indeed, with the exception of the instances of prosecution related to 
the Somali operation, and the pending prosecution of Sergeant Philippus Jacobus Venter in 
South Africa, no other prosecution exists. For instance, no soldier has been prosecuted for 
crimes committed when serving with MONUC. The state of law related to peacekeeping, 
especially in respect to national military contingents of the UN force, does not ensure that the 
repatriated individual will face prosecution once home.  
It is for all the reasons mentioned above that sexual violence against women and girls has 
occurred and will, perhaps, continue to occur unabated since no adequate mechanism has been 
put into place. For rape, it does not matter whether the act is performed by members of rebel 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
UNGA Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group: 2009 substantive 
session (UN Doc A/63/19 of 24 March 2009). 
91 Supra chapters 5 and 6. 
92 Adaka F ‘The Enforcement of Military Justice and Discipline in External Military Operations: Exploring the 
Fault Lines’ 2008 (47) Military Law and the Law of War Review 253-265, 256. 
 319 
groups or by people upon whom victims should be able to rely to regain hope for life. The act 
is graver when perpetrated by peacekeepers.  
8.2 Recommendations 
Since the UN OIOS is unlikely to be given the power to prosecute as a substitute for national 
justice, it must be required of State members of the UN to take a more cogent responsibility in 
the selection of troops to be deployed with the UN. To uphold the UN code of conduct, strong 
and enforceable mechanisms are needed and have to be applicable to all peace support 
operations staff, whether military or civilian. They must serve as a deterrent against sexual 
abuses, especially with minors.
93
 Instituting a practical system of accountability by providing 
for on-site courts martial in each contingent was advised by the Zeid Report.  It was suggested 
that the solution could lie in the creation of a tripartite criminal court dealing with all types of 
misconduct by peacekeepers that amount to an offence, whether under domestic or 
International Criminal Law. Before such a mechanism is put in place, and where a Troop-
Contributing Country does not prosecute, it may be recommended that the ICC competency 
be triggered in order to compel Troop-Contributing Countries to act in accordance with their 
obligations under the Rome Statute, Memorandum of Understanding, and other international 
instruments. In the interim, before an adequate convention is set up, signed, and ratified to 
become enforceable, the Host State should be allowed the jurisdiction to investigate. It was 
indicated that the findings of the investigation would have to be presented in evidence before 
the suggested courts martial. It was suggested that the Secretary General should, or must, 
waive immunity for non-military personnel and help the Host State to conduct proceedings. 
This would ensure that international standards are observed during prosecutions, and that 
Host State authorities are invited to observe them even in prosecutions of specific cases 
relating to their nationals. It is in that way that the UN may play a meaningful role in restoring 
peace.  
If peacekeepers cannot refrain from committing crimes against civilians, and, if it happens 
that they violate the law but they do not face justice, which should be the case, no one will 
expect the government and/or rebel groups to do any differently. Such a stance adds to the 
                                                             
93 Du Plessis M & Peté S Who Guards the Guards: The International Criminal Court and Serious Crimes 
Committed by Peacekeepers in Africa (ISS Monograph Series No. 121 February 2006) 6-7 quoting Kristina 
Peduto, the head of MONUC child protection in Bunia, interviewed by the London Independent Newspaper UN 
wire Abuse by UN troops in DRC may go unpunished, report says, 12 July 2004. 
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hardships of civilians, especially women and children. The UN should be encouraged to take 
a strong stance against those responsible for committing serious human rights violations, 
including sexual violence against women. The UN should not limit its reaction solely to 
repatriation and pecuniary sanctions. Perpetrators should be fairly tried, and, if found guilty, 
face penalties that correspond to their crimes. If a Troop-Contributing Country does not live 
up to its obligations under the Memorandum of Understanding, it should be warned that it is 
no longer eligible to contribute troops in future operations. There should not be a fear that, in 
doing this, the UN runs the risk of not gathering sufficient troops to keep the peace, for it is 
not worthy of the UN to deploy troops that do not observe their mandate, and who act 
contrary to what is expected of them, to the disadvantage of the host population. States should 
not be eager to contribute troops without any commitment to ensuring that those troops are 
actually capable of being an outstanding example for the benefit of the host population. Some 
Troop-Contributing Countries may be eager to be involved in order to further a political or 
economic agenda against the host country.  
To this end, the present author has devised and drafted possible measures as a convention 
which could be considered to hold peacekeepers accountable from a substantive, procedural, 
and jurisdictional perspective. This is set out below. 
 Suggested Draft Convention on Accountability of UN Peace Personnel94 
Preamble 
The States parties to this Convention 
Recognizing the important role the United Nations peace operations play in bringing peace 
and stability to war-torn countries to fulfil the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations; 
Bearing in mind that, although peacekeepers have carried out their duties with 
professionalism and dedication under arduous and often dangerous conditions, the United 
Nations peacekeeping operations’ record is being tarnished by unconscionable criminal 
conduct committed by a few individual members of those operations; 
                                                             
94 This proposed Convention differs greatly from the Draft Convention by the Group of Legal Experts UN. Doc. 
A/60/980 of 16 August 2006 (Annex III). It fills the gaps or grounds of criticism identified in chapter VII of this 
thesis. 
 321 
Affirming that criminal conduct by United Nations peacekeeping operations personnel are 
serious crimes which undermine the credibility and the effectiveness of the mandate of the 
Organization under the Charter, namely, the maintenance of international peace and security; 
Stressing the obligation of members of United Nations peace operations to respect all local 
laws and regulations of the Host State as well as International Humanitarian Law and 
International Human Rights; 
Noting that United Nations peace operations personnel enjoy privileges and immunities as set 
out in the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and adopted by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations on 13 February 1946; 
Emphasizing that such privileges and immunities are granted in the interests of the United 
Nations and not for the personal benefit of the individual; 
Having in mind that, in the case of crimes committed by United Nations peace operations 
personnel in the territory of the Host State, it may be difficult for the alleged offender to be 
prosecuted by the Host State because of the ineffectiveness of the Host State judiciary in 
handling criminal matters in conformity with international standards of fairness; and 
Believing that the present Convention will ensure that such situations do not lead to impunity 
for offenders, in particular those who commit serious crimes under local and international 
criminal laws; 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article 1: Definitions 
For the purposes of this Convention: 
(a) “General Convention” means the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
United Nations, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 13 February 
1946; 
(b) “United Nations peace operation” means any operation established by the competent 
organ of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 
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conducted under United Nations authority and control for the purpose of maintaining or 
restoring international peace and security; 
(c) “Host State” means a State in whose territory a United Nations peacekeeping operation is 
conducted; 
(d) “United Nations peace operations personnel” means Members of a United Nations peace 
operation who enjoy any immunities from the jurisdiction of the Host State pursuant to 
article V or article VI of the General Convention or pursuant to either the provisions of 
the status-of-forces agreement entered into by the United Nations and the Host State for 
the peace operation or, pending the conclusion of such an agreement, the provisional 
application of the model status-of-forces agreement (A/45/594) dated 9 October 1990; 
(e) “Third State” means any State other than the Host State or the Troop-Contributing 
Country (State of origin of the alleged perpetrator); and 
(f) “Universal jurisdiction” means court jurisdiction over international crimes regardless the 
place of perpetration, the nationality of victims or perpetrators. 
Article 2: Scope of application 
1. This Convention applies to all members of the UN peacekeeping personnel, whether 
civilians or military. 
2. It also applies to UN operations established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
3. No Status-of-Agreement Forces will provide otherwise. 
Article 3: Crimes committed during United Nations peace operations
95
 
1. A member of United Nations peace operation personnel commits a crime within the 
meaning of this Convention if that person intentionally engages in conduct which 
constitutes one of the serious crimes set out in paragraph 2 of the present article while 
serving on a United Nations peace operation in a Host State. 
2. The serious crimes referred to in paragraph 1 of the present article are: 
                                                             
95 See Article 3 and alternative paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the Draft Convention on Accountability of UN 
Officials and Experts on mission UN Doc A/60/980 of 16 August 2006. 
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(a) Intentional Crimes against the physical integrity of a person, including but not limited to 
murder, assault with the intent to cause grievous bodily harm, rape and sexual offences 
such as enforced prostitution, and crimes against property punishable under the national 
law of the Host State by imprisonment or other deprivation of liberty of at least two years 
of imprisonment or by a more severe penalty;
96
 
(b) An attempt to commit any such crime; and 
(c) Participation in any capacity, such as an accomplice, assistant, or instigator in any crime 
set out in subparagraphs (a) and (b). 
3. Any violations of embargoes imposed pursuant to UN Security Council Resolutions. 
Article 4: Jurisdiction over crimes committed by UN peace operations personnel 
1. The UN Security Council resolution establishing a peace operation shall provide for an 
on-site tripartite court that will have jurisdiction over the conduct of individuals involved 
in the peace operation.  
 
2. The on-site tripartite court envisioned in paragraph 1 above shall be composed of judges 
and prosecutors as follows: 
(a) Three Judges, of whom one comes from the Host State, one from the State of 
nationality of the offender, and one designated by the UN from a third State
97
; 
(b) The prosecution shall be conducted by a Prosecutor from the Host State. Prior to 
prosecuting an offender, investigations shall be conducted by the Prosecutor with the 
assistance of the UN Investigation Division of the Office of Internal Oversight 
Services as well as of an investigator of the nationality of the suspect offender; 
(c) The proceedings related to the prosecution of a person involved with a peace operation 
shall be conducted where the alleged offence was committed. 
 
3. Each State party shall have jurisdiction over crimes committed by a peace operation 
personnel member if such a person has not been prosecuted according to the tripartite 
mechanism as provided for in subparagraphs 1 and 2 of the present article.  
 
                                                             
96 These crimes include international crimes. 
97 Third State here means a State involved in the peace operation from which the offender is not a national. 
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4. The State party in the territory in which the alleged offender is present shall, if it does not 
extradite that person, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and without undue delay, 
to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution through 
proceedings in accordance with the law of that State. Those authorities shall take their 
decision in the same manner as in the case of any other offence of a serious nature under 
the law of that State. The State parties concerned shall cooperate with one another, in 
particular on procedural and evidentiary aspects, to ensure the efficiency of such 
prosecution. 
Article 5: Issues related to extradition  
1. The crimes set out in article 3 shall be considered extraditable offences in any extradition 
treaty existing between States parties. State parties undertake to include such offences as 
extraditable offences in every extradition treaty to be subsequently concluded by them. 
2. When a State party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty 
receives a request for extradition from another State party with which it does not have an 
extradition treaty, the requested State party may, at its discretion, consider this Convention 
as a legal basis for extradition in respect of the offences.  
3. State parties which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall 
recognize the crimes as extraditable offences between themselves. 
4. The provisions of all extradition treaties between State parties with regard to the crimes set 
out in article 3 shall be deemed to be modified as between State parties to the extent that 
they are incompatible with this Convention. 
Article 6: Reparation to victims
98
 
1. The competent Court under Article 4 shall establish principles relating to reparations to, or 
in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation. On this basis, 
in its decision, the Court may, either upon request or on its own motion in exceptional 
circumstances, determine the scope and extent of any damage, loss, and injury to, or in 
respect of, victims, and it will state the principles on which it is acting. The court may 
order the forfeiture of any valuables of the offender to serve to pay damages. Where the 
                                                             
98 This article draws upon articles 75 and 109 of the Rome Statute. 
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adjudicating court is the Tripartite On-site Court, it may indicate that reparation will be 
made by the UN or by the State of Origin of the offender. 
2. The Court may make an order directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate 
reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation, and 
rehabilitation. Where appropriate, the Court may order that the award for reparations be 
made through the United Nations or a NGO indicated in the decision. 
3. Before making an order under this article, the Court may invite, and shall take account of, 
representations from or on behalf of the convicted person, victims, and other interested 
persons or interested States. 
4. In exercising its power under this article, the Court may, after a person is convicted of a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, determine whether, in order to give effect to an 
order which it may make under this article, it is necessary to seek measures under article 
93, paragraph 1. 
5. A State Party shall take measures to recover the value of the proceeds, property, or assets 
ordered by the Court to be forfeited, without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third 
parties. 
6. Nothing in this article shall be interpreted as prejudicing the rights of victims under 
national or international law. 
8.3 Implications for further studies 
Since the present study has dealt with only three countries, it may be important also to study 
the allegations of crimes by peacekeepers in Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Darfur, and Sierra-Leone, 
especially the attitude of Troop-Contributing Countries to such claims and the action taken, if 
any. It may also be interesting to conduct such a study and ask experts from the armies of 
such Troop-Contributing Countries to suggest the mechanism that may well suit soldiers 
deployed in a host country for at least six months. Their contribution is critical to the search 
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for adequate means of curbing the commission of the kind of crimes commonly committed by 
such soldiers.
99
  
8.4 Final remarks 
For a long time, sexual violence and rape committed by peacekeepers in all peace operations 
have been ignored. Since the unveiling of information by the media, given the widespread 
nature of these acts and especially given the fact that they were perpetrated against women 
and girls in war-torn societies such as Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and 
Burundi, the lack of prosecution amounts to the double victimization of women and children. 
Crimes by peacekeepers, therefore, must be dealt with in an appropriate manner if they are to 
be avoided in the future. There is no need for the UN to wait until acts of peacekeepers 
amount to crimes against humanity for the organization to act.
100
 
The present thesis has argued that to let the crimes committed by UN peacekeepers go 
unpunished sends the message that some persons are above the law. At the present state of the 
law of peacekeeping, the Troop-Contributing Country enjoys the monopoly of trying 
members of its military contingent for their crimes committed abroad during UN missions of 
peace. This is the consequence of agreements between the UN and the Host State, the UN, 
and the Troop-Contributing Countries. It is normal that agreements signed be respected. It is 
possible to imagine a mechanism that circumvents the impunity peacekeepers enjoy under the 
current agreements by recommending full follow-ups by the United Nations that the Troop-
Contributing Countries concerned effectively exercise their criminal jurisdiction as agreed 
upon or otherwise  be barred from future participation in peacekeeping operations.  The UN 
has the means of ensuring that the victims and witnesses in the Host State, where the crimes 
were committed, are informed of the outcomes of the prosecution of perpetrators, consistent 
to the law. 
                                                             
99 For instance, since extradition excludes offences under military law, and this would be the case where the 
conduct by a peacekeeper amounts to a war crime or an offence to military discipline, the mechanism of 
extradition may envision overruling the customary military offence excetion. If such an exception does not stand 
against exatradition procedures, the handling of members of for example the SANDF accused of having 
committed crimes while on UN mission of peace would reveal to be much easier or at leat South Africa would 
find to be actually prosecuting them in order to fulfill its obligations under international law. If such proposition 
comes from military officers, it may be a manifestation of willingness of tackling impunity.  
100 As Van der Bijl and Rumney point out, the focus on legal rules that define offences or govern procedures, 
while ignoring many other factors with a real impact on the enforcement of the criminal law, is not enough to 
meet the objectives of any reform. See Van der Bijl C and Rumney P ‘Attitudes, Rape and Law Reform in South 
Africa’ 2010 (73) Journal of Criminal Law 414-449. 
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The present thesis propounds that the proposed code of conduct
101
 which at present is limited 
to sexual offences committed by UN personnel other than members of national military 
contingents be extended to the latter category. It seems important to create an on-site 
investigating team
102
 within each contingent of each UN mission of peace to circumvent the 
problems of investigation by the Troop-Contributing Countries, which, under the current 
mechanism, exercise exclusive criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction over peacekeepers. The 
UN can erect a special tripartite on-site court for any criminal offence committed during 
peacekeeping mission by peacekeepers. It has been pointed out that the crimes by its 
personnel are not always sexual offences, but may also include weapons trafficking in 
violation of embargoes. For example, to supply weapons to rebels in order to get minerals, 
diamonds, and other natural resources, is simply a way of fuelling the conflict. Without such 
mechanisms being put in place, it will remain difficult to hold peacekeepers criminally 
accountable. 
Amongst other identified gaps in the law applicable to UN peacekeeping operations, it is 
imperative to point to the discreet manner with which the Organisation as well as Troop-
Contributing Countries hold facts and information related to alleged crimes.
103
 The present 
research recommends the commitment of the UN to an obligation of naming the countries 
whose peacekeeping personnel have been repatriated after the substantiation of misconduct. It 
is recommended that the outcome of any prosecution should be made available to the public. 
To increase awareness of such crimes, one scholar has even suggested that there be a “UN 
peacekeeping Bill of Rights” to curb the scourge.104 Such a corpus of rights should include 
the individual rights of victims and witnesses to know the outcome of any prosecution.
105
 
Apart from the right to information, the proposition should also include a commission tasked 
with entertaining claims from the public with respect to any violation of the Peacekeeping Bill 
                                                             
101 Draft Convention, Annex III to UN Doc. A/60/980 of 16 August 2006. 
102 The tripartite on-site court mechanism will therefore be able to function by choosing investigators from such 
a team. 
103 For instance findings of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, Investigation Division, are classified as 
Strictly Confidential, Internal to UN. The OIOS Report of the investigation of an allegation of sexual assault in 
2006 was consistently classified, the service withholding all informative details of the identity of perpetrator and 
the details of the investigation. See UN OIOS-ID ID Case No. 0553-06 of 11 October 2007. 
104
 Bongiorno C ‘A culture of Impunity: Applying International Human Rights Law to the United Nations in East 
Timor’ 2002 (33) Columbia Human Rights Law Review 623-692, 677-678. 
105 It may be difficult for a court to reach a sound decision without the help of victims. With respect to crimes of 
peacekeepers, most of them are sexual. During investigation, therefore, it is important to take into account this 
factor. Investigators should include female experts. See Hudson H ‘Mainstreaming Gender in Peacekeeping 
Operations: Can Africa Learn from International Experience?’ 2000 (9) African Security Review 18-33, 21. 
 328 
of Rights.
106
 Other human rights institutions, such as an ombudsperson, courts, and 
monitoring commissions ought to be present in every deployed UN mission of peace.
107
 
Regarding the matter of the jurisdiction of crimes allegedly committed by peacekeeping 
personnel, an on-site tripartite court composed of representatives of the UN, Host State, and 
Troop-Contributing Countries would be the proper solution.
108
 The on-site jurisdiction has the 
advantage of ensuring that all the abused victims participate in identifying the wrongdoers, 
and, above all, witness the rule of law taking precedence and justice being seen to be done.
109
 
Such a court should include all offences whether in violation of international law or the 
domestic law of the host or sending State. Even if it is essentially a court martial, it should be 
given the power to adjudicate allegations levelled against other categories of UN personnel.
110
 
The prosecution of perpetrators of the crimes committed today can prevent the repetition of 
similar crimes in the future.
111
 
  
                                                             
106 Bongiorno C op cit (n 103) 683. 
107 Bongiorno C op cit (n 103) 686-687, 690. 
108 It is important always to prosecute crimes where they occur. For fear of the ICC to prosecute US 
peacekeepers, see Cerone JP ‘Dynamic Equilibrium: The Evolution of US Attitude towards International 
Criminal Courts and Tribunals’ 2007 (18) European Journal of International Law 277-315, 315. 
109 Van Dyke JM ‘Reconciliation between Korea and Japan’ 2006 (5) Chinese Journal of International Law 215-
239, 230. 
110 See, for hybrid courts Kanu AI and Tortora G ‘The Legal Basis of the Special Court for Sierra Leone’ 2004 
Chinese Journal of International Law 515-552, 517. 
111 Ntoubandi FZ Amnesty for Crimes against Humanity under International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
Leiden 2007) 1 quoting Justice Robert H. Jackson, UN Chief Prosecutor during the Nuremberg Trials in his 
opening statement before the Nuremberg Tribunal 1945. 
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ANNEXURES 
Annexure A 
Excerpts from Burundian Penal Code (French) - Translation by Kakule Kalwahali 
... 
Article 25:  
 A person who, at the time of doing an act which if committed by a sound person would 
constitute an offence, by reason of mental illness or deficiency did not possess the power of 
appreciating the nature of his or her actions or of controlling such actions to conform them to 
the requirements of the law shall not be held criminally responsible.  
Article 26:  
 A person, however, who voluntarily deprives himself or herself of the use of his /her mental 
faculties at the time of the offence, remains criminally responsible, even though this 
deprivation has not been provoked in order to commit the offence.  
Article 27:  
 A person who commits an act under irresistible duress or force majeure shall not be 
punished. 
Duress can never be used as a defence in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and other international crimes, but it can be taken into account for the reduction of the 
sentence.  
Article 28:  
Children under fifteen years of age shall be deemed to lack criminal capacity and shall not be 
tried for, or convicted of, any offence, which he or she is alleged to have committed. 
The acts of the above children, shall not, however, affect any civil claim by the aggrieved 
party against the parents or guardian of the child. 
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Article 29:  
When the offender or the accomplice of an offence is a minor of, or above, fifteen years of 
age but less than eighteen years of age at the time of the offence, the punishment will be as 
follows:  
1. If the incurred punishment would have been life imprisonment, the sentence imposed on 
the minor shall be five to ten years of imprisonment; and 
2. If the incurred punishment would have been a privation of freedom limited in time or a 
fine, the sentence against him or her shall not be over four years.  
… 
Article 31:  
There is no offence:  
1. When the act was either ordered or authorized by the law or by the legitimate authority, 
except if the act was obviously illegal.  
Superior order can never be used as a defence in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, and other international crimes, but may be taken into account for the reduction of 
the sentence.  
2. In an instance of state of necessity, which is the situation of a person who is placed in 
serious and imminent danger to himself or herself, to others, or to a property, or with the 
aim of preventing/interrupting the commission of an offence, commits an act which falls 
under the ambit of criminal law in order to safeguard a more superior interest to the interest 
sacrificed. The means used to achieve this goal must not be disproportionate to the gravity 
of the threat.  
State of necessity can never be used as a defence in cases of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and other international crimes, but may be taken into account in 
mitigation of the sentence.  
Voluntary homicidal offences are not affected by the content of point 2.  
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3. In the instance of private defence, which is the reaction of a person who, in the face of  
unjustified aggression towards himself/herself or others, accomplishes an act that falls 
under the penal law, provided that the means used are not disproportional to the gravity of 
the aggression.  
… 
Article 144:  
To be effective any abandonment of a complaint must, except in cases where the law has 
provided otherwise, take place before the verdict becomes final.  
Article 145:  
If the complaint has been lodged by several victims of the same offence, prosecution can be 
stayed only if all the complainants withdraw.  
... 
Article 196:   
By ‘crime against humanity’ is understood any of the following acts when committed as part 
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population with knowledge 
of the attack: 
1. Murder;   
2. Extermination;   
3. Enslavement;   
4. Deportation or forcible transfer of population;   
5. Imprisonment or any other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of the 
fundamental provisions of the international law;   
6. Torture;   
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7. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any 
other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;   
8. Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, 
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph the article 197, 10, or other 
grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in 
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;   
9. Enforced disappearance of people;   
10. Crimes of apartheid; or 
11. Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering or serious 
injury to body or to mental or physical health. 
Article 197:   
For the purposes of the previous article:   
1. ‘Attack directed against any civilian population’ means a course of conduct involving the 
multiple commission of acts referred to in the previous article against any civilian 
population, pursuant to, or in furtherance of, a State or organizational policy to commit 
such an attack;   
2. ‘Extermination’ includes the intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the 
deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of 
part of a population;   
3. ‘Enslavement’ means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership over a person and include the exercise of such power in the course of 
trafficking in persons, in particular women and children; 
4. ‘Deportation or forcible transfer of population’ means the forced displacement of the 
persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are 
lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law; 
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5. ‘Torture’ means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, upon a person in the custody of, or under the control of, the accused; except that 
torture shall not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in, or incidental to 
lawful sanctions;  
6. ‘Forced pregnancy’ means the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant 
with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other 
grave violations of international law; 
7. ‘Persecution’ means the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary 
to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity; 
8. ‘The crime of apartheid’ means inhumane acts of a character similar to those referred to in 
the previous article, committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic 
oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups, and 
committed with the intention of maintaining that regime; 
9. ‘Enforced disappearance of persons’ means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons 
by, or with, the authorization, support, or acquiescence of a State or a political 
organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give 
information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons with the intention of removing 
them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time;   
10. The term ‘gender’ refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society. 
It does not imply any different meaning.   
Article 198: 
By ‘war crimes’ means any crimes committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-
scale commission of such crimes, in particular: 
1. Any of the grave breaches of Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949:   
a. Intentional homicide;   
b. Torture or inhuman treatment, including biologic experiments;   
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c. Wilfully causing great suffering, or seriously injury to body or health;   
d. Destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity and carried out 
unlawfully and wantonly on large-scale;   
e. Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile 
power;   
f. Wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or any other protected person of the rights of a fair and 
normal trial;   
g. Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement; and  
h. The taking of hostages.   
2. Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, 
within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts: 
a. Intentionally directing attacks against the civil population as such or against individuals not 
taking direct part in hostilities;   
b. Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are not military 
objectives;   
c. Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units, or vehicles 
involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to 
civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict;   
d. Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental 
loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term, 
and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation 
to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated; 
e. Attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings 
which are undefended and which are not military objectives;   
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f. Killing or wounding a combatant who, having laid down his arms or not having any means 
of defence, has surrendered at his discretion;   
g. Making improper use of a flag of truce, of the flag or of the military insignia and uniform 
of the enemy, or of the United Nations, or of the distinctive emblems of the Geneva 
Conventions, resulting in death or serious personal injury to others;   
h. The transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian 
population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the 
population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory; 
i. Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, 
science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick 
and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives; 
j. Subjecting persons who are in the power of an hostile party to physical mutilation or to 
medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are neither justified by the medical, 
dental, or hospital treatment of the person concerned nor carried out in his or her interests, 
and which cause death to, or seriously endanger the health of, such person or persons; 
k. Treacherously killing or wounding individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army; 
l. Declaring that no quarter will be given;   
m. Destroying or seizing the enemy's property unless such destruction or seizure be 
imperatively demanded by the necessities of war; 
n. Declaring abolished, suspended or inadmissible in a court of law the rights and actions of 
the nationals of the hostile party; 
o. Compelling the nationals of the hostile party to take part in the operations of war directed 
against their own country, even if they were in the belligerent's service before the 
commencement of the war; 
p. Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault; 
q. Employing poison or poisoned weapons;  
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r. Employing asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials, or 
devices; 
s. Employing bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a 
hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core or is pierced with incisions; 
t. Employing weapons, projectiles, and material and methods of warfare which are of a nature 
to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering or which are inherently 
indiscriminate in the violation of the international law of armed conflict, provided that 
such weapons, projectiles, and material and methods of warfare are the subject of a 
comprehensive prohibition; 
u. Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment; 
v. Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as defined in 
article 197, 6°, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also constituting 
a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions; 
w. Utilizing the presence of a civilian or other protected person to render certain points, areas, 
or military forces immune from military operations; 
x. Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and transport, 
without any precaution being taken to avoid these objects becoming targets of military 
operations; 
y. Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and transport, and 
personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions in conformity with 
international law; 
z. Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of 
objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as 
provided for under the Geneva Conventions; and 
aa. Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the national armed 
forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities. 
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3. In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious violations of 
article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the 
following acts committed against persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including 
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat 
by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause: 
a. Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, 
and torture; 
b. Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment; 
c. Taking of hostages; and 
d. The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment 
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees which are 
generally recognized as indispensable. 
Article 198:   
4. Point 3 above applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and thus does not 
apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic 
acts of violence, or other acts of a similar nature. 
5. Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an 
international character, within the established framework of international law, namely, any 
of the following acts: 
a. Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual 
civilians not taking direct part in hostilities; 
b. Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and transport, and 
personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions in conformity with 
international law; 
c. Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units, or vehicles 
involved in humanitarian assistance or a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the 
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Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to 
civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict; 
d. Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, 
science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick 
and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives; 
e. Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;   
f. Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as defined in 
article 197, 6, enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence also 
constituting a serious violation of the Geneva Conventions; 
g. Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed forces or groups 
or using them to participate actively in hostilities; 
h. Ordering the displacement of the civilian population for reasons related to the conflict, 
unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand; 
i. Killing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary;   
j. Declaring that no quarter will be given;   
k. Subjecting persons who are in the power of another party to the conflict to physical 
mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are neither justified by 
the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the person concerned nor carried out in his or 
her interest, and which cause death to, or seriously endanger, the health of such person or 
persons; and 
l. Destroying or seizing the property of an adversary unless such destruction or seizure be 
imperatively demanded by the necessities of the conflict. 
6. Point 5 above applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and thus does not 
apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic 
acts of violence, or other acts of a similar nature. It applies to armed conflicts that take 
place in the territory of a State when there is protracted armed conflict between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups.  
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... 
Article 211:  
Any act by which a person intentionally causes the death of another person is murder. It is 
punished by imprisonment for life.  
Murder committed in preparation for, or in furtherance of, an offence or a crime, either to 
encourage the flight or to silence witnesses in order to assure the impunity of the perpetrator 
or of the accomplice of a crime or an offence is punished with imprisonment for life.  
Article 212:  
The murder of fathers, mothers, or other legitimate grandparents as well as the murder of 
one’s natural father or natural mother is parricide. It is punished with imprisonment for life.  
The murder of a person’s children, brothers, or sisters, whether legitimate or natural, is also 
punished with imprisonment for life.  
The murder committed by the father or by the mother of a newborn child whether legitimate 
or natural is infanticide. It is punished with imprisonment for life.  
Article 213:  
Murder committed with premeditation is qualified murder or assassination. It is punished with 
imprisonment for life.  
There is premeditation when the intention to achieve a homicidal act has been formed before 
the action.  
Article 214:  
Murder committed by the means of substances which are susceptible to give death more 
expeditiously, no matter how these lethal substances have been administrated to the victim, 
constitutes the crime of poisoning. It is punished with imprisonment for life.  
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Article 215:  
Whoever has voluntarily administrated any substances susceptible of causing death or which, 
without likely to be susceptible of causing death, can, however, seriously impair health, is 
punished with a term of imprisonment from one year to twenty years and with a fine between 
one hundred thousand and one million francs. 
Article 216:  
The perpetrators who resort to acts of barbarism during the commission of any crimes 
provided for in the preceding articles of the present section are punished with imprisonment 
for life.  
… 
Article 219:  
Whoever has voluntarily caused injuries or has assaulted others is punished with 
imprisonment from two months to eight months and with a fine of fifty thousand to two 
hundred thousand francs, or with one of these two sentences.  
In the case of premeditation the person found guilty is punished with a term of imprisonment 
from one month to two years and with a fine of two hundred thousand francs.  
Article 220:  
If the assault or the injuries cause an illness or a permanent inability to work, or if the conduct 
impaired severely the use of an organ or resulted in a serious mutilation, or if either was 
carried out against a pregnant woman and the perpetrator knew the state of pregnancy, the 
accused shall incur a sentence of between two and ten years imprisonment and a fine of fifty 
thousand to two hundred thousand francs. 
Article 221:  
The penal servitude provided for in the two preceding articles shall be doubled whenever the 
assault is perpetrated against a parent or grand-parent, a spousal or a child of less than 
eighteen years of age, or against any person living in the same house with the perpetrator, or 
any other parent or an in-law up to the 4
th
 degree of relationship. 
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… 
Article 554:   
[Rape is defined as] any act of sexual penetration, whatever the nature of such an act, 
committed by an adult person against a minor even if such a minor consented to the act.   
It is also defined as rape, if accompanied by violence, sexual assault committed with a minor 
who has not reached eighteen years of age, even with his or her consent.   
Domestic rape is punished only with a prison sentence of eight days and a fine of ten 
thousand francs to fifty thousand francs or one of these sanctions.   
Article 555:   
Rape is committed, either by means of violence or serious threats or by duress against a 
person, directly or through the intermediary of a third person, either by surprise, by 
psychological pressure, within a coercive environment, either while abusing a person who, as 
a result of illness, by the loss of his/her faculties, or by all other accidental reasons would 
have lost the use of his/her senses or would have been deprived of such in whatever manner,  
even though the victim is the person's spouse:   
1. By any man who, whatever his age, introduces his sexual organ, even superficially into that 
of a woman, or any woman who, whatever her age, obliged a man to introduce, even 
superficially, his sexual organ into hers;  
 2. By any man who penetrated, even superficially, the anus, the mouth, or any other opening 
of the body of a woman or of a man with his sexual organ, or with any other part of the 
body or with any other object;   
3. By any person who introduces, even superficially, any other part of the body or any object 
into the woman’s sexual organ;   
4. By any person who obliges a man or a woman to penetrate, even superficially, his/her anal 
opening, or his/her mouth by a sexual organ.   
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 Rape is punished by five years to fifteen years of penal servitude and a fine of fifty thousand 
francs to hundred thousand francs.    
Article 556:   
Rape is punished by fifteen years to twenty five years of penal servitude and a fine of fifty 
thousand to two hundred thousand francs:   
1. When committed against a minor of less than eighteen years of age;    
2. When committed by a parent or grandparent or by a child or grandchild, legitimate, natural 
or adoptive, by a brother or a sister, or by the victim’s stepfather or the victim's 
stepmother;    
3. When committed by a person in the victim's service;    
4. When committed by a person who abuses the authority conferred by his/her functions;    
5. When committed by an educator (of the victim);    
6. When the rape is committed by a minister of religion (of the victim).   
7. When committed by physicians, surgeons, obstetricians, or other medical staff towards 
people confided to their care; and   
8. When committed against a vulnerable person because of his/her age, illness, infirmity, 
physical or mental deficiency, or pregnancy, and that vulnerability is obvious or known to 
the perpetrator;    
Article 557:   
The rape is punished with penal servitude of twenty to thirty years and with a fine of one 
hundred thousand to five hundred thousand francs:   
1. When committed by several people acting as either a principal or accomplices (gang-rape);      
2. When the perpetrator was carrying a weapon;    
 388 
3. When it caused a serious change in the victim’s health and/or resulted in serious physical 
and/or psychological effects such as mutilation, permanent infirmity, or the transmission of 
a disease;    
4. When committed with the use or threat of a weapon;    
5. When the rape was committed against a child of less than 12 years; and   
6. When committed in public.    
Article 558:   
Rape is punished with perpetual penal servitude (life imprisonment):   
1. When the perpetrator had knowledge that he or she had a sexually transferable disease of an 
incurable character;    
 2. When the rape caused the victim's death;    
 3. When the rape was committed against a child of less than 12 years.   
 4. When the rape was preceded by, or accompanied with, acts of torture or barbarism.   
Article 559:   
The punishments provided by the provisions of the present section cannot be commuted, 
cannot be rendered void by any statute of limitation, are not eligible to amnesty laws, and 
cannot be pardoned by the President of the Republic.   
Article 560:   
The official capacity of anyone accused of offences of a sexual violence cannot exonerate 
him/her, on any account, of his/her responsibility or constitute a reason for the reduction of 
the punishment.   
  
 389 
Article 561:   
The defence of superior orders or the command of a legitimate civil or military authority does 
not exonerate the perpetrator of his/her responsibility for a crime of sexual violence.    
  Article 562:   
Regarding the infringements of the provisions relating to sexual modesty and rape, the judge 
pronounces, in addition to the main punishment, at least one of the following supplementary 
sanctions:   
1. The publication of the sentence;    
2. The presentation of the convicted person to the public;    
3. The interdiction to exercise civil rights, and family rights;    
4. The interdiction of sojourn (in Burundi where the perpetrator is a foreigner);    
5. The attendance to socio-judicial counselling sessions.   
If the judge perceives that the victim would be harmed with regard to point 1 above, the 
victim's identity is not made known to the public.   
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Annexure B 
Excerpts from DRC legislation (French) - Translation by Kakule Kalwahali 
Article 2 of the statute on the protection of children (Law no.09/001 of 10 January 2009) 
1. A child means every human being below the age of eighteen years. 
… 
9. ‘A child in conflict with the law’ is defined as a child between the age of fourteen and 
eighteen who performs an act which amounts to a violation of criminal law. 
Article 28 of the DRC Constitution of 18 February 2006:  
A person is relieved of the duty of obedience whenever a superior order is obviously an illegal 
order. Any individual and/or any state agent is relieved of the duty of obedience when the 
received order manifestly constitutes a violation of human rights, public liberties, and good 
morals.  
The burden of proof of the obvious illegality of the order rests with the subordinate who 
refused to carry out the said order.  
Article 467 of the DRC family Code (1987):  
Any person convicted of adultery shall be punished with imprisonment of six months to one 
year and with a fine; such person shall include:  
1. Anyone, unless he has been deceived, has had sexual intercourse with a married woman;  
2. A husband who has had sexual intercourse with a person other than his wife, if the conduct 
is particularly offensive to his wife;  
3. A woman who has had sexual intercourse with a married man under the circumstances 
provided for under point 2 of this article;  
4. A married woman who has had sexual intercourse with a person other than her husband.  
  
 391 
Law no 06/018 of 20 July 2006 modifying and supplementing the Decree of 30 January 
1940 - Congolese penal Code 
Preamble 
Since the second half of the previous century a new form of criminality has developed all over 
the world on a large-scale. It has been economically, socially and politically driven, although 
it consists of crimes of sexual violence.  
The wars of 1996 and 1998 in our country have worsened the already dire economic situation 
and provoked millions of victims of whom the most vulnerable and targeted have been cruelly 
weakened by all kind of crimes. These victims have been violated in their dignity, their body, 
in their moral integrity, and also in their lives. Such acts of violation should, therefore, not go 
unpunished in the future.  
In order to warn perpetrators, to punish crimes of sexual violence severely, and to ensure that 
victims are systematically attended to, it has been of paramount necessity to revisit some of 
the provisions of the penal Code.  
Up to this time the Congolese penal law has not contained all the crimes that contravene 
international law as it existed since 1946 to serve as a deterrent against those who, ordinary 
and important people alike infringe international law, especially international humanitarian 
law, thus denying the quality of life and values of humanity to the civil population.  
The present law, thus, modifies and supplements the Congolese penal Code by integrating 
into it the principles of international humanitarian law relating to crimes of sexual violence. 
This law largely takes into account the protection of the most vulnerable people, namely 
women and children and men who are victims of crimes of sexual violence.  
It is hoped that this law will contribute to the restoration of public morality, public order, and 
security in the country.  
Regarding the penal Code, modifications relate mainly to provisions with respect to the crime 
of rape and sexual assault. The other provisions supplement the penal code and provide for 
new crimes of different forms of sexual violence, not previously criminalized under the penal 
Code.  The definition of rape is now in conformity with applicable international norms.  
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Article 42 (bis)  
The official capacity of the perpetrator of a crime of sexual violence cannot exonerate such a 
perpetrator of his criminal responsibility nor constitute a mitigation of the sentence.  
Article 42 (ter)  
Superior orders or the command of a civil or military legitimate authority does not exonerate 
the accused of a crime of sexual violence of his/her criminal responsibility. 
… 
Articles 44 and 45  
Homicide committed with the intention to cause death is murder.  
Murder committed with premeditation is assassination.  
They are punishable by death.  
Article 46:  
Whoever has voluntarily caused injuries or assaulted another human being is punished by 
imprisonment of eight days to six months and with a fine, or with either one of these two 
sentences.  
In the case of premeditation, the convicted person shall be sentence to a term in prison of one 
month to two years and with a fine.  
Article 47:  
If the conduct causes an illness or an inability to engage in personal employment, or if the 
conduct results in a serious impairment so that any organ can no longer be used or has been 
seriously mutilated, the perpetrator shall be sentenced to a term in prison of two years to five 
years and a fine. 
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Article 48:  
When voluntarily assault unintentionally causes the death of the victim, the perpetrator shall 
be sentenced to a term in prison of five years to twenty years and a fine.  
Article 48 bis (Law no. 11/008 of 9 July 2011 criminalizing torture)  
Any civil servant or public officer, or any person entrusted with a public service or any person 
acting in official capacity or at the instigation of or with consent or acquiescence of a public 
officer, has intentionally or deliberately inflicted severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, for such purposes as obtaining from a victim or a third person information or 
confession, punishing him/her for an act he or she has committed or is suspected of having 
committed, or intimidating or coercing him/her or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind shall be sentenced to five to ten years in prison and to a fine of 
fifty thousand to one hundred thousand Congolese francs.  
Article 48 ter (Law n° 11/008 of 9 July 2011 criminalizing torture) 
A person guilty of torture shall be sentenced to imprisonment from ten to twenty years and a 
fine of one hundred thousand to two hundred thousand Congolese francs when the conduct 
envisaged in article 48 bis has left the victim with a serious trauma, an illness, a permanent 
inability to work, a physical or psychological deficiency, or when the victim is a pregnant 
woman, an underage minor, an elderly person or a person living with a disability.  
If the acts of torture cause the death of the victim, the torturer shall be punished with 
imprisonment for life. 
Article 48 quater (Law n° 11/008 of 9 July 2011 criminalizing torture) 
Notwithstanding the provisions of article 24 of the penal Code, the prosecution resulting from 
articles 48 bis and 48 ter is not subject to a statute of limitation or a period of prescription. 
… 
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Article 67:  
A person who unlawfully, by violence, ruses or threats, arbitrarily abducted or caused 
abduction to be conducted, arrested or instigated arrest, detained or instigated the detention of 
any person shall be sentences to a term in prison of one to five years.  
When the abducted, arrested, or detained person has been subjected to torture, the accused 
shall be punished with a term of imprisonment of five to twenty years. If torture caused the 
death of the victim, the accused shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life or to death.  
… 
Article 167:  
Any act contrary to good morals which is directly and intentionally performed against another 
person without the valid consent of the latter constitutes sexual assault.  
Any sexual assault committed without violence, ruse, or threats against the person of a child 
below the age of eighteen years shall be punished with a term of imprisonment of six months 
to five years. The child's age can be determined by medical expertise in the case of the 
absence of a birth certificate.  
Article 168:  
Sexual assault committed with violence, ruse, or threats against people of either gender shall 
be punished with a term of imprisonment of six months to five years.  
Sexual assault committed with violence, ruse, or threats against or through the intermediary of 
the person of a child below the age of 18 years shall be punished with a term of  
imprisonment of between five and fifteen years. If sexual assault has been committed against 
or through the intermediary of people below the age of ten years, the perpetrator shall be 
punished with a term of imprisonment of five to twenty years.  
… 
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Article 170:  
Any person who, either by violence or serious threats or by coercion against another person, 
directly or through the intermediary of a third person, either by taking advantage of a coercive 
environment, or by abusing a person who, by the effect of illness, impairment of his/her 
psychological faculties, or by any other accidental cause has lost or has been deprived of the 
use of his/her senses, has committed rape. Such persons include: 
a) Any man, whatever his age, who has inserted his sexual organ, even superficially, into the 
sexual organ of a woman, or any woman, whatever her age, who has obliged a man to 
insert, even superficially, his sexual organ into hers;  
b) Any man who has penetrated, even superficially, the anus, the mouth, or any other opening 
of the body of a woman or of a man by his sexual organ, by any other part of the body, or 
by any object;  
c) Anyone who has inserted, even superficially, any other part of the body or any object into 
the vagina;  
d) Anyone who has obliged a man or a woman to penetrate, even superficially, his/her anus, 
mouth, or any opening of his/her body by a sexual organ, by any other part of the body, or 
by any object.  
Anyone found guilty of rape shall be punished with a term of imprisonment of between five to 
twenty years and a fine not less than one hundred thousand Congolese francs.  
Sexual intercourse with persons designated under article 167, paragraph 2, is considered as 
rape committed with violence.  
Article 171  
If rape or sexual assault causes the death of the person against whom it has been committed, 
the perpetrator shall be given a life sentence.  
… 
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Article 174 c  
Anyone who, in order to get pecuniary or other benefit, has caused one or more persons to 
engage in one or more acts of a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such 
as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression, or abuse of 
power against such person or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of such 
person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent, shall be punished with a term of 
imprisonment from three months to five years.  
… 
Article 174 m  
Whoever has made any description, however created, of a child taking part in explicit, real, or 
simulated sexual activities, or any representation of a child's sexual organs, mainly for sexual 
ends shall be punished with a term of imprisonment of five to ten years and with a fine of one 
hundred fifty thousand Congolese Francs. 
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Annexure C 
Excerpt from Act 16 of 1999 Military Discipline Supplementary Measures Act of 23 
April 1999 (South Africa). 
 
... 
Section 3  
3. (1) This Act shall, subject to subsection (2), apply to any person subject to the Code 
irrespective whether such person is within or outside the Republic. 
(2) For the purposes of the application of this Act and the Code, ‘‘person subject to the Code’’ 
includes, to the extent and subject to the conditions prescribed in this section and in the 
Code— 
 (a) all members of the Permanent Force; 
 (b) every member of the Reserve Force— 
(i) while rendering any service, undergoing any training or doing any duty in terms of 
 the Defence Act, 1957; or 
(ii) when liable or called up therefore, fails to render that service or to undergo that 
 training or to do that duty; 
(c) all persons, other than members of a visiting force, lawfully detained by virtue of or 
serving sentences of detention or imprisonment imposed under the Code or this Act; 
(d) every member of the auxiliary services established in terms of section 80 of the Defence 
Act, 1957, being on service as defined in the Code; 
(e) every person attached to the South African National Defence Force in terms of section 
131 of the Defence Act, 1957; 
(f) all students under instruction at a military training institution, in accordance with section 
77(3) of the Defence Act, 1957; 
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(g) every person not otherwise subject to the Code who, with the consent of the 
commanding officer of any portion of the South African National Defence Force, is 
with or accompanies or performs duty with that portion of the Defence Force which is -  
  (i) outside the borders of the Republic; or 
(ii) on service: Provided that any person who is subject to the Code by virtue of any 
consent given under this paragraph shall be so subject -  
(aa) where that consent has been given in writing, on the basis indicated in that 
consent; or 
(bb) where consent has not been given in writing, on the basis on which he or she has 
been accepted and treated for living and messing facilities; and  
(h) every prisoner of war as contemplated in Articles 4 and 33 of the Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, or by customary 
international law, and who is in the power of the Republic and detained by the South 
African National Defence Force. 
(3) When a person who is subject to the Code is suspected of having committed murder, 
treason, rape or culpable homicide in the Republic, the matter will be dealt with in 
accordance with section 27 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act, 1998 (Act No. 32 of 
1998), and any ensuing trial shall take place in a civilian court. 
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